No such thing as a short translation. But a translation exists here, Godel's pp. 4-39, but other treasures in the book, e,g., pp. 305-337, by Emil Post, although this one starts easy and gets hard.:

https://www.amazon.com/Undecidable-Propositions-Unsolvable-Computable-Mathematics/dp/0486432289/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=The+Undecidable%2C+davis&qid=1616602363&s=books&sr=1-1

And cheaper here:

https://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?cm_sp=SearchF-_-topnav-_-Results&ds=20&kn=the%20undecidable%2C%20davis&sts=t — tim wood

Thank you; these are invaluable.

Well, I'm only guessing at this point but your objections seem to have its roots in a weltangschauung that, true or false, gives math a kind of privileged status which I presume is that of math as some kind ultimate Tertön but I'm taking a different approach, an approach which treats math as only one of many facets to reality, comparable in more ways than just that of being different windows to the world. — TheMadFool

That may be, but I was merely seeking to reassert the epistemic character of Mathematics, as a discipline. It's not as though two, distinctive modalities can be integrated seamlessly (and there are few modalities less comparable, than that of purely subjective Philosophy, and Mathematics).

I do concur with you, on the front that it's one of many facets to reality; I solely believe that mitigating the chasms it shares with other facets of reality, is not a straightforward objective.

In the same way that words have to be spelled correctly. Except that as a practical matter, words do not really have to be spelled correctly - colse cna wrok. But not in math. To say that thirteen is almost divisible by four is to say that thirteen is not divisible by four, and sometimes the does it or doesn't it is what matters. — tim wood

That's certainly a thought-provoking analogy.

If the notion of Gödel divisibility was of an exact accuracy, though, one might witness a multitude of surprising repercussions emerge. Wouldn't it then be plausible, to Gödel code every unsolved hypothesis - and reverse-trace an axiomatic proof? I'm certain the idea exists at a concrete threshold; only one far more intricate than arithmetic divisibility.

Btw, I see above you're reading an online paper of about 150+ pages, Godel's theorem itself is about 34 pages, and very readable. Even a non-math person like me, with a little effort and work, can get most of it. Of course there are subtleties, like the depth of water under the ice you're skating on. But if the ice is good and skating is what you're doing, then why break through it? — tim wood

I've searched comprehensively for short translations of Gödel's 1931 paper, to no success. I do, nonetheless, intend to learn the language of formal logic, prior to readily engaging in the paradigm (such that to learn Gödel incompleteness with the context it was synthesized in); the 150-page variant is consistent with the second phase.

To me, yes. All the words I listed can be made precise with math and thereby hangs a tale. — TheMadFool

Wait - isn't that tremendously ambitious? Words themselves can be made precise, but the sentences they're placed in are far more subjective. In order to express a qualitative construct, in a mathematical model - it's almost paramount that one first find an intermediary, that allows the entirety of the construct to be amenable to quantitative manipulation.

Propositional logic, for example, acts as an equivalent intermediary (between generic, philosophical statements and First-order logic).

Furthermore, several mathematical edifices are exclusionary to quantitative discourse.

For instance, Functions pertain to continuous variables across domains, that are mapped onto (quantitative) output spaces. Under what circumstance, might one be able to repurpose them to philosophical conveyance?

For anyone who doesn't know: Identity theory in philosophy of mind is the theory that mental states are brain states. Your anger/love/pain/joy is, ontologically, exactly, the firing of certain neurons and the movement of certain chemicals. — khaled

Having read your delineation, I'm conjecturing that Identity Theory encapsulates the two, following meanings:

• Certain mental states are engendered by neuronal states - that is to say, neuronal configurations selectively demonstrate psychological ramifications.
  
• There exists no mental abstraction or event, that can't be rationalized neurologically.

First and foremost, there'll always remain an indeterminacy at the heart of the mind-body problem. That's (perhaps) a precursor to several misgivings against Identity Theory; you can't assert the two propositions above, without being empirically speculative. With premeditated biological models, you can merely approximate a predictive model of cognition - as opposed to creating a satisfactory and infallible scheme, for deriving answers to unforeseen questions.

Personally, I adhere to Epiphenomenalism in this regard, insofar as there's no reciprocal determinism between mental and physical events; there's solely a one-way causation - that, in and of itself, is not exhaustive.

Hi, I am a theist and I have a question for atheists. I hope this does not cause too much turmoil. Do atheists actively not want God to exist? I am aware that many atheists come to their conclusion because they believe God is impossible and other reasons. However, is there ever an element of not wanting God to exists? I hope this makes sense. — Georgios Bakalis

Atheists (and I may be resting this fallaciously) are individuals solely identified by a non-belief in God; whether they find God heartwarming or authoritarian, is immaterial to whether they are atheistic.

Anti-theists, on the contrary, are fervently averse to theistic ideas (eg. Christopher Hitchens). Antitheism almost invariably subsumes atheism, whilst atheism may not have an additive perspective on theological belief.

Words like "congruence", "symmetry", "asymmetry", "equality", "function", and loads of other words with mathematical meaning do pop up frequently in philosophical discourse. — TheMadFool

They may bear mathematical significance, but is their invocation necessarily in a mathematical context?

Even if they aren't (strictly), though - one can always endeavor to quantify philosophical communication.

First-order predicate calculus, for example, was derived from a quantification of propositional logic - which, in turn, is sentential (quintessential of any mode of discourse).

Yes, he himself says he is simplifying it, but I does give one a rough idea about it, which I thought was a good start for TheMadFool. — Amalac

It's an excellent resource, for anyone seeking to immerse in the concept.

If only the particulars were that elementary, though - Gödel might have devised a pathway, to resolving all of mathematical enigma. Reverse-mathematics, unsurprisingly enough, is likely to have been standardized.

This Numberphile video might help:

https://youtu.be/O4ndIDcDSGc

(Around 5:32 he starts to talk about Gödel numbering) — Amalac

That's an engaging talk, and certainly an unsophisticated introduction of the idea. It may consist, nonetheless, of certain oversimplifications (which might be worth mentioning).

For instance, at one phase, it asserts that the provability of a theorem hinges on its Gödel number being divisible, by the Gödel numbers of a formalized system's constituent axioms. I'm hardly acquainted with the specifics of Gödel Coding, but that appears to be an overly reductionist idea (acknowledged, of course, by the professor).

Oh, citation/reference/evidence please? — tim wood

We don't reside in a world, that confers any value to evidence anymore. I'm not denigrating anyone, but @Gary Enfield is adhering to a nonstandard interpretation, without disconfirming the specifics of its antithesis (on which there exists an empirical consensus: Hubble's Law).

The overall effect is still that things had to travel faster than the speed of light to get from the Big Bang point, to the extremities of what we can see and theorize about in the universe, in absolute terms. Nobody knows how big the Universe is because we can't see its outer limits (if indeed, there are any). — Gary Enfield

C remains insurmountable, solely under the following prerequisites (I may be mistaken, but this is a canonical interpretation):

If a massive body were to traverse alongside a beam of light, on a flat space-time fabric (the intuitive analog of a four-dimensional Pseudo-Riemannian manifold), then it'd be unable - with any degree of acceleration, to surpass that beam. If there exist crevasses or protrusions within that manifold, such as a metric tensor defining a traversable Einstein-Rosen bridge, a massive body might be able to encompass an otherwise spacelike distance, that a beam of light would cease to trace on a flattened variant of the continuum.

Space-time fabrics, nonetheless, are tractable - if they expand, they necessarily elongate the relative distances between any two bodies on them. @jkg20 delineated this idea, earlier; you can't characterize space, with a normative velocity. I hope you'll attribute any degree of credence to a (reverified) Wikipedia article on the construct (insofar as you won't be incorrigible, or obstinate):

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expansion_of_the_universe

The benefit of doubt in the context of babble is inconsequential. — jgill

I'm sorry; I didn't quite grasp this - can you elaborate on what you meant?

At this pace, we'll witness every letter of the English Alphabet being summoned for denotation (under this thread).

It's invigorating, though. When I commenced this discussion, I'd never envisioned my own ignorance of the subject it pertained to. Nevertheless, this has been a revelation.

To grasp how exactly it all works and makes perfect and rigorous sense, you really would need to read a book in mathematical logic — TonesInDeepFreeze

For anybody who's enthused and willing, here's a thorough exposition of Gödel incompleteness - distilled in formal logic. I'm reading it, too.

https://www.math.wisc.edu/~miller/old/m571-08/smith.pdf

I'll call that statement C* (it is a part of the incompleteness theorem C). Both C and C* are not stated in the language of F, but rather in a meta-language for F. And neither C nor C* are the Godel-sentence. In other words, the statement of the incompleteness theorem is different from the Godel-sentence that is used to prove the incompleteness theorem. — TonesInDeepFreeze

What's a meta-language for F? Does that imply that C, and C* are statements that concern or describe the language of F?

Force equals mass times acceleration, F=ma, and energy equals mass times the squared speed of light, E=m(c^squared).

If we solve for mass and then equate, F/a=E/(c^squared), and cross multiplying yields Ea=F(c^squared). — Enrique

This is terribly unprincipled. F=MA is a Newtonian approximation, that disintegrates in special-relativistic (or for that matter, general-relativistic) contexts - from which the latter formulation stems. You can't interchange the two, without discounting the argument of relativistic mass (which is inextricably associated with the work encompassed by a body). F = dp/dt, with an updated Lorentz factor, may be an appropriate substitute. Physics isn't so exoteric, such that it lends itself to a mindless coalescence of equations, with an approach bereft of a priori significance.

https://qr.ae/pGX0v5

If motion is fundamentally supraspatiotemporal, it seems plausible that light can be part of a large spectrum that extends in the direction of more rapid speeds, while the acceleration of massive bodies towards light speed constitutes a very narrow range of material occurrence. — Enrique

What, on Earth, is 'supraspatiotemporal'?

For those knowledgeable about physics, what is the significance of ft=1? It seems that as energy increases, time contraction occurs, and if the energy increase is nonlinear by whatever measure, time will contract nonlinearly, perhaps exponentially. Maybe a constant would be necessary to scale this properly. Distance and wavelength probably need to be defined with more precision, even though the equation in this crude form does capture the essence of correlations being considered. — Enrique

Time contraction, in special-relativistic contexts, is engendered by a local constancy of the speed of light in (presumed) Minkowski Spaces; that is to say, c remains intractable to inertial reference frames.
You can't passively adhere to that idea, whilst simultaneously espousing tachyons - or variable lightspeeds.

Try reading three threads I posted awhile back at this site to get a feel for the concepts, which seem to be unprecedented:

Qualia and Quantum Mechanics
Qualia and Quantum Mechanics, The Sequel
Qualia and Quantum Mechanics, the Reality Possibly — Enrique

Why is it, that there seems to exist an unrelenting fixation on integrating QM with metaphysical ideas? Quantum Mechanics is the hallmark of Mathematical Physics; it entails Wavefunction Collapses, Hilbert Spaces, PDFs, Dirac Matrices and Path Integrals; Qualia, on the contrary, pertains to human consciousness. In what fictitious universe, are the two intertwined with one another?

Causation at the quantum scale happens almost instantaneously, and the elapsed time is faster the more high energy the matter is. Some of the highest energy matter on Earth is electricity, for it is made up of maximally compacted electrons. This high energy means that it conveys quantum entanglement effects more robustly than probably any alternate form of Earthbound matter.

The brain with its one hundred trillion synaptic connections is an extremely powerful electric field, and so radiates quantum causation like an electron differential or electrical potential sun, seemingly entangled with surrounding matter in an instantaneous way that defies the laws of classical physics. This can perhaps explain the mystical experiences such as synchronicity that many have, and the philosophical doctrine of “all is mind” which we see surfacing throughout history. — Enrique

With all due respect, are you not being dishonest to yourself? You're sermonizing in a manner quintessential of fraudulent proponents of Quantum Mysticism, such as Deepak Chopra. What does the term 'quantum causation' convey, precisely? Why would you bring 'synchronicity', to the fore? What's an 'electron differential'? I'm not a Physicist, but you're demonstrating an utter apathy, to the overarching subject that you're sourcing fragmentary ideas from.

Vast difference between quantum and classical phenomena can be explained by the deep disjunct between subatomic and macroatomic scales. The subatomic scale contains all the energy of the classical scale, but the relatively tiny diameter of its highest probability concentrations compared to the total probability wave means that a huge time contraction is in effect, making the relative motions of subatomic matter almost instantaneous. This can be contrasted with the greater continuity of macroatomic to macroscopically Earthlike scales that produces dynamics of classical physics. — Enrique

Are you referring, in part, to the probabilistic nature of Schrodinger's Wavefunction? If so, can you elucidate the nature of the time contraction you're interpreting? For instance, are the notions of 'energy' you've readily apprehended, conceptually attached to the Hamiltonian Operators and Time-Evolution of a model particle? What formalism are you construing them in, from a mathematical perspective?

If you're undertaking an epistemic pursuit inside a rarefied framework (Physics inclusive), then do so in a manner that is adherent, and respectful of that framework. If you don't, you appeal neither to the scientific method - nor a purely nonscientific one. You're entrapped instead, in a pseudoscientific paradigm.

1 Doesn't really break the "no object faster than the speed of light" principle: as per my post above, the speed that galaxies appear to be receding at is a function of both the velocity of the galaxy which is sublight and the expansion rate of space, which is not a speed at all. — jkg20

That's an exemplary clarification - and simultaneously what I was pensive over, having read the comment. Universal expansion isn't characterized by a velocity; it's empirically derived by an (approximately) linear gradient mapping of the Hubble Constant, onto observed recessionary velocities against their distances from Earth.

You know, you sound very authoritative in all this, but I don't have the knowledge to engage you, and I don't know if you actually know what you are talking about. But I give you the benefit of the doubt. It would be good if kenosha kid or another real physicists would comment. — jgill

That's an affirmative stance, but is it necessarily wise to accord a benefit of doubt, prior to witnessing an even partial demonstration of an argument's veracity?

Smacks of suicide, and I ain’t done yet, so......no. — Mww

I'm inquisitive, though; is your decisiveness on this subject predicated solely on mitigating against the eventuality of your own demise, or is it at all characterized by a larger reverence of the human race?

No, the opposite. First-order logic subsumes propositional logic. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, that's what I meant with the term 'corollary'. First-order logic, in most contexts, cannot exist without an underlying propositional logic (once again, unless I'm mistaken).

I cannot make sense of that. I don't know what you mean by "a set of ideas that stemmed from propositional conventions, which were then affixed with arithmetic operators". — TonesInDeepFreeze

If logical propositions can be quantified with quantifiers, then can they not (equivalently) be mediated with arithmetic operators (that is to say, 'adding' and 'subtracting' propositional conditions from one another)?

Just please do not ask me to press the button. — Sir2u

Press the button.

'self-consistency' is not ordinarily used in the sense of "proves its own consistency". Rather, 'self-consistency' is just a longer phrase for 'consistency'.

A theory is consistent if and only if there is not a formula such that the theory proves both the formula and the negation of the formula. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I was merely shortening (with 'self-consistency'), how I communicated the notion of a (system) proving its own consistency; it may not have been of appropriacy.

Do you mean that there are only a finite number of axioms? Or do you mean that the axioms entail that there are only finite sets, or something like that? — TonesInDeepFreeze

- a finite number of axioms.

Do you mean to ask whether there are theories stronger than PA that are incomplete. Yes.

Or theories with all the axioms of PA plus more axioms and that are incomplete? Yes. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Both; as long as it doesn't consist solely of PA. Thank you, for clarifying that the answer is affirmative either way.

I don't know what you mean by 'proof-statement correspondences' nor what you mean by 'underlying logical edifice'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

First-order logic (unless I'm mistaken) is a corollary of propositional logic, insofar as it quantifies the interrelations between its subjects - as opposed to delineating them with logical connectives. With a 'logical edifice', I was referring to a set of ideas that stemmed from propositional conventions, which were then affixed with arithmetic operators. Won't any constraints on the latter, inclusive of Gödel incompleteness, emerge for the former (propositional ideas)? Is this formulation, any more intelligible?

Sincerely I say that your understanding of this subject would depend on familiarizing yourself with good books or articles on it, and with that you would have recognizable terminology in which to couch your questions about it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

'Godel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide To Its Use And Abuse' - Torkel Franzen
Probably the best book ever written for introducing the subject of incompleteness for everday readers. — TonesInDeepFreeze

That's most certainly an endeavor of mine. I'm not as educated on this subject as you are, since propositional calculus (and its formalized language) is a rarefied discipline. Hopefully, nonetheless, I'll one day be able to contextualize Gödel's incompleteness theorems - as they are meant to be.

I think the idea is that any system of sufficient power is subject to Godelian self-referential sentences that are in that system unprovable, but provable in an expanded system that incudes the sentence as an axiom, that extendibility into the transfinite. But if you run with this, your almost certainly running into speculation, which Godel really is not about. — tim wood

Why is it speculative, though?

Where do you find such terminology in discussions of incompleteness? Where did you read such things? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Neither of them are terminological, in the first place.

If a theory is recursively axiomatizable, sufficiently arithmetically expressive, and consistent (let's call these 'G-theories'), then it is incomplete, no matter whether the set of axioms is finite or infinite. Some theories that are not G- theories are complete (and some are finitely axiomatizable). — TonesInDeepFreeze

Here's the crux of the question I was posturing - insofar as arithmetic expression and consistency are prerequisites to Gödel incompleteness.

What lack of consistency? Incompleteness doesn't say that e.g. PA or ZFC are inconsistent. Rather, a proof of consistency is not available within their own systems. — TonesInDeepFreeze

That is literally, what 'self-consistency' denotes (demonstrating a self-referential consistency, from within a system).

Some theories are recursively axiomatizable with even an infinite set of axioms. For some reason you are stuck on a notion of finite axiomatization that is not relevant in this regard. — TonesInDeepFreeze

There's no fixation on 'finite axiomatization' - I'm only asking whether given a condition of axiomatic finiteness, Gödel incompleteness extends outside Peano Arithmetic.

Also, 'elementary' has a technical meaning different from your use. — TonesInDeepFreeze

What are the (formal) subtleties?. What does a non-elementary axiom entail?

You shouldn't generalize about "logical systems" but rather you should be accurate by addressing just G-theories in this context. And the answer is yes; to prove the consistency of a G-theory we have to do that in some other theory (which itself could be another G-theory). For example, Z set theory proves the consistency of PA. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Discerning which generalizations are appropriate, and which aren't, was the predominant objective of this thread. G-theories, as I'm sure you'd concur, are not a trivial subset of all logical formalisms. If, for example, one were to create and quantify a logical edifice (with arithmetic), might the Gödelian constraints on certain proof-statement correspondences in formal languages, lend itself to the underlying logical edifice?

That's virtually what the question's intent is, though - whether one would render the end of the human race, instantaneously - with no immediate sensory consequences (inclusive of suffering and pain), whatsoever. I'm not certain that euthanasia is an appropriate characterization, however (since it's willful, and as a term caters to individuals).

Having said that: my personal world turned inside out in May when my husband dissected his aorta, ascending and descending. COVID restrictions were in place and for weeks he was on a ventilator, brain bleed and blood pressure so high they couldn't move him for 4 days into the CT machine to see if he was "in" there. He survived and our youngest son and I kept our personal business alive for the 7 weeks before we could ask him questions. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Firstly, I'm apologetic for the personal adversities you have had to confront, and I'm thrilled that your family remains intact and well. If anything, how you've emerged in its aftermath is a testament to how valiant and forbearing you've been, which in turn is an affirming revelation. Quite truthfully, your story's both solemn and inspirational. Thank you, for sharing it.

My answer is an evolving yes. Not only yes but HELL yes. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

That is, naturally, a compelling answer. I've continually vacillated on the subject, partially since I haven't lived a life long enough to be decisive, and partially as a result of its gargantuan ramifications. Ultimately, though, meaning that is derived from ennoblement (overcoming chaos and uncertainty) and living a virtuous life (staying true to yourself, despite every incentive not to), is perhaps the best fortification against nihilism. It isn't flawless, but nonetheless mitigates against the emergence of self-resentment, and by extension misanthropic constructs.

Fastest way: Godel's theorems are rigorous arguments with a rigorously determined subject matter. We understand, then, or not, or to some degree which itself requires gauging. Interpretation, on the other hand, is all the area outside the rigor, and while some fun, even poetically interesting, most is nonsense. — tim wood

Interpretations may not be sacrosanct to formalized systems of logic, but are they truly nonsensical? Any epistemological modality that isn't purely formalized, is likely underpinned and inspired by interpretations. Not all of them have to be whimsical, or poetically arbitrary; oftentimes, they're necessary in discerning or directing what neither empiricism, nor formal logic can (eg - hidden variable theories in canonical QM paradigms).

1) Any arithmetic model? No. — tim wood

Thanks - that's what the literature suggests, too.

2) Crisis at the heart? No — tim wood

Once again, a presumed extension of the first answer.

3) Transcending systems? No. Although one can think about the system as a system, from "outside" of the system. In this instance called meta-mathematical thinking. And I think that one solves all Godelian problems by adding as axioms the critical sentences. In any case, there is no "Royal road to knowledge" certainly with respect to Godel's theories and thinking, there's just the work of it. — tim wood

Contemplating a system externally, is what I meant by 'transcending' them.

Isn't there, however, a self-perpetuating element to Gödel incompleteness (that is, irrespective of how many new axioms one defines a set or structure with, an unprovable sentence can always be derived within it)?

Have I entertained the idea of: before rushing back in, that I take a look at what it is that I am rushing back to and if it is worthy of returning to? — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Yes, that is precisely what I was asking.

And as many times as life breaks us down, we have the ability to rise again — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Before resurfacing from unrelenting tragedy, which we most certainly can, have we ever asked whether to rise?

Artistic license accords expressive liberty, irrespective of wherein it manifests. As long as it doesn't detract from or obfuscate the precise meaning of a statement, it is designed to be accommodated for.

Going 'gentle', on a sidenote, may not be lexically incorrect; 'gentle' merely describes the state of an agent 'going' somewhere - it doesn't have to qualitatively characterize how that agent is headed.

Artistic license, in all probability.

Prior to commenting, I'll preface my stance on the philosophical implications of a purportedly infallible society, under the reasonable inference that a society is best characterized as comprising a state of collective being.

Conjuring an idyllic state of being, under any doctrine, is terribly perilous in my estimate. It's far wiser to devise a mechanism of approximation to an idyllic state, and valorously adhere to the mechanism under the foreknowledge of its finiteness, as opposed to living under the disillusionment of its possibility. Deceit, malevolence, and every other vice that may be complicit in social adversity, is innately entrenched into the recesses of the human condition - to the extent that its manifestation is necessitated by the very existence of a human society. Devising an equivalent state of being in abstract principle is entirely affirming - as long as one refrains from anthropomorphisms in relation to that principle.

'I personally have tried to make a utopia but have been unsuccessful and will only be pointing out flaws rather than giving my own utopia as I am conflicted between many.'

Utopias are inexistent fictions. In order to construct a universally ideal society, one must necessarily convene on a universal conception of what idealism entails. Economic predicaments are oftentimes successful in elucidating this impediment. What might better approximate an ideal society; a) individual sovereignty in the form of untrammeled capitalism, that invariably engenders Pareto Inequities through accumulated wealth, and exploits differences in human merit, or b) a society bereft of abject poverty, that permeates asymmetric socialist constraints, progressive taxation and securities, whilst curtailing free enterprise? Political philosophies may also be analogous in this regard. To ethnocentrists, an ethnically homogenous society, subservient to totalitarian dictates, in the aftermath of a genocide, may well be unconsciously idealistic in comparison to a secular democracy.

One can, of course, maximize optimally on a cohort of dimensions that are widely consecrated; human welfare, mutual cultural appreciation, atheistic and theistic liberty, and the freedom of speech may all be intertwined with conceptions of a society whose contents are immune both to falsification, and to being ameliorated. Aside from being an imaginative exercise, nonetheless, there's no measurable utility in synthesizing an ideal social schematic. One may demonstrate aspirational proclivities in doing so, and yet the material aim to which they may be ascribed, will forever remain elusive.

'You are the one who said passivity, not hypocrisy, leads to complicity.'

Hypocrisy complements passivity. Acting against one's exhortations is another way of circumventing them, because one continues rationalizing those acts to themselves.

'I guess where I'm still confused is that you talk about "behavioural consistency" but then you bring up issues like identity politics, genocide, dictatorships and issues that have, well, nothing to do with my behaviour.'

I'm invoking these issues not in the context of their existence, but in the context of how individuals regard them. I'm criticizing proponents of their own sovereignty and free speech, who simultaneously adhere to and act passively in light of political correctness. I'm criticizing proponents of religiously motivated sentience and benevolence, who repeatedly bring ethno-nationalists into hegemony. None of those conflicts are independent of one's behavior in the slightest.

'Which is it? Are you asking me to i.e "resent discourtesy and thus be courteous" and "be the change you want to see in the world" or are you asking me to work towards reforming the government, protesting animal cruelty and doing charity work?'

I'm not asking you to elect either. Resenting discourtesy, and thus being courteous is the principle that I'm laying forth. Reform the government, feed stray animals, or engage in literally any other exercise, but act consistently with your ideals and use resentment against a defiance of your values as a means to do so.

'I need unnatural motivation for that, you say, all that will work is a deep, sustained resentment of the condemned act or acts which go against my values. It's not exactly clear what I have to do, what I need to achieve or how much I need to do.'

I'm stating that sustained resentment is a precondition. Without it, people are neither deplored by themselves, or their acquaintances, to the extent that they will undertake substantive changes to their behavior. I'm not dictating the categories, expanse or consequence of those behaviors - but only that those behaviors can be engendered by hatred.

'Passivity leads to complicity, you say? You have found a way to condemn swathes of innocent people for doing literally nothing with horrible crimes you aren't seeing them address, I suppose. Of the potentially hundreds of problems an individual can take moral issue with, how many do they need to address? Go save a cat, feed the homeless, a different rally for each day of the week, maintain a blog devoted to activism, do charity work instead of a holiday? It's not good enough to just live honestly without bothering anyone? That's the same as being complicit with all you find morally repugnant? Heh, okay.'

I'm not denigrating people who live their lives honestly without bothering others. I'm criticizing those who claim to themselves a moral ideal, and then live in a manner that is unrepresentative of that ideal. If a result of that is a condemnation of everyday individuals for being passive to the evils they desecrate, but fail to address - then yes. I'm not furthering the idea of changing the world to one's own will. I'm furthering the idea of changing how one acts in response to the world, in recognition of their will.

'We should be aiming to tolerate difference instead of turning every moral issue into a battleground. Most people don't have a clue anyway, got people yelling "death to capitalism" without being able to define it. Isn't there a middle ground between hypocrisy and activism, where someone just lives in accordance with their principles?'

'Death to capitalism' isn't a consequence of a moral misgiving; it's a consequence of structural asymmetries in capitalis that result in practical distresses to millions. Pareto inequities are inevitable. Corruption is inevitable. How do you incentivise people to congregate on the matter, when half of them live in affluence, and the other in abject poverty? All I'm stating that living in accordance with one's principles isn't as straightforward as superficial riddances of guilt - you need a lasting mechanism by which to do so - and sustained contentment, when channeled accurately can serve as one.

'If a misanthrope were channelling their contempt for mankind in an uncivil or violent way, towards those doing that which they passionately hate, that would make more sense to me than what you're saying. You know damn well that many of the things in your OP shouldn't be treated with civility, it's just a matter of where you draw the line. For many of the issues in the US polarisation and across the world, it's not an ideological game, people's lives are at stake. Why would you ask for moral zealotry, to the extent where a person should live life orientated around their moral ideals, but then expect no serious consequences, only people politely minding their business, bettering themselves and leading by example?'

I'm not asking anybody to abandon their civility. Qualms against harming others are also moral traits. Why can't both take place simultaneously? You don't have to be unhinged to be behaviorally consistent with what you claim to yourself. This isn't ideological zealotry. This is sustained, value-driven resentment. I'm not resenting another individual. I'm resenting their acts, and what they embody, and then seeking to reverse them in my own life.

'I don't know why you're so insistent on using the term when your usage is just going to mislead people into thinking you're saying something different than you are, it's part of why it's taken so long just to understand what your argument is.'

Misanthropy is a general disinclination of a human being towards his own species. Beyond that, I really don't think there are any universal strictures on who a misanthrope is, or isn't. I understand that most are defined solely on the basis on the arbitrary concept of hatred, but one can be a misanthrope for various causes, and in a variety of ways. I'm simply positing that an individual's misanthropic tendencies in this respect can be channeled and repurposed, and therefore should be neither underappreciated or rejected in a philosophical context. I don't think my use of the term is misleading to the extent that it equivocates my argument.

'Do you adhere to this position? It seems to contradict what you just wrote two posts ago about the political situation in the US.'

I'm simply adhering to the idea that passivity leads to complicity. As far as my comments on US politics are concerned, I simply happened to pinpoint that polarization in that instance has been caused by ideological collectivism, as opposed to genuine and meaningful moral differences. How are the two related?

'So you haven't been able to find highly motivated people, motivated in part or entirely by their values or moral beliefs, who don't rely on sustained hatred?'

I personally believe that a rare few individuals are motivated by the fact of their values, and that instead most are driven by egotistic instincts that they cease to acknowledge, and falsify as representations of their ideals. Subconsciously conflating intelligence with sentience is a quintessential example. Sustained resentment, for me, is not a necessity to this motivation. Its concept, however, deserves greater emphasis - both in terms of its ability to act as a catalyst and for what it speaks about an individual's moral constitution.

'So, you want people to be intensely passionate about sustaining how much they hate animal abuse but how do they embody the rejection or become the antithesis of that?'

Becoming the antithesis of what one detests will be never reliant solely on resentment, but on one's resolve and internal consistencies. In this instance, being contemptuous of oneself, and of others who engage in the acts of animal cruelty, should manifest first with personal measures (perhaps of veganism, or assisting stray animals). When this is accomplished, one may attempt to disseminate those very same virtues, by example (not in a pervasive, but civil manner), to the rest of society.

'I don't believe what you're describing bears any resemblance to misanthropy. You're seemingly unwilling to condemn even the guilty, let alone the entire species? Honestly, I still struggle to understand how your philosophy deviates from a person simply being their normal self.'

I understand why my arguments in favor of misanthropy appear dissociated from what misanthropy generally implies, but the concept plays a significant role in what I'm laying forth.

Before acting on any human vice, one must necessarily first discern it. Upon recognizing it, most individuals will engage in an iinstantaneous reaction, or otherwise impermanent sentiment of hatred, and then proceed with their lives without a second thought. I believe in replacing that with genuine, sustained discontentment against the evils that one perceives, occasionally attributed to the whole of humanity. Being passive in light of what one perceives to be a reprehensible act is for many, tantamount to being complicit in that act. If I adhere to that proposition, then I am impelled to therefore condemn all those who remain behaviorally passive to the evil that I apprehend. In some instances, this may inspire a rationally directed hatred towards the human species (misanthropy) - and in others, it may not. Without that sustained hatred, one is devoid of any compelling motivation.

Misanthropy, or sustained resentment in general, to me, when channeled meaningfully, is an intermediary between perceiving an act to be immoral, and embodying a behavioral antithesis to that act - irrespective of what that act comprises.

'Isn't it difficult to convince people to feel hatred? Wouldn't any other route of galvanizing people be easier and also, wouldn't different ways lead to more reasonable approaches being taken?'

I'm certain that there are more practical mechanisms by which to mobilize individuals; a number of the ones you stated earlier seem very promising. The one I'm explicating, however, is curated around an individual's states and modes of being, and is therefore not yet of any real utility.

'A major issue in America right now is political polarisation but it seems like that's just the result of people doing something quite similar to your suggestion. Moral zealotry, with a real "fuck you" attitude to people who aren't on board with your way of thinking. Is that not the case?'

That's very disconcerting, and definitely true.
What's happened in the US, for instance, is a clash of collectivistic sentiments. We've observed both liberals and conservatives, who oftentimes refuse to engage in substantive discourse, and will literally exhibit animalistic tendencies in light of opposition. I'd argue that their troubles aren't caused by moral, but ideological zealotry. Moral superiority is solely the guise that people use to shroud their unwillingness to listen or change.

When one feels hatred upon an act, it can be either towards the act in principle, or towards a defiance of their own ideals in relation to the act. Unfortunately, political conflict is directed towards the latter, wherein the remediation of the act is of less significance than avenging for one's defiance.

Let's say, for example, that I deplored any behavior that entailed animal cruelty. I'd like to think that most individuals, by virtue of their humaneness, would concur. Now, if I am solely acting out of my stance, then I'll readily condemn anybody who opposes me on the matter, perhaps even going to the extent of trespassing others' properties.

Having done so, however, I'd be less inclined to act out meaningfully against animal cruelty or distress in my own life, because the hatred I'm channeling is not a consequence of decency, or a love for animals, but instead a falsification of self interest and pseudo-moralistic stances.

Resenting human behavior, in my opinion, should stem from the values that human behavior desecrates, as opposed to who engages in that behavior, why, how or whether they defy me.

In response to your caution, I genuinely believe that the greatest challenge for any philosophy is its preclusion from degenerating into a set of ideological doctrines. What I'm laying forth, therefore, is not a mechanism to better the world precisely, but one to better an individual and one's behavioral consistency with their ideals.

Unfortunately, it appears that what I'm describing is increasingly distant from canonical definitions of misanthropy.

'The means by which they do? Isn't this process automatic, I don't need to consciously activate my annoyance of things not going my way. I don't get it.'

Yes, it is automatic, and I'm stating that it doesn't have to be. If it were consciously driven, it'd likely sustain itself in the human psyche, as opposed to vanishing once the stimulus one is reacting to is no longer in sight.

'It should work this way, "has views" --> leads to misanthropy, not "has misanthropy" --> leads to views'.

I concur with you, but people don't forge views on purely on the material basis of what they're viewing. They form them following a reaction that stems from their inner self. In order to be sentient about a particular matter, and in this case resentful, I need to first feel a hatred against it (in this case, the arbitrary use of the term 'misanthropy').

'What I'm hearing is that you seek to galvanise people, to care more about their moral stances. To you, hate seems like a good motivator so go with that. What you want is dedication, for people to embody the antithesis of that which they hate, is that right? Is the opposite of your view less about liking humans and more like moral apathy?'

Yes, exactly. Misanthropy is a misleading term, and I used it solely because its consequences are an ideal example. Moral passivity and/or apathy is what I'm arguing against, and I'm using misanthropy (or a variant of it) as a faculty designed to fulfill that objective.

The human being, bereft of sentience, is nothing more than an intelligent animal.

Do you want to share credit for that quote? I think it's terrific, and almost Nietzschean.

'My understanding has been that misanthropy is a distaste for human society, more than a deep understanding of it. As such it would be invidious to dignify it with the term 'philosophy.'

I agree with you entirely. It's more so the psychological underpinnings of misanthropy that I was attempting to bring forth and repurpose.

'But lacking the myth of Adam and Eve, the natural philosopher as misanthrope seems bound inevitably to succumb to a global pessimism and be unable to maintain even that 'every prospect pleases', or indeed any. And one is dragged down therefore to the hell of antinatalism, and the loss of meaning.'

One can derive why that's the case. Self-hatred (as far as a species is concerned) for its own sake and without objective, is tantamount to detesting one's nature/essence - and soon thereafter, one's own existence. Antinatalism and an erasure of meaning do prevail, but often as an implication of communal nihilism.

'
'My understanding is that misanthropy is not about improvement and it's not constructive, a misanthrope is simply someone who holds humans in contempt, we do not know their reason just by the definition. So instead of being futile, it's just not trying to accomplish anything.'

I concur. My use of the term may have been misguided, but it's the most proximal meaning I could find. In that respect, I know for a fact that it needs a considerable degree of modification, or perhaps even a replacement.

'Let me ask you, instead of trying to change how human traits lead to your condemned incidents, shouldn't we look towards basically everything besides human traits? Human rights, social welfare, international law, governmental reform and so on? Most of your list of condemnations is either unanimously condemned within the West or highly contentious and highly debated. You point out how you hate political correctness and identity politics but you're not alone. Debate is already taking place, you use strong language but in reality, you're just joining these debates, these two things come up fairly commonly on this forum'

I agree entirely. Upon reflection, I am partaking in these debates, but the philosophy of misanthropy I'm postulating is independent of any stances on them.

Let's imagine that you, by your own account, consecrated the concept of secularism. Consequently, you wanted to demonstrate a valor in defending it against ethno-national doctrines, which act as proxies to genocide. How would one approach the problem? You'd first recognize an encroachment on your liberty, detest it in light of your religious affinity or principles, and then presumably rebel if you had the wherewithal to do so. You couldn't act without first resenting the encroachment, or the forces that impel it. Everyone undergoes this, which is why the means by which they do should be of greater emphasis.

What I'm postulating is that man's hatred of himself in some circumstances can be distilled into a series of philosophical axioms, instead of being treated as an arbitrary sentiment in passing. If it is subjected to that rigor, it can preclude individuals from remaining passive on a certain matter, and sally them forth into acting out their beliefs, irrespective of what they are. Hatred, as far as I can discern, is a powerful motivator. Socrates conjectured, if I'm not mistaken, that it's one of the two ways whereby a human being's hatred of his or her kind can manifest - the other being evasion, which is how traditional misanthropy approaches the vices it sees.

As far as the specificity of an individual's views are concerned, I'm don't intend to impinge on their sovereignty. You're right in arguing that several individuals are either intransigent, or juxtaposed to my beliefs. Another contributor may well contend my arguments on political correctness in a meritorious fashion, perhaps even emerging victorious to an outsider - and that'd be perfectly fine. I believe nonetheless, that the means by which they embody those beliefs, oftentimes fueled by self-hatred, should be ascribed greater significance.

'As some have mentioned, misanthropy finds one or two crimes of which only some are guilty and indicts the entire species. It’s unjust, fallacious, and as such, worthy of its own condemnation and ridicule.'

I most definitely concur. Naturally, any individual who engages in this exercise is acting in an erroneous manner. My hope, solely, was to seek a rationalized variant of the concept bereft of generalizations, capable of instilling an antithesis to the revulsions incited by certain human traits. That appears now, nonetheless, to be an idea incomparable to traditional misanthropy entirely.

I think misanthropy is completely aligned with an existential viewpoint because existentialism makes the error of thinking that we exist for not purpose. I think humanity will find, some day, that there is much more to a sentient perspective than just continuing to act like an animal mimicking sentience

That's a very insightful assertion. I've never thought about it before. If human beings are animals mimicking sentience, they're effectively intelligent animals - and not solely in the biological sense.

If misanthropy is just a condemnation of certain human behaviours then everyone is a misanthrope.

There exists an unmistakable distinction between a commonality's passive condemnation of a vile act, and a misanthrope that brings it into cognizance, rationalizes any hatred, and reconstitutes himself/herself as its antithesis, either through directive behavior or thought. The latter isn't interwoven into misanthropic attitudes, but it most certainly can be engendered by them if one is willing enough.

'It's the conclusion that these condemned aspects are irredeemable and ubiquitous among humans and that disliking or hating humans is justified or warranted as a result that is misanthropy.'

Arrogating to oneself that human existence is irremediable is both futile and hypocritical, insofar as one's existence is complicit in the statement. If misanthropy does, in fact, promulgate that idea, then I'm entirely disinclined to it.

'Power is so pervasive and commanding, it corrupts leaders but renders individual resistance futile.'

One could, perhaps, lay forth the argument that man's intrinsic predispositions and maladaptation to power are culpable for this stated corruption, as opposed to the fact of power itself. One may concurrently argue that these predispositions are ubiquitous, and ancestrally entrenched into the deeoest recesses of the human psyche. Why won't a targeted recognition, and resulting contempt of that trait be of any utility? Isn't it a precursor to any meaningful discussion in relation to remediating that trait?

Besides the lack of nuance, your views would tell me more about you than about humanity, truth is constructed, its form a result of the creator's intent. Couldn't another user post a thread today listing only good things about humans and profess how happy and optimistic about it all? Each view is correct enough to invalidate the other, the varying facts are all just threads to be woven by the intellect.

I'm not attempting to construct an infallible truth. Are my thoughts perspectives driven by intent? Yes, they are. That doesn't detract from them any credence as far as their context is concerned.
Why can't they be distilled and systematized in creating a rational philosophy? Aren't all philosophies effectively singular facets of the same dice? Another individual could most certainly construct an argument for the contrary, and that'd be entirely reasonable. Each corresponding view between the two arguments, however, will not necessarily invalidate another. There aren't varying facts. They're an identical myriad of facts from which different individuals elect to extract disparate interpretations, and in doing so, assemble a distinctive worldview. Rational, targeted and purposeful misanthropy is nestled into mine, and I suspect several that of others.

Misanthropy isn't perfect. As far as a species-wide condemnation is concerned, I understand that for its own sake, it is neither utilitarian nor appealing. The principle upon which the concept rests shouldn't be a cluster of generalities, as it stands today.

Having said that, its consequences, and perhaps some of its implications shouldn't be abnegated without the sparing of a single thought.

That's a terrific statement. Recognizing the immorality of the human being without experiencing either despair or resentment is no small feat.