Not that I'm taking any sides here - but what about this unfocussed anxiety of mine? — jkg20

It depends. You have to realize, from the start, that the mental events that Brentano and Husserl primarily interested themselves with where more of the "higher-order kind", such judgements with propositional contents. Psychology back then was still a dirty word, especially if prefixed with "experimental", so the objects of psychology where the objects of Philosophy of Mind. Brentano's approach to psychology is very reminescent, in many ways, to that of Aristotle, if only perhaps more instructed. The laws of psychology were the laws of of logic in the context of the their application by a rational mind. That's why Brentano could not stand Freud, even as a student, nor could he fathom the possibility of a subconscious content which would have an influence on the conscious content.

However, it is also important that Brentano and Husserl where at the turning point of psychology, in it's becoming a proper field of study, and were conscious of this. They started to see how the problems from experimental psychology could be linked to the problems of "higher" psychology, as it was called back then, just a little after William James did. They were preparing the field, so to speak, for the possibility of talk of supervenience or eliminativism.

Whether or not it be self-inflicted as a result of drinking too much, it's a mental phenomenon (I presume, although perhaps it depends on definitions of terms) but doesn't seem to have an object. — jkg20

Since the rise (and fall) of phenomenology, there have been a lot of thought experiments offered to point to mental acts without objects. Classically, the idea of the ineffable or even the sublime seems to refer by definition to mental events which do not have a specific or easily definable object. More modernly, events of pain have been offered as an example, since there is extensive research into pain therapy, and we know that events of pain can be "without location", entirely diffused across the nervous system. I've always felt that these criticism misses the mark. Is an event of pain without object simply because you cannot pinpoint what area the pain is stimulated from? Is it not simply possible that some event of pain do not have a location to refer to, despite having an object (possibly, you, as an entirety)?

Then again, what point is there in applying Brentano's and Husserl's phenomenology to mental acts such as these? They did not deploy the type of phenomenological propedeutic necessary to handle talk of qualia or unconscious processes. Theirs is rather the type of study which leads to general axioms of psychology, with a psychologism bent, such as "Any object that present itself to perception also occlude some of itself". You could look into Dennett's heterophenomenology, which interest itself more with mental acts conceived as cognitive acts rather than representational. Needless to say, it is entirely a different beast than Brentano's or Husserl's or Merleau-Ponty's or etc... And many philosophers find Dennett's style and approach rather rebuking. But I think he's still very important to read in Philosophy of Mind.

Edit : Although, now I remember that Merleau-Ponty did talk quite a bit of neurosis, face-blindness and other cognitive-bent problems in Phenomenologie de la Perception. You might want to check it up. It's a great read, as is pretty much everything by M-P.

Stanford is your Bible? Yikes! — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, Standford is not perfect, far from it, but there are few general access online ressources with the same degree of professionalism or depth.

Although, with time, this depth really does start to appear to be an illusion. There are articles which have been requested years ago which should never have taken more than a few months to write.

If you have a better ressource, please share it with the class. I'm sure my teachers are getting tired of seeing a dozen Stanford reference in every one of my bibliographies. :sweat:

Far from living at their expense; we guarantee their survival and they live in far better comfort and security than their natural cousins; they die cleanly, with no pain. — charleton

Have you worked on a kill floor before? Because I have, for hogs, and I can tell you that no, not at all, the beasts do not die well or cleanly. Even in a plant where we have a gakload of regulations in place.

I have seen people beat up hogs, I have seen people disrespect the flesh by playing "organ tag" (yes, exactly what it sounds), I have seen people get their hard-on from cutting the heads of the animals.

The industrial meat plant is the modern incarnation of Hell.

I've been reading a little bit about so called representational accounts of the mind. — jkg20

Hi jkg20, welcome to the forum.

The Representational Theory of the Mind/Consciousness (or RTM) is not a specific, well-defined corpus of philosophical treaties. That's often lost because in Philosophy of Mind, we have come to present RTM as an alternative to CTM (Computational Theories of the Mind), which are all fairly new and easily circonscribable into a Theory worthy of its capitalization.

In opposition, RTM goes back to at least Aristotle. Its starting point is the non-theoritical, common-sense position that the natural, representational language of folk psychology (representations, jugdgement, emotions, etc) is at least accurate enough to accuratly explain mental processes such as thinking and reasonning.

Ying refered to Brentano, who along with Husserl, are probably the most important philosophers on this subject. There are a lot of others, of course. Dennett, Churchland, Dretske and Fodor to name but a few.

In regards to your question qua intentional regress ; at least for Brentano there is no such regress that is possible. Brentano's theory of representation describes a functional scaffolding : at the basis of every mental event there is a representation. On the basis of this representation the mind can take position, i.e., obtain a judgement. On the basis of this judgement the mind can enact an emotion. There are subtleties which justify why judgement goes before emotion, but the important part, for Brentano at least, is that this scaffolding means that every mental event has, necessarily, a representation. It's not so much an explanation of the mind in terms of the mind, but more a foundational account of psychology. It's true that, at first, the realisation of the intentionality of the mental may seem like a sterile tautology, but if you look up the list of philosophers in the 20th century that have treated of intentionality, you'll see that it is quite a fertile ground. Although, it is becoming more and more popular to claim that Husserl's phenomenological project failed because of the emphasis on intentionality.

Subpar.

Deer, in the upper midwest at least, have reached large populations and have become foraging pests with refined tastes -- leaving aside corn for garden flowers, vegetables, and plants in hanging pots. They'll stand up on their hind legs and clear cut a $50 planter hanging from the eves--and this is in small cities, not out in the country. Food is so abundant for them that they have become gourmets - preferring potted impatiens to dandelions.

City rabbits breed like rabbits, and are clearly over-populated, with large die-offs in the fall. Ditto for squirrels.

I happen to like all these animals--raccoons, rabbits, squirrels, elephants, ants, whales, grasshoppers, bees, baboons, bonobos, birds, bats, and bison. With adequate natural predation (hawks, owls, eagles, snakes, bats, wolves, fox, etc.) the small gnawing biting stinging little animals are kept in balance. The megafauna like elephants, rhinoceros, hippos, wildebeests, zebras, lions, tigers, etc. are central to African ecology. Whales are critical for ocean ecology, as are all the other creatures in the oceans. — Bitter Crank

This is just-in-time capitalism at it's worst. "Why, killing animals is even good for the animal!". Try to find a single entity with a large carbon footprint than humans. Hell, even 1/1000th of our footprint. You won't. If killing animals is even good for the animal, then killing humans is the Supreme Good for human beings.

The vitriol and indignation are generally unhelpful. — Hanover

Whataboutism is certainly more unhelpful. Indignation is justifiable when one is facing indignities. You are doing the apology of Human Rights violations. That is what your pretense of mild-maneurism is obfuscating.

Opinions are dependant upon circumstances. In a circumstance where you claim that there are justifications for a 16 years old girl facing a military court for a misdemeanor, it is clearly justifiable to hold the opinion that you are, in this instance, batshit crazy wrong.

"Undergraduate tuition and fees: In-state tuition: 2,293.5 CAD (2015)" — Bitter Crank

And unless that was for a Dental program, that was more than likely per year, rather than per session. Almost every programs tops at around 1400 per session, without afferent fees.

But the 3.135 I quoted earlier was for International tuition. So, even if that is per session, that still means a 6K/per year tuition at a University which is but a step down from Ivy League.

And pot is going to be fully legal in less than 3 months! What more could you want? Okay, perhaps not attending your expensive McGill classes while domed... but still... !

Yeah, constitutional Monarchy can be left-leaning. — Agustino

Not in France, at least not as of right now. Louis de Bourbon is a full-blown reactionary who excuses Franco, and a Spaniard to boot. No way in hell he's getting a crown, even the most hypothetical of crowns. Henry d'Orleans is an entitled ass who has nothing better to do with his time than to create yet another Very Holy and Very Distinguished Office of the Left Buttcheek of our Lady of Paris. Jean-Christophe Napoleon (or Napoleon VII) seems like the better choice between the three, but that's mostly because he doesn't seem to care about the throne at all.

Are you a legitimist, an orleanist or an imperialist?

The median cost of public college tuition and fees is about $10,000 a year for resident IN-STATE tuition. — Bitter Crank

Just checking, the tuition cost for McGill University is 3.135 $. This might be per session, as we usually break it down per semester rather than year up here in the North.

As McGill is very well seen, it might be an option if you want to cut on some costs.

Consider what is being said about Israel as the result of a 16 (now 17) year old child for striking an officer. She was no stranger to intentional provocations against military officers in what basically amounts to a war zone. She is not a little child, but someone who was specifically protesting and physically resisting for the purpose of impacting public opinion about Israel in her effort to gain political advantage where she could not gain it militarily. She was not part of a round up effort of children and she wasn't whisked away after a late night knock on the door. Might a 16 year old be sentenced to 8 months in detention in the US after repeated resistance against police officers, especially if it occurred in areas where officer's safety was threatened? Maybe, it wouldn't be that extraordinary — Hanover

Repeat after me : "A minor has no fucking place being judged in front of a military court for a misdemeanor. The country who does this is a gakhole with no respect for common decency and international laws.".

Its not hard. If you can't do that, sorry, but you are a human rights violation apologist. It's that simple.

That is sad. Still, I can only hope that the 63-75 % Catholic majority will be able to hold against that rise in popularity.

Your not a catholic so it does not matter to you?
or
This discussion is about Catholics so it does not matter? — Sir2u

Ah, no. Munoz and Protestant Evangelicals in Latin-America are not going to matter in the long run, becausethey are not Catholics. It'll just take a bit of time for a Catholic candidate to muster a reactionary mouvement that will bury Munoz. The same has happened in the Fillippines, where something like only 3% of the population is Protestant (of the Evangelical ilk, too), but they had a disproportionate amount of influence in the 90s.

And they believe really weird stuff. I had an ex who had gone to Evangelical Bible camp to learn about the Black Pope and the Papist-jewish conspiracy against God. Not actually kidding. :smirk:

Not a Catholic, so won't matter.

Ahed Tamimi is one such girl detained by the Israeli police for kicking a soldier and while I congratulate the soldiers in that instance for not responding to her frustrated resistance, is she "dangerous" enough to merit 10 years imprisonment? — TimeLine

From the article :

"But with Israel’s military court system boasting a 99.7 per cent conviction rate for Palestinians, the odds don’t look good."

Why the bloody hell is a minor judged in front of a military court for a misdemeanor?

Why would anyone want to hold a "generous view" of those who commit such abuse?

Funny enough, there are currently 3 different aspirants to the throne of France. And one of them is bald.

CAIR? Are you serious? I almost suspect I'm being trolled at this point. — Thorongil

The fuck is wrong with CAIR?

Why care about David Horowitz? The man can't even count : he publish a book titled the 101 most dangerous academics, but only includes 100... :vomit:

I mean, you don't have to get past the title to put the fact-checking meter in the negative!

So why would the Russians bother doing this. — René Descartes

Because someone somewhere had a tooth to pick with Skripal, which, given he was a burned traitor of a spook, is not exactly hard to imagine.

It's still possible, many Western leaders have been involved in huge conspiracies, eg. Water Gate, or the Bay of pigs. — René Descartes

No. Honestly, just, no. Watergate or the Bay of pigs are not equivalent to a country's leader falseflagging a toxic attack in her own country, with one of the most difficult to control toxic substance.

So the UK could have used the Novichok in him, and blamed it on Russia. Why blame it on Russia? Brexit. May's absolute failure in the brexit negotiations is reducing her popularity and she needs something to distract the masses from the big issue, and an attack by Russia on it's home soil would do just the trick. — René Descartes

This is ridiculous.

Let's say the Russians did it. Let's say there's even some form of timeline established which points directly to Russian intelligence. What happens, from the point of view of the Russians. Not much. A few international slaps on the wrist, maybe a bit of monetary punishment, but countries which did not declare war over Ukraine are clearly not ever going to declare war over a burned ex spook. I mean, that's probably a spooks first lesson : your country is never going to go to war for you.

Now let's say the May government is behind it. Besides that it's almost so trope that it'd be obvious, and the synopsis of V for Vendetta. Let's say that they get caught. What happens to May and her co-conspirator? They spend the rest of their life in prison for treason. They will be so destroyed that it would make it impossible for anyone to present themselves under the same political banner.

This is pure conspiracy hogwash.

Very plausible. As you said, the Russians are evil but not stupid. — CuddlyHedgehog

Except it's to the Russians interest to be suspected. It's always been their modus operandi. Read upon the Russian intelligences practices like Kompromat. They will blackmail you even if they do not have anything to gain, if you have nothing to offer right now, just so you and everyone else knows that they are willing to blackmail anyone and everyone for just about no reason.

If you don't want to mention the word "law" for some reason - and remember it's not me that defends the term - then what exactly would you like to call this kind of universal if-then statement? — apokrisis

A rule isn't a law.
A theorem isn't a law.
A constant isn't a law.
An algorithm isn't a law.

Take your pick.

The deepest physical laws look to capture mathematical symmetries. This is in fact a theorem - Noether's theorem. — apokrisis

Noether's theorem can be rephrased with no mentions of laws : "If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities whose values are conserved in time."

I've said this when they first introduced the concept, I'll say it again : this is a dystopian environnment in which hackers are going to thrive like never before.

if we admit both senses, to the degree that nature is not 'well-regulated' in the 2nd sense ('efficient'), it is because it is not well-regulated in the 1st sense ('extension'). There's a logical priority here which one must be careful to attend to. — StreetlightX

Ah! Agreed, and well put.

I'm still thinking about the negativity of what we can call natural laws. I'll get back to you on this one. I have to babysit an anxiety-ridden doberman that could well enough murder me in my sleep. :worry:

In this context it'd be the former sense of the phrase that's under consideration. — StreetlightX

I agree, in the context of your OP, that is clear. :wink:

My previous ramblings are only train-of-thoughts on what I perceive to be, perhaps, a semantic shifting ground which reinforce the impression that the application of the term is, at all, appropriate.

And perhaps should we not simply stabilize the usage of the term to resolve the issue of your OP? If Nature is not a stress-free system, not a place of well-regulated common practices repeated over and over again, as, it seems to me, all evidence should point to, then should we not agree that neither one or the other meaning of the term applies to it? That, rather, our opinion of the universe's process stability is a function of our position within it?

The philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright explains this idea best: "Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. I imagine that natural objects are much like people in societies. Their behaviour is constrained by some specific laws and by a handful of general principles, but it is not determined in detail, even statistically. What happens on most occasions is dictated by no law at all.... God may have written just a few laws and grown tired." (Cartwright, How The Laws of Physics Lie). — StreetlightX

Random ramblings :

"Well-regulated" may, in a vacuum, refer to the extension of laws covering the specific situation, but it may also have a more mechanical usage of "efficient", "without operating deviations", so to speak.

Both meanings are applicable to the philosophical inquiry at hand.

As SLX correctly pointed out, only a few jurisdictions have such an extensive body of laws that one could be tempted to say the the legal system, in such a jurisdication, is totalitarian. More often, only social situations which are very common or very risky have their own legal specificities. However, it seems a priori correct to apply at least one meaning of the term "well-regulated" to both a society which does not have an totalitarian legal system, but in which the majority of social situations are resolved within acceptable parameters, and to a society which does have a totalitarian legal system but which is constantly encountering critical failures, so to speak.

"Regulation" here becomes suspect. Where, in the totalitarian version of Laws of Nature are we presented with an account of systematic critical failures?

Yeah. Anyone not standing alongside you is a douchebag. Skillfully argued. — apokrisis

It's not the object of this thread to argue weither or not "PC pluralism" or "Pomo Neo-Marxist hermeneutics" are justified by SLX's attack on the concept of Laws of Nature. At least it does not seem so to me. It seems that rather that it is a criticism of the concept of Law in regards to the domain of natural philosophy or even just Nature itself, a qualification of how should be understood the extension of these Laws of Natures. If this ends up being an argument against a specific social discourse, it can only be by inference that this special discourse bases itself entirely on justifications by Laws of Nature. I will admit that I would find such an ideology repulsive almost entirely on aesthetical grounds alone, although I would not have much of an issue developping an argument to expand on this disgust.

As such, I would say my expression, although perhaps a bit crude, does stand. Had SLX decided to provide a justification for a socio-political vision of science, I would have found the argument strange, if only because it seems rather self-defeating to justify "Pomo Neo-Marxism French Theory PC Pluralism" or whatever, on the basis of a metaphysical discourse. Its otiose. Rather, you demonstrate that every single other system stands on an uncriticised metaphysical discourse, and then show that, as I said, your game is the only left in town.

But, seemingly, from all accounts but yours, this is not SLX's intent.

If the "laws" of nature are merely a social construction, a convenient illusion we project on to a bricolage of individuated histories, then this would give a metaphysical-strength justification for a politics of PC pluralism. — apokrisis

I don't see the point. "PC pluralism" has on it's side Existentialism and, and this may be a bit chauvin, the non-negligible advantage of being the only non-douchebag game in town, so to speak.

In fact one of the things I liked about Cartwright's quote that I cited in the OP is that she argues that 'laws of nature' are more like 'human' laws and not less: they bear upon very specific situations, and for most action and behavior, the law simply has nothing to say. — StreetlightX

I think that's a myopic vision of laws. Law can be exactly as extensive as the Legislator wishes it to be. And by design, it is only through it's own exercise that it can limit its extent. As Aristotle said, everything is political, but as we Modern should be quick to add ; but the Law can decide that something is no longer political.

There are laws which give context to just about every possible social interactions of subjects in a society under the Rule of Law : constitutional laws. Of course, the level of abstraction of these laws to individual situation makes it nearly impossible to recognize their influence if you are not specifically looking out for these relations. These are not explicitely rules or orders or commands, but rather acts of empowerement on a circumscribed domain of action. There are no special constitutional Laws of Nature, or perhaps, the things we call Laws of Nature can only be so by analogy to constitutional law.

There are no Legislator to science, who can arbitrarily decide the extent of a totalitarian science and what is and isn't an object of science.
There is no systematic valence to individual states of Nature ; as such, what scientific situation should become the object of a law, and which shouldn't?

What is the political agenda associated with StreetlightX's view? — T Clark

I wonder the same things. Admittedly, before one even decides weither there are Laws of Nature or there are not, the content of those laws cannot be presupposed. Maybe they are the most Pomo Neo-Marxist Laws there's even been, or maybe they are a fascist's domination society wetdream...

On the other hand, I can only encourage anyone who, like SLX, denounces the abuse of the terms of Law and legal usage in philosophy and science. As my initial interest in philosophy was Philosophy of Law, I am expectedly very sensitive to the quick recourse to legal terminology in philosophy.

The worse aspect of which being, of course, that whenever a philosopher requisition the use of legal terminology in a philosophical argument, he very rarely does so without committing a serious category mistake. The latest anti-abortion thread gave a very evident exemple of this : the pro-lifer's claim that "abortion is murder". By which, they mean, abortion is wrong, and should be treated legally as murder, but since murder is a legal term before it is a moral one (in fact, there are probably no other domain of discourse that have generated quite as many general usage terms than the Law : tolerance, prescription, hell, even pontificate!), all the pro-lifer does in shouting "abortion is murder" is setting himself up for the quickest technical shutdown there can be.

Now those moralists could very well claim that Law and Morality are correlated, something which would be outside the aim of this thread to contemplate. My own position is that the recourse to correlate the domains of morality and legality is almost always unjustified. If that is the case, quite obviously, then I'm even more ready to denounce the move to irremediably link the legal domain and the scientific domain.

And this link is quite tenuous. It relies on a truncated and outdated notion of Law as the Sovereign's edicts (in this case, a barely concealed theologist throwback), for which Austin has already been duly criticised for. As Hart demonstrated, the Law is not in anyway similar to the immutable orders of an all powerful Sovereign, no more than it is similar to the relation established between a gun-toting bank robber and those he orders to give up their belongings.

The abuse of law by "science" and philosophy of nature is rather infertile, too. The analogy only seem to work so far as we limits ourselves to the axiomatic character of the Law. What's the route of appeal for science? What are the rules of recognitions? The contractual laws of science? What about the initial conditions of the Universe qualifies as Laws? Because they are set in stone, so to speak? But then the past would always have the value of Law!

The external recourse to legality is almost always (if I were less prudent, I would say always) an abuse motivated by the need to inject morality or the possibility of a moral stand in regards to the object of the discourse. This is even more tragic since the Law is almost always unable to perform this injection by itself.

Like animals (which we are very similar to), humans have that need or drive to breed, and so, yes I disagree with the objectification of women (and of men), but it may be a natural psychological response — René Descartes

Objectification is not sexual attraction, I'd reply.

Objectification might be how a person specifically relates to sexuality, but that's a particular mode. Objectification can also be related to other facets of human existence, such as labour. And it need not be presented as a defective hermenetics ; Baudrillard, in le système des objets, suggests in a quip that perhaps the only real liberation humanity has ever experienced is the partial and gradual liberation of labour objectification (the power of an individual to define himself in terms of labour power) that we have experienced in the last century or so.

There are very few aspects of the feminist critic of female objectificaton by males which I might agree to file under the heading of "meh, that's instinctual and natural", such as perhaps some points about male gaze (gaze, being to a point an involontary reaction to stimulus, an individual's gaze is not necessarily something he controls, but most of the time, male gaze refers to something else entirely), but certainly not that instinct and natural drives explains away the tendency to value women mostly according to objective sexual factors.

I'm an atheist, and would never claim that two Popes, especially one who protected child rapists, were "intellectuals." — LD Saunders

Well, you only showcase your ignorance by refusing to call Karol J. Wojtyla an intellectual. And that's also coming from an atheist.

Finished The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus
&
The Trial, Kafka

Starting Writing and Difference, Derrida, translation by Alan Bass

If the US had the same military interference in their neighbourhood by Russia, like the Russians have had from NATO, the reaction from the US would have been a lot more paranoid and catastrophic. The US should take a look at their own foreign policy before criticizing other countries and accusing them of overreacting. — CuddlyHedgehog

Yes, because Russia creeping on adjacent countries only started when NATO was founded... :confused:

2) incoherently argues that a rising new scientist intelligentsia, who are "quasi-religious" in their political correctness, to the detriment of scientific fact. — Maw

Yeah, I noticed that too. And then how the author stated his own personal favourite approach to the problem was through the lenses of psychedelics and occultism... which is at the very least a bit of a random comment given how it wasn't further expanded upon?

Painting Damore as a martyr is one sure-fire way to show your bias. Why don't conservatives and right-winger decries the use of company ressources to push down a social agenda in a way that completely show disregard to company authority or assigned duties?

what do people think of his tariffs on Steel and Aluminium Tariffs? — René Descartes

A major "Fuck you, Canada!" to compensate for the one from Boeing we just rebuked.

If Trumps wants to paint doing business with Canada as a serious national security threat, then we can exit NAFTA, start again dumping prices on wood, and even cancel the hydro contracts that powers a third of New England and New York!

You thought New Yorkers were dicks, wait until they've spent two weeks in February with no heat!

I cannot choose to be an African because none of my ancestry is from there, and Marx couldn't choose to be a Jew because his family was mostly Jewish. — René Descartes

Depends on interpretation of the Halakhic law. Since both his parents converted to Lutherianism, he no longer has at least one Jewish parent. But then, his parents had him when they were both Jewish, so...

You have to admit, an ethnic Jewish person will likely raise a lot of eyebrows when he states he is both Jewish and Lutherian. As such, I've much more often seen Marx described as a German philosopher than a Jewish philosopher.

Is this thread about Donald Trump or Marx now? — Maw

Ah c'mon! This Marx intermission is pretty much the best thing about this thread.

Firstly Where did you get this strange idea that Karl Marx was a jew? — The Devils Disciple

He was ancestrally Jewish, his maternal grandfather was a Rabi. His dad converted to Lutherianism as a way to avoid persecution and to further his legal career. Perhaps Descartes got confused by that?

I am certain that I am in Fremantle.

What's your problem with that?

It is that you can't do truth, nor certainty. — Banno

Can't you image a scenario, however unlikely it is, that might prove the contrary to be true? Yesterday the municipal council ceded the parcel of land where you stand to the next city. Someone is playing a ridiculously overcomplicated practical joke on you. Etc...

Not saying you might not hold certain things to be certain, but your location, your perceptions, those a probably not the best things to hold as certain.