Why would it be a catastrophe? — Skalidris

It would actually be progress but in evolutionary terms it would be a sudden catastrophic change of course, not an evolution. To abandon dualism would for most people mean entirely scrapping their previous philosophical ideas, theories.and ideological commitments.

There are three possible solutions for metaphysics - dualism, monism and non-dualism. To abandon dualism means is to endorse the last of these, and this is to abandon western philosophy.

I see no future for western academic philosophy and there are university chancellors who feel the same and are cutting it from the curriculum. It is dead and cannot evolve but only go around in ever decreasing circles. .

This is why I predict a revolution. It will come when philosophers wake up to the perennial philosophy.and realise it is the only hope for the future of their discipline. It is not currently of interest to most philosophers, but it might become so when jobs at stake. .

To be clear, the problem is not people who can't understand the mathematics, but those (not necessarily ones lately in this thread) who refuse (through years and years of their ignorant, confused, and arrogantly prolific disinformational posting) to even read the first page of a textbook on the subject. Such people are a bane and toxic to knowledge and understanding. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I can see this point. But I feel mathematicians are somewhat to blame for not being able to explain why the issue is important beyond mathematics, which is where most people live.

. .

The basic idea of what the theorem says can be stated roughly in common language:

If T is a consistent theory that expresses basic arithmetic, then there are sentences in the language for T such that neither they nor their negations are provable in T; moreover, either such a sentence is true or its negation is true, so there are true sentences not provable in T. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Okay. I get this.

The basic idea of the proof is not as easy to say in common language, but we have:

For a consistent, arithmetically expressive theory T, we construct a sentence G in the language of T such that G is true if and only if G is not provable in T. Then we prove that G is not provable in T. But this cannot really be understood and be convincing if one doesn't study the actual mathematics of it; otherwise it can seem, at such a roughly simplified level, as nonsense or illegitimate trickery, though it is not, as would be understood when seeing the actual mathematics, not the oversimplified common summary.

Okay. But what is an example of G for some system T? .

Mathematically, there is no legitimate debate about the theorem. It is as rock solid a mathematical proof as any mathematical proof. It can be reduced to methods of finitistic constructive arithmetic.

I get this. I just don;t see it's significance beyond mathematics. Stephen Hawking used to have as essay online titles 'The End of Physics', arguing that incompleteness means physics cannot be completed, but he later took it down. It ought to mean that metaphysics cannot be completed, but I;I've not seen this argued. .

In the philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of computability, there are different diverging perspectives about the theorem.

Amen to this.

In any case, one cannot reasonably philosophize about the theorem without actually understanding it mathematically as a starting point. I wouldn't make claims about the philosophy of mind based on studies about the electrical chemistry of the human brain without first really understanding those studies. Should be the same with metaphysics referring to mathematics.

I'd half agree. My view is that if mathematicians are unable to work out and clarify the implications of incompleteness for philosophy then philosophers can ignore it, since they're hardly likely to do any better. But I don't want to ignore it. I feel it's important but cannot pin down the reasons. I don't find mathematicians helpful on this issue since they don't seem able to make clear why philosophers should even be interested. Perhaps they needn't be. Do you have an opinion?

So I'm not against your approach, — plaque flag

To be clear. it's not just my approach, it's the Perennial philosophy.

but I favor an inclusive approach. It's all real. Confused daydreams are real, and they exist in the style of confused daydreams. All entities are semantically-inferentially linked in a single nexus. Language is directed at the one common world.

You might like to look at Buddhism's doctrine of two truths. This states that space-time phenomena - , which in Buddhism are dhamma or 'thing-events' ,- are conventionally real but ultimately unreal. This is why they are said to 'not really exist'. One could say that by reduction they are unreal, and what is truly real would be irreducible, Nobody claims that nothing exists, although some western scholars confuse Buddhism with nihilism. ,

Metaphysics has to reduce the many to the one, and if we assume the many is truly real this cannot be done. I think you'd have to admit that the incomprehension of philosophers suggests that they're missing a trick. .

FWIW, I think a certain kind of knowledge strives to transcend both time and space --to be valid or worthy at all times and places. But this is the only kind of negation of space and time I can make sense of. It's a negation of the relevance of where 'o clock for the divine thinking that is everywhen and all ways. — plaque flag

Okay. But this is not a metaphysical idea. In metaphysics the idea that time and space are truly real doesn't survive analysis. It is a difficult idea for sure, but not incomprehensible. Ive been quoting Kant, Leibnitz and Weyl, who all endorse the unreality of space-time. So did Erwin Schrodinger, and as far as I can make out modern physics seems to be arriving at the same conclusion. .

So are you saying that space is an illusion ? Along with time ? — plaque flag

Yes. It has to be both or neither. This is Weyl's view also. As an illusion extension it is just as real as it seems to be, but as a metaphysical phenomenon it would be reducible.

Leibnitz makes the point thus:

"In Leibnitz’s view, the ultimately real, something that depends on nothing else for its existence, cannot have parts. If it had parts, its existence would depend on them. But whatever has spatial extension has parts. It follows that what is ultimately real cannot have spatial extension, …”

Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy
Ed. Thomas Mautner (2000)
,

What metaphysical presupposition are requited for physics? I cannot think of any but perhaps I'm missing something. . .

I mean the idea of something existing which cannot even in principle be perceived, something like 'things in themselves,' when it's also assumed they are only ever mediated by appearances -- by phenomena in the crude prephenomenological sense. — plaque flag

Ah. So you disagree with Kant? He concludes that it is a necessary definition of the ultimate phenomenon that it cannot be perceived or conceived since it lies beyond thee categories of thought. . But clearly it does not exist in the usual sense of ;standing out'. It has nothing from which it can stand out.

This is the classical Christian idea of God, that God exists but not in the way you and I exist. I don't like the word 'God' but the argument holds for the ultimate phenomenon whatever we call it.

.

I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time. — Joshs

Yes. The idea of the eternal now requires the idea that we can transcend the experience-experiencer duality. As you seem to say, if we cannot do this the idea makes no sense.

We never experience the pure present. There isn't time to experience it. But we can be in it. This explains how yogis can sit for weeks without moving. They are not experiencing the passing of time.

The nonduality teacher Sadhguru began to become famous after sitting on a rock for two weeks. When he came back to everyday li0fe found himself surrounded by admirers. He thought he'd been sitting for half an hour and was taken by surprise. . , . .

To be 'punctiform' is to be a point with no extension. Thus the 'eternal now' is outside of time.and should not be thought of as a brief amount of time. In this sense time is not punctiform.[/quote]

These problems arise for space and time and for the numbers and the number line and Weyl dismisses all of them as a fiction. The idea that any of then are made out of points is paradoxical/. He concludes that the idea of extension is paradoxical when we reify it, and endorses the 'Perennial' explanation of extension as a fabrication of mind. .
.

o me it's still feels pretty bold to doubt the 'independent object.' It reads almost like impiety, even if one is an atheist. — plaque flag

Sorry but I don;t quite understand your post. What do you mean by 'independent object'? . .

I would say physics is the study of appearances as filtered though a particular set of metaphysical suppositions, what Husserl calls objectivist metalhysics. All science is doing metaphysics, but implicitly rather than explicitly. — Joshs

I'd rather say physics doesn't need to make metaphysical suppositions. It has banished metaphysics to a different department. Physicists often stray into metaphysics and sometimes hold strong views, but when they do they're no longer doing physics. Materialism is the typical methodological assumption, but this is not a scientific theory.and it is not even necessary to physics. . . .

Heidegger would say that the notion of ‘appearance’ of a world before a subject is itself grounded in a particular metaphysical presupposition.

I'd agree. But the idea that appearances can appear in the absence of a subject to whom they appear makes no sense to me. They seem to be mutually dependent phenomena.

Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation. — plaque flag

You might like the read Herman Weyl's famous book on the continuum. He correctly states that we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to creatr the illusion that we are experiencing it. The 'eternal now' is what Weyl calls the 'intuitive continuum, which is unextended, and the fictional time we seem to experience he explains as a theoretical construction. His book is mostly mathematics, but his philosophical ideas are well described by commentators and in his other writings. .

As you say, the idea of time as a metaphysically real phenomenon is inherently paradoxical. But the eternal now is transcendent to time. . . .

Ah, I see. That's a reasonable way to understand bracketing. But phenomenology is a big tent. Husserl alone was amazingly prolific and always revising (his work is too large and complex for me to begin to pretend to have mastered it. But I see that mountain of it. And once Husserl embraced transcendental idealism (and lost some worthy followers), he was a full-fledged metaphysician doing first philosophy. Doing it pretty well often enough it seems to me. — plaque flag

Yes, a fair point. It's only a very small step from your neutral phenomenology to transcendental idealism, which is a neutral metaphysical theory. But it's a much bigger and braver idea that leads beyond phenomenology and perhaps this is why he lost followers.



I read those quotes carefully and they seem to support my point. Metaphysics extends beyond phenomenology. The boundary is rather messy, however, and I can see why they become confused. The study of appearances is physics and the natural sciences and the the study of their origin and true nature is metaphysics and mysticism, so I'm not sure how phenomenology could be defined as a distinct subject. The boundaries are always going to be messy. . . .

I wonder if we all agree on the definition of phenomenology, since all those I've seen are quite vague. .


. ., . .

Sure there is. Just read a textbook on the subject. But if you're not interested in doing that, then indeed there's little hope that you'll understand the subject.

This is a technical subject. It requires study. Just as, say, microbiology is a technical subject and you can't expect to understand results in microbiology without knowing at least the basics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is clearly true, and it must be frustrating trying to talk to people who can't follow the calculations. Still, I find it odd that it's so difficult to express the basic idea in a non-specialist language.

My interest is philosophical, but the implications of incompleteness for metaphysics seems to be a matter a debate among scholars and there is little agreement.

We must have radically different conceptions of phenomenology. I'd say it's largely the opposite of naive realism. Though I will grant that it sometimes comes back around to a highly sophisticated direct realism. — plaque flag

The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory.

I'm not arguing with the idea that mind and matter arise from a source,that is neither, since this is my view, and can see why you might call this a neutral phenomenology, but for a fundamental theory we would have to go beyond phenomenology and endorse a neutral metaphysical theory. This has implications for all metaphysical dualities and not just mind -matter.

This comment seems to sum up the issue-

"In fact, part of the way one starts to do phenomen-
ology is to push aside any doctrines or theories – including sci-
entific and metaphysical theories. This pushing aside is part of
the method of phenomenology. The phrase ‘way of seeing’ could
be written ‘method of seeing’ – it is certainly a methodologically-
guided way of seeing. Accordingly, some authors suggest that
phenomenology is best defined as a method rather than a philo-
sophical theory. The ‘whatever appears to be as such’ and the
‘manner of appearing’ or ‘its manifestation’ – these are all ways of
talking about the phenomena, which is a Greek word for appear-
ances. For Husserl, phenomenology (literally, the ‘science of
appearances’"

What Is Phenomenology? - Shaun Gallagher

Thanks. I read GEB many years ago and enjoyed it but was unable to see its importance. This may or may not be because it went over my head. I did like the idea of strange loops. The idea was not new to me but t liked the name he gave them. I'd been thinking of them as feedback loops, being a guitarist.who likes to use them. The world seems to be made out of these loops.

I never quite grasped what Hofstaedter was trying to say, however, and this may be directly connected with my inability to see what Godel was saying. . .

. .

According to various textbooks, the 'transcendental ego' refers to 'subjective consciousness devoid of empirical content', namely anything that pertains to the external world or to the ego's psychological states (e.g. feelings or moods) — Wayfarer

These textbooks are not explaining transcendental idealism. The phrase 'transcendental ego' is an oxymoron since the ego would be an illusion, and the ultimate state of consciousness would not be subjective. If we reify the ego as a subjective phenomenon then we are not going to be able to solve any problems since the idea doesn't make metaphysical sense. It would be subjective idealism, which has to be abandoned for transcendental idealism.

. . .

I find your approach odd. That the ultimate is not mind or matter is the claim of the Perennial philosophy, and I wonder why you don't consider this a solution to the problem.

It is a neutral metaphysical theory for which consciousness is fundamental and there are no philosophical problems.

The trouble with phenomenology is that it is effectively naive realism and can never produce a fundamental theory. . . .

'I don't see the world differently. Or this is still not strong and clear enough. I am the world from a different perspective. The world [so far as we can know or even make sense of ] only exists perspectively. ' — plaque flag

For the world of time and space this is the case. But what Sartre is saying, and also Kant,and the Perennial philosophy, is that by reduction all perspectives can be reduced and for a fundamental analysis would not really exist. All Kantian phenomenon would be empty of substance and illusory, and this would include the ego and the individual 'I'. .

I misread your word 'neutral' as 'natural; - sorry about that.

In what sense do you call it neutral? . .

The idea of a transcendental subject or ego sounds like dualism to me and not a fundamental idea. For a fundamental theory the subject and and the ego would have to be reduced. For transcendental idealism both would not really exist. The subject-object duality would be, in Sartre's words, of a functional order only, and the ego would be a fantasy. (As your title seems to suggest}.

The phrase 'natural phenomenalism' is intriguing. I'm struggling to figure out what it might mean. Does it refer to particular theory or approach?

.

Thank you to all those who've spent time explaining this but for me it's probably a lost cause. I'm unable to make sense of it.

My interest is in the philosophical implications, but there is a variety of views on this and I have no way to distinguish the wheat from the chaff.

Thanks for trying, it's much appreciated, but I can't see the mathematical significance of a self-referential statement that states 'This sentence' is false'. What sentence?

It would help if I could find a statement that is true but provably undecidable, but I've never seen one. Do you have an example?

Your piece of paper example doesn't do it for me since the two statements make contradictory claims and clearly cannot both be true. We can invent these paradoxical circular arguments easily enough but where do they occur naturally?

.

Thanks. I tried to read the linked article but it goes over my head. It seems it is impossible to explain this issue to non-mathematicians.

Suppose a mathematical theory/system T.
G=This sentence is not provable in T

Either G is provable or not provable

1. G is provable. So G is unprovable
2. G is not provable

So, there is G in the theory T

Have I got it right? — TheMadFool

For me the problem starts with 'This sentence is not provable'. This is meaningless. It does not state what is not provable. It would make no more sense to say 'This sentence is provable'.'This sentence' is not a statement and is not even a sentence. It is not provable or unprovable.

I wish someone would explain incompleteness in a way that it seems plausible to non-mathematicians. But explanations always it seems to depend on taking the liar paradox seriously, which try as I might I cannot do. , . . .

So, if people like this emerge and write about it, would we even be aware they exist, would we even consider their work? — Skalidris

Sure. I'm one of them, and I get some attention. .

Or are we stuck with slow changes? And by slow changes, I mean derivations from the main method that don't challenge it to the core.

If a change doesn't challenge the approach of academic philosophy to the core then it's unimportant.and leaves the situation unchanged.

P.S. I'm guessing a lot of people would disagree with premise 4, especially since philosophy seems so intuitive for some people that it would be hard to imagine how it could be done differently.

I would disagree with premise 4. I'd say there are essentially just two ways to do philosophy.

As for academic philosophy, I'd say it's dead and has no chance no evolving. It hasn't evolved since Plato. What may happen, however, is its transformation. This could happen if it ever decides to take the Perennial philosophy seriously. Until then it will keep going round and round in circles for the benefit of nobody.

Really there are just two philosophies, one that states the world is incomprehensible and the other that it is comprehensible. These are dualism and non-dualism. Every philosophical theory falls into one of these two categories. Academic philosophy is typically n the first category. The only way forward for it is to abandon dualism, and in evolutionary terms this would be a catastrophe rather than part of a gradual evolution. . . . . .

What say you? — Bob Ross

I would say you have a very common but wildly incorrect view of metaphysics. It's almost as if you haven't read a book about it.

Suppose you ask whether the universe begins with something or nothing. You'll find that both ideas don't work. What has this got to do with imagination? It's a simple piece of logical analysis. There is a good reason why metaphysics is often described as a science of logic. William James characterises it as 'nothing but an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly', and this is what it is.

Also, you place tight and unjustifiable limits on human experience. You're dismissing the claims of those who go beyond these limits with no argument, which is not a sensible practice.
.
Clearly metaphysics requires some imagination, but the whole point of it is to overcome imagination and get at the facts. ,

There is a matter of perspective here. You should have seen the state of things 36 years ago, when I started looking into the subject. The progress in understanding since then has been substanantial. Considering the complexity of the subject under study, the technological difficulties in gathering detailed information, and the (IMO) warranted ethical restrictions faced by researchers, I'd say we social primates are doing pretty good. — wonderer1

At least the scientific community now accepts that consciousness exists and this is certainly progress. I don't share your view that it is making progress otherwise, but don't rule out the possibility. I suspect we'll have to wait for one of Kuhn's generational paradigm shifts. .

I feel 'flimsy pseudo-science' is an apt description for modern academic consciousness studies. .

It is flimsy because it has no metaphysical foundation and pseudo-science because it does not study consciousness scientifically. .

I subscribed to the Journal of Consciousness Studies for three years and was disgusted by the poor quality of the work. It's not an area of study but a club for people who need to get published. .

Pardon my strong views. I feel;the general public are being duped and scientific standards are being abused, and that academics should behave more responsibly. . .

1)The universe cannot be perpetually reducible. — AlienFromEarth

Agreed.

2) of course, if the universe is perpetually reducible, there is no smallest particle.

Agreed.

3)The universe must have some kind of fundamental level of existence. In other words, it can't be reduced beyond a certain point/

Agreed.

4)This fundamental level of existence must therefore have some kind of shape.

Muddled thinking. For a fundamental theory extension must be reduced. This deals with propositions 5, 6, 7 and 7 and 8.

So what is the scope for original possibilities and are there questions which have not been touched upon at all. Or are we coming to a dead end in this post postmodern era. — Jack Cummins

One person's;new idea is someone else's old one. I look forward to the time philosophers consider it part of their job to study the Perennial philosophy, for this is a still a new idea for most trained philosophers. It seems to me that university-style philosophy died some some ago and rigour mortis.is well advanced.

As you say, the internet is a crucial consideration, It is now possible for anyone to examine the facts. This gives me hope that they will see the poverty and ongoing failure of mainstream western philosophy and move on. . . .

Yep. There are all sorts of ideas out there, But only one survives close analysis.and has the ability to explain philosophy. For nondualism the subject-object distinction is of a functional order only and must be reduced for a fundamental theory.

This theory states that nothing really exists or ever really happens, so it is quite easy to distinguish from the ideas you mention. For the mystic the explanation of one phenomenon is the the explanation for all of them, so phenomenology is a doddle. At present, however, phenomenology is unable to explain even one phenomenon, since to do so would require a systematic metaphysical theory.
As there is only one reality and only one way that it works there is only one fundamental theory.that works.


. .

How does making consciousness prior to experience eliminate the hard problem, which results from separating body and mind, subject and object? It seems to me that your approach reifies dualism by hardening the separation between these aspects of being. Dont we need to find a way to think subject and object, mind and world, inside and outside, feeling and thinking, experiencer and experience together, rather than giving one side priority over the other? — Joshs

Yes! This is exactly what we need to do. The only way to do it is to assume consciousness is fundamental and prior to all the distinctions that give rise to dualism.

This requires assuming that intentional or 'subject/object' consciousness reduces to the the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. This is nondualism, the rejection of all the distinctions that you say we should reject.

We seem to agree but maybe use the words differently.

I am sorry, I don't feel there is much fruitful to be gained in continuing this specific conversation. I find it very difficult to engage with your way of writing, it all seems very vague — Apustimelogist

Sorry about this. It isn't at all vague but perhaps it looks that way. My basic point is that your idea of consciousness is bound to lead to problems. Rogue AI makes the point is a different way.

[quote="Count Timothy von Icarus;840524" Modern scholars do accuse Shankara or falling into the excluded middle and violating bivalence. I'm not familiar enough with Shankara to really weigh these appropriately, but it's interesting in that it's another example where religion seems to clash with analytical techniques that, IMO, might be being misapplied.[/quote]

Modern scholars often make this accusation. I would argue that that they are misunderstanding bivalence and abusing Aristotle;s logic. Nondualism requires no changes to the rules but only their stricter than usual application. This can be demonstrated and is not a matter of opinion. Graham Priest accuses Buddhism of being full of contradictions, and I cannot imagine a more profound and unnecessary misunderstanding. It seems utterly perverse. , .

Maybe, that's sort of the perennialist take on Eckhart. But the man maintained throughout his life that his doctrine was in keeping with Catholic orthodoxy, granted we could imagine this was partly due to social pressure and threats.

It seems mostly to be bang in line with the orthodoxy, but clearly he restricted what he said for the reasons you mention. In mysticism Jesus us usually regarded as m authentic teacher who was misunderstood by the later church. For instance, in Taoism Christ is the True Man who resides within each of us.

Personally, I can't buy it. The man's work is too covered in scriptural references, practical references to living in the type of Christ, love as loving Christ in others, etc. I'm by no means an expert on his vast corpus, and I originally got into Eckhart reading the perennialist interpretations, Eckhart as a pantheist, but Bill Harmless and others make a pretty convincing case for a more orthodox Eckhart based on his correspondence and practical advice.

I feel pantheism is a confusing red herring so won't go there. It seems inevitable that people who do not understand nondualism are bound to misread Eckhart, Jesus and all others who teach the same doctrine. I had to study Buddhism in order to make sense of Christianity and I've heard many others say the same. . . . .

But we can't know for sure, right?

I think we can know for sure. He writes with great care and clarity.

Theology is cool in that way, a bit freer than philosophy is some ways.

Hmm. I rather think the limitations of theology are made clear in the name. Philosophy has to start with no assumptions about God. I'd recommend replacing theology with metaphysics and starting with a clean slate. Still, if you're talking about what passes for philosophy in our universities then I'd probably agree. . .

To me the whole issue is summed up in Lao Tzu's comment, 'True words seem paradoxical'. This would only be the case if the advaita doctrine is true, so his brief words reward a lot of study. .

If there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not then you can simply clarify those senses in a bivalent way by breaking the statement down into atomic propositions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can, yes, and then both statements would be untrue.

Of course, it is not a violation of logic to say that a natural language sentence appears contradictory, but actually isn't.

Of course not. But most people would say that the statement 'We are and are-not; is a contradiction and find it difficult to see how it can not be one. .

And I think this is what is meant in some statements that might seem contradictory or heretical at first glance. Like Eckhart's claim that he preexisted God. This is a claim about the potentialities within God, including humans, pre-existing creation, versus the human conception of God as God only existing temporally. No contradiction there.

Eckhart is saying that God is a concept and that consciousness and ultimate reality is prior to concepts. He is saying that God is not fundamental, thus that monotheism is wrong. He is merely agreeing with the pagan philosophers he so admired, who say that God is a misunderstanding. So yes, no contradictions are implied.

But Saint Denis's claims about a light that is darkness doesn't yield to the same sort of breakdown.

I think you;ll find ti does, but I don't know Dennis so don't know the quote or the context. If it is a contradiction in the way that he meant it then he is not thinking clearly, but I expect he;s endorsing the same view I'm defending. .

I'm not sure what you mean by "rules of logic," here. There are many logical systems. Multivalued logic is not any less rigorous or less logic. Second, I don't know what you mean by "nondualism" here. Generally the term refers to ontological dualism, in which case, yes, Plotinus and Plato are absolutely dualists in key respects. But it seems like you might be talking more about rejecting bivalence?

I was speaking of the rules for the dialectic as proscribed by Aristotle. This is necessarily bivalent, and because of this must be transcended for nondualism. Nothing wrong with the rules though. It's just that reality would not be bivalent. It would be 'advaita or 'not-two', undivided, undifferentiated and best described as a unity, or as Plotinus describes it - a one without a second. ,

The idea that Plotinus was a dualist is one I've never encountered previously. To see that he is not would require a study of nondualism. If you don't know what this word means then Plotinus and the entire literature of of mysticism will be incomprehensible.

You clearly know your stuff theologically, but I feel you're missing out on the view that opens up when one lets go of monotheism. The idea of God confuses the issues since it is so emotive and vague. Plotinus and Eckhart ask us to look beyond this idea.

I suspect even Aquinas would have agreed since he endorses the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, and nothing could be simpler that the unity or 'One' that serves as the Ultimate for the Perennial philosophy.. .

Thanks for an interesting discussion. . . .

Who actually has a suggestion though? — Apustimelogist

Have you examined the suggestions of the Buddha, Lao Tzu and the Upanishads? Afaik there is no other explanation for consciousness that works. .

When I say experience is primitive, I just mean in a kind of epistemic sense - experiences are immediately apparent and intuitive to us and they don't have an explicit characterization... I just see blue, I cannot tell you what it is/

Okay. But I''m speaking ontologically. I'm suggesting that consciousness in its original state is prior to experience and is known simply as what it is. . .

My whole experience (tentatively I would say consciousness) is just a stream of these things. They cannot be reduced further... they are the bottom and foundation for everything I know and perceive. That is to say nothing about reality but just that experiences are the primitive, irreducible foundation of what I know and perceive.

If you explore your consciousness I predict that you'll eventually discover that consciousness is not a stream of things. These 'things; are the contents of consciousness, not the phenomenon itself. Meditation is the practice of seeing beyond these things to their underlying basis. This basis is beyond time and space, and knowing this is what 'enlightenment' means in Buddhism. . .

Not sure what you mean by experience-experiencer duality beyond conventional dualism. I am not sure what "experiencer" means.

An experience requires an experiencer. I;m suggesting that if you explore your consciousness you are capable of transcending this duality for the final truth about consciousness. The task would be to 'Know thyself', as advised by the Delphic oracle. When Lao Tzu is asked how he knows the origin of the universe he answers, 'I look inside myself and see'. . .

Again, my notion of primitiveness just relates to the immediate, irreducible apprehension of experiences after which there is nothing more basic epistemically.

This is a very bold assumption. I wonder whether you realise that what you're proposing is that the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy is false,. .

I don't think you can have consciousness free of information nor do I understand why you think this is required for a solution.

An information theory without an information space is not fundamental or even coherent. You may believe that consciousness cannot be free of information, but it is telling that having made this assumption you cannot explain metaphysics, consciousness, or the hard problem. Have you considered that your problems may be caused by your own assumptions? .

I don't think there is priority here. If there is information, it exists on an information space; n information space is defined by the information in it. One doesnt come before the other

In order to draw a Venn diagram one must first have a blank sheet of paper. .

I don't see what your alternative suggestion could possibly be if you don't believe dualism is true. Regardless of what you think the fundamental reality is, the evidence is overwhelming about how consciousness relates to or can be characterized in terms of brains in a functional sense (I hope you understand what I mean when I say functionally). What is your alternative characterization?

My suggestion is that consciousness is prior to number and form and that its function is simply knowing. All the rest is cogitation, intellection and conceptualisation. If you cannot imagine my alternative suggestion then this can only be because you've not studied philosophy beyond the walls off the Academy. You'll find the same suggestion in every book you ever read on mysticism. Those who investigate consciousness rather than speculate come back to report that at its root consciousness is prior to number and form and free of concepts and ideas. . ,

I am starting to think you haven't understood anything I have said at all. Its hard to believe now that you could have said my previous post was perceptive and a good summary if you really understood it. Neither have I been trying to think about some fundamental theory that resolves the hard problem. My initial post said that I didn't think the so called hard problem could be solved at all.

Yes. So I chipped in to say it was solved long ago and is easy to solve. The solution would be to abandon dualism and pay attention to what those who study consciousness have to say about it. It is astonishing how few people bother to do this, and so not at all surprising that so many people struggle with the hard problem. . . .

I would say that the need for a paraconsistent;logic that you speak of is a misperception.

My point was merely that these traditions embrace paraconsistent descriptions as better, if still flawed ways of conceiving of that which is beyond all description. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They're not paraconsistent descriptions, albeit they seem contradictory. They are a rejection of all extreme views and descriptions requiring no modification of ordinary logic. .

There are two crucial issues here. First, those who describe the Ultimate in seemingly contradictory terms do not say this is God. Eckhart and Plotinus, for instance, deny that this is God. To think of The One as God, says Plotinus, is to think of it 'too meanly'.

Second, the contradictory language associated with the nondualism of Eckhart and Plotinus strictly obeys the rules of logic. When Heraclitus states 'We both are and are-not' he is not abandoning logic, but saying that there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not. As a consequence, it would be unrigorous to state 'we are' or 'we are not'. These are extreme positions and all such positions are rejected by nondualism.

The point would be that the propositions 'we are ' and we are not' would not form a legitimate contradictory pair, since it would not be the case that one is true and one is false. Thus to reject both requires no modification to dialectical logic. .

Lao Tzu tells us 'true words seem paradoxical', not that they actually are. I suspect that this point about logic is vital for an understanding of Eckhart and the mystics, since otherwise it will seem that they speak in riddles and have no respect for the laws of dialectical logic.

I don't see it as pessimistic at all or that anything is lost. What does a solution to the hard problem look like? I don't think there is a good one I can think of which doesn't imply some sort of dualism which I fundamentally disagree with. — Apustimelogist

You're right., Dualism is hopeless. The solution would be nondualism.

I am not suggesting looking for a fundamental ontology based on computation but an explanation for why knowing about fundamental ontologies are out of reach.

I'm suggesting such knowledge is not out of reach. To show that it is out of reach would require ignoring all the people who claim to have such knowledge, or proving they do not. . .

I think the explanation is actually already there, it just has to be articulated and demonstrated. Like you said, experiences are primitive.

Ah. I didn't say this and would argue against it. You're conflating consciousness and experience, but I;m suggesting that the former is prior to the latter. Bear in mind that experience-experiencer is a duality that must be reduced in order to overcome dualism. . .

We know experiences are related to the functional architecture of our brains. We can transfer or demonstrate the concept of this kind of primitiveness into the architectures and functional repertoires of A.I. We use A.I. to demonstrate the limits of what kinds of information is transferable from the environment, what kinds of concepts are created and what information they don't or can't include, and then see what kind of metacognitive consequences this has. Does a. A.I. come up with primitive phenomenal concepts on a purely functional basis that it cannot explain, similarly to our hard problem? This is a totally plausible research program even if it may not be possible right at this moment.

There are no primitive concepts or experiences. This was shown by Kant. For a solution one would have to assume a state or level of consciousness free of all concepts and prior to information. Don't forget that and information theory requires an information space, and the space comes before the information. .

Not sure what you mean here but functionally, yes we are just intelligent machines. We are just brains.

If you believe this you will never have a fundamental theory and will will have to live with the 'hard' problem. forever. I wonder what leads you to believe this when it is just a speculation. If you believe this then much of what I'm saying will make no sense to you. I would advise against making such assumptions, or indeed any assumptions at all. , .

To be sure, there is a religious tradition, starting more with the Enlightenment, that tries to use a more classical sort of system to analyze God. You see this with folks like Alvin Plantinga, who would be a great person to read on for a classical, bivalent logic based analysis of this sort of thing. But such logic and methodology seems totally alien to the religious thinking of Saint Denis, Saint Bonaventure, Eckhart, Boheme, Merton, etc.

There, you often see paradoxes set atop each other as a mode of description of the divine essence, or even the argument that all description and analysis ultimately causes us to lose sight of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I liked your post as it raises interesting issues, but do do agree. I'd be interested to know why you believe Eckhart's view requires that we abandon ordinary logic.The dialethists claim this but their arguments don't withstand analysis.

It would be because the Ultimate lies beyond the categories of thought that it cannot be conceived and must be described in partial and contradictory ways, but these would not be true descriptions, just the best we can do. For Eckhart the truth would lie beyond the possibility of contradictions or, as De Cusa puts it, 'beyond the coincidence of contradictories'. Thus beyond all contradictions. This view requires no modification of ordinary logic, just the recognition that bivalent logic cannot describe the unity of the Ultimate. The Buddhist philosopher-monk Nagarjuna explains this in his doctrine of 'Two Truths', and Eckhart endorses the same world-view.

Just defending Eckhart. .

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