So these two worlds have the same physical laws, but they're still different from each other. What is that supposed difference? It's consciousness. Therefore, does that mean consciousness is not physical by merit of me being able to imagine said two worlds? — Yun Jae Jung

Not necessarily. I can imagine a physical world that is the same as ours except it has no tomatoes. Yet there are tomatoes in our world. Does that mean that tomatoes are not physical?

Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, it is possible to choose against our strongest motive but to me that is an unmotivated choice, namely a choice without intention. Or if I have no strongest motive I can choose without caring about the choice. When I am choosing according to my motives (intentionally and with care), I am considering the attractiveness (= strength) of these motives. Whether the motives motivate me by some kind of classical pleasure or by intellectual, spiritual or ethical satisfaction, it is always according to the attractiveness of the motives.

So while they are both in the same set of motives, the two subsets are separate, and the influence of strength applies only to motives within the same subset. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why would influences of strength apply only within the same subset? Many objects in our world are under the influence of different kinds of forces and the object's motion is determined by the joint influence of these forces.

I don't deny that these are all possible motives of pleasure; but I still claim that it is possible to choose the right thing simply on the basis that it is the right thing to do. — Samuel Lacrampe

Even if an ethical concern or desire motivates us with something else than pleasure/satisfaction, it is still a motive in the set of motives that influence us. Every motive influences us with some strength; without strength it would not influence us at all. And the joint influence of all our motives determines our action. Thus our choice of action can be free in the sense that we can act according to our motives (do what we want to), but it is determined by our motives, which we cannot choose (and by other conditions which we cannot choose either).

E.g. "I did this, not because it is pleasurable but because it is the right thing to do". What could possibly push us to choose either the end of pleasure or the end of the ethical? — Samuel Lacrampe

We are pushed toward the ethical by motives such as compassion, pangs of conscience, desire for rewards in afterlife, fear of hell in afterlife, desire for order, fairness, balance, harmony in society... What else? But satisfaction of all these motives is a kind of pleasure, a kind of satisfaction.

All of our motives influence our choices toward what we expect to bring us pleasure (satisfaction). If we didn't have a motive to hit the targets, information about the targets position would not motivate us to shoot at them. On the other hand, if we had a motive to hit the targets but didn't have information about the targets position we wouldn't be motivated to shoot at the targets either (because we wouldn't know where to shoot). So in this case we need both motives/influences to shoot at the targets.

We may not call the information about the targets position a "motive" but it is still a force that pushes us, together with the motive to hit the targets, toward shooting at the targets. This just means that in order for our motives to work we may also need other conditions, including a spacetime and laws of physics, but we can't choose those conditions just as we can't choose our motives.

I would define it as "That which is right now, irregardless of belief, attitude or consideration." — Cidat

I would just shorten it to "That which is," where being includes not just "right now" but everywhere in a time dimension as well as everywhere outside a time dimension, and everything that is identical to itself. That seems to be the most all-encompassing definition of reality possible. But by "reality" people often mean just a part of reality that they call "concrete reality", which comprises all concrete objects (as opposed to general objects/properties), and more specifically concrete objects in spacetime, and even more specifically concrete objects in our spacetime or our universe. As a side note, concrete objects are collections (combinations) of other objects or empty collections (non-composite concrete objects).

If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. — Samuel Lacrampe

But an unmotivated choice is not freely willed - it is made without care, desire or sometimes even without intention.

The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them. — Samuel Lacrampe

These ends and information are the motives that influence the agent to act in a certain way. Even the information about the targets position steers and pushes the agent's action, together with his motive to hit the targets.

I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the agent expects an act to give him a net displeasure (net dissatisfaction), it means that the act would be against his strongest motive and thus would be unmotivated to the extent of the difference between his strongest motive and any weaker motive he may have for the act.

Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe

But the differences in their acts may be caused by differences in their bodies and in the structures of their minds.

So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one. — Samuel Lacrampe

But we are not motivated by general concepts. We are motivated by concrete motives (which are concrete instances of general concepts) experienced in our consciousness, and these motives move us according to their strengths. Entities without strengths cannot move us and so they cannot be motives. I can't even imagine how something without a strength could motivate me; I choose according to attraction or appeal of different motives, and attraction or appeal are just other words for the strength with which the motives influence me.

I don't even think we can be conscious of general concepts. Can you be conscious of general triangle or general red color? General triangle doesn't even look like a triangle and general red color doesn't even look like something red. They don't look like anything because while a concrete triangle or a concrete instance of red color are spatial objects, general concepts are not. When we imagine a general concept we actually imagine a concrete instance (example) of it or a concrete object that represents/symbolizes the concept (word as heard or seen, graphical symbol...).

If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself. — Samuel Lacrampe

Right.

The end is indeed what motivates the will to choose it, but not because of its strength (those general ends don't have a strength; only particular instances of them have a strength); but rather because of its nature. E.g. pleasure is a subjective value whereas the ethical is an objective value. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ethics and pleasure are both general/abstract concepts which in a concrete situation manifest in concrete motives, that is, in a concrete ethical concern or a concrete desire for a concrete experience of pleasure, which are both subjectively experienced and move the person toward performing an act.

But the point is that the pleasure to others is still done for my sake and not theirs. — Samuel Lacrampe

These two pleasures are inseparable.

The act is merely a tool for my own pleasure, and if the tool were to cease providing me pleasure, then I would drop it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Which means you would stop desiring to perform the ethical act.

Altruism is supposed to be selfless, or, at best, it is my pleasure that is the byproduct. — Samuel Lacrampe

An altruistic act can be seen as "selfless" in the sense that it is directed to benefitting others without giving the actor certain kinds of pleasure such as carnal or corrupt, or while causing the actor carnal displeasure or even harm.

As I see it, nothing prevents the choice of the end to be motivated by the end itself. Choose pleasure because the end is pleasurable, or choose the ethical because the end is righteous. — Samuel Lacrampe

Then the end is a motive that will make the person choose this end, unless the person has a stronger counter-motive.

Yes, but if the drive is only the pleasure to oneself and nothing else, then the pleasure to others is merely a byproduct or an accident. Like a rock falling down a cliff which happens to hit a criminal and prevents a crime - it's a good outcome, but there is no merit to the rock. — Samuel Lacrampe

The pleasure provided to others from an altruistic act is not just a byproduct of the act; it is the condition on which the pleasure of the giver depends.

It is not unmotivated since the act is motived by the ethical. So to reiterate: The end goal between pleasure and the ethical, i.e. black angel and white angel, is freely chosen. After that, the drive is indeed the strongest motive to that end goal, which once reached, will produce some satisfaction. — Samuel Lacrampe

But if a motive appears only after the choice of the goal, it means that the choice itself (the act of choosing the goal) is unmotivated.

Let me try another way: If a seemingly morally good act is always motivated by pleasure or satisfaction to oneself, then it sounds like all acts are inherently selfish. But as selfishness is typically seen as immoral, it would follow that there really are no morally good acts. Doesn't this sound absurd? — Samuel Lacrampe

Even if all acts are motivated by the actor's own pleasure or satisfaction, some acts may be directed to helping or benefitting others so these could be called altruistic. Loving acts typically bring pleasure to both the actor and the person to whom the act is directed.

Yes, going to jail is highly unpleasurable but not turning himself in might be even more unpleasurable for him due to pangs of conscience or maybe a religious belief. Such a decision is surely highly emotional, it's not just that he plainly observes that turning himself in is the right thing to do.

If a person doesn't act in the direction of their strongest motive/pleasure/satisfaction then why would he act so? It seems that such an act would be unmotivated, at least to the extent of the difference between the person's motive (if any) for the act and his stronger counter-motive. But any machine is capable of an unmotivated act.

What kind of feeling is satisfaction then?

Why would we choose to prioritize one of the goods? Your answer is: Because we choose to prioritize one of the goods. My answer is: Because one of the goods brings us greater satisfaction. Satisfaction is a good feeling, and like any feeling it is constituted by the state of the mind. If you insist on choosing the state of the mind you get into a regress because you need a motive to choose the state of the mind and a motive to choose that motive, etc. until you get to a motive that you have not chosen, which then determines the state of the mind and thus the levels of satisfaction from goods.

If that description is correct, then satisfaction occurs after the attainment of any good, pleasure or ethical, and thus it cannot be what drives us to choose one good over the other. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why not? We choose the good that brings us greater satisfaction.

Ok, it depends on what satisfactions (of desires or intentions) you are willing to include under pleasure. If you don't want to call all satisfactions "pleasure", then just say that all our freely willed acts are motivated by satisfactions.

. If you perform the good act only as a means to the end of pleasure, it means that if the pleasure were to be gone, then you wouldn't do the act, thereby showing that you don't care about the act itself. — Samuel Lacrampe

If you desire to perform an ethical act, performing it will satisfy the desire and thus bring you pleasure. It may be a different kind of pleasure than, say, carnal pleasure, but it is still a satisfaction of a desire.

Would you say that for you, there is only one last end or motive, being pleasure? Thus when you say "we do what we want", does it mean "we do what pleases us"? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes but there are various kinds of pleasure (pleasant feelings) - carnal, intellectual, spiritual, ethical... Avoidance of pain is a motive too, but since pain is the opposite of pleasure, avoidance of pain is the same as seeking to increase or maintain pleasure.

Yes, being ethical can be pleasurable, but that is not necessary. — Samuel Lacrampe

If your act is not motivated by pleasure, it means that you don't care about the act. Caring about an act means that you gain some satisfaction from doing it.

We choose that for which we have a stronger motive. There are various kinds of pleasure: from eating, relaxation, sex, watching an interesting movie, doing interesting work, philosophizing, praying, etc. The satisfaction from doing the right/ethical thing is a kind of pleasure too.

Why? As previously mentioned, free will by definition satisfies the principle of sufficient reason on its own. Thus setting the intention towards one of the two paths can be the starting point. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why would you set the intention? If you have no motive/intention for the act of setting the intention, then the intention just appears in your mind without being chosen by you. It is the same problem as with motives, only now you replaced "motive" with "intention". Intention is a kind of motive that drives a specific action.

(1) We freely set our intention to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the act of setting our intention is free, you need an intention to set the intention. Regress again.

People believe the minority that live a life of suffering are a reasonable sacrifice for everything else life has to offer.

Have you heard of The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas? — Down The Rabbit Hole

When one shuts his mind to the suffering of others, his mind will become severely constricted and wither. Sooner or later his own happiness will disappear.

Reminds me of Eastern religions and Gnosticism: being born on Earth is a mistake, gotta get out of the cycle of reincarnation. Reach bliss by extinguishing desire (sounds a bit like a contradiction).

What would you call my view of free will then? My view is that all our acts are ultimately completely determined by factors over which we have no control, but we can do what we want. (Our wants are determined by factors over which we have no control.)

If I desire that you be happy, that is other-directed; — Bartricks

Still, the desire is yours, and so the pleasure from the fulfillment of this desire will be yours too (and I will be happy too, of course). So you are motivated by your own pleasure, whether your desire is self-directed or other-directed.

But if the "choice" is determined by a motive that is determined, then the whole system is determined, and free choice is just an illusion. Isn't that simply hard determinism? What part of compatibilist free will is free? — Samuel Lacrampe

The part that we can do what we want (although our wants are determined by factors over which we have no control).

On the other hand, if free will is to exist, at least to be entertained, then there must be a component that is truly free. In which case, there is no prior motive to drive the choice described in (1). — Samuel Lacrampe

You can do something without a motive, but that just means you don't care about doing or not doing it, or you do it unintentionally. Is that free will? Any machine can act without care or intention.

(1) We freely choose to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa. This is free. — Samuel Lacrampe

But why would you choose to prioritize carnal pleasure over ethical or vice versa? It seems you would need a motive to prioritize it.

We are getting into a regress: In order to choose act X, you need to choose the motive to choose act X. But in order to choose the motive to choose act X, you need to choose the motive to choose the motive to choose act X. This regress goes into infinity or it stops at a motive that you didn't choose and this motive determines all the consequent motives that lead to act X.

E.g. Buying ice cream would give me great pleasure, but giving the money to charity would produce a bit of ethical good works. Although hard to quantify, the first value seems greater than the second one, yet I can still choose the second path. — Samuel Lacrampe

But apparently the second value is greater for you, at least in that moment, and that's why you chose it. Why else would you choose it?

You can have motives of various types but they cause forces of the same type in your brain (physical forces), which then cause motion of your body.

The will is the person in the middle that chooses to side with one of the angels. It makes the final call. — Samuel Lacrampe

But why would the will choose one side or the other? I can only imagine that the will has motives, some stronger than others, and the will's decision is the result of the pushes of those motives. For example, you are hungry but have no money, so there is a push to steal food. And the more hungry you are, the stronger the push. But there is also a counter-push by the fear of being caught or by ethical concerns. So your will goes in the direction of the stronger push, but there may also be a lot of inner struggle and hesitation as the opposing forces grow stronger and weaker based on changing information from the environment, emerging and interacting thoughts, feelings and memories, etc.

To clarify, are you arguing from the standpoint that free will does not exist? — Samuel Lacrampe

The only kind of free will I can understand is the compatibilist free will to do what one wants. I don't know how a different kind of free will could work.

From your description, I picture two minions inside a brain wrestling to pull a lever towards themselves haha. If that description is fitting for what you have in mind, it is unfitting as a description of the will resisting inclinations. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? It's the gist of a standard neuroscientific description.

We may be very tempted to do a certain act, but ultimately the decision to act comes from the will. E.g. out of anger, I may be tempted to punch someone, but ultimately the act of punching was my choice. — Samuel Lacrampe

And why would you resist punching the person? Whatever reason you would have for the resisting, that reason is the minion in your mind that acts against the minion of anger. And the result of this battle between minions will be whether you punch or not.

Anyway, hard determinism is, by definition, incompatible with compatibilism. — Bartricks

Yes, and still it seems that the difference between hard determinists and compatibilists is trivial in that they both say that in a deterministic world where all our acts are ultimately completely determined by factors that are out of our control we still have the ability to do what we want - but while compatibilists are satisfied to call this ability "free will", hard determinists refuse to call it so.

Let's say I proposed that everyone is concerned for the welfare of others and does nothing out of self-interest at all. That's known as psychological altruism. Is it plausible? No. — Bartricks

It seems not only implausible but also self-contradictory. What does "concerned" mean? Does it mean that it would make the "concerned" person happy or satisfied if he did something for the welfare of others? In that case the resulting pleasure (happiness or satisfaction) is the person's motive that makes it worth for him to do the act for the welfare of others.

If a person is not motivated by his own pleasure, it means he doesn't care whether to do or not to do the act, or he does the act unintentionally. It doesn't mean that he cares for the welfare of others. Careless and unintentional acts certainly occur but obviously no free will is required for them; any machine can act without care or intention.

Yes, it is highly controversial - it is known as psychological egoism and has virtually no defenders. It's exposed to so many prima facie counterexamples that it just isn't plausible. — Bartricks

What counterexamples? Like the one I gave about self-sacrifice?

That's confused. If compatibilism is true, then hard determinism is false. This thread is about what hard determinism entails. So it must be granted that compatibilism is false, for compatibilism is incompatible with hard determinism (hard determinists are incompatibilists about free will). — Bartricks

Ok, so what is the difference between hard determinism and "ordinary" determinism (compatibilism)? Both views say that all our actions are ultimately completely determined by factors over which we have no control. The only difference seems to be a trivial one: compatibilists say that even in this situation we still have a capability called "free will" (because we can still do what we want) while hard determinists say that this capability is not worthy of being called "free will".

Question begging. We don't have any obligations if hard determinism is true. — Bartricks

We still have our programming, which includes our obligations and everything else that motivates us.

Well, that's a highly controversial and fairly obviously false pyschological thesis. — Bartricks

Is it? If you mean cases where someone sacrifices his own pleasure for someone else or for some honorable principle, don't you think such a sacrifice has given him a good feeling of satisfaction that was worth the sacrifice and therefore prevailed over the sacrificed pleasure?

It's not clear what bearing it has on the current issue - if we're programmed to behave in any way, then we lack free will in that respect and thus will lack any obligations. — Bartricks

We still have free will in the compatibilist sense.

Yes, and cars are not agents and do not have obligations. — Bartricks

Obligations are just a special word for "programming" when referring to humans. We are driven by obligations like machines are driven by their programming. And we can fail to fulfill our obligations like machines can fail to work according to their programming (because of a malfunction, some external interference or a flaw in the program).

My car is not obliged to start when I turn the key, is it? — Bartricks

The car is programmed to start when you turn the key, like we are programmed to fulfill our obligations.

To recognize that there are reasons to do things involves recognizing that one has options - that there are alternative possibilities available and thus one needs to consider what one has most reason to do or believe. — Bartricks

Yes, we choose the option that seems to maximize our pleasure and minimize our pain (according to our evaluation). We are programmed that way. An autonomous car is programmed to stop at red lights and go at green lights; it too has options when reaching a crossroad: stop, go, turn left, turn right...

Second, it is manifest to the reason of most that if you ought to do something, then you can do it. And if you ought not to do x, then you can refrain from doing it. — Bartricks

An autonomous car is programmed to stop at red lights and usually it can do it. But if it malfunctions it can keep moving.

What you call "obligations" can be rephrased as "programming", which doesn't require free will.

Drives towards pleasure and away from pain are constituted by forces in the brain (neurotransmitters, hormones, electrical signals). Even if we suppose there are also non-physical forces acting in the brain, these non-physical forces must cause physical forces in the brain in order to control the behavior of our physical bodies. So all physical acts of will, whether of physical or non-physical origin, are immediately caused by physical forces in the brain and are dependent on the strengths of these forces. If free will is something non-physical, then in order to overcome some physical force in the brain it must cause a greater counter-force in the brain.

Let's clarify what you are saying. Free will can overcome an internal force in the brain, such as inclination to fall asleep, no matter how strong the internal force is, but only up to a certain point of strength of the internal force. If the internal force is stronger than this point, free will cannot overcome it. Is that what you mean? If so, why would there be such a point in the strength of the internal force?

Inclination is an "internal force", not in the sense of a physical force F=ma, but a drive, desire, or temptation. Free will can resist temptations no matter how strong, but not physical forces like lifting boulders. Passing out from exhaustion would be more like a physical force. — Samuel Lacrampe

Inclination is not a physical force? But inclination to fall asleep is a physical force in the brain. All physical forces give acceleration to mass and their strength is equal to acceleration x mass.

Yes, as along as that the drive to sleep is merely an inclination and not a necessity. E.g. if you pass out from exhaustion, then this is too strong to be an inclination. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why would it matter how strong an inclination is if free will is not a force? You said that free will is not a force and can choose against all inclinations no matter their intensity.