Yes, your view in that murder thread wasn't too popular :smile: I'm 100% with you on prioritising suffering though.

So, suppose that someone responds with lethal force towards another because it was the only way to avoid experiencing extreme physical pain. Would you say that this constitutes strict proportionality? — TheHedoMinimalist

I see where you're going with that question. If one believes that deadly force is justified if the only way to avoid experiencing extreme physical pain, they cannot oppose abortion.

Physical pain is unpleasant, and explaining how matter can have unpleasant sensations is the hard part. The "illusion" of being in pain seems to also be unpleasant. So what exactly is calling it an illusion bringing to the table?

I don't think consciousness is immaterial, but I don't think dennett is right either. Explanatory power is the measure of any hypothesis. — Mijin

I agree. I don't think consciousness is immaterial either, and saying that consciousness is an illusion is unhelpful, and it comes across as an abuse of language.

The left/right politics is how we deal with this mess now it's happened. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Saying that, the question of whether reproduction should be regulated i.e. child limits, is a political question.

From your previous posts I take it you don't agree with regulation? Despite us both agreeing it would prevent many people living a life of suffering?

The left/right politics is how we deal with this mess now it's happened.

It seems about right to me. In view of evolution (including by-products of gene survival traits) being an explanation for pretty much everything about us, I think it reasonable to suspect the same of our experience.

How could you know? Sure there are indicators but that's all they are. An alleged well-off child could be born with a debilitating defect or have an accident that will be with them their entire life. An alleged poor or unfortunate child can end up being a genius or win the lottery or something. You never know. Just Google "rich people born poor", for a few examples. It's rare, no doubt. But it happens. — Outlander

You cannot know for sure, but a decision on whether to procreate could be made on the most likely outcome. Whether most lives are net positive or negative could provide strong guidance.

Furthermore, why is "procreation that leads to a life of mostly pleasure" right? Is there some religious basis for this? A "soul" being rewarded with the pleasures of this world? If not, many would liken all of us, rich or poor, to little more than slightly-advanced animals living a meaningless existence of chasing shiny objects. — Outlander

It's standard utilitarian thought that what ultimately matters is pleasure and suffering. I think at the very least they are the most important considerations. I don't think I can prove this as objective moral truth, but it seems right to me.

Regardless, who are you to "gamble" with a life, be it divine or animalistic. Just someone who can- simply because you can at that moment. What meaning is there at all from that standpoint? — Outlander

As aforesaid, it could be argued that you should gamble when the odds are in your favour but not when the odds are against you. On the other hand it could be argued that the stakes should be taken into account.

I don't understand where imagination would come from if not from evolution (including by-products of other evolutionary traits). What do you mean by universal emergence?

In my view, procreation that leads to a life of mostly suffering is wrong, and procreation that leads to a life of mostly pleasure is right. The question is, when, if at all, we should take the gamble.

Following a different path, these things could have been created sooner, and/or have lead to better creations.

I cannot see a flaw in your argument; the EM would provide more preference satisfaction than RL.

However, I believe preference theory is built on air. Positive and negative experience is all that matters.

I was pre-empting an argument that any finite suffering will always be outweighed by the infinite joy of the afterlife.

By the same token, it would not be all-loving of an all-powerful god to allow eternal suffering [in the afterlife] for a finite offence.

Given the mystery of consciousness, the possibility that all matter is sentient to some extent (panpsychism), is taken seriously by philosophers. Notwithstanding, I think it is most probable that consciousness is unique to brains, and evolved to aid in gene survival.

We were only given it to increase the survival chances of the genes. This is all evolution cares about; it doesn't care about our suffering (some people's being unbearable).

I think the best negative utilitarian utility monster would be a monster that suffers greater than any other being, but they would get much less utility from each unit of a resource than anyone else. I would still say the criticism fails.

It is possible for an all-loving god to allow evil, despite having the power to stop it. However, considering that people suffer in hell for eternity for finite offences, it does seem improbable that they would allow this.

When I say inheritable, I don't mean that they are always inherited. It just means that we have an increased chance of inheriting the optimistic/pessimistic trait of our parents.

I have been meaning to read up on gene editing, but it seems clear that this has better potential to eliminate suffering than promoting antinatalism.

Yes, optimism and pessimism are inheritable.

David identifies as a 'soft antinatalist'. While he acknowledges that procreating is wrong, he believes that as the genes of the optimists will be passed on as opposed to that of the pessimist, antinatalism is doomed to failure, and genetically editing out suffering is our only hope.

A Negative Utilitarian focuses on reducing suffering. If a potential life is likely to be net suffering, it would be consistent for them to oppose its birth.

As libertarians want to minimize state intervention, it would be consistent with their position, and if permitting this would maximize happiness and well-being it would be consistent with utilitarianism.

The libertarian could argue that as it's a voluntary interaction, the state should not interfere with people's free choices. This could be on the basis that choice is in itself valuable, or that choice leads to something that is valuable, eg. happiness/well-being.

The utilitarian could argue that the result leads to less people being brought into existence, and that the happiness/well-being experience by the female drug addicts receiving the $300 would pale in comparison to the happiness/well-being that would otherwise be experienced by the unborn. Alternatively they could argue that were the female drug addicts to reproduce, the potential persons would have such a poor quality of life, that it would maximize happiness/well-being the most by permitting the female drug addicts to receive the $300 and guaranteeing that the potential persons do not come into existence.

Suffering focused ethics are a minority view, especially antinatalism etc.

While you should disengage when it becomes too stressful, without challenge these views would be reinforced within an echo chamber. This would be unhelpful for either side of the argument, provided their goal is the truth.

Actually, Alex O'Connor (CosmicSkeptic on YouTube) is to release a video on why he believe death is not bad for those that die. Apparently he is delaying its release due to the sensitivities with the pandemic.

You have done a good job of tackling some standard arguments against your proposition. Others have raised the point that if murder was normalised there would be negative knock-on effects. Maybe I am missing something, but surely the knock-on effects of normalising causing suffering, would rise equally.

The Asymmetry does appear to be his main argument against procreation. Though he makes a point in his book and his interviews to say that even if the Asymmetry is not accepted, the other arguments (the poor quality of most lives being hidden by an optimism bias, the sacrifice of the minority that will suffer so that others can exist) would nevertheless support antinatalism. He pre-empted that even Negative Utilitarians would struggle to accept the Asymmetry.

It can be easy, in any philosophical topic, to be bogged down in word semantics. Whether or not it is 'bad' that no life exists on a foreign planet, I maintain that if every life that could be created would experience net positive, it would be the morally correct thing to bring them into existence.

The formula looks sound. I cannot think of a way for the 'overwhelming factors' to fail, and I cannot think of any others. :up:

Contrary to Benatar's Asymmetry, I believe it is the net experience that matters. To take it to the extremes to prove my point, I would take some minor negative experiences for a life otherwise full of pleasure, but I would (obviously) not take some minor positive experiences for a life otherwise full of pain.

The trouble is procreation is a gamble, and I believe there is a fair chance of creating someone with a net negative experience, and a chance (however small) of creating someone with with a life of general suffering. I don't believe it is right to take this gamble, so I agree with your conclusion, if not your path to getting there.