Your intuitions about intuition could use some development. — wonderer1
There is more to it than simply acquiring knowledge. Tom Storm and T Clark brought up important points. TS brought up experience and TC brought up attentiveness. — wonderer1
Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos? — Philosophim
No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument. — Philosophim
No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism. — Philosophim
I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known. — Philosophim
If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious. — Philosophim
Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example. — Philosophim
I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation. — Philosophim
That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation. — Philosophim
Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality. — Philosophim
No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny. — Philosophim
The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes. — Philosophim
No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly. — Philosophim
Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational. — Philosophim
I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it. — Philosophim
No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so? — Philosophim
Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience. — Philosophim
Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking. — Philosophim
Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.
Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot. — Philosophim
No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction. — Philosophim
Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.
Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.
And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience. — Philosophim
If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.
Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does. — Philosophim
And most importantly: any study has its sensory foundation on which it builds a complex understanding. All sciences presuppose sensory (I don't use this term. Too Kantian) givenness, and therefore, there is the claim that all science is analytically reducible to just this, as in Kant's, sensory intuitions are blind without concepts; concepts without sensory intuitions are empty. — Astrophel
Insulting talk about rambling has no place in a discussion. Don't be a child. — Astrophel
All knowledge is forward looking, and so science's claims are forward looking, i.e., temporal constructions. — Astrophel
Buddihsts are like Wittgenstein: they are right about what they do, wrong that one cannot talk about it. See the Abhidhamma: It does talk about ultimate reality and has extraordinary things to say, that is, if you are a serious meditator. But it's analyses are mostly dogmatic, though, they may be right. Hard to say since one needs to learn Pali. But I noticed it doesn't have the rigorous analysis of Husserl's Ideas or Levinas' Totality or Derrida's Margins. You CAN talk about these things, but only indirectly, which makes the field difficult because this because the material before is obscure to language, and this is because of a lack of shared experience. They say tibetan Buddhists had/have an mysterious language filled with references to things encountered only in deep meditation. — Astrophel
People don't read philosophy. That is why they don't get it. Simple as that. I have encountered some who, finding that they really know nothing at all about what they post , like yourself, are inspired to read after our exchanges. One reason why I go on. You may not admit it to me, but later you will perhaps read to see what it is you have been attacking so vacantly.
Have a lovely time with Heidegger. Rorty considered him, along with Dewey and Wittgenstein, to be among the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. Being and Time is literally life changing.
Later.....perhaps. — Astrophel
Right, learning is required and the consequences of that learning are not fully predictable. However, I'm not talking in black and white terms, of intuitions either being perfectly accurate or totally unreliable. I'm just suggesting that intuitions can be improved to a significant degree. — wonderer1
But really, Darkneos, all this says is no. You have to come to grips with this and try harder to actually make a case. I can help you:
You would have to show how context changes pain and any affectivity at all, in the same way the knife's sharpess changes from good to bad given the context of its appearance. You see this, right? You are trying to make the claim that pain qua pain is context determined. There is a very good work on this by Stanley Fish in his Is There a Text in this Class: He argues that context makes the determination, and apart from this, there is no "center" of knowledge claims. All is contingent, just as you are defending here. A student asks if there is a text in the class coming up soon, but the prof is confused: does she mean text to be a textbook? Or is it the that the student left her book and is looking for it? Or, does the prof have a textual frame of reference for the way the ideas will be discussed? — Astrophel
You see this?: text, text or text, three alternative possibilities, each very different, ambiguously in play, at once! This is contingency, and it is the kind of thing post modern thinking is about, this loss of determinacy in foundations of meaning. Is the world not like this when language speaks it's truths? — Astrophel
"Recent philosophies suggest pain to be an illusion?" Fascinating! tell me how works: how can it be that my toothache is illusory? — Astrophel
I know you don't want to think like this, but I am guessing since this is a strain of philosophical thought that dominates our age, and really: it is on YOUR side of tis issue, that it might be useful to you the next time you you defend your, well, curmudgeon-ism.
Science doesn't think like this because it is thematically outside its purview. That is, it simply don't take up questions like this, just as astronomers do not take up basket weaving. It is simply not what they do. This is philosophy, an essentially apriori "science." — Astrophel
Do you speak from experience? Have you tried improving your intuitions, and always failed? — wonderer1
But apart from an ethical context like this, the stand alone pain is absolute. The proof for this lies in the presence of the unmitigated pain itself and the failure to contextually change what it is. — Astrophel
Indeed, nothing can, which is why it is an absolute; but more: an existential absolute! This is not like Kant's pure reason or causality (found in his categories, but causality is especially poignant--so easy to demonstrate intuitively). It is in existence itself, not as an apriori principle, but an apriori actuality. A Real with a capital 'R'. — Astrophel
A most important point in this: I am arguing that it is affectivity that is at the heart of what Truth and Reality IS. — Astrophel
Affectivity of any kindcannot be mitigated or altered. — Astrophel
This is why Wittgenstein insisted that ethics and value cannot be discussed: They are IN the givenness of the world, and are irreducibly what they are. We can argue about contingencies, but not about ethics/aesthetics/value AS SUCH! — Astrophel
Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction. — Philosophim
We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans. — Philosophim
Here's an example.
Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.
If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use. — Philosophim
If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another. — Philosophim
Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue. — Philosophim
As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.
Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.
We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.
We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.
Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion. — Philosophim
The pain is ahistorically bad. It cannot be mitigated for what it is, only how for how it stands against competing interests, and such things are, of course, variable among cultures. But the child, say, who suffers for the greater good, does not thereby suffer differently. — Astrophel
I didn't take it that way. I think we maybe agree on the proper mix of appreciation and irreverence. Some of the old geniuses might be able to revolutionize philosophy again once they were up to speed. — plaque flag
But the matter turns to the notorious good and bad of ethics. Is it at all possible to deny a lighted match on living flesh is "bad"? — Astrophel
IOW, doubting and logically evaluating intuitions can lead to having very reliable intuitions in the future. There is a synergy that can arise from the interaction of slow thinking and fast thinking. — wonderer1
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.
Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim
This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.
When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?
Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.
This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right? — Philosophim
Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.
Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.
The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.
As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.
What was the problem you were thinking this missed? — Philosophim
A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.
As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem. — Philosophim
Yes, Darkneos, I am familiar with the philosophy of "Bah Humbug!" — Astrophel
Yes, that sounds right. I don't want to pick on Kant too much, because for his time he was a great genius. According to Popper and others, Newton was just a towering figure. Instruments were not precise enough to find fault with his physics. It was if the source code for the matrix had been discovered, a great triumph for species. Small wonder that Kant wanted to secure this treasure against Hume from being falsifiable. Synthetic apriori truth is tall order indeed. — plaque flag
No, you miss the point: knowledge of anything requires inquiry into that thing. You don't inquire philosophically, therefore you don't understand its issues.
It is not about ego. It is about basic reading. You need to do this, then your anxieties on this will disappear. — Astrophel
Yes, ethics. But how to live depends not simply on setting up a system for personal behavior: such a system needs a grounding in the understanding. Christians have a system, time honored and useful. But it comes with a metaphysics that is confused and dangerous. Philosophy is the tool to discover where things go wrong and how they might be reviewed and revised.
You likely have similar problems in the basic justifications of how to live, and I say this because you seem to be admitting that such a review is useless. Fundamentalists of all stripes think just like this, embracing foolishness, then reifying it in the public consensus. — Astrophel
They certainly do impact your life if you want to understand things beyond what "people say". Descartes' evil demon is just to demonstrate a point, like Schrodinger's cat. Not just a game, but an illustrative game. — Astrophel
It is an important distinction: to be IN an environment implies that this environment is somehow outside or apart from one. I am saying, onw is not IN an environment like this in discussing experiential structure: Rather, one IS the the very structure one analyzes. It is a turning toward one's own existence for discovery, for, after all, the issue here is the relation between ME an that fence post, so what I AM and the distinctions that descriptively rise up when I try to make sense of something like "I experience a fence post" call for a sharp division between us. But is there such a thing? Does the traditional analysis of S knows P make any sense at all when it comes to identifying and releasing P from the justificatory conditions of believing P?
THIS is a very big question to philosophy. The fence post is "over there", granted; but my knowing is over here, on my side of the epistemic fence. What can possibly account for this? A fascinating question. — Astrophel
Heidegger believes that truth is "made" but the engagement of pursuing truth is an openness that has extraordinary VALUE, and I emphasize this because in this value is the true foundation of human cognition, which is one way to put what I have been arguing. The circle is hermeneutics. The disclosure within this is momentous. This is my position. Observe the value/aesthetic/ethical dimension of our existence, and do not simply register this as a premise, but realize this is "the place" inquiry truly seeks!
A very strong philosophical position. I am saying that Truth is really an endeavor of affectivity. We divide knowledge into categorical parts to pragmatically address our essentially problematic confrontation with the world, but this has led to the current illusion that truth is statistical, logical, rational, while affect is altogether unwelcome in describing truth (indeed, emotion has historically been willfully ignored). This is patently wrong.
As to certainty: this is not nonsense. But only if you are interested. — Astrophel
Great question. I suspect (as weird as it sounds) that Kant was saying that Newtonian physics is built in to the automatic human interpretation of otherwise obscure Reality (something actually beyond time and space.) It is only in the frozenness or unchangeability of the Form of our cognition that Newton escapes Hume ( and later Popper.) — plaque flag
Well, this just says you haven't a clue. A bit like the Christian who insists through Jesus redemption arrives, but when asked how defers to faith.
If knowledge is justified true belief, and I am sure it is just this, and you believe "ability to experience" yields a justification, then show this. It is NOT that I am denying that we do have knowledge of the world AT ALL! It is rather that when you take this question seriously, you are forced to reconstrue everything everything you believe vis a vis basic questions. — Astrophel
Anyone, that is, who does not think about serious philosophy. If scientists never tried to understand the fossil record, we would not at all have a concept in place about geologic eras and their subcategories. This is what happens when one chooses not to think. — Astrophel
No Darneos; you have it all wrong. This is because you haven't "read" your way into the discussion about the structure of consciousness. It is the only way into a philosophy of existence.
You should at least be curious as to the epistemic relation between a brain and a world. I mean, to have no analytic inquiry about this at all behind you, yet to come out swinging as you do....curious, and then some. — Astrophel
Causality is apodictic. Try imagining its contradiction.
The brain: but there is the brain and there is fence post. How does this work, exactly, or even vaguely, such that the former knows the latter. You take a philosopher like Quine, one of my favorites because he was an explicit naturalist in the Deweyan tradition, yet so revered in analytic philosophy, and you find nothing but frustration when it comes to accounting for how it is that causality, which he takes as foundational in explaining the world, produces meaning; and this has to be taken as priority: when you THINK at all, you are not IN meaning, but ARE meaning.
But such questions that apply to this kind of thinking have to begin with curiosity. One has to be motivated by seeing the deficit in human understanding at the basic level. If you don't see this, you really have no motivation, and end up in the back of the class sleeping.
Question: why take this class at all? — Astrophel
See above: How do you know objects cannot move themselves? — Astrophel
If knowledge is without meaning then how are you writing this and expecting others to communicate? How do you even know there are others to communicate with?
I think it's as I said before, you're kinda searching for something similar to Descartes except he had to invent god to get out of his funk. But life doesn't work like that, nothing can be definitively known beyond all doubt, it just doesn't exist. Still total certainty was always a myth anyway and we never needed it before. — Darkneos
Evidence of what? Evidence for the claim that the world outside our heads is not what we experience? Well, it's really not to the point. But since you asked, the world "outside" of one's head, how is it that is actually get into the head? I'm saying it doesn't because there is no way to even conceive of this. Therein lies the evidence: one way of justifying a denial that P to be true, to show that P is nonsense. — Astrophel
Keep in mind that if your belief that the world is what you see rests with "things working" then your claim would rest with pragmatics. Then you would have to show how pragmatics reveals the way the world is. That is, if S knows P, and to know is to be able to use for some purpose, then knowing is mere pragmatics, but what one knows IS the pragmatics and not the world
Generally science takes a stronger view than this, affirming the nitro's independent existence apart from the pragmatics we experience. But this, again has to be explained. I think it nonsense. — Astrophel
I can understand this. But a pragmatist like yourself should have an epistemology, just so your claims can be useful philosophically. Reread the things you object to, and consider the simple thesis that philosophy's pursuit of truth is REALLY an affective endeavor. So looking for truth as a propositional affair that only looks to facts is going to lead only to other facts and these the same. It is not about a quest for information about meaning. It never has been. This is the historical error that has made philosophy so intractable.
It has historically been the purview of religion to deal with value/aesthetics/ethics (the same thing in essence), and philosophy has been about analytic arguments at the basic level. I hold that philosophy IS the only authentic religion. — Astrophel
Not just a form of cognition, but cognition itself. After all, how do you know modus ponens is right? How do you know objects can move themselves? The world of our understanding rests entirely on intuition.
Talk about brains: perhaps hard to see this, but brains are supposed to generate experience, and thereby give a reductive account of what experience "really" is. This is what I infer from your thoughts. but how is it one knows the brain is there to be this generative source? Why, it is through the phenomenon of the brain which the brain generates.
You DO see the issue here, yes? — Astrophel
Perhaps a silly question - but if, as Kant and subsequent others suggest, space and time are built into our cognitive apparatus and not the universe , does this not suggest that the laws of physics are a reflection of how we process reality, not reality as it is in itself (the ineffable noumena). And does it follow from this that hypothetical sophisticated aliens who do not utilize human cognition might have developed an entirely different and efficacious alternative to our physics? A physics which appears to map onto their world the way ours appears to map onto ours? And there's the possibility that even this account of reality, however it might appear, is still just an appearance... — Tom Storm
What is it to know? If there is no way to account for this, then we are lost. I mean, if language is only self referential, and one cannot grasp even in the imagination what, at the most basis level, of knowledge claims could even possibly be, then knowledge isexistentially without meaning. What do I mean by existentially? Reference is to existence, and existence refers to the palpable "sense" of being here, and this refers to not simply raw physical feels and impositions, but, thoughts, and affectivity (a broadly conceived affectivity that comprises our ethics and aesthetics). Do thoughts exist? Of course. Existence is not to be reduced to "metaphysical physics". Does affectivity exist? A foolish question, really: nothing could be more palpable.
I think language gets lost in language, and it is the familiarity of language that removes for our sight an original existence, not original in an historical sense, as if once long ago, but original as in something primordial and "under the skin" of what we call experience.
Easy to access, in a way, because while language creates an analytic divided world, it also puts it back to gether again; in other words, language is also redemptive when the direction of inquiry goes to basic questions: those words you're thinking now, from whence to they come? I am thinking of Beckett's book Molloy. the idea is how to get around the extraordinary claim that it is language that speaks! Not "me". Molloy/Molone is dying, but it is not the death of the body, but of language, and words that linger to the end, grasping for existence, knowing soon words will not sustain the monologue that is the self. — Astrophel
certainly logic is not about nothing, nor is affectivity; but concepts like these that quantify and divide experience, because they are categories, do not represent the original uncategorized primordial whole. — Astrophel
But this is just to the point I am making. But you need to make a further step into inquiry: when you analyze a star's light and bring forth a conclusion there is beneath this, or presupposed by it, a structured consciousness that does the bringing forth of the basic conditions for "receiving" anything at all.
What makes science singularly disqualified for philosophy is that it doesn't look at the world at this level of inquiry. Nor does it thematically take up the caring and value that you raise here. As a scientist you do indeed have more or less strong interest, occasionally exhilaration. But it goes further still: to speak at all, to have a thought and draw a conclusion or affirm a conditional or negation is inherently affective. the point I make here is that it is these analytical conditions, which are typical in everyday living, tend to reify the categorical analyses, reducing the world to its own abstract image. The actuality, intuitive givenness of things, if you will, of putting the eyes to the computer screen, implicitly drawing conclusions, rejecting others, then, consummating an inquiry! At this level the experience is a singularity. — Astrophel