But we don't understand the external world enough to refute solipsism or skepticism, or idealism and many other ideas. If we did have a better understanding of it, these problems need not arise. — Manuel
I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention? — Bob Ross
Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. — Bob Ross
I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.
My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why? — Bob Ross
I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.
Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment? — Bob Ross
I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you. — Bob Ross
The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ. — Bob Ross
This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important. — Bob Ross
There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with? — Bob Ross
When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia. — Bob Ross
Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant. — Bob Ross
My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie. — Bob Ross
This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense). — Bob Ross
I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. — Bob Ross
Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): — Bob Ross
A philosophical zombie still has 'feelings' and 'cares' in the sense that you can see with your own eyes: they can express gestures of gratitude, they avoid pain, sit down and listen to your problems, they can still love you, etc.;
I think if you really reflect about what you can know (directly from experience), you will find that the warmth or frigidity of other people is a reflection of your pyschological state of mind. For example, imagine you sincerely believed that solipsism was false, wouldn't that bring some wanted warmth into experience for you? even though nothing changed about reality other than your state of mind, you would now experience a warmer kind of coexistence with other people. Now, imagine you believed it is true (or maybe that it is even indeterminate), then you lose that warmth--see how this is not a reflection of the truthity of the actual position of solipsism? It is a depiction of your state of mind. If you dive into yourself, then you can fix the issue without getting an answer to solipsism. — Bob Ross
Can one be arrogant enough to believe he is the sole source and author of all great music, all architectural marvels and technological achievements, the author of all our epistemology and the content found in all youtube videos.
And if he does believe that...why getting in the trouble to debate it with him self in a public forum? — Nickolasgaspar
My point would only be that this: I Am!, is an action, a process; who we define ourselves to be, say, against the crowd, is not given to us as an inherent fact. People believe they have "thoughts", and those are precious gems that come from who they are, their identity as a singular person, something special from inside only them, when most of the time they are platitudes or regurgitation--though sometimes what is common is most true (it all depends). As Heidegger says: what is most thought-provoking is that we are not yet thinking. — Antony Nickles
I think I was trying to say the same thing. What I meant was that, yes, we have singular experiences but there is nothing that ensures our individuality (nothing taking the place of the metaphysical "mind"). — Antony Nickles
The idea that some men must work for governments in order for rights to be meaningful and useful is nonsense. I can confer a right to you and defend it just as any king or official can. — NOS4A2
(Of course we can have individual experiences outside of language--like seeing a sunset that leaves us speechless--but those instances don't structure our relation to ourselves and others.) — Antony Nickles
Is that how you protect someone’s right to life, by begging the government to restrict our rights?
Or in other cases, abortion control, the right to life via not being chopped up in a womb and sucked out with a vacuum. All this talk of protecting life suddenly falls on deaf ears when this subject comes up. I don’t believe any of it.
What kind of weapon would you use to protect your children, should the need ever arise? Ballots and petitions? Beg a politician? — NOS4A2