<cont>
Notice also that another assumption is that all of our decisions are like that of the experiment. In the experiment the participants are asked to choose between two options where one is not obviously preferable to the other. The choices are completely insignificant to the participant's life and are essentially meaningless. That means the participant will not be invested in the decision and that is reason to think that this decision is not like other decisions he makes in his life. Indeed, when I make decisions about things that matter in life there is a complicated deliberation between the conscious and the subconscious in evaluating what is the wise choice. In such decisions asking which came first, my conscious or subconscious would be like asking which came first, the chicken or the egg. Even if there is a definitive answer (which is doubtful), that doesn't mean the decision could be attributed solely to the conscious or the subconscious. Both play extremely big part in the decision making process. In the experiment discussed by Harris, the decision making process would be much much simpler. Remember, free will does not assert that we have control over ALL parts of our life, that's clearly ridiculous. Merely that we have control and influence over some things. In some things, we could have done otherwise.

As before, in light of these observations the objection does not seem reasonable anymore. Perhaps it is, but then the objector would have to try to bring about the contradiction more explicitly. How is it exactly that the fact that my consciousness becoming aware of a choice I made comes some time after the choice is made, incompatible with free will? I see no obvious contradiction. Indeed, if I do have free will, it seems likely to expect some sort of delay by different part of my mind and brain. I was already aware that my thoughts are not lightning-speed. I know I spent a considerable amount of time writing this because my thoughts have delay. So where's the contradiction? If there is one, the objector (presumably Sam Harris, or one of his supporters) has to try harder to make it explicit.

As it stands, the Sam Harris objection does not seem to be reasonable, or at least reasonable enough to be a reason to doubt my own perceptions.

8. These are all the arguments that I am aware of against the trustworthiness of my own perception of free will.

If you have any more arguments, please post them. And please try to be as explicit as possible. A point by point logical structure as in this argument would be highly appreciated.

9. Therefore, it's reasonable for me to believe that I have free will.

QED

Discuss.