Searle employs the objective/subjective dichotomy in interesting ways when he draws a distinction between using them in an epistemic sense and an ontological sense and the historical conflation of the two when it comes to any and all positions which deny direct perception... idealism(s), arguments from illusion, argument from science, Stove's Gem, etc.

I've had several of his books for years. That library will not be thoroughly cracked and enjoyed until I have more spare time. Been collecting for over a decade though.

The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the beleif.
— Searle

Making the Social World — Banno

He's not talking about language less creatures' beliefs.

For the casual readers' sake alone...

A cat's belief that a dog is in the house is not an attitude that the cat has towards the proposition "a dog is in the house". That's patently impossible. The cat's belief does not consist of meaningful marks or attitudes towards meaningful marks. It consists of correlations drawn between a dog, sheer terror(fear), and all sorts of other directly perceptible things.

Here I was hoping to attain mutual concessions in order to further the discussion beyond the sticking points we always seem to arrive at. I am willing to concede that language less belief can be put into propositional form. I was hoping at least that you would concede that a language less animal is incapable of having attitudes towards propositions.

The insult is petty and it's not true. Ah well...

Our report of a cat's belief comes in propositional form. Cats cannot have attitudes towards propositions such that they take them to be true. You know that.

Cookie's belief that a dog is in the house is not an attitude that she has towards that proposition such that she holds it as true. Rather, it's more of the direct presentation of the dog being in the house. Searle's account of direct perception and intentionality works well here. I've been watching Searle, being the exciting guy that I am...

Isn't part of this because they have taken Plato's cave allegory to heart? The assumption being that those illusory shadows are everywhere and that only adults and smart people can work to discover the truth behind the deception of appearances. — Tom Storm

Perhaps.

I think Searle has it right when he talks about the mistakes that have been repeated, in some form or another, for hundreds and hundreds of years. It pleases me that a highly respected authority has so much to say that dovetails nicely to my own position.

A twenty-seven-month-old child can know when "there's nothing in there" is false, when the speaker is talking about a fridge. I gave that real life example earlier. She demonstrated that knowledge. She has no idea whatsoever about theories of truth. The terms "truth" and "falsehood" are not even understood by her. She certainly does not understand the logic of truth.
— creativesoul

Which is why use tells us much more about these concepts, i.e., tells us much more about meaning and understanding. — Sam26

Hey Sam!

Indeed. It's puzzling how a child that can barely string two or three words together knew when she heard the claim that it was not true, and then went on to demonstrate that much, and yet highly educated people seem to have talked themselves right out of that.

I think that that qualifies for Witt's notion of bewitchment. The story may be able to tell us something about hinge propositions???

Truth is not belief - already covered:
Truth is a unary. T(p) is a general representation of the statements, propositions, sentences, facts, or whatever you will, that we cast as true: "p is true"

Belief is binary. B(x,p) is a general representation of the statements, propositions, sentences, facts, or whatever you will, p, that we cast as being believed by x. "x holds that p is true"
— Banno

Further, one chooses between a realist and an antirealist grammar. The best grammar for cats and mats is realist. — Banno

This is about our accounting practices. It restricts and/or limits all belief to propositional attitudes. While this is little to no problem at all if we're talking about language users who have and or develop propositional attitudes, it is quite problematic if we're talking about creatures that are incapable of having a propositional attitude but are perfectly capable of believing that a mouse is behind the tree, that a lizard is under the stove, that a dog is in the house, that food is in their food bowl, or that another cat is on the bed. So, while it works well for analyzing belief statements, the grammar of belief being put to use here is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of language less creatures' belief. It's found lacking in explanatory power.

Cats do not have an attitude towards propositions. They do not hold propositions as true. The T sentence cannot properly account for creatures incapable of having propositional attitudes, and thus, we cannot rightfully encapsulate a cat's belief within quotes on the left side as we do with language users for that would be a mischaracterization of the cat's belief(an accounting malpractice when used in such a way). However, and this is very interesting to me, when we do talk about what it would take in order for a cat's belief to be true, we find ourselves saying much the same thing as we do when it comes to propositional attitudes, despite the fact that cats are incapable of having and/or developing them.

Cookie's belief that a dog is in the house is true only if, only when, and only because a dog is in the house.

Such are the kinds of belief that some language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding. Much like us, they are more than capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief about what's going on around them. Unlike us, they are incapable of talking about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. Unlike us, they are incapable of considering what sorts of things can be true, and what it takes in order for them to be so. Unlike us, they are incapable of doubt and/or skepticism. Much like us, they are capable of forming, having, and/or holding true belief, false belief, as well as belief that is neither at the time(in the case of expectation).

Again, I find it very interesting that our analysis of what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so has no issue at all exhausting some language less creatures' belief, so long as it's not formal logic being used. Common language works just fine.

Is there any practical difference between understanding the logic of truth, and how to know the truth? — Yohan

A twenty-seven-month-old child can know when "there's nothing in there" is false, when the speaker is talking about a fridge. I gave that real life example earlier. She demonstrated that knowledge. She has no idea whatsoever about theories of truth. The terms "truth" and "falsehood" are not even understood by her. She certainly does not understand the logic of truth.

My point is that when you say "...but not-P is true", then you are using "is true" in a non-deflationary way. — Luke

Your critique(Pie's claim) reminds me of Moore's paradox.

This discussion is about what 'false' means. — Isaac

That's where you've staked your claims, as well as your objections, I suppose. You're not very good at providing valid objections. Just sayin'...

I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false
— creativesoul

Yet you've not demonstrated that to be the case within the context of this discussion... — Isaac

The fridge had stuff in it. Someone stated, "there's nothing in there", talking about the fridge. The statement was false. The child knew that the statement was false. She demonstrated that much.



:brow:

It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying — Isaac

No need to assume that they're lying... They could be very confused about what sorts of things can be true and what it takes in order for them to be so.

Someone might, for example, take the position that "the cat on the mat" is true if and only if a reasonable number of their community agreed. I think they'd be wrong. Or that it can be "true for them". Again, wrong. But what are we to make of the fact that there are people who make such arguments. It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying, or being stubborn. So it seems we've no choice but to concede that some people do not know when "the cat is on the mat" is true. — Isaac

Insincerity pervades everyday discourse, I find it highly suspicious for anyone who knows what "the cat is on the mat" means to deny that it is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat. If they have never ever thought about what sorts of things can be true and what it takes in order for them to be so, then we have an interesting case.

Upon what grounds would anyone deny that the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat?

A twenty-seven-month-old child put her knowledge of when a statement is false on display for all to see. She was told "there's nothing in the fridge". She knew better. She uttered a toddler sized version of "Yes there is!" when she said "uh, huh!" as she opened the door to show the speaker that they were wrong! She pointed to things inside and said, "Ders dat, nnn dat, nnn dat...

She knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false.

I see no possible way for anyone to even be able to arrive at any philosophical position without already knowing at least as much as a child who's barely stringing two or three words together.

As written we can't 'all know' full well when it's not true otherwise there'd be no disagreements about that. There are. There are relativists, there are idealists, there are solipsists. — Isaac

I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false, and so many 'highly educated' adults seem to have somehow talked themselves right out of it.

:brow:

...

It's a category error to say that people in their ordinary conversations are speaking wrongly because they don't use a word in accordance with the rules set down for it's use in some given mental practice. — Isaac

Who has done that?

No, they are referring to truth. If they are understood, then that's what the word means. There's no god-given dictionary, and if there were it's certainly not the one you happen to have in your head. They may not be referring to truth in the sense you mean it, but you are not the authority on what the word 'truth' ought to mean. — Isaac

The irony. Pots and kettles once again.

I've had many discussions over the years with different people who talk like that. I knew some of them quite personally. I understood them just fine. "Your truth" refers to what that the listener believed to be true. The same holds good with "true for you".

it's simply not how the word is used.

On what authority do you define words for a language community which clearly uses them in defiance of your edict? — Isaac

Mirror mirror...

Pots and kettles...

I'm not defining terms for them. I have no issue at all with acknowledging different accepted uses. You seem a little chippy...

Not all senses of "truth" are on equal footing. Many nowadays use it when they're talking about what they and/or others believe. That's what's going on when someone utters "my truth", "your truth", "his truth", "her truth", "our truth", and/or "their truth". They are referring to belief. That kind of speech is often used to openly attribute respect and value to another's person by virtue of attributing respect and value to another's opinion and/or worldview. People take lots of stuff personally. The same thing is often happening when people say things like "everyone has a valid opinion". It's about showing consideration to others. So, that particular use isn't all bad(like morally unacceptable or anything), but there are much better ways of being considerate to others without sewing and perpetuating such confusion into the public domain.

Not all opinions are valid. Not all belief is true. It is best to keep that in mind.

...and ummmm.... I'm not alone in that, not in the least.

We all know full well when it's not true
— creativesoul

Nonsense. This would imply that there's never disagreement. — Isaac

That claim is not at odds with disagreeing about the claim. The point is that we all know full well what it takes in order for the statement to be true.

To your point, we do not always know when it is. We do quite often though. So, not nonsense at all, just not as clear as it could've been and not properly qualified.

We disagree when one of us believes the cat is on the mat and another does not. We both know full well that if the cat is there then the statement is true. We also both know full well that if the cat is not there, then the statement is false. We must know that much in order to even disagree upon whether or not the statement is true.

Whether or not the statement is true and what it takes in order for it to be so is perfectly well understood by many children under the age of four. My twenty-seven-month-old granddaughter knew full well when she heard someone say there was nothing in the fridge that that was false. She opened the door and showed the speaker their mistake. We all know full well when it's true because we all know full well what it takes in order to be so.

We all know full well that it's true when the cat is on the mat. That's all I was saying.

Take the statement "the cat is on the mat".

We all know full well when it's not true, because we also know full well what it means. Because we know what it means, we know what to look for and where to look in order to check and see.

When it comes to whether or not that particular statement is true...

It does not matter whether or not anyone believes that the cat is on the mat. It does not matter whether or not anyone would assent to the statement. It does not matter whether or not anyone has some disposition and/or attitude such that they take it to be the case.

That particular statement is true only if, only when, and only because the cat is on the mat.

Tarski's T sentence illustrates that beautifully.

Serendipitous storytelling timing!

:smile:

So what's your preferred understanding of truth ? — Pie

My understanding of truth, how it emerges, and how it works within all thought, belief, and statements thereof is not exactly conventional. Correspondence Theory is closest but has vestiges of historical mistaken accounting practices persisting. Tarski's 'explanation' is best, but I've been told that I misunderstand it, because to me it is a near perfect account of how a true statement is so by virtue of correspondence to the way things are, the case at hand, what's happened, is happening, and/or has yet to have happened(wrt predictions/expectations). My outright rejection of "propositions" as they've been historically conceived doesn't help either, given their continued prevalence. As we've touched upon elsewhere, my objection is based upon the fact that convention has it that truth requires language in a way that it is somehow existentially dependent upon it, such that where there has never been language, there could have never been truth. I've very good reason to reject that claim and hold otherwise, but I'll leave it at that for now.

A story may prove helpful...

There was a recent power outage after a storm in one of my sons' homes. The lack of electricity had already lasted for most of the day, and the power company informed everyone in the affected areas that it may take quite a while longer to restore power to everyone's homes. All the adults in the house were cognizant of the dangers of food spoilage, particularly the stuff in the fridge. As a result, there was a concerted effort to minimize potential losses by keeping the fridge closed as much as possible.

My not-quite-two-year-old grandchild had just begun putting more than one word together in speech. She had no clue what the word "truth" meant. She could not use the terms "true", "false", "not true", or any of the other common terms and words used to talk about true and false statements. However, she definitely knew when she heard a false claim about the contents of the fridge, even though she was barely capable of stringing words together, and could neither name nor describe a single item therein.

That fact is interesting and relevant.

So, the power is out, the adults are deliberately attempting to open the fridge as little as possible as a means to save the food within, when she walked towards the fridge extending her arm, fingers outstretched, as if to open the fridge door to look inside. This was already a habit of hers, to stand there holding the door wide open while looking all around inside to decide if she wanted anything she saw. All the adults in the home knew that much and they had all been long since attempting to discourage her from do so, even before the power outage. So, when one of them took notice of her intention to open the fridge, they also believed that she would once again stand in front of it with the door wide open while deciding if she wanted anything she saw. In a proactive attempt to put a halt to that, they sternly called out her name as a means of immediately getting her attention so that the door remained closed. It worked, temporarily at least. She stopped right in front of the fridge, her hand already on the handle of the door, looking back. He then goes on to say, in a much friendlier tone, "There's nothing in there" in an attempt to stop her from opening and holding the fridge door open and letting all the cool air out of it while she 'window shopped'. What he meant was that there was nothing that she needed at the time, because they were conserving the cool air within, but he did not say that, and she did not understand what he meant. She heard exactly what he said, understood exactly what those words meant, and knew that what he said was not true. The interesting part is that she knew all this even though she was completely incapable of expressing her knowledge with the terms I'm using to describe the situation.

Ahhh...but what she did do was sooo much better!

Instead, she furled her brow, displayed all the confidence that a toddler of that age can possibly muster, and retorted "Uh huh" while opening the door wide enough for him to be able see inside. After ensuring that he could see inside for himself, she began directly contradicting his claim that there was nothing inside the fridge by virtue of pointing to all the different things that were inside the fridge saying "There's that... and that... and that... and that..."

So, what can this situation tell us about truth and/or our understanding thereof?

It tells us quite clearly that a mastery of language is not necessary in order to be able to tell when some statements are true or false, or to already intuitively know how to check and see for ourselves as well as showing another that what they've said is not true. It shows us that we can already understand all of this, on a very basic level, long before having acquired the mastery of language replete with metacognitive endeavors that are required in order for us to be able to talk about it. It shows us that she understood how true claims correspond and false ones do not long before ever being capable of using those terms. She showed him that what he said was not true, and that she knew that much, despite her not being able to tell him.


It also shows us quite clearly that coherence played no role in her understanding, in her knowing that what he said was not true. She was not taken aback regarding whether or not his words followed the so-called 'rules' of correct inference. She was not criticizing the consistency of his language use. She was not keeping a keen eye on the form of his language use. She was not attempting to judge whether he said what he meant.

She was comparing what he said about the contents of the fridge to her knowledge of those contents. She already knew that some stuff was in the fridge, so she knew that what he said was not true. That comparison happened autonomously without the mastery of language required to be able to say so. She communicated to him that what he said was not true. She did not have the mastery of language in order to be able to tell him. So, she did so by virtue of the only means available to her at the time. She showed him that what he said about the contents of the fridge did not correspond to the contents of the fridge. In her doing so, she shows us that we need not be able to use the terms so often used in philosophical and normal everyday discourse in order to intuitively know that 1.)some meaningful statements are false, 2.)what makes them so, 3.)how to check and see for ourselves, or 4.)how to show someone else.

It's no stretch at all to extend that to knowing some meaningful statements are true, what makes them so, how to check for ourselves, and how to show others.

All long before having a linguistic framework replete with the terms "truth", "true", "false", etc...

So, I take it that you agree that "is true" adds nothing meaningful to a sincere belief statement? That truth is presupposed within belief statements?
— creativesoul

That's it, yes. "P is true" is "P"... — Pie

Yep. So long as we do not mistakenly take that farther and claim that all belief are equivalent to "P". They are not.

So, I take it that you agree that "is true" adds nothing meaningful to a sincere belief statement? That truth is presupposed within belief statements?

:smile:

"Is truth a property of sentences (which are linguistic entities in some language or other), or is truth a property of propositions (nonlinguistic, abstract and timeless entities)? — Pie

Is that the only two options?

It adds the ability to explain how some meaning is not existentially dependent upon language use; how language is created; how naming and descriptive practices work; how rigid designators work; how reference works; how new meaning is formed; how meaningful language use transcends the individual speaker; how users of different languages can say much the same thing about the same things using remarkably different syntax and semantic structures. It's how meaningful language use(marks) becomes utterly meaningless and uninterpretable when all the users have long since perished; how the Rosetta stone became a translation device as a result of having enough shared meaning with at least one language still used; how all meaningful things become so; how symbolism works; etc.
— creativesoul
:up:
All great issues. — Pie

Just the tip of the iceberg.

I wonder to what degree exactly such an investigation can avoid attributing postulated linguistic beliefs — Pie

Properly implementing the approach requires drawing and maintaining the distinction between language less thought and belief and thought and belief that includes language use. That also serves as the basis for calling out anthropomorphism. As mentioned heretofore, it involves setting out thought and belief in terms of their elemental constituency and existential dependency.

If such modelling is a part of psychology currently, perhaps there are more recent philosophers who have integrated this fact into their thinking? — Pie

Perhaps.

You say you are right where all philosophers up till now are wrong...on an important issue. That's a strong claim, for which a strong case ought to be made. — Pie

Indeed! Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof/justification/warrant. First things first though.

I've already offered a simple easy to understand distilled version of what convention has been wrong about. Convention has it that both truth and meaning are existentially dependent upon language.<-------That's true, and the basics.

If truth and meaning are existentially dependent upon language, then language less creatures either cannot form thought and belief or language less thought and belief is neither meaningful nor truth apt(capable of being and/or becoming true or false).

There are also all the problems surrounding language use itself and how it emerges. Banno referred to Davidson's paper on malapropisms and the clear refutation of conventional understanding that they posed at the time of the paper. There's a thread about that paper on this site. I think Banno linked it. It's well worth reading!!

A child that has just been burned as a result of touching fire forms the belief that touching fire caused the pain solely by virtue of drawing a correlation between what they did(touch the fire) and the pain that ensued. We can know this much as a result of their absolute refusal to touch it again.
— creativesoul
What does this proposed drawing of a correlation add to the situation? — Pie

Drawing correlations between different things is a basic outline that adds elegance and explanatory power where it's been found lacking(in our accounting practices of meaningful human experience as well as human thought and belief). It adds a means for arriving at a scientifically and philosophically respectable position when it comes to taking account of the origen and evolution of meaningful experience. The scope of rightful application is as broad as it can be. It applies to everything ever thought, believed, spoken, expressed, and/or otherwise uttered. Well over a decade ago, when I first began delving into this, the scope was daunting. It's much less so now that certain pieces have fallen into place, so to speak.

It adds a bridge for explaining how meaningful thought and belief first emerge and subsequently evolve into our own metacognitive endeavors via language creation and use. It adds the ability to explain how some meaning is not existentially dependent upon language use; how language is created; how naming and descriptive practices work; how rigid designators work; how reference works; how new meaning is formed; how meaningful language use transcends the individual speaker; how users of different languages can say much the same thing about the same things using remarkably different syntax and semantic structures. It's how meaningful language use(marks) becomes utterly meaningless and uninterpretable when all the users have long since perished; how the Rosetta stone became a translation device as a result of having enough shared meaning with at least one language still used; how all meaningful things become so; how symbolism works; etc.

What kind of experience(s) does a bat have? We don't know, but we might be able to take a guess, a more or less educated guess, no? Don't we imagine a chiropterologist might have a better idea than we do? — Janus

I would hope such a person would have knowledge about bats that we do not. Seems reasonable to say that that knowledge could be very useful for acquiring knowledge about a bat's experience in the same way that a neuroscientist would have knowledge that is useful to taking account of our own experience.

However, I see no reason to believe that bat experts have knowledge about how thought and belief emerged, simply because they are bat experts. Although they could be very knowledgable when it comes to what sorts of things a bat is capable of drawing correlations between, because that is largely determined by the biological machinery of bats.

So far I think you've only told us what the objects in question are not.

I've said nothing at all about objects.

Perfect example of anthropomorphism.
— creativesoul

Which was the point, sir. — Pie

Given the medium of communication is bereft of all but word use and my tendency to believe I'm talking to an honest person who's seriously interested in the topic at hand, I'm sure you'll understand how the sarcasm went unnoticed.

I'm looking for an alternative to a mathematical model or modeling via linguistic beliefs. So far I think you've only told us what the objects in question are not.

Where are you looking? I suggest a very careful re-read of this conversation. What you claim to be looking for has long since been presented

Does an ameoba have its reasons ? — Pie

Perfect example of anthropomorphism.

Another approach: it's we who are making sense of the cat... — Pie

Indeed. There is no problem at all talking in terms of "the cat believes" as a means to make sense of the cat so long as we do not claim that the cat's beliefs are propositional in content. Our report is.

It seems pointless to guess at what-it's-really-like-for-a-crow. — Pie

I take serious issue with the very notion of what-it's-like regardless of the candidate under consideration. It's not like anything at all to be me. What sense does it make to expect there to be something it is like to be a bat(or a crow)? It's a flawed approach with no clear target. Bottles and flies.

We can arrive at a scientifically and philosophically respectable position when it comes to what our own thought and belief consists of as well as what it is existentially dependent upon, and should that notion be amenable to evolutionary terms as well as being able to bridge language less belief with language use, then we ought have a much better idea of the thought, belief, and/or consciousness of other creatures.

For instance, how does one detect/define consciousness ? — Pie

The notion is muddled, as you well know. How one 'detects' consciousness is a matter of what they're looking for to begin with, or at least, one goes about detecting consciousness by looking for whatever they think and/or believe it is, according to the language games they've played involving the term. I am of the well-considered opinion that consciousness amounts to meaningful experience and as such it is the sort of thing that existed long before we began talking about it. Which is to say that it is the sort of thing that we can be wrong about.

If one rejects the idea of a mysterious X that makes the difference between an arbitrarily convincing P-Zombie and a 'Real Boy,' then we must have some threshold of recognition. In ordinary life, it'd be something like responsiveness (we could talk the details endlessly, but we wouldn't be worried about P-Zombies.)

Biological machinery is not mysterious. I'm not worried about P-Zombies anyway.

So how do you determine or grab a nonlinguistic belief ? Currently I can imagine attributing linguistic belief or a mathematical model.

I prefer to use the term language less. I've found that the "non-linguistic" description fails to be able properly account for the content of a language less creature's belief in terms of elemental constituency and existential dependency.

Are you asking me how I've arrived at the bare minimum criterion(elemental outline) for what counts as a language less belief that I have?

If belief is internal and external, it'd be hard to grab it, I'd think...

It's postulated. Belief as propositional attitude was postulated as well. Turns out that language less belief falsifies it. Not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes. I go even farther and argue that some complex human belief is not! I've already touched upon that with Russell's clock and the sheet over the wire fencing.

What I'm setting out is very easy to understand.

A language less child can learn that touching fire causes pain. Do they infer?
— creativesoul

I'd say no, but we, who do infer, might explain them in inferential terms. We could also mathematically model the situation, I suppose. Why not ? But what else is there ? ESP ? A baby whisperer, if that made sense ? Perhaps I'm wrong, but I fear you are pointing at something ineffable. — Pie

You're definitely wrong about that!

A child that has just been burned as a result of touching fire forms the belief that touching fire caused the pain solely by virtue of drawing a correlation between what they did(touch the fire) and the pain that ensued. We can know this much as a result of their absolute refusal to touch it again.

There's no language necessary for the child's belief. Our knowledge thereof, our accounting practices, well... those most certainly need language. But the child has none. The child cannot have an attitude or disposition towards a proposition such as "touching fire causes pain", but they can and do learn that touching fire causes pain.

I'm not rejecting the practices that I'm criticizing. Rather, I'm simply pointing out the scope of rightful application.

All I've done was point out the fact that outwardly observable behaviour - alone - is not always a reliable means to know what the candidate under consideration is thinking.
— creativesoul

What's your operational definition of this thinking ? If not a beetle in a box, then presumably there's something ? I don't think you mean dispositions. You seem to mean something 'inside.' Brainstates ? — Pie

No. Human thought and belief is not the sort of thing that has a precise spatiotemporal location. It's not in the skull. It's not outside the skull. It consists of internal and external things, and thus it is neither one nor the other... it's both.

Not sure what "operational definition of this thinking" is asking for.

Correlations drawn between different things. <------that's what all human thought and belief amounts to.