Is this a response to my having said that distinctions begin with consciousness? You have expressed it here in reverse; that mind (not consciousness) begins with distinctions, and I think that works too since we can say they are co-arising. So, I take it that for you mind is intentional consciousness, and by 'consciousness" you mean satchitananda? — Janus

Yes, this would be how I think of it. I don't speculate beyond a certain point since there would be little value in doing so, but for the sake of relating consciousness and mind this would be my interpretation of what is said.by those who know. Plotinus states that we should not think of 'The One' as God or mind, and so this seems to be the arrangement. Would you agree? Or is there another way of looking at it? . . . .

I am not getting your drift here—I see the question as decidable two plus two does not equal either three or five. If the question is whether reality is foundationally matter or mind, or something else, we cannot answer; and that is what I mean by undecidable. — Janus

The first question is undecidable because the correct answer is not included in the question. I'm saying that the same problem arises for the mind-matter question. The correct answer in both cases is no.

The closest we might get to a decision there would be to say the question is inapt, that no answer we give can state the actuality.

Yes, the question is inapt. It asks us to decide between two wrong answers. This is my point. There's no need to decide these undecidable questions and they really are undecidable. But they are answerable. . . . .

I think the same goes for this answer. We don't know, discursively, what "being. consciousness, bliss" is, so discursively speaking it is a non-answer.

It's a non-answer when stated blankly with no argument or explanation. When justified it's an answer that works. .

One might enjoy an altered state of consciousness wherein one feels and thinks intuitively "Oh, this must be the satchitananda the sages speak of", but this remains an experience, open to different interpretations. Another person might say "I saw God". These kinds of experiences are ineffable and discursive interpretation necessarily distorts them because thought and language are inherently dualistic, and such experiences, in fact I would say all experiences, are inherently non-dual.

This is why a different argument is required, one that makes no appeal to experience..Such an argument is possible in metaphysics, as is shown by Nagarjuna. ,

Experiences require an experience and an experiencer so are inherently dualistic. . .

... though I'm not convinced we should expect any discursive or analytic investigation to be able to see beyond intentional consciousness.

There is such an argument and it's not difficult to make. But few people investigate these issues.or seem interested in doing so.

One might have an experience that convinces one that one sees beyond intentional consciousness, but the belief that one sees beyond intentional consciousness is itself a dualistic interpretation of a non-dual experience.

I'm not sure why you would think this. You seem to be saying that Buddhism and more generally the Perennial philosophy is nonsense. . .

Yes, I think this is analogous to what Hadot says about some ancient philosophies: that they were systems of ideas designed to be aids to spiritual transformations and realization, not discursive propositions to be debated.

This is simply wrong. This is not just an ancient philosophy but also bang up to date. Do you not know the role of debating in Buddhist practice? Do you not read the proofs of Shankara, Nagarjuna, Bradley, Spencer Brown et al? Do you suppose non-dualism is woolly nonsense with no philosophical basis? Why would you take any notice of the historian Hadot, who appears to have known nothing of this topic? His low view is common but does not withstand a bit of study.

I don't know how to make progress in these discussions. I'm going to withdraw from the forum at least for now. as Its too time-consuming and generally opinions seem to trump analysis. I'll happily respond here if you want to continue this current chat, but once we're done I'll depart.


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I see I made the right decision. You have not understood my approach at all and I doubt I can change this. I see no evidence that you want to understand philosophy as opposed to fight for your opinions on the basis of your current inability to do so, but it;is a common approach. It's more fun to have opinions than do the sums.

Never mind. See you around.

I've enjoyed our chat but feel we're at loggerheads. No problem, but if it's okay I'll drop out here. We'll cross paths again no doubt. Cheers.

I realise I made a careless mistake earlier. It is not consciousness that begins with distinctions but mind. For the advaita view neither mind not distinctions would be fundamental. .

rancisRay
Phenomenology is the business of describing how things appear to be, not explaining anything in terms of metaphysical theses. — Janus

Quite so. Although even phenomenologists seem to sometimes forget this.

Such a theory is so obviously false that it only make sense if understood as ironic or metaphorical. — plaque flag

I can;t fight against this sort approach. Okay, so you think you know know the Perennial philosophy.is false. Lots of people think the same. I feel you'd be better off trying to understand it before dismissing it, but it's your choice.

To say that consciousness is fundamental is to propose an answer to a metaphysical question. I had thought you agreed with me that metaphysical questions are undecidable, which I take to mean they cannot be definitively answered. — Janus

You make a good point. I spoke sloppily. They are undecidable if one assumes that their extreme answers are an instance of A/not-A. For a neutral theory they are not. Both the extreme answers would be be incorrect and there is a third answer. So they are undecidable but answerable. It's like asking whether two plus two equals three or five. This question is undecidable as asked, but not an intractable problem. , .

'Consciousness' is just a word. What do we mean when we say consciousness is fundamental?
Our notion of consciousness finds its genesis in understanding consciousness as intentional consciousness wherein there is always something that consciousness is of.

Oh yes, another good point. Intentional consciousness is clearly not fundamental. The words are difficult. I'm speaking of the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. .

If this is right, the idea of consciousness is necessarily dualistic, and thus would have no place in non-dualism.

Another good point. An inability to see beyond intentional consciousness might be the most ubiquitous problem in modern consciousness studies. . . .

It is also worth noting that in the context of Buddhism the Yogācāra or "mind-only" school is only one among many schools. And the salient question is whether it was meant to be an ontological position rather than a phenomenological explanation of experience and a conceptual aid to practice.

I'm endorsing Middle Wat Buddhism, which is an ontology and epistemology.(since 'knowing' would be fundamental) as described by Nagarjuna, who attempted to normalize the sangha on a specific metaphysical position.
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We could equally say that being is fundamental, but 'being' is also just a word, and also misses the non-dual mark.

All the words are hopeless. Words are inherently dualistic. Really we should say 'Being/non-Being' Hence Lao Tzu states 'True words seem paradoxical'. Sri Aurobindo explains this point clearly in his 'Life Divine'. But we have to use words, and the usual words are 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss'. . . . .

I agree in the sense that it can clearly be seen that metaphysical questions are undecidable, and in that sense, it is a realization rather than a view. On the other hand, like any proposition, it is open to being negated, so someone can always hold the (erroneous or myopic) view that metaphysical questions are decidable. — Janus

Clearly seen by you and me perhaps, and Kant and most philosophers, but apparently it's not obvious to everyone.

I suppose someone can believe that two plus two equals five if they want to do so, but they cannot expect to understand mathematics. .

Just so you know, that's not an innovation on his part. It's standard axiomatic set theory. — plaque flag

Yes, but the approach is different. .

This source [ Theodore Kiesel ] places Heidegger's primary breakthrough at the lecture KNS 1919: THE IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLDVIEWS. — plaque flag

I'm not sure what this post is for.

I think we should bring our discussion to a close,. but I'll reply to your other posts first.

All is הֶבֶלl . — plaque flag

You clearly don't believe this, given your views on experience. . .

I agree that we don't have to be a great thinker in the sense of obtaining a great breakthrough that'll get us in the canon.

If you don't understand metaphysics then you don;t know whether one would have to be a great thinker to do so.
— plaque flag

I agree that facts are important, but we also have to think (reason carefully from or on the facts.)

This is the issue on which I've been trying and failing to convince you. You seem to prefer to chat about opinions and conjectures. . .

That's just it. I simply take experience as experience, as 'real.' It's you (in my view) who are simply deciding to ignore this or that aspect of experience. — plaque flag

Okay. Your a realist. I seem unable to persuade you to examine the facts of philosophy so there's no way I;m going to be able to change your mind. . .

It tries to give meaning to a metaphor --- or to a tendency to treat some experience as somehow 'unreal.' — plaque flag

What metaphor? That the space-time world is unreal (in a specific sense) is a result of analysis, not a metaphor.or anything to so with your attitude.

As I see it, we all see the same world, but we do see from different positions. You see the world and understand metaphysical questions are undecidable so that the claim fits or articulates the world.

You give offer your testimony. But (as I've stressed elsewhere), saying that P is true is just saying that you believe P. Is just claiming P. Your testimony is your testimony. And that's it. — plaque flag

If you cannot conceded that metaphysical questions are undecidable and feel it;s just my opinion then there will be no purpose in our talking about metaphysics, We can shoot the breeze about this and that,but we won;t get anywhere.

Before long you;ve got people who are content merely believing that someone is Enlightened but not really concerned to get there themselves. The belief in the distant possibility suffices (hence the envelope being the letter — plaque flag

Yes, this is an issue. But the work is not for everyone.

That metaphysical questions are undecidable is also my view. As soon as we say anything like "reality is mind-dependent' or 'being is nothing but consciousness' we have gone off-track.

Distinctions begin with consciousness. — Janus

That metaphysical questions are undecidable is not a view any more than that F=MA is a view. .

I think you should justify your dismissal of Wittgenstein. In my view, you are underrating him. I'm not his agent, and I don't take him for an authority. It's just think he deserves the fame. Same with Heidegger -- though I'd drag into Husserl more and stress some undernoticed early Heidegger (lectures 1919 on.) — plaque flag

I'd put Heidegger in a different class to Wittgenstein. I can't make head or tail of the Tractatus but the later Philosophical Investigations are naive and ill-informed. Heidegger was a great and perceptive thinker and I'm a fan, but he muddles the issues to the point of incomprehensibility and did not crack the case. (Sherlock Holmes is my model for a good philosopher, albeit he was concerned with other matters). . .

Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out.

The view I endorse may be called Transcendental or Absolute Idealism. It would not be possible to confuse this with realism. I dislike calling this Idealism, however, since there are too many ways of interpreting this word.

This is early Wittgenstein. A lean, direct presentation of nondualism.

A bit too lean for me to read it as nondualism. In any case he'd given up any hint of nondualism by the time of the Investigations.

But (I think we agree) the 'deep' subject is no longer subject but the very being of the world itself -- its only kind of being (that we can know of, speak of sensibly.)

Yes, although I'd prefer to say there is no 'deep' subject and that in the final analysis being is also non-being.
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I've look into that book, but I didn't find it gripping enough to keep going. I may give it another chance. I'm trained as a mathematician, so I recall it being technically daunting. — plaque flag

I have no comprehension of the mathematics and for philosophy it's not necessary to know more than that it works. The point is his reduction of form to formlessness, and his explanation of how the world is created by the multiplication of categorical opposites. Also, his dismissal of the idea that there is a 'set of all sets'. . .

My mere suspicion is that it'll be similar to Wittgenstein somehow, who also worked at the intersection of mysticism and logic. If you care to paraphrase the gist of the work, I'm all ears. What does it mean to you ?[/qquote]

Wittgenstein had no idea what mysticism is. From his writings it is not clear he ever read a book about it. Brown is in another league.

Roughly speaking Brown is saying that the original phenomenon is free of all distinctions, this a mathematical point, true continuum, unity or void, ((all of which are partless) and the first distinction or 'mark' in this tabula rasa is the beginning of the creation. In set theory this is the idea that for a Venn diagram the blank sheet of paper is fundamental and mathematics begins with the first mark we make or circle we draw.

Was 'Bertie' a fool ?

Only in certain respects. He failed to understand Bradley or Brown, and this was because he rejected mysticism without bothering to find out what it is. I'd say this is just plain stupid, although call him merely foolish because this was prior to the internet. He also believed that containers can contain themselves, and then wondered why he encountered a paradox in set theory, which to me looks like a careless beginner's mistake. . . , ,

Still, this is all just gossip basically

Its all relevant and interesting, but it's a bit like chatting about complex mathematics before sorting out arithmetic,

I think 'illusion' has to be a kind of metaphor here. As I see it, all 'experience' is 'real.' — plaque flag

Hmm. I see no reason to make this assumption.It;s something to work out or explore, not to preempt with assumptions.

In this context, the so-called illusion becomes so with the detachment.

Your realisation of its unreality will grows with practice, but the practice of detachment will not be enough to reveal it. It would be necessary to 'see' its unreality, and this would require realising what is not unreal. Only from the perspective of the real does the world of change seem unreal. But one can calculate its unreality for the sake of a metaphysical theory.

I transform the world into an 'empty' spectacle by a change in attitude or investment.

Maybe, but this would have nothing to do with whether or not it is unreal and some sort of illusion..

How would you define 'enlightenment'? I've tended to be wary of binary understandings of t

It is said that full enlightenment is union with reality, the death of the individual and the ego.and the transcendence of life and death. To be a little enlightened would be to have glimpsed beyond the veil and realised the possibility of being fully enlightened. Not many people can be authoritative on this topic but there is plenty of literature.

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The great thinker is only realized (for me) within my own cognition. I have to 'become' that great thinker in order to understand them. So the false humility thing is indeed a confusion, though a true humility with respect to fallible and endless interpretation is fitting. — plaque flag

Yes. Nobody can understand philosophy for us. But what I;m suggesting is that you don't need to be a great thinker to do this. One just has to take account of the facts.

Look how many great thinkers failed to understand philosophy. Clearly being a great thinker is not enough. Indeed, I sometimes wonder if being very clever is a drawback. .

You yourself say that metaphysical questions are undecidable. That's a fairly positivist claim, it seems to me. — plaque flag

I suppose you could say it;s a positive claim, but it;s not a positive metaphysical statement. Whatever it is it's a verifiable and demonstrable fact. It's the precise reason why logical positivism exists.

t's only a narrow, prejudiced version of positivism that's problematic, — plaque flag

I can agree with this. A positivism that dismisses metaphysics as meaningless is not so much extreme as simply wrong.

I'd say that those ideas and details are philosophy. Tho I will grant you that the point is to grasp some 'theorems' of value. In math, for instance, a theorem might be 'obviously' true after a certain amount of experience. But proofs are a kind of hygiene: we make sure we aren't deluded, and we find a ladder to aid the intuition that really matters. — plaque flag

They are philosophy, yes, but look where it gets the people who take this approach.

Good point about mathematics. It is this 'hygene' that I'm advocating. .

The basic affirmations of positivism are (1) that all knowledge regarding matters of fact is based on the “positive” data of experience and (2) that beyond the realm of fact is that of pure logic and pure mathematics. Those two disciplines were already recognized by the 18th-century Scottish empiricist and skeptic David Hume as concerned merely with the “relations of ideas,” and, in a later phase of positivism, they were classified as purely formal sciences. On the negative and critical side, the positivists became noted for their repudiation of metaphysics—i.e., of speculation regarding the nature of reality that radically goes beyond any possible evidence that could either support or refute such “transcendent” knowledge claims. In its basic ideological posture, positivism is thus worldly, secular, antitheological, and antimetaphysical. Strict adherence to the testimony of observation and experience is the all-important imperative of positivism.

This is exactly the sort of approach that I would warn everybody to avoid. If we do philosophy like this we will become lost forever in a muddle of ideas and details. Clearly the positivists have no understanding of metaphysics and what it does and does not prove. this passage is typical of the hopelessness of western academic philosophy. It depends on the idea that metaphysics is incomprehensible,and we might as well just speculate wildly and in all sorts of complex ways and make life hell for students of the subject. .

These are not empty words. But I can't back them up without presenting an argument and this means going back to the undecidability of metaphysical questions. . .

To me it seems you are underestimating Western philosophy. The greats have not feared to charge the edges of the map. — plaque flag

There are a few exceptions, of course, but for most philosophers it has only become practically possible to study this area of knowledge in recent times. I believe Schopenhauer was the first to dive into this rabbit hole. After hon there are others but they;re few and far between. The average professor know next to nothing on this topic. .

As you say. even those who do tend to speak vaguely and not helpfully. But please don't think the sceptical rational approach is at fault in any way. It;s t he approach I take. I;m suggesting that this approach demands a study of mysticism, and that it this is avoided it is not a sceptical rational approach. .In other words, I would accuse most philosophers in the tradition of Kant and Russell of doing t heir job badly, not of using the wrong methods. My complaint against the academic community is poor scholarship, not poor methods.

It's not my approach that is backwards, it's the approach you think I'm taking. I'm just doing philosophy the usual way. A plausible theory must be proved in logic, not just wafted around as an idea.

I;m certainly not suggesting we must settle for the 'ineffable sage'. For a not-practitioner the only way to make sense to hat such people say is a cold-hearted sceptical study of metaphysics. This is what I was suggesting earlier. It would be pointless expecting anyone to conduct a study of metaphysics and mysticism it it has to depend on ineffable ideas and unprovable conjectures.and only a great sage could understand it. I;m suggesting that most people could understand it.once they know the trick.

Of course,this approach doesn't lead to a sages understanding of the world, but understanding how to make sense of metaphysics is a much easier task.

You speak of 'verifiable facts,' but it's hard to make sense of such a phrase in the light of the assumption that only thought exists. We can roughly identity thought here with signitive intention (empty or unfulfilled or unchecked hypothesis or picture of the world). Then a fulfilled intention is us going and looking at the situation. I see that there are two eggs in the fridge. Color, shape, the cool feeling of them in my hand, the crack sound as I smack them against a cast iron edge. — plaque flag

Unless one is a meditative practitioner It would impossible to sort these issues out without a close study of metaphysics, and this would mean starting with the undecidability of metaphysical questions. This is verifiable regardless of what is and is not a thought. It is a solid foundation on which to start building an extended theory. If we cannot explain this philosophical fact then metaphysics will be incomprehensible.to us. It cannot be explained by Western thinkers, so they believe metaphysics is incomprehensible. It is explained in the perennial philosophy and in a very simple way, but most philosophers don't think this solution is worth studying .It;s an area of philosophy left blank and marked 'Here be dragons', and this is considered a rational approach to philosophy. . . ..
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But I'd say it's metaphorically nothing, unless that 'nothing' is supposed to point at the framework character of space and time. — plaque flag

Eckhart is very clear. He states they are 'literally nothing'. They are something as appearances, of course, but for an ultimate analysis they are nothing, This is the Buddha;s teaching and more generally that of the perennial philosophy. It is logically proved by the Buddhist master Nagarjuna in his 'Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way. . . . .

The Buddha's words you quote are consistent with Eckhart's statement. .

Note that I'm not claiming to be a Buddhist. Instead I'm getting a more universal (perennial?) idea of transcendence in terms of detachment. The world becomes a spectacle. We get 'distance' on it. We find ourselves less 'immersed in the object.'

We get distance by detachment, although oddly we also get closeness. But this detachment indicates an underlying truth, which is that there is nothing from which to become detached. It is all illusion, and when we see this we are finally and fully detached. The practice of detachment helps us to achieve it, but to fully achieve it requires enlightenment and an understanding of phenomena. . .

. As far as I can tell, there's not much more to be sought or had than the continual re-attainment of an always fragile state of grace or play. We always fall off the horse again, find ourselves petty and resentful, or just tormented by a health issue, or forced to deal with a dangerous situation where stress (tho never panic) is appropriate.

Do we agree on this ? Or do you find something that radically 'cures' life in what you call mysticism?

I would strongly disagree, both on logical and experiential grounds. The teachings of the Buddha are said to be a medicine and this would be the cure. It has to be self-administered since nobody can become enlightened on our behalf, but the teachings are the label on the bottle. The last of the Four Noble Truths is the cessation of suffering. At a certain point in the progress of our knowledge It is revealed as an illusion, as is the person who suffers. Nothing extended in time and space would really exist, and this would include the suffering and the sufferer. .

Those who are not fully enlightened may to some extent know this and be able to transcend suffering to some degree, but as you say they will sometimes fall off the wagon. It seems Jesus fell off for a moment,while on the cross and feared his non-suffering state had forsaken him. If you check out the story of the brutal execution of the Sufi master Al-Hallaj by the Islamic church you'll see an example of how utterly detached from life, death and suffering one can become and how stable this state is once fully attained. .

This achievement is within the power of all of us, since it is no more than a recognition of who we are. Thus the cure for suffering is to 'Know Thyself'. This is the entire method of mysticism in two words. All the rest is about helping us to succeed. .

As the mystics often say for the sake of humility,, 'Thus I have heard'.

The world is not just thought. Thought is merely something like its intelligible structure. — plaque flag

I see this as an opinion since you cannot prove it. I would suggest it's an unnecessary assumption,and that it's best not to make it. Cartesian doubt and all that. I feel it's best to start with verifiable facts and build on this foundation.

our tone has sometimes been, from my POV, too much on preachy / condescending side. I view us as doing something like science here. When you bash Wittgenstein (a primary influence on this thread), you sound a bit crankish (a bit envious-bitter maybe of the fame of the charismatic man .) And you speak of Russell thinking Wittgenstein was a fool, but that's contrary to the well known details of their story. I've read biographies of both. And this is not a matter of my sentimental attachment. If you recklessly speak contrary to the facts or tear down the 'mighty dead,' then that's a stumblingblock to your credibility. You ought to explain how all the other shrewd readers could be so silly as to get things so wrong. — plaque flag

All this is very fair. I should have been more careful.

Russell did express uncertainty as to whether Wittgenstein was a genius or a fool, and it's true that I think he is not worth reading. As you say, however, I can't just waive my arms around but must make the case.

I should have made it clear that I think most of western philosophy is also a waste of time. Nobody claims to understand philosophy and it just just goes round and round in circles. In the perennial tradition people who don't understand the topic don't write about it. . . .

I once spoke on the phone with George Spencer Brown, a colleague of Russell's, and asked him why Russell had been unable to see the meaning of Brown's book Laws of Form,, which is of vast importance in metaphysics.,despite praising it as presenting a valuable new calculus. He replied in a friendly and wistful tone, 'Ah, Bertie was a fool'. This does appear to be the explanation and it is my view also.

I'm afraid that from the perspective on anyone who has understood the perennial philosophy people like Russell and Wittgenstein look foolish for not studying it and for not understanding philosophy as a consequence.

This attitude looks arrogant and deluded to others, since most people think they know that philosophy cannot be understood and is like quantum mechanics,such that anyone who claims to understand it must be unable to understand it. Meanwhile, in the perennial tradition many people claim to understand it and it is an expectation of students that one day they will. .

Of course, both were very clever people. Russell was brilliant as a communicator and deserves respect for his his activism on social issues, nuclear arms for instance. But like his protege he failed to solve any problems, refused to study mysticism and made surprisingly basic mistakes. . .

I completely understand the point you make here. and normally you'd be completely right to make it. The point for me though is that we cannot understand philosophy unless we can see the mistakes made by Russell and Wittgenstein that prevented then from doing so, and once we have done so they do appear rather foolish. If I make any bold remarks that look naive or deluded then you can always ask me to put my money where my mouth is and justify them.

But okay, I see your point and should have been more circumspect. My impatience with the western academic approach to philosophy got the better of me. The 'mighty dead' you speak of were in some ways mighty, but if they did not understand philosophy then their mightiness was of limited scope. .

I appreciate that you were very polite about it, but it seems a bit brutal to just stop talking without an explanation.

Could you just quote the words that caused your reaction? I was stunned by it and would genuinely like to know what I said that caused the problem.

This is not a philosophical way of doing business. I think for now we should take a break in the conversation. But no hard feelings. I just think it'll be counterproductive to proceed, given our apparently very different conceptions of what kind of conversation this forum is for. — plaque flag

I'd say it's the only way to do business.

I stated that metaphysical questions are undecidable. What else can this forum be for than exploring the facts? Are you suggesting this isn't a fact? It's been known for thousands of years.

I thought you were trying to untangle philosophy, in which case the facts are the place to start. . .

I'm not the one who denies time. Indeed, I'm insisted that being is time in some sense. I write of 'interpenetrating worldstreamings.' In this context, structure is something constant in the flux. For instance, physicists once talked of the conservation of energy. Or there's the tripartite 'care structure' of the stretch moment mentioned above, inspired by Husserl and Heidegger. So one can, in my view, have nothing at all without time. — plaque flag

Exactly! And no-thing is precisely what we need as the ultimate for a systematic fundamental theory. Again, Kant proves this. At any rate, mysticism will make no sense to anyone who reifies time or space.

"Verily, if the reader can break down the power which the notion of extension has over his own mind, he will have gone a long way in preparing himself for the Awakening.

Franklin Merrell-Wolff – Pathways Through to Space

In the same vein, Meister Eckhart dismisses space-time phenomena as 'literally nothing'.
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Not disagreeing, but Why ? — plaque flag

Because it's a matter of logic and experience. Kant famously makes the case. Even in modern astrophysics this is recognised, hence Victor Stenger's idea of creation from nothing.

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Not trying to be difficult, but the expectation in a context like ours is that one justify grand claims of that nature. I readily grant that adopting the role of the critical-discursive philosopher in the first place is optional. Most of us here live in free societies where the problem is people being too bored with spiritual babble of strangers to be offended by anything more than the buttonholing itself, with the incommodious proselytizing form rather than the content. Too many fathers, not enough sons, that sort of thing. — plaque flag

Sorry to be dense, but I don't know what this means.

I don't nee to work hard to justify what I said. I was agreeing with just about every philosopher who ever lived. It is simply a fact that metaphysical questions are undecidable. This is the reason such questions are called antinomies. There's nothing mysterious about it and it's common knowledge. . . . . .

I’m aware that the classical understanding of the ultimately real is the eternally unchanging. My argument is that the idea of seeing beyond time to some sort of awareness or reality is incoherent. To be aware is to change. Pure anything , including pure timelessness, is not Being but the definition of death itself. — Joshs

You'll find that your view does not allow you to make sense of metaphysics or consciousness. You call this unchanging reality the 'classical understanding', but in fact it's the understanding of anyone who dives deeply into consciousness even today. You're speaking of ordinary awareness, which as you say requires change and time.

But in a way you're right, it is a definition of death. Thus the prophet Mohammed advises, ;Die before your death', which all the realised masters advise. For a deeper view of consciousness and time one would have to explore beyond life and death. Those who succeed in this,endeavour, the Dalai Lama tells us, do not experience death.

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A question that might be asked is whether this is true by definition --- whether we tend to understand 'Being' [the truly real ] precisely in terms of constant presence. If so, is this a bias ? — plaque flag

Good point. But it;s not a definition. It;s a result of analysis. A fundamental theory must reduce space-time, motion and change.

Heraclitus points out that in the world of time there is constant change but does not suggest this is the fundamental nature of reality. Heraclitus and Parmenides are easy to reconcile. .

Much of the radicality of Being and Time is perhaps in its claim or suggestion (according to some) that being is time. This is maybe like Heraclitus making the Flux itself most real.

I have a boo here with the subtitle 'Buddhist Explorations in Consciousness and Time. Here the word 'and' is highly significant. I wouldn't agree that Heraclitus reified the flux.

My own view is that discursive philosophers really can't help looking for atemporal structure.

I feel the phrase 'atemporal structure is an oxymoron. How can one have a structure without time?

Wittgenstein tried to express the logical form of [the conceptual aspect of] the world....

I can never grasp why anyone reads Wittgenstein. ThePhilosophical Investigations reveal no grasp of the issues. Even his mentor Russell suspected he was a fool.

For the logical form of the conceptual aspect of the world you can't do better than George Spencer Brown in his Laws of Form. To investigate this issue means examining naive set theory and solving Russell's Paradox. This allows us to dive deeper than the conceptual aspect. .

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I like Emerson also. Nietzsche is a great thinker but Emerson is nearer the mark for me.

Not to be difficult, but claiming that all metaphysical questions are undecidable seems to decide an important metaphysical question. — plaque flag

It is simply a fact. All selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. This is demonstrable and old news. Figuring out what it implies for the world is the entire secret of metaphysics. . . .