Right, but it isn't just translation. We'd need some sort of very good predictive capability — Count Timothy von Icarus

Predictive capacity is already implied in the philosophical approach. Translation proceeds from a philosophical mode of anticipation into a conventionalized mode of prediction, which in today’s sciences means mathematisizing the objects of study i order to build apparatus for the purposes of calculation and measurement. This doesn’t make the scientific version more precise than the philosophical , it merely swaps a deeper philosophical notion of precision for a shallow instrumental idea of precision.

The world is never the same 'twice,' and yet I am describing the world, as predictably infinitely novel. Concepts have a relative stability that makes our conversation possible. — plaque flag

Husserl’s genetic method begins with an ego-intentionality which we imagine as preceding the constitution of any regularities in experience. At this point there isnt much to determine that there is something like ‘the’ world, if this is to indicate a realm of recognizable regularities, patterns and meaning. So what sort of process is required to turn a chaos of meaningless flux into the meaningful, stable patterns that would justify calling what we experience ‘the’ world? The flux would certainly need to make itself amenable to the construction of simple predictable groupings of some sort or other, but this is still a far cry from a world of stable objects that the subject can interact with. One would have to imagine that the subject progressively synthesizes out of simpler correlations more and more complex ones. In Heidegger’s terms, the subject creates a ‘worlding’. If this is an entangling of subject and world , it is one in which what the world brings to the correlation is subordinated to the requirements of recognizability and similarity.

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness [in the same person] by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth)

No, I understood the distinction, you did a fine job describing it. What I was saying is this: were we able to manipulate our own sentience/experiences well enough, we'd probably also believe that that we understood it well enough to decide rather some AI actually experienced things or not.

For example, if I was hooked up to a machine and someone said "I'm going to press a button and you're going to experience enacting x exact internal monologue, feel happy, see a green pony walk into the room, then lift your arms up and yell "I love Newt Gingrich," and mean it," and the person pressed the button and all that actually happened, I'd assume that whatever technology they were using implied enough mastery of the causes of sentience that they could tell me if a given AI experiences it or not. The reason P Zombies are a problem, IMO, is that we actually don't have a good idea what causes sentience, and so we don't know what to look for to determine what things have it.

Now, of course we could always remain skeptical and suppose that maybe even rocks are sentient deep down, but I think this would be enough evidence for most people.

Predictive capacity is already implied in the philosophical approach.

Maybe sometimes. But it seems to be able to do without making distinct predictions quite a bit. E.g., Hegel's theory of history and institutional development obviously could be extended to make predictions, but he specifically doesn't do this, history being "thought comprehend in its own time," and all.

And I've never come across any phenomenology that tries to make the sort of predictions psychology does, although maybe that's selection bias.

This doesn’t make the scientific version more precise than the philosophical

Of course. Nor does it make it more accurate. "Garbage in, garbage out," as they say in the data biz.

But that's why I use the example of a technology that lets you interact with conciousness in a profoundly direct way. Perhaps "prediction," is a bit to amorphous here. Part of what makes the scientific view so convincing is that it allows for mastery of a phenomena. It lets you grab cause by the handle and shape things to your will. The proof is in the pudding.

It's the difference between gnosis and techne. You don't necessarily need gnosis, understanding, knowledge, to master something with the appropriate technology. But to be the one who makes the technology, that requires gnosis. The best proof of gnosis in most contexts? It's techne, mastery, the technique for manipulation. Techne is where the speculative element of gnosis is put to the test, "causal mastery talks and bullshit walks."

Which isn't to say you can't know things about phenomena and not be able to control them. Nor that people can't control phenomena to some degree while failing to understand them. But if you learn how to control them well enough, and you understand the techniques you employ, then it seems like good evidence that you understand the whole thing. It's the difference between advancing lift as a theory in physics on a chalk board and trying to convince people that way versus flying a plane over their head and yelling "ta-da!" Well, we might not think the Wright Brothers understand everything about lift, but we know they understand something important.

This is also why I think people expect saints and sages to behave in a particular way. It's something like: "you say you've reached a sort of special understanding of the world, achieved the gnosis. Ok, now show me how you've mastered yourself then." The ascetic practice plays an important role for the practitioner, to be sure, but it also seems to play a role as "proof" to the would-be student.

Husserl’s genetic method begins with an ego-intentionality which we imagine as preceding the constitution of any regularities in experience. At this point there isnt much to determine that there is something like ‘the’ world, if this is to indicate a realm of recognizable regularities, patterns and meaning. So what sort of process is required to turn a chaos of meaningless flux into the meaningful, stable patterns that would justify calling what we experience ‘the’ world? — Joshs

It seems to me that self and world would have to be elaborated at the same time. The body is especially entangled and undecidable, for it is revealed and revealing. The (psychological) self too is made of patterns and boundaries, right ? The 'pure witness' is, in my view, anonymous being, more like a clearing or the light that shines on the scene of development. Or really just its being there. Just its happening.

FWIW, I don't think babies are able to think of being in this world, but I think we practiced concept-mongers understand their awareness to be awareness of the world.

For example, if I was hooked up to a machine and someone said "I'm going to press a button and you're going to experience enacting x exact internal monologue, feel happy, see a green pony walk into the room, then lift your arms up and yell "I love Newt Gingrich," and mean it," and the person pressed the button and all that actually happened, I'd assume that whatever technology they were using implied enough mastery of the causes of sentience that they could tell me if a given AI experiences it or not. The reason P Zombies are a problem, IMO, is that we actually don't have a good idea what causes sentience, and so we don't know what to look for to determine what things have it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You make a good point. But there's still maybe a gap here between steering sentience and creating or understanding it. I readily admit that technical power is even dangerously persuasive.

FWIW, I think we do take our fellow humans and sufficiently complex animals as sentient. So we 'do' already know what to look for in that sense. But in some sense 'my' pain (and so on) is mine. I see the object from one side, you from another. Everyone is seemingly forced to see the object only from this or that place at this or that moment. 'Ontological cubism.' The world is an 'infinite' or hypersaturated object which is only given in such slices or adumbrations. The shiny world that hovers in Euclidean space is a useful 'fiction,' an important piece of culture which perfects the transparency of the subject.

So for me the larger issue is not consciousness detection but consciousness as the very being of a world entangled in our cognition, as it is itself enclosed in the world (a Klein bottle, a Möbius strip.)

The painter, when he has to draw a round cup, knows very well that the opening of the cup is a circle. When he draws an ellipse, therefore, he is not sincere, he is making a concession to the lies of optics and perspective, he is telling a deliberate lie.
https://smarthistory.org/cubism-and-multiple-perspectives/

Is the opening really a circle ? This really-a-circle is a bit like the thing-in-itself, but note that it still relies on an idea viewing angle (straight on). It's still for and through the eyes that the circle is given.

We must have radically different conceptions of phenomenology. I'd say it's largely the opposite of naive realism. Though I will grant that it sometimes comes back around to a highly sophisticated direct realism. — plaque flag

The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory.

I'm not arguing with the idea that mind and matter arise from a source,that is neither, since this is my view, and can see why you might call this a neutral phenomenology, but for a fundamental theory we would have to go beyond phenomenology and endorse a neutral metaphysical theory. This has implications for all metaphysical dualities and not just mind -matter.

This comment seems to sum up the issue-

"In fact, part of the way one starts to do phenomen-
ology is to push aside any doctrines or theories – including sci-
entific and metaphysical theories. This pushing aside is part of
the method of phenomenology. The phrase ‘way of seeing’ could
be written ‘method of seeing’ – it is certainly a methodologically-
guided way of seeing. Accordingly, some authors suggest that
phenomenology is best defined as a method rather than a philo-
sophical theory. The ‘whatever appears to be as such’ and the
‘manner of appearing’ or ‘its manifestation’ – these are all ways of
talking about the phenomena, which is a Greek word for appear-
ances. For Husserl, phenomenology (literally, the ‘science of
appearances’"

What Is Phenomenology? - Shaun Gallagher

Time is that within which events take place.
...
Time is initially encountered in those entities which are changeable; change is in time. How is time exhibited in this way of encountering it, namely, as that within which things change?
...
What is this now, the time now , as I look at my watch? Now, as I do this; now, as the light here goes out, for instance. What is the now? Is the now at my disposal? Am I the now? Is every other person the now? Then time would indeed be I myself, and every other person would be time. And in our being with one another we would be time — everyone and no one. Am I the now, or only the one who is saying this?
...
What is involved in the fact that human existence has already procured a clock prior to all pocket-watches and sundials? Do I dispose over the Being of time, and do I also mean myself in the now? Am I myself the now and my existence time? Or is it ultimately time itself that procures for itself the clock in us? Augustine, in the Eleventh Book of his Confessions, pursued the question so far as to ask whether spirit itself is time.
...
"In you, I say repeatedly, I measure time; the transitory things encountered bring you into a disposition which remains, while those things disappear. The disposition I measure in present existence, not
the things that pass by in order that this disposition first arise. My very finding myself disposed, I repeat, is what I measure when I measure time. " — early lecture The Concept of Time ---the ur Being and Time

Or is it ultimately time itself that procures for itself the clock in us? I think it was Gadamer who summarized Being and Time with 'being is time.' Existence is time, which I understand in terms of a dynamic steaming of what might have been called experience if we weren't more wary now of taking the 'experienced' subject as more fundamental than the 'experience' (streaming being.)

The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory. — FrancisRay

Ah, I see. That's a reasonable way to understand bracketing. But phenomenology is a big tent. Husserl alone was amazingly prolific and always revising (his work is too large and complex for me to begin to pretend to have mastered it. But I see that mountain of it. And once Husserl embraced transcendental idealism (and lost some worthy followers), he was a full-fledged metaphysician doing first philosophy. Doing it pretty well often enough it seems to me.

The 'pure witness' is, in my view, anonymous being, more like a clearing or the light that shines on the scene of development. Or really just its being there. Just its happening.

FWIW, I don't think babies are able to think of being in this world, but I think we practiced concept-mongers understand their awareness to be awareness of the world. — plaque flag

Yes, indeed.
The personal ego is itself an idealism in that, rather than leading us back to the apodictic self-othering, subjective-objective becoming of temporal constitution, the psycho-physical ego is itself a product of constitution, via self-apperception. When we complete the epoche by abstracting away this self-apperception, we arrive at the primordial stratum where there is as yet no ego, but there remains the unitary flow of subjective temporal processes. “At the beginning of its development, the subject is not an Object for itself and does not have the apperceptive unity, "Ego."”(Ideas II, p.361)

Husserl argues that “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity.

The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory — FrancisRay

This doesn’t seem to be true for the founder of phenomenology:

Our monadological results are metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is anything but metaphysics in the customary sense: a historically degenerate metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which meta­physics, as "first philosophy", was instituted originally. Phe­nomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses. (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations)

To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus to bring to in­sight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility—this is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the
strenuous road to realization. It is the only way to decide
whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature— whether this telos, then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations * and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not
rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy. ( Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences)

Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity. — Joshs

Which is basically what Wittgenstein offers in the TLP, and which seems right to me. The subject is time (or being becoming) . But this zero-point clearing, as time or being has a perspectival self-like care structure of motivated sentience.

I understand the motivation of calling it a transcendental ego, but I try to avoid the wrong kind of idealism, which errs in the same way as a naive adoption of the independent object.

Phe­nomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses.

:up:

Here's Husserl in a text about first philosophy.

Genuine rational life, and in particular genuine scientific research and achievement, must, by means of radically clarifying reflection, completely transcend the standpoint of naiveté. It must—ideally speaking—furnish a fully sufficient justification for each step it takes, while at the highest level this justification must come from principles obtained with insight.

Through the high seriousness with which Plato, in this Socratic spirit, seeks to overcome anti-scientific skepticism, he becomes the father of all genuine science. He does so, first, by refusing to take lightly the Sophistic arguments against the possibility of valid knowledge and of a science that would be binding on every rational person, instead subjecting these arguments to a deeply penetrating, fundamental critique. Together with this, he undertakes the positive search for the possibility of such a knowledge and science, doing so (while being guided by the deepest understanding of Socratic maieutics) in the spirit of an intuitive clarification of essences and an evident exposition of the general essential norms of such a science. And finally, he strives with all his powers to set genuine science itself into motion on the basis of such fundamental insights.

Ah, I see. That's a reasonable way to understand bracketing. But phenomenology is a big tent. Husserl alone was amazingly prolific and always revising (his work is too large and complex for me to begin to pretend to have mastered it. But I see that mountain of it. And once Husserl embraced transcendental idealism (and lost some worthy followers), he was a full-fledged metaphysician doing first philosophy. Doing it pretty well often enough it seems to me. — plaque flag

Yes, a fair point. It's only a very small step from your neutral phenomenology to transcendental idealism, which is a neutral metaphysical theory. But it's a much bigger and braver idea that leads beyond phenomenology and perhaps this is why he lost followers.



I read those quotes carefully and they seem to support my point. Metaphysics extends beyond phenomenology. The boundary is rather messy, however, and I can see why they become confused. The study of appearances is physics and the natural sciences and the the study of their origin and true nature is metaphysics and mysticism, so I'm not sure how phenomenology could be defined as a distinct subject. The boundaries are always going to be messy. . . .

I wonder if we all agree on the definition of phenomenology, since all those I've seen are quite vague. .


. ., . .

Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of $\Bbb R$). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation.

I claim the world exists only perspectively, and we humans live as much in possibility as we do in actuality. So possibility is real, existing as a blurry anxious uncertain situation. Our narrower concept of the External reality as pure actuality and pure pointlike now-presence is a handy fiction, which corresponds to a maximally generic subjectivity, a dead camera without a temporal dimension.

It's as if some variant of deism is popular, where what's left of the creator is just its glorious machine, which can run in the dark forever , somehow meaningful but ineffable if one is honest, for all perception must be stripped away if it is to run divinely in perfect darkness and silence. Its divinity is its radical independence.

Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation — plaque flag

Yes, which is why I think Heidegger’s critique of internal time consciousness as a metaphysics of presence is a bit unfair to Husserl.

But it's a much bigger and braver idea that leads beyond phenomenology and perhaps this is why he lost followers. — FrancisRay

:up:

To me it's still feels pretty bold to doubt the 'independent object.' It reads almost like impiety, even if one is an atheist.

I tend to interpret Husserl as sharing my concern with semantic legitimacy. What does (what can) it mean for something to exist radically apart from the subject ? Or, to be fair, to feature a subject without a world ? If I say the world will go on without the human species, what kind of world am I thinking of but that which was given in correlation with the human spectator ?

If I say that aliens exist on a far away planet, I [ must ] mean that they are potentially perceivable, at least in theory. Our spaceships may not be fast enough yet, etc.

It's something else entirely to speak of the paradoxical or self-contradictory. And phenomenology is often, in my view, just the calling out of such paradox and bluff.

Yes, which is why I think Heidegger’s critique of internal time consciousness as a metaphysics of presence is a bit unfair to Husserl. — Joshs

:up:

Yeah, reading Husserl directly has been eye-opening for me. Ideas II was clearly an inspiration for Heidegger, along with so much else. Heidegger had that existential sexy factor going, then the scandal. I still think Heidegger is great, but perhaps Husserl's star will shine at least as bright in the long run.

Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation. — plaque flag

You might like the read Herman Weyl's famous book on the continuum. He correctly states that we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to creatr the illusion that we are experiencing it. The 'eternal now' is what Weyl calls the 'intuitive continuum, which is unextended, and the fictional time we seem to experience he explains as a theoretical construction. His book is mostly mathematics, but his philosophical ideas are well described by commentators and in his other writings. .

As you say, the idea of time as a metaphysically real phenomenon is inherently paradoxical. But the eternal now is transcendent to time. . . .

The study of appearances is physics and the natural sciences and the the study of their origin and true nature is metaphysics and mysticism, so I'm not sure how phenomenology could be defined as a distinct subject. The boundaries are always going to be messy. . . .

I wonder if we all agree on the definition of phenomenology, since all those I've seen are quite vague. . — FrancisRay

I would say physics is the study of appearances as filtered though a particular set of metaphysical suppositions, what Husserl calls objectivist metalhysics. All science is doing metaphysics, but implicitly rather than explicitly. Heidegger would say that the notion of ‘appearance’ of a world before a subject is itself grounded in a particular metaphysical presupposition. A perhaps you can see, Im defining metaphysics as a set of grounding presuppositions guiding any domain of culture.

You might like the read Herman Weyl's famous book on the continuum. — FrancisRay

I do love that kind of stuff.

He correctly states that we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to creatr the illusion that we are experiencing it. The 'eternal now' is what Weyl calls the 'intuitive continuum, which is unextended, and the fictional time we seem to experience he explains as a theoretical construction. — FrancisRay

To me the situation is tricky. I think there is an 'eternal now' in the sense that there is a form of the present, but this present is not punctiform. Husserl famous analysis of hearing a melody is sufficient, in my opinion, to prove this (to allow us to notice it, to see around the encrusted punctiform tradition.

Since temporal objects, like a melody or a sentence, are characterized by and experienced as a unity across a succession, an account of the perception of a temporal object must explain how we synthesize a flowing object in such a way that we (i) preserve the position of each tone without (ii) eliminating the unity of the melody or (iii) relating each tone by collapsing the difference in the order between the tones.

Bergson, James and Husserl realized that if our consciousness were structured in such a way that each moment occurred in strict separation from every other (like planks of a picket fence), then we never could apprehend or perceive the unity of our experiences or enduring objects in time otherwise than as a convoluted patchwork.

https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/

I also read James' Principles of Psychology lately, and he is great on this issue in that book. It's not just melody but the flow of meaning itself (in a spoken sentence perhaps) that is 'stretched' and non-punctiform. Consider the experience of reading these words. There is a stream of presence, retention and anticipation. An entangled trinity.

we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to create the illusion that we are experiencing it. — FrancisRay

I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time.

I would say physics is the study of appearances as filtered though a particular set of metaphysical suppositions, what Husserl calls objectivist metalhysics. All science is doing metaphysics, but implicitly rather than explicitly. — Joshs

I'd rather say physics doesn't need to make metaphysical suppositions. It has banished metaphysics to a different department. Physicists often stray into metaphysics and sometimes hold strong views, but when they do they're no longer doing physics. Materialism is the typical methodological assumption, but this is not a scientific theory.and it is not even necessary to physics. . . .

Heidegger would say that the notion of ‘appearance’ of a world before a subject is itself grounded in a particular metaphysical presupposition.

I'd agree. But the idea that appearances can appear in the absence of a subject to whom they appear makes no sense to me. They seem to be mutually dependent phenomena.

o me it's still feels pretty bold to doubt the 'independent object.' It reads almost like impiety, even if one is an atheist. — plaque flag

Sorry but I don;t quite understand your post. What do you mean by 'independent object'? . .

I'd rather say physics doesn't need to make metaphysical suppositions. It has banished metaphysics to a different department. Physicists often stray into metaphysics and sometimes hold strong views, but when they do they're no longer doing physics — FrancisRay

I’m not talking about sitting down to write a treatise with the word ‘metaphysics’ in the title. I’m talking about the presuppositions , usually unexamined, that make it possible to do any kind of science. Thomas Kuhn understood this. Think of a scientific paradigm as a kind of metaphysical frame. Physicists may think they have banished metaphysics, when all they have done is banish a certain strand of metaphysical thinking and substituted for it another, even more insidious one , which they are so far from recognizing that they have convinced themselves they have somehow escaped from history.

Sorry but I don;t quite understand your post. What do you mean by 'independent object'? . . — FrancisRay

I mean the idea of something existing which cannot even in principle be perceived, something like 'things in themselves,' when it's also assumed they are only ever mediated by appearances -- by phenomena in the crude prephenomenological sense.

I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time. — Joshs

:up:
Even Hobbes was on to this. I'll just offer a sample, but the chapter 'Of Man' is surprisingly temporally aware.


And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end.
...

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.
...
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.




https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0038

To be 'punctiform' is to be a point with no extension. Thus the 'eternal now' is outside of time.and should not be thought of as a brief amount of time. In this sense time is not punctiform.[/quote]

These problems arise for space and time and for the numbers and the number line and Weyl dismisses all of them as a fiction. The idea that any of then are made out of points is paradoxical/. He concludes that the idea of extension is paradoxical when we reify it, and endorses the 'Perennial' explanation of extension as a fabrication of mind. .
.

To be 'punctiform' is to be a point with no extension. Thus the 'eternal now' is outside of time.and should not be thought of as a brief amount of time. In this sense time is not punctiform.

These problems arise for space and time and for the numbers and the number line and Weyl dismisses all of them as a fiction. The idea that any of then are made out of points is paradoxical/. He concludes that the idea of extension is paradoxical when we reify it, and endorses the 'Perennial' explanation of extension as a fabrication of mind. . — FrancisRay

So are you saying that space is an illusion ? Along with time ?

FWIW, I think a certain kind of knowledge strives to transcend both time and space --to be valid or worthy at all times and places. But this is the only kind of negation of space and time I can make sense of. It's a negation of the relevance of where 'o clock for the divine thinking that is everywhen and all ways.