Did you read the rest of that post? I generally do not align with Meta.

All our understandings are, strictly speaking, anthropomorphic, or human-shaped, because we are human; so, leaving aside any imputation of what should be understood to be exclusively human qualities and capacities to animals, I think the question of anthropomorphism is beside the point. Do you have anything substantive to add to that or disagreement to express? — Janus

I do not share your pessimism. It's not fait accompli, regardless of whether or not you poison the well. It does not follow from the fact that we are human that all our understandings are anthropomorphic. I sense a bit of chippiness from you. I added quite a bit of substantive examples to discuss earlier. You quoted the first statement of the post and ignored the rest. We can agree to disagree, but it would be far better for us to at least come to clear understanding of what the disagreement is about, and/or where it lies.

Animals without linguistic capabilities obviously do not think in linguistic terms, so presumably they think in sensorimotor ways; whereas we think in both sensorimotor and linguistic ways... — Janus

Well, that's a fine place to start. I agree. Although, the "think in sensorimotor ways" would be best fleshed out.

Some other animals - beside humans - do have language though, so drawing the line at language is not going to serve the purpose of drawing and maintaining the distinctions between thought and belief that is exclusively human in kind, thought and belief that could be had by other animals with language, and thought and belief that can be had by language less creatures.

Gettier is hard. It seems clear there is no general way to block Gettier cases, because whatever you come up with will generate a revenge case purpose built to block your solution. — Srap Tasmaner

Is it hard? Seems straight forward to me.

Gettier is attempting to take account of another's belief(granted, the other is a fiction borne of Gettier's own imagination, but nevertheless). Gettier invokes the rules of entailment in order for Smith to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket, and I will get the job" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job".

The point is that Gettier is talking about Smith's belief, not a naked proposition. With that in mind, because it is Smith's belief, "the man with ten coins in his pocket" refers to Smith and Smith alone. So, when someone else gets the job regardless of how many coins they have in their pocket, Smith's belief is false, because he did not get the job. Smith does not believe anyone other than himself will get the job.

The second case neglects the fact that Smith's belief is a complex one, and again fails to take that complexity into consideration due to treating the disjunction as a naked one. Smith only believes that either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, because he believes Jones owns a Ford. The disjunction is true because Brown is in Barcelona. Smith believes it's true because Jones owns a Ford. Smith's belief is false.

We need only to take notice that there is an accounting malpractice going on.

We proceed on the assumption that we can analyze "naked" propositions with no speaker; — Srap Tasmaner

As did Gettier when invoking entailment to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket".

Pretty sure that release was prior to the Mar-a-lago search. I just wondered if there was any conncection between Trump's penchant for stealing classified materials and that reporting.

Thanks. That's sounds like what I remember seeing only once mentioned, then forgotten.

No.

I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus

I suppose I could make the broader point now. Perhaps the reason you do not share my optimism regarding avoiding anthropomorphism is because you have difficulty yourself in understanding what sorts of thought and belief are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. The notions of 'language capable beings' and 'linguistically mediated thought' only discriminate between language users and language less creatures, so, they are unhelpful for avoiding misattributing some of our thought and belief to other language using creatures. We see this often in nature shows.

I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus

Earlier I asked how you/we avoided anthropomorphism. You basically questioned whether or not we could. I claimed that we can in both principle and practice. You then said you did not share my optimism. Then...

I expressed that we understand the difference between thought and belief that is exclusive to humans and thought and belief that is not.

You then acted as if you had not disagreed with that, but you had, evidently unbeknownst to yourself, because you disagreed that we could avoid anthropomorphism. The problem(for you) is that if we can understand that much, then we can avoid anthropomorphism, for that is the key for doing so. That's how. If you agree with that then it ought be easy enough for you to realize that we can avoid anthropomorphism in both principle and practice. That's one of the things I am getting at.

Secondly, you invoked the notions of 'language capable beings' and 'linguistically mediated thoughts' in order to make a claim that you later judged as trivial/uninformative. You were arguing with yourself, because I never invoked those notions. In fact, neither can draw and maintain the distinction necessary to avoid anthropomorphism because some animals have language.

I've no idea.

There have been an extremely unusually high number of American agents murdered or missing since Trump left office.

Trump illegally took the kind of highly classified documents that deal with agent information like those agents to Mar-a-lago.

Is that a coincidence?

Not if those stolen documents directly pertain to those missing or murdered agents. Not if the classified information pertaining to those agents is missing.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this
— Janus

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism. — creativesoul

Do you not understand that understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not is how to avoid anthropomorphism?

The question you ask presupposes that I meant something other than what I wrote. I did not. What I wrote is plainly understood exactly as it is written. Do you not understand it as it's written?

Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true. — Janus

Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said.

The sheer number of agents who were working with American government and have come up either missing or murdered since Trump left office hasn't been openly considered in the public domain. I wonder if there are any connected dots between those abnormalities and Mar-a-lago?

You can take a further step and claim that there is nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than people who hold the belief that it is honestly expressing that belief by saying, or being disposed to say, "The book is in Michael's room."

Now what does this mean, that there is "nothing more to it"? That suggests there is a biconditional that looks like this: — Srap Tasmaner

That just seems way too convoluted and theory laden...

Seems to me like there's nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than the book, the room, and the spatial relation between the two.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this — Janus

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.

The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.

It would make no sense to say that a parrot danced as a way of showing its appreciation for the aesthetic beauty of a particular song unless it had personal taste regarding music. It would make no sense to say that my cat is jealous of the way my other cat looks unless she had a beauty standard for her to even be bitter about because it is one that she feels she has failed to meet whereas she feels her roommate has succeeded.

The gecko on my outdoor table was not thankful to me for leaving bits of butter mochi and juice for it - and could not possibly be - without having a meaningful sense of gratitude. The pheasants in my yard cannot respect the individuality of each other simply for the sake of doing so unless they have some socially derived moral/ethical sense of respecting the individuality of others simply for the sake of doing so. The male peacock does not have all his hopes and dreams wrapped up in successfully 'courting' females unless he has thought and belief(hopes and dreams) about what has yet to have happened(the future).

In principle, thoughts exclusive to humans would be(consist of) correlations including written language use. In practice, we do not attribute such thought to non human creatures.

Since it is always we who imagine or posit this or that about what we think or imagine animals might experience, can we avoid anthropomorphism? — Janus

I think we can in both principle and practice.

It takes knowledge of what the difference is between language less creatures' belief and language users'. We need a standard for what language less animals can and/or cannot think and/ believe. One thing is certain; language use is the key for establishing what they cannot.

How do we(or you) avoid anthropomorphism?

You seem to be suggesting that you can't create a bowl without a language. I'm sure that pre-linguistic man created bowls of some sort, or maybe you're referring to a particular kind of bowl, say plastic bowls. Even if you're right, it seems like a stretch to the conclude that because a thing (maybe stove is more appropriate), is created by language users, that the cat's belief is dependent upon language. — Sam26

It's all about the content of the belief Sam. I think you would agree that believing a mouse is under the stove depends upon the prior existence of a mouse, a stove, and the spatiotemporal relationship between the two from the vantage point of the believing creature(regardless of whether or not the creature has language). There may be other elements as well, but for simplicity's sake alone, we can just focus upon those main elements of this particular belief. The belief is existentially dependent upon all of those elements. All stoves are existentially dependent upon language. All belief involving stoves must be as well.

When I use the phrase "dependent upon language," I'm referring to the use of concepts as part of a statement of belief. So, the cat is not dependent upon language in this sense.

The cat is not dependent upon language. We certainly agree there. I completely agree that cats do not use linguistic concepts. However, they can and do directly perceive some things that emerged into the world by virtue of our use of linguistic concepts; stoves and sofas are precisely such things. All belief about such things is existentially dependent upon those things. Those things are existentially dependent upon language. All belief about those things is existentially dependent upon language.

You're adding another sense of "dependent upon language" that doesn't involve the direct use of concepts, which seems to be an indirect dependence. Am I understanding your point, or not? Mostly I'm talking about concepts, in particular the concept truth. The difference maybe in our focus.

I do not think that I'm adding another sense of "dependent upon language" - as in a completely different sense - so much as expanding the sense you've put to use here in such a way that it includes spatiotemporal considerations pertaining to the direct dependence upon language use that some things require for their initial emergence. I mentioned earlier to someone here how I thought that logic's lack of spatiotemporal consideration was a fundamental flaw. The approach I use includes keeping spatiotemporal considerations in mind. I see no other way to arrive at a scientifically and philosophically respectable position regarding how belief emerges and subsequently evolves given time and mutation. This ties into truth and meaning both, because it is via thought and belief formation that both truth and meaning first emerge onto the world stage(that's a topic in it's own right).

That being said, you're right to take note of the difference, because to the best of my knowledge, it is unique.

This ought help you to understand my use of "existential dependency".

I'm just saying what we all know; that we know, in the most basic sense, pre-linguistic sensory experience, which our language cannot capture without losing its living quality and distorting it into a world of fixed entities and facts; which, in other words our language cannot adequately capture even though it can express linguistic truths and falsities which pertain to that collective representational schema we call the world.

To say otherwise would be to claim that animals do not experience anything at all. — Janus

That first sentence is very long, but the more I read it over, the more it looks like a partially formed incomplete thought. Be that as it may, I've thought long and hard about what you've been saying and I think, but I'm not at all certain of it, that you seem to be claiming - roughly mind you - that language doesn't do any justice(so to speak) to language less creatures experiences. You seem to also want to say that it cannot, despite our being able to use it to make true claims about our shared world, which you call "that collective representational schema".

The last sentence clearly suggests that we only have two choices when it comes to talking about the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience of language less creatures. We can either hold the view that you hold or claim that language less creatures do not have any experience at all.

That's not true.

The approach one takes towards setting out the meaningful experience of language less creatures is pivotal to one's understanding, assuming one maintains coherency by avoiding self-contradiction and/or equivocation. Different approaches often lead to different consequences. Our respective approaches are remarkably different. Being a charitable reader, the one you've employed/adopted leads you to believe that language cannot capture the meaningful experience of language less creatures.

Whereas my approach leads me to first question what it takes to 'capture' the meaningful experience of language less creatures. What are we expecting to be able to do with language? Language cannot reproduce meaningful experience. We're just offering reports and/or accounts of meaningful experience. We're not attempting to accurately reproduce each and every aspect of meaningful experience in our report/account of it.

Perhaps you would find it helpful to adjust your expectations regarding what we can do with language.

One consideration worth mentioning...

An overlap happens between language less creatures' belief and belief of language users. The overlap could be rendered as a Venn diagram with the commonalities being directly perceptible things. Trees, sofas, stoves, fridges, mice, and spatiotemporal relationships, for instance, are directly perceptible things within the aforementioned overlap. This overlap could be talked about in terms of the world shared between cats, mice, and humans.

There is, as a kind of ground to all our propositions, truths and facts, a pre-linguistic actuality to which they must submit. Analysis and conceptualization cannot gain purchase on that actuality, because to do so is to bring it into the linguistic domain, and there all we have purchase on is our communal perceptions and conceptions of what is the case, — Janus

The "pre-linguistic actuality" I have in mind is our basic experience of images, smells, sensations and impressions as well as recognition of repetition and pattern. — Janus

In the bottom quote above you are doing what you said we could not do in the top quote. In addition, we've also arrived at incoherency/self-contradiction by virtue of equivocating the notion of "pre-linguistic actuality". The top quote sets it out one way. The bottom another.

It is very hard to talk about the subject matter at hand when we do not avoid such results and/or situations. I think we can nix the notion of "pre-linguistic actuality" altogether and by doing so, increase clarity while losing nothing. While "pre-linguistic" seems potentially useful, "actuality" does not.

I think we agree that a cat's belief that a mouse is under the sofa includes a mouse, the sofa, and a spatiotemporal relationship between the two from the cat's vantage point... right?

Things such as the tree being, say, 11m tall, will be true regardless of their being stated. — Banno

Only after we first stipulated what counted as eleven meters. Not before. The fact that the tree is eleven meters tall is existentially dependent upon language. The fact that the mouse is behind the tree is not.

The tree we are talking about is outside of language? — Banno

We may be talking about different trees. The one in my front yard is most certainly outside of language.

The term "tree" consists of meaningful marks. The term "tree" is not outside of language. What I'm picking out of the world to the exclusion of all else by using that term most certainly is.

Some facts involving trees are existentially dependent upon language. All statements about trees are.

One issue here is what a "linguistic fact" is, so that we can understand what a "nonlinguistic fact" is.

It seems to me that it doesn't make sense to say that (1) is a linguistic fact. If someone thingks it does, then it is up tot hem to provide some account. — Banno

I'm not defending that use of "linguistic fact" or "non-linguistic" fact.

All kettles were, are, and will forever remain to be, existentially dependent upon language. If they were planned originals, then all meaningful marks involving kettles emerged in the planning and fabrication of the first kettles, as well as accounting practices of kettles thereafter. If they were accidental originals having resulted from ingenious on the spot novelty of use, then all meaningful marks involving kettles emerged after the original kettle.

Statements involving kettles. Situations involving kettles. Circumstances involving kettles. Belief involving kettles. Knowledge involving kettles. Everything involving kettles came immediately prior to, during, and/or after the first kettle emerged into the world.

All facts involving kettles are existentially dependent upon language.

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"
3. "The kettle is boiling" is true
4. '"The kettle is boiling" is true'
5. '"The kettle is boiling is true' is true

Previously I've felt obliged to explain that 1, 3 and 5 in this list are facts.

Arguably, since they are directly about sentences and not about kettles, 3 and 5 might be called linguistic facts. But on that criteria, 1 is directly about kettles, not sentences. — Banno

Makes sense to me thus far...

There are, it seems, folk who think that we need an item 0 in this list, a state of affairs or an exterior thing in itself, outside of language or perception or belief or some other; and that it is this item 0 that is the fact, which is represented (or some such...) in item 1.

The tree is outside of language, perception, and belief is it not?

A kettle? Not so much.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon... — Sam26

Hey Sam, sorry about the delay. Doctor visit.

I think we agree much more than the above seems to suggest. Could you re-read that post and tell me at what point exactly you begin to disagree?

Just to be clear, I haven't posited an "actual world"; I've talked about the distinction between experienced actuality, meaning actual experience, which I'm saying is of images, sensations, impressions, and the world, which I'm saying is the idea of the totality of things, facts and relations that we think gives rise to actual experience. — Janus

There is, as a kind of ground to all our propositions, truths and facts, a pre-linguistic actuality to which they must submit. Analysis and conceptualization cannot gain purchase on that actuality, — Janus

That's the bit directly above that seems to be untenable in the same way that Kant's Noumena is.

The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language... — Sam26

When and where there has never been language there could have never been stoves.

That sums up the difference between our views it seems. The object that "stove" refers to is existentially dependent upon language on my view, but not yours.

Understood. I do strive for agreement with myself though.

:wink:

Indeed. Gives me time to do this though! lol. Cannot move around as usual, otherwise I would not be doing this. There are more real life results based things I would be doing if I could.

It's like an itch that won't go away — Sam26

Like the shingles virus that I'm currently suffering from...

:yikes:

(And again, that is what creativesoul misses in his account.) — Banno

I do not completely agree with Davidson or Witt. There are important differences at a fundamental level between their views and my own. My and your view differ in much the same respect, I think. Yours is more in line with theirs, whereas I disagree with all three of you on some basic tenets. It could be summed up with "truth and meaning are both prior to language".

:wink:

We just are never going to get the kind of precision out of language that some philosophers want. It's like an itch that won't go away. — Sam26

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed.

For example, the terms/adjectives "linguistic" "non-linguistic" and "pre-linguistic" have been employed in this discussion by a variety of different individuals. Those uses were mainly talking about kinds of facts or something like that. For different reasons in the past, I used them myself, because they seemed like a commonsense easily understood distinction. I wanted to draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between language less creatures' belief and language users' belief. Naturally, I saw the difference to be language. So, I began by saying that language less animals have non-linguistic(or pre-linguistic) belief and language users have linguistic belief. Seems fairly straight forward. Makes perfect sense. I later found that that particular simplicity, which I always strive for, was deceptively so.

Turns out that that was a very useful distinction for me, but not for the reasons I initially began using it. I wanted to clearly demarcate two categories of belief as mentioned heretofore. I called them "linguistic belief", which was meant to pick out all belief that is existentially dependent upon language, and "pre-linguistic" or "non-linguistic" belief, which was meant to pick out all belief that was not existentially dependent upon language. Seems all well and good right up to the point when we want to set out cat's belief about bowls in terms of the content of the belief.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. All belief about bowls is existentially dependent upon bowls. Even illusions of bowls are not possible without bowls. So, I had arrived at incoherence and/or self-contradiction without being guilty of equivocating terms. This forced me to re-evaluate my position and what I was aiming to take proper account of. I want to offer a notion of belief that is philosophically and scientifically respectable. Such a notion ought be able to sensibly bridge the gap between language less belief and the belief of language users in a way that belief as propositional content has been found sorely lacking.

I had - and remain to have - no doubt whatsoever that some language less creatures have belief, but realized that we could not make sense of those sorts of belief by using the terms "linguistic" and "pre-linguistic" if I wanted to also hold that non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief.

So, I had no choice but to abandon the idea that a language less creature's belief could not be existentially dependent upon language, because some of them clearly are. This line of thought led me to realization that the difference between language less belief and the belief of language users could not be properly set out by using such terms. While language use is the difference, it was not whether or not the content of the belief was existentially dependent upon language use that determined the difference between language less creatures' belief and language users'. Rather, it was whether or not the content included language use.

Thus, we can make sense of the cat's belief that a mouse is behind the tree, or that a mouse is under the sofa, or that the food bowl is empty, or that a duck is under the car because none of those beliefs have language use as content. The correlations being drawn do not include language use. However, my cat also has some belief that includes language use as content, not because she asks, "you want some treats?" each and every time in the same tone prior to giving her treats, but because I do, and she has come to believe that she is about to get treats when I say that as a result of drawing correlations between my language use and what happens afterwards. She has attributed meaning to the language use by virtue of drawing correlations between it and eating treats. This points towards language acquisition and what it takes to go from language less creature to language user.

Now, if we go back to my granddaughter, we can also sensibly say that she believed stuff was in the fridge, and her belief was true because stuff was in the fridge. So, when she heard someone say otherwise, she knew that the claim was false on it's face, because she knew what was being claimed(she knew what it meant) and she had true belief to the contrary. The claim made no sense to her! Her belief included correlations between language use(which is directly perceptible, but includes things that are not - meaning) and other directly perceptible things like the fridge and its contents.

I'm not convinced there is a coherent account of belief that doesn't rely on knowledge as a separate category... — Srap Tasmaner

Are there beliefs that do not rely upon accounts(language use)?

I was just pointing out that the absurdity of carving initials on a perception, which creative was attempting to use against what I had said, is inapt since the whole experience: carving, initials, tree and all the rest are all of the same perceptual fabric. — Janus

Not necessarily use against what you said so much as attempting to makes sense of how the 'actual world' posited earlier fit into the carving. You've also said that we don't see the world, but rather our perceptions, conceptions, impressions, and things of a nature which sound like a denial of direct perception.

Here though, you've posited the tree, and not your conception or perception of the tree, so at least the tree is included. I've little interest in nailing down flaws in people's positions for the sake of exposing them alone, so I'm not going to push on this or make any charges. My replies are more for my own understanding.

Your asking me to explain your own terminology — Banno

That's a common scenario around here.

I think the problem lies in the vagaries of language, and trying to fit language into a very precise medium, like mathematical logic. Logic is a guide for our reasoning, but it has it's limits. The two mediums of logic and ordinary language are very different, and it's this difference that may contribute to the problem. — Sam26

I would agree.

Are you carving your initials into a tree or your perception, conception, and/or impressions?