Somebody link the Mueller Report please...

Gotta link my friend?

I am not just myself, but my relationship with others. — Moliere

Brilliantly put!

Cheers.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. A similar point could be made about the causal implications of specific facts or events. There's another complicated issue for philosophy about disentangling beliefs that have values built in to them (such as the belief that X committed murder or that COVID is dangerous) and their factual content. — Ludwig V

This was one of the aspects that I thought could be further unpacked and explained in terms of how it applies to Gettier.

Another was the equivalence drawn between atomic propositions and beliefs such that convention has it that "Michael was not born in Germany" counts as a belief of some who believes Michael was born in France.

I think these are related...

Professor Chomsky:

Hello! Welcome to the forum. Many of us are very happy to have you. Given that your expertise spans many different fields of study, I expect that you'll see a vast array of questions. I'd like to focus this question on philosophy. Would you please share your view regarding the currently popular topic of consciousness? In particular, I hope to have you shed light on the so called 'Hard Problem'. I'm familiar with your view on it, but I believe that it would be beneficial to the overall philosophical community if you could explain your view regarding the 'Hard Problem' on this forum.

Thank you in advance, and for the public service(s) you've provided throughout your lifetime.

But it’s not really a language. We give the molecules symbols and talk of “translation” and such, but that’s a projection. — Mikie

Anthropomorphism

Cheers!

You’re saying im being irrational just like Pi.
— invicta

Hmm. Well, it seems you both go on forever. — Banno

:rofl:

That's the funniest thing I've seen in quite some time. I probably should not be promoting it, but damn... that was funny. I momentarily lost control of myself.

Afraid I won't be of much help.

1) Can objects be understood without reference to human subjectivity? — schopenhauer1

Thanks for the invite. Not sure how much I can help, or whether or not I can add anything of substantive value to the discussion.

Interesting OP. I may have finally found "my label"... Speculative Realist.

If the notion of understanding is on par with a worldview and/or belief system, and as such need not be true, accurate, or correct, then it seems to me that understanding is nearly identical with/to 'human subjectivity'.

We can and do understand all sorts of stuff without referencing human subjectivity. It's all fraught though. I mean, by my lights, the very distinction between subject and object is inherently inadequate. It cannot take into account anything that consists of both subject and object. Understanding is itself is one such thing. The very same is true of everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. Such things consist of both, subject and object. Hence, neither "subject' nor "object" is capable of taking proper account of thought, belief, and/or anything else consisting thereof, whether just in part or wholly.

Employing the subject/object dichotomy as a linguistic framework to take account of ourselves and 'the world' results in rendering stuff as one or the other. Not all things are one or the other. To quite the contrary, some things consist of both. Hence, I find that it is an inherently inadequate framework to begin with, ontological or otherwise.

2) Is it even wise to try to overlook the human aspect to all knowledge? Is this not only a fool's errand but somehow anti-human or is this just trying to take out a pernicious anthropomorphism that might lead to a more open field of exploration? — schopenhauer1

Anthropomorphism is to be avoided. What I mean is that it is a fatal mistake to attribute uniquely human capabilities to that which is not human.

Most Western philosophical tradition holds/held that all thought is uniquely human. It has been believed that it was our minds that separated us from the mere 'dumb' animals. Hence, the overwhelming majority of academia will still reject the very idea of non-human thought and/or belief, on pains of coherency alone. That's not entirely wrong, but it is wrong enough to have caused deep misunderstandings concerning thought and belief. It's also made it near impossible for current convention to arrive at a notion of thought and belief that is easily amenable to being explained in terms of evolutionary progression.

The aforementioned mistake was/is the account of human thought and belief. It's nowhere near refined enough, ontologically speaking, to be capable of adequately explaining the different degrees of complexity inherent to human thought and belief. Notably, some is prior to common language use, does not include language, and is not existentially dependent upon language in any way, shape, or form. Such thought and belief can equally be formed and/or 'held' by some language less creatures replete with the biological machinery required for doing so.

Those are the ones current convention and everyday people has/have trouble with. The result of the former is denial of language less thought. The result of the latter is often anthropomorphism.

The United States has never been a democracy. It's always been a republic with democratic traditions. The logistical 'problems' mentioned in the OP are features of a representative form of government not flaws.

One big problem is monetary corruption. It's legalized bribery now... quite literally. Another is conflicts of interest. Another is when faced with a choice between what's in the best interest of the overwhelming majority or what's in the best interest of the very few, the US government has been erring on the side of the few for around 50 or 60 years. That's the result of the corruption, not the form of government.

Thanks for the explanation. In what little spare time available I've been watching Chomsky. There's an abundance of interviews old and new. It seems you've fairly characterized the main thrust of his view. I particularly noted that he's prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level. Our views differ there, so it's probably best for me to end it here.

I should clarify that I agree with saying that language and thought are the very same thing at their core. It's just that my explanation of that core is starkly different than Chomsky's I language or innate grammar.

Well, I find that there are examples of both. I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience. I've done fairly well in public speeches, including impromptu, using quick outline notes, and well rehearsed written speeches. So, performance with language use(E language) has multiple ways it can considered.

Oral - on the fly. Oral - after practice. Written - on the fly. Written - after editing. Written - after practice. That's just right off the top of my head...

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable.

There is an interesting consequence of Chomsky's temporal/causal rearrangement of grammar and language. As it was traditionally held, performance generated competence. Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance.

It's far more complicated than this snippet, but I found that consequence intriguing.

Chomsky's view also makes perfect sense of baby babble and twin speak, moreso than other traditional views. I do struggle a bit to make sense of the claims that equate grammar, universal grammar, and/or I language to physical structures in the brain.

This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. — RussellA

I suppose that I was thrown as a result of you saying that no one would know it's meaning. I should have asked if you believed that the statement has meaning in that case, because "it" referred to the statement. The time frame in question was void of humans. So, I wondered why and/or how you believed that statements could still be meaningful in such a situation.

I would agree that there are no such things as meaningful language or statements in that situation. If we imagine a time in the future when all humans have perished, the once meaningful and true statement "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris" would be neither true nor meaningful.

That's why saying that "no one would be around to know it's meaning" threw me a bit. Still does, but the thread is more about the analytic synthetic distinction, and Chomsky's take on that. So... I'll leave well enough alone...

Thanks for the answers.

:smile:

:up:

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false. — RussellA

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all?

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them. — RussellA

Okay.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

:rofl:

Yup.

Chomsky very recently characterized chatGPT as glorified plagiarism, or words to that effect.

I do think that awareness and the material world we are aware of are two seperate things. — lorenzo sleakes

I never said otherwise. I criticized the presupposition that sensation and mind are completely distinct 'things'. Seems to me that the former are part of the latter in such a way that complex minds such as ours evolved - over enough time and mutation - from simple sensation(s). In other words, without sensations there could be no minds.

There are currently all sorts of offline activities that are more productive for me, practically speaking. I agree with the frustrations that can come with this medium. I can certainly relate. To answer your question...

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking.

I've read back a bit, but I'll need to carefully reread further back in order to better remember what all we had been discussing. I do seem to remember that there were some very interesting aspects that I hoped we would further explore.

Yes. We might use the metaphor of a distorting lens. — plaque flag

I've called it the worldly fingerprint placed upon each of us by virtue of natural language acquisition/adoption. That's another matter in its own right, and would be too far tangent to be considered on topic.

Yeah, I should probably not continue here. My own position rejects both direct and indirect realism as it's currently defined. That is due to the stark ontological differences in what constitutes thought and belief, and subsequently... a mind.

Is that directed at me, in response to my last reply???

A group of people can watch the same set of events unfolding in real time and walk away with completely different opinions about what happened.

One reason why and/or how is because each person brings their own worldview along. They each have their own sets of thoughts and beliefs about themselves and/or the world around them. It is through these respective worldviews that people 'see' the world. One's pre-existing belief system largely mediates how one comes to terms with the world and what happens in it(and in them). There are all sorts of preconceived notions at work in each of them, and these preconceived notions can and do influence the way the events are taken into account while being witnessed. Thus, any differences in testimony about what happened is often due to the differences in worldviews.

Eye-witness testimony has also been proven to be quite unreliable at times. It does not follow from the fact that different people have different accounts of what happened that they did not all watch the same set of events unfolding in real time.

if all observers are directly observing the same facts in the external world, then why do different observers make different judgements about the moment when one fact changes into a different fact. — RussellA

Could you rephrase this question by dropping "facts" and "external world" out of it?

For the Direct Realist, the world we see around us is the real world itself. — RussellA

Is there no distinction to be drawn and maintained between a direct realist and a naive one?

:yikes:

:grin:

How does phantom limb syndrome work? — Michael

Reactivated neural pathways in spite of no longer being complete. A consequence of the largely autonomous central nervous system simply doing it's thing in spite of its having lost most of the input mechanisms of those pathways.

Neural pathways are not just in the brain.

May have something to do with neuroplasticity as well(the biological machinery repairing itself by virtue of using different structures than before to perform some task/function that was once performed by the missing structures).

Severely damaged nerves can do weird things. I nearly cut off the end of my thumb once. Dr said that I was very unikely to recover much feeling in the part beyond the laceration due to the nerves being completely severed. Years later, for a brief time, I experienced odd pains in that area, despite there not having been anything external to me playing a role.

There are a multitude of places where philosophy 'went wrong'! Many have been pointed out by later philosophers throughout history.

Here's one that has yet to have been adequately addressed and/or corrected in academia...

Philosophy went wrong, and still goes wrong whenever taking account of thought and belief, both human and non-human.

In fact we're trying to do exactly that to enable the blind to see. — Michael

Good luck in the absence of red things outside the head to play a role.

"Electromagnetic radiation stimulating the photoreceptors can cause someone to see red for the first time" is a gross oversimplification.

You used "activation". I think it's better put as a "reactivation". The difference is one of evolutionary explanation of seeing red. There's no way to check, but I think it's much safer to claim that we could not induce seeing red for the first time with someone who was in the complete dark, had never seen red before, using only the means you're suggesting are required.

The evolution of seeing red...

Okay. Then seeing red does require things outside the head.

The position you're arguing for seems to completely neglect all the events that lead up to the ability to reactivate the biological machinery.

I'm just baffled by the claim that seeing colours and shapes does not require anything outside the head.
— creativesoul

Does feeling pain require something outside the head? — Michael

Of course it does. Phantom limb pain requires once having had a limb. The limb is outside the head. As is any prior object that caused injury to the limb.

Does it require having seen red before?
— creativesoul

And really it can only be reports of having seen red, I'd think, which is the application of a concept requiring language. — plaque flag

Well, I do not think that seeing red requires language. Our discussion of it does. I'm just baffled by the claim that seeing colours and shapes does not require anything outside the head. That makes no sense. Or better yet, it leads to saying that everything is inside the head.