Maybe you don't understand how basic rules of logic work. ITs not me who has to "have something" on an unfalsifiable, irrational ontological speculation. You might not have any critique on teapotism, but that doesn't make teapotism a legit philosophical thesis.
Not all ideas are serious, philosophical or useful...just because some people attempt to force them in Philosophy.

This might be a naive question, but from a solipsistic standpoint, how do you account for the 'number of parallel events' that occur every second in the universe? If YOU cause all of them, then your parallel processing speed per second, must be far greater than light speed. Have you ever considered such 'scientific' issue's when you muse on the truth of solipsism?
All the calculations done by every computer, is actually done by YOU?
How likely does that seem to you?

Hello Darkneos,

I think we are misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain in more depth (and let me know where you disagree).

When I was saying that a philosophical zombie has ‘feelings’ and ‘cares’, I was not contending that they have them in the sense that is in dispute for the term philosophical zombie—as you rightly point out that, by definition, a PZ ‘has no feelings’. However, what is meant by ‘having no feelings’ in that sense? My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie.

The problem is that the feelings that are removed, by definition, from a philosophical zombie, I would argue, is a kind of ultra feelings which are described as ‘actual feelings’. A PZ can still cry, but it “isn’t real” because there’s an extra component of ‘being human’ which goes being the mere act of crying (allegedly); A PZ can show obvious signs of concern for your well being, but it “isn’t real” because there is something extra required, something beyond demonstrating obvious concern for another, which is required to be a ‘true’ feeling. This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense).

Although I don’t think human’s are robots necessarily, if you wanted to call a PZ a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery”, then I would still argue, in that case, that it still has feelings. The only reason we don’t do that with AI now, is because it isn’t a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery” like a human being: that’s the only meaningful difference for all intents and purposes.

Of course there is a world of difference when you’re interacting with a human who has feelings and emotions

I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. Solipsism is providing something superfluous to the conversation: there has to be some impossible to attain component of existence that qualifies one as a ‘true’ feeling being. I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): there just another component to your existence that you can’t verify for another person (i.e., that they are aware and feel in the same manner as you), and (I would argue) it isn’t actually relevant to solipsism (although I grant contemporary literature will disagree): I know there are other subjects, because by ‘subject’ I mean a will—not the whole package deal of ‘consciousness’.

Hopefully that clarifies a bit.

Bob

Again not an actual criticism. They would argue that they don’t have to be maintaining everything going on in their world just what they are aware of in that moment.

My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie. — Bob Ross

This point is still not true as when you realize they are a P Zombie then those things stop. It would have a bearing, especially since people can tell whether you mean something or not.

This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense). — Bob Ross

But there is a need for that “extra” because again people can tell. There is usually evidence for it but it’s not something you can test in a lab. It has to go beyond machinery to have feelings. What you’re saying is simply false.

I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. — Bob Ross

And you’d be wrong. The reason people mistreated those before is they took their actions to be that of a machine, in other words they didn’t really feel anything or mean it.

I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): — Bob Ross

Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.

They would argue that they don’t have to be maintaining everything going on in their world just what they are aware of in that moment. — Darkneos

Don't you mean 'you?' and if events are happening that you are unaware of then again, is that not evidence against solipsism?

Hello Darkneos,

This point is still not true as when you realize they are a P Zombie then those things stop. It would have a bearing, especially since people can tell whether you mean something or not.

I think we may need to dive into what a PZ actually is in terms of its definition. To keep it simple for now, I am going to just use the basic, standard definition from Wiki:

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person, considered as having qualia, but does not have conscious experience, qualia

I would like to note a few things pertaining to the definition. Firstly, the sole aspect of a PZ is that it doesn’t have qualia which, in turn, is subjective, conscious feelings: it is not that a being cannot feel in the sense of being capable of crying, being concerned, etc.; The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ.

Secondly, the term ‘qualia’ is a very specific term which does not translate to ‘feelings’ in the sense that I was deploying them before: it is a subjective, personally sensation which occurs simultaneously with the physical events themselves, but not within space itself. This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important.

There are many ways to dissect the idea of ‘qualia’ and illegitimize it, but, to stick with my original claims, I will put a pin in that for now.

My point is that whether a person I am experiencing has ‘qualia’ or not, they still demonstrate emotions: they still cry, they still hold intervention meetings for addicted love ones, they still perform acts of love, etc.; these do not go away if they are a PZ. What goes away is a corresponding , ‘along-with’ sensation. This ‘along-with’ sensation is superfluous to me as it is not required to infer a person is ‘feeling’ (in the sense that emotions are demonstrated: e.g., crying, genuine crying, ingenuine crying, etc.).

Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with?

But there is a need for that “extra” because again people can tell. There is usually evidence for it but it’s not something you can test in a lab. It has to go beyond machinery to have feelings. What you’re saying is simply false.

When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia.

Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant.

And you’d be wrong. The reason people mistreated those before is they took their actions to be that of a machine, in other words they didn’t really feel anything or mean it.

When you say “machine”, I think you are conflating it with a “sophisticated machine”, like a human (in this PZ thought experiment).

Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.

Hopefully I explained adequately why this is false. Please let me know if I did not.

Bob

What I meant is that the processing argument doesn’t hold, rather it only needs to “render” what is around you not the globe.

The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ. — Bob Ross

That’s not what it means. It’s to argue against an alleged inner life that might be occurring in the person. They don’t have qualia, hence the wording of “considered” as having it but not really.

This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important. — Bob Ross

Again you misunderstand the PZ. It acts and has all the normal actions of pain but doesn’t really feel pain. Pain is eliminated as a PZ or rather it never truly was. You’re butchering the thought experiment to fit your narrative.

Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with? — Bob Ross

There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.

When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia. — Bob Ross

And again you’d still be wrong. One needs qualia to be concerned. I can ACT like it but it matters whether I feel it or not. Again people can tell.

Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant. — Bob Ross

Again no. If they don’t have qualia or feelings then they aren’t sincerely anything. You keep making up stuff like “ultra feelings” when the feeling behind an action makes all the difference. It’s just basic.

Again you’re not getting it. Did you even finish the math link?

I would keep away from Hume if I were in your shoes, which in a way I am, at least at the moment you read these words.

The external world is an extremely difficult topic. Assuming more people exist other than I - which is a mere assumption, for I can do no better - we don't know what 95% of the universe is made. 27% or so, is called dark matter - which is a misleading name, it might not even be matter - the rest is dark energy, also a misleading name.

So we only partly understand 5% of the universe. But we must postulate 95% of it with stuff we know virtually nothing about, except that if it is not postulated, the 5% we do know doesn't make sense.

Now, if you take it that physics to be, outside our immediate perceptions, the most reliable knowledge we have, then it shouldn't be terribly surpassing if we cannot make much sense of the external world, because the topic is much more difficult than physics.

So, we postulate what we need, in order to make sense of the world. If that includes other people, so be it. We cannot attain certainty in empirical affairs.

Hello Darkneos,

That’s not what it means. It’s to argue against an alleged inner life that might be occurring in the person. They don’t have qualia, hence the wording of “considered” as having it but not really.

If by “inner life” you mean “qualia”, then you are correct—but what are you contending with in my argument? That is what I said too. As far as I am understanding, you are just repeating the definition I already gave: nothing about what you quoted from me claimed that a PZ still has qualia .

Again you misunderstand the PZ. It acts and has all the normal actions of pain but doesn’t really feel pain.

I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention?

Pain is eliminated as a PZ or rather it never truly was

Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. I think you are committed to saying there is no pain, or finding some kind of logical (or maybe metaphysical) impossibility in this above scenario. But if you say it is impossible, then you’ve also annihilated solipsism, because if it is impossible for you to scream out in agony without being aware of the pain (i.e., having the qualia corresponding thereto), then a normal person who is screaming in agony must have qualia (by your own logic). Now, I am not saying that that would be correct, but I am simply pointing out that my analogy holds (in the converse direction) on the same assumption of the PZ thought experiment.

If you accept that analogy, then you can see (hopefully if I have explained adequately enough) that, in that scenario, you have a scenario where you have no qualia but your body is still 'feeling' pain. The ‘machine’, if you will, is feeling pain indeed.

You’re butchering the thought experiment to fit your narrative.

I think you may be misunderstanding I am saying, or maybe I am not explaining it adequately enough. I am not re-shaping the PZ thought experiment: I am agreeing with it. I cannot know that you have qualia, which is the whole point of the thought experiment. I am contending with an unnecessarily metaphysical commitment that sneaks its way into the definition of ‘feeling’ that solipsists tend to deploy: that to ‘feel’, one needs qualia (i.e., one needs an extra, along-side sensation with the pain the body is having).

Perhaps I may have confused you into thinking that by ‘pain’ I mean an ‘uncomfortable sensation within one’s subjective experience’--because I would agree, in that sense, that a PZ doesn’t have pain; but I am not arguing that. I am saying that ‘pain’ ought to be something ‘less’ than having a subjective experience of it (in the sense of qualia). Maybe to you this seems like cheating. To define ‘feelings’ in the sense of qualia is to meddle in transcendent affairs that are completely unnecessary (in my opinion).

There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.

Perhaps you should explain how that extra property makes a difference instead of throwing insults.

Let me elaborate on my love analogy.

I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.

My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why?

And again you’d still be wrong. One needs qualia to be concerned. I can ACT like it but it matters whether I feel it or not. Again people can tell.

I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.

Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment?

Again no. If they don’t have qualia or feelings then they aren’t sincerely anything.

The whole contention I am raising is that ‘qualia’ is disynonymous with ‘feelings’: which one, in my terms, are you contending with here? I understand that you use them synonymously, but to do that in contending with my view is to not contend with it at all.

Again you’re not getting it. Did you even finish the math link?

No, I have not read the math link. If you would like to invoke that into our conversation, then please feel free.

You keep making up stuff like “ultra feelings” when the feeling behind an action makes all the difference. It’s just basic.

I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you.

Bob

What I meant is that the processing argument doesn’t hold, rather it only needs to “render” what is around you not the globe. — Darkneos

Do you agree that it is illogical for a solipsist to reference the word 'they?'
On Star Trek TNG's holodeck, the virtual reality is only rendered, as you navigate the holodeck, but the system (the Enterprise computer) that produces the holodeck, exists, independent of the subject experiencing the holodeck program, so, even in that scenario, there is more than 1 existent.

Again not a real counterpoint.

Again not a real counterpoint. — Darkneos

From a solipsistic standpoint, that's quite funny!

I don’t know where you got 5% of the universe from but I think we had data that showed the edge of the universe so we understand more of it than you think we do.

Also we can make a ton of sense of the external world, that’s how we have modern society.

I already know you have no arguments against it.

I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention? — Bob Ross

It's pretty obvious what it is.

Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. — Bob Ross

Again, no that is not what the PZ thought experiment is based on. A feeling cannot occur without being consciously aware of it. Your second example would simply not take place. The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything. You have woefully misunderstood the thought experiment not to mention your example is just wrong.

I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.

My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why? — Bob Ross

No you don't, you assume that. All that you said requires qualia. People can act a certain way but not really feel that way about you. They can perform the action but without the emotion it's not really care and concern. People lie all the time, lead people on, so you're just wrong here. It's not just the action they have to actually feel and have love for you, which a P-Zombie cannot, ever.

I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.

Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment? — Bob Ross

Acts of love aren't proof of love, they have to have the feeling for it to be so. Again the fact you can't understand why the emotion behind it makes all the difference is telling. They have to be conscious otherwise it doesn't matter. Pretty much everyone knows this.

I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you. — Bob Ross

It is entailed in the basic definition you gave me. You can make the argument that the form of the argument is wrong but that doesn't matter, you're simply wrong in your assessment.

Your whole chain shows you don't get it.

Of course you do. There can be only one!

https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Space_Science/Extreme_space/What_is_the_Universe_made_of#:~:text=The%20Universe%20is%20thought%20to,visible%20object%20in%20the%20Universe.

Also we can make a ton of sense of the external world, that’s how we have modern society. — Darkneos

Yes, because more often that not, our perceptions and conceptions are similar enough that we understand each other more or less.

But we don't understand the external world enough to refute solipsism or skepticism, or idealism and many other ideas. If we did have a better understanding of it, these problems need not arise.

Hello Darkneos,

To be honest, I don’t think this conversation is very productive. You aren’t actually contending with my claims at all; but I am going to try one more time to respond adequately, and then if you still feel the exact same way, then we should problem just agree to disagree.

It's pretty obvious what it is.

I gave a fairly long, substantive response and I asked what you are contending with in my view (as you were simply disagreeing with me yet it sounded like, to me, you were actually agreeing with me without realizing it). Responding with ‘it is obvious’ does not help further the conversation.

My point in asking was not to send a condescending, rhetorical question: I genuinely don’t think you are seeing what I am saying and wanted clarification on what you are contending with. Your use of ‘feelings’ = ‘qualia’ is fine for you own view, but it doesn’t work to address my contentions. Let me ask you: why do you think ‘feelings’ are synonymous with ‘qualia’?

Again, no that is not what the PZ thought experiment is based on. A feeling cannot occur without being consciously aware of it.

The PZ experiment does not claim that a ‘feeling’ equates to ‘qualia’. Now, I will grant (as I already have many times) that many basic arguments for the PZ experiment are predicated on that assumption: but that is what I am questioning and arguing against. Telling me that the PZ thought experiment is not based on ‘feelings’ being disynonmous with ‘qualia’ just tells me that you are subscribing to that kind of argument: now tell me why feelings cannot be disynonymous with qualia (in the manner I already outlined it).

I am claiming that a feeling can occur without being consciously aware of it in the sense of qualia: you disagree. Now, tell me why.

The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.

This is just semantics: you aren’t contending with what I am saying. By ‘feel’ in your sentence, you are assuming it is synonymous with ‘qualia’. Let me put it this way. I agree with this sentence:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really have qualia.’

I disagree with:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.’

You have woefully misunderstood the thought experiment not to mention your example is just wrong.

How is my example wrong? A person can still be screaming in agony if they do not have qualia: surely you agree with that. I think you are getting caught up in the semantics. The ‘screaming out in agony’, to me, classifies it under the term ‘feeling’; for you, it does not. Why?

No you don't, you assume that. All that you said requires qualia.

This is just blatantly false: a person doing a nice thing for me does not require qualia. The whole point of the PZ experiment is that a person could do a nice gesture for you and yet still not have qualia. If qualia were required for such actions, then there would be no point to the thought experiment: everyone would know that everyone else has qualia because they do those things. On the contrary, that’s not the point of the thought experiment at all: it isn’t enough that she drove all the way across town to get me something as a token of love—she must be consciously aware of it as well to ‘feel’.

They can perform the action but without the emotion it's not really care and concern.

Yes it can: I could be completely numbed up on morphine and still care about you.

People lie all the time, lead people on, so you're just wrong here.

I never said that a person lying is truly concerned: obviously that would be false. I said that I can determine if a person is genuinly concerned based off of their actions and, yes, some clever psychopaths can pass my tests.

It's not just the action they have to actually feel and have love for you, which a P-Zombie cannot, ever.

But do you think that they need to have a conscious experience to love you? You keep using the term ‘feeling’, but that is just leading us to confusion. If conscious experience is what you mean by ‘feel’ in that sentence, then I think you are wrong because I don’t think one needs to have a subjective experience to love you; if you mean that they can love you without them being sincerely psychologically in love with you, then I agree. Do you see the distinction I am trying to draw (even if you still disagree)?

Acts of love aren't proof of love, they have to have the feeling for it to be so.

I disagree. To clarify, I don’t think that I can ‘prove’ that someone loves me with certainty; but I can pragmatically tell (and I would argue most people can too); and, again, when you say ‘feeling’, are you referring to ‘consciously aware of’ or ‘it is psychologically true that’?

Again the fact you can't understand why the emotion behind it makes all the difference is telling.

I am still, and have always been, claiming that emotions matter (in sense of emotions being ‘feelings’): but that term doesn’t translate to ‘qualia’ to me. You just keep trying to mesh the two terms together, because you use them synonymously, instead of trying to understand my distinction.

They have to be conscious otherwise it doesn't matter. Pretty much everyone knows this.

I can assure you that everyone does not know this: you are presuming that peoples’ actions only matter if they are consciously aware of them in the sense of a subjective, private, ‘along-with’ sensation.

It is entailed in the basic definition you gave me

No where did the definition use the term ‘feelings’: it used ‘qualia’.

Your whole chain shows you don't get it.

If you still think that there is no substance to what I am saying, then it may be for the best that we just agree to disagree.

Bob

But we don't understand the external world enough to refute solipsism or skepticism, or idealism and many other ideas. If we did have a better understanding of it, these problems need not arise. — Manuel

We actually do though, but that is not why you can't refute those ideas. Rather those are ideas science cannot test, as metaphysical claims we just cannot. Solipsism cannot be tested or proven because it says only your existence is certain and everything else is either doubtful or non existent. So it can't use any metric to support it's argument.

The PZ experiment does not claim that a ‘feeling’ equates to ‘qualia’. Now, I will grant (as I already have many times) that many basic arguments for the PZ experiment are predicated on that assumption: but that is what I am questioning and arguing against. Telling me that the PZ thought experiment is not based on ‘feelings’ being disynonmous with ‘qualia’ just tells me that you are subscribing to that kind of argument: now tell me why feelings cannot be disynonymous with qualia (in the manner I already outlined it). — Bob Ross

Because they are just not. The whole issue with your argument is a based on a misunderstanding of the PZ thought experiment. So either deal with the experiment as it is or don't comment on it.

The point of the thought experiment is to elicit what could be the difference between such a being and a normal feeling human. It literally went right over your head.

In either case your point does nothing against solipsism.

We actually do though, but that is not why you can't refute those ideas. Rather those are ideas science cannot test, as metaphysical claims we just cannot. Solipsism cannot be tested or proven because it says only your existence is certain and everything else is either doubtful or non existent. So it can't use any metric to support it's argument. — Darkneos

How? What you are arguing doesn't at all go against what I'm saying. You say that because these views are metaphysical (which isn't clear that they are, some are epistemic, as solipsism is about our knowledge of the world, not the world itself -as would be claim made by materialists or idealists) hence science cannot test them.

I agree science cannot not test them. If we knew more, if we had a more sophisticated and elaborate understanding, I don't see why we couldn't know enough to say for certain "solipsism or skepticism is false." We can't say they are a-priori necessarily metaphysical views.

For an advanced civilization, they may be trivial questions.

Nevertheless for us, the issues will remain problematical, so it's not as if I'm trying to refute these ideas, we can only go by probability and likelihood here, in my opinion.

If it can't be solved, don't worry about it. You're happy enough right? Leave well enough alone.

There are three things that would cause genuine solipsism. Interacting regularly with a supernatural being that knows what you're thinking, about to do, or have done. Being isolated from birth (living life without having met another person). And if the only relationship you have with another is from correspondence not in person (slowly, willingly choosing to lose all contact with others and solely communicating strictly by mail or internet for example).

Look at it this way. You weren't born being a solipsist. Someone had to introduce you to the idea and notion so, you can be rest assured if the rest of us don't exist at least that one other person who first introduced the idea to you must be real. Otherwise, you couldn't have been real in the first place. Therefore, we all must be real and solipsism a lie. Damn. Sometimes I impress myself. I should be getting paid for this.

How? What you are arguing doesn't at all go against what I'm saying. You say that because these views are metaphysical (which isn't clear that they are, some are epistemic, as solipsism is about our knowledge of the world, not the world itself -as would be claim made by materialists or idealists) hence science cannot test them. — Manuel

They are metaphysical though, that much is clear. Solipsism isn't about our knowledge of the world. Science cannot test it because it's a metaphysical claim. Also because solipsism at best doubts everything but the existence of yourself so of course you can't use science to prove it.

I agree science cannot not test them. If we knew more, if we had a more sophisticated and elaborate understanding, I don't see why we couldn't know enough to say for certain "solipsism or skepticism is false." We can't say they are a-priori necessarily metaphysical views.

For an advanced civilization, they may be trivial questions. — Manuel

Yes we can because that is what they are. No amount of knowledge will change that it is unprovable. In short the only way to prove solipsism true or false is pure omniscience.

Nevertheless for us, the issues will remain problematical, so it's not as if I'm trying to refute these ideas, we can only go by probability and likelihood here, in my opinion — Manuel

Judging from what others have told me it's not problematic or an issue. Solipsism, even if somehow it were true would change nothing about reality.

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Look at it this way. You weren't born being a solipsist. Someone had to introduce you to the idea and notion so, you can be rest assured if the rest of us don't exist at least that one other person who first introduced the idea to you must be real. Otherwise, you couldn't have been real in the first place. Therefore, we all must be real and solipsism a lie. Damn. Sometimes I impress myself. I should be getting paid for this. — Outlander

Solipsist could just argue it was their mind making them aware of it. Whether you're born with it or not is irrelevant.

Solipsist could just argue it was their mind making them aware of it. Whether you're born with it or not is irrelevant. — Darkneos

Eh... okay. Seems to philosophically be along the lines of "indicting a ham sandwich" but okay.

I suppose questions along the lines of "who gave birth to you" and "where does new knowledge come from" are of the same.

It doesn't add up. You literally cannot end up in an eternal loop of "your true self" revealing more and more information. Eventually you would reach the point of omnipotence, which means as a god, all things are your creation and deserve to be treated as real as you are. You're a nice god, aren't you? I have feelings, desires. hopes, dreams. Leave me be! Preserve yourself so I do not perish and rest assured, the lives of billions with observable intelligence and a will (real to you or not) to live depend on you abandoning your solipsism! Or at the very least considering we might be real. See now it's not all about you.

In my opinion solipsism just seems like something a brilliant military psychologist came up with and introduced into a populous deemed too intelligent but. I suppose you already knew that :smile:

Well I’m just saying that your point wouldn’t be an argument against them. I mean…they can just say it’s a figment of their mind. Asking them to accept the existence of everything else which is secondhand knowledge is a huge ask.

It’s like last Thursdayism, you can’t prove it wrong or true.

Your point about being a god also isn’t what solipsism says, that’s a strawman.

Your point about being a god also isn’t what solipsism says, that’s a strawman. — Darkneos

If you're not creator of all things and have the power to destroy all that exists (if you are destroyed) then, no, logic 101 dictates everything "the entire universe" does in fact not exist solely in your head.

So. Preeetty sure it does... Also what is a straw man argument anyway to a solipsist. Just something you made up for fun. You'll come up with something better.

If you're not creator of all things and have the power to destroy all that exists (if you are destroyed) then, no, logic 101 dictates everything "the entire universe" does in fact not exist solely in your head. — Outlander

Logic would not in fact dictate that. Just because something exists in your head doesn't mean you have control over it.

Like I said, strawman.