...This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain.
— Hanover

This poor argument is at the bottom of so much confusion on TPF. — Leontiskos

It strikes me as a performative contradiction, given the fact those purportedly holding the first claim as true have been incessantly making claims about the constitution of the stimulus.

...one does not require perfect certainty in order to have knowledge. — Leontiskos

Yup. As far as I'm concerned, one need not be certain at all in many cases. Certitude is confidence. Knowledge is not. One can be unshakably certain and wrong just as one can be very hesitant and right, to put it roughly.

I like AJ Ayers answers to radical skepticism given the awareness of our own fallibility. It does not follow from the fact that we have been wrong about some things that we've been wrong about everything. It does not follow from the fact that we cannot know everything about something that we cannot know anything about it.

Oh, and there are no colorless rainbows, nor colorless visible spectrums.
— creativesoul

These are aspects of visual world of a perceiver. If you're suggesting, in these terms, that colour inheres in the Rainbow... hehe. Nope. Try changing your terms around to be idependent of perception. Could make some headway.. — AmadeusD

Nice red herring, strawman, non sequitur, etc...

I made the case a few posts back. See for yourself.

That para honestly felt like trolling... Is it? — AmadeusD

Pots and kettles.

'Felt like'???

Or projection, perhaps.

I can't make you pay attention to the whole post. Hallucinations of red pens never include red pens. The pain feels like it's coming from where the limb used to be for the reasons already explained in the parts you edited out. The phantom pain is the result of having already had pain in the limb. It's what is happening when the neurological structures are acting as if there is pain in the limb.

It does not follow that no pain is located in limbs.

Oh, and there are no colorless rainbows, nor colorless visible spectrums.

:zip:

Phantom limb pain works exactly like hallucination does as it pertains to the existential dependency aspect between limb pain and phantom limb pain. The biological machinery behaves as it does when there is a pain in the limb. If there were never a limb, there could never be a phantom pain.

The pain is in the limb, not the brain. The brain plays a role, but not as the location of the pain. It is the locus of one's awareness of the pain. Hence, after having already evolved the neurological pathways of having experienced pain in the limb, they are primed to act that way again, despite no longer having a physical extremity located where the pain seems to be coming from. It's akin to neurological muscle memory. Biological structures acting as they do... mindlessly.

I'm reporting what the science says. — Michael

Well, you're reporting what the writer says. If the author is a scientist, then you're reporting what a scientist says. And they... and we... are theorizing from observation/experiment. Not all scientists agree on the theoretical extrapolations you're presenting. Theoretical physics is philosophy. So, it seems to me that you're reporting on both, the experiments, and the philosophical explanations thereof. Those are flawed as well, as I'll address shortly.

First...

Here's what I'm saying: The biological machinery under consideration - in complete and total absence of external stimulus - is inherently incapable of seeing, dreaming, or hallucinating anything at all, colors notwithstanding. Seeing, dreaming, and hallucinating colors takes more than just the biological structures.

Second...

I'm not disagreeing that hallucinations and dreams happen even though there is no typical external stimulus present. I mean, hallucinating and dreaming red pens, never includes a red pen. It is only after one has seen color, that can one hallucinate and/or dream that color. It is during dreams and hallucinations that the same biological structures behave as if they were seeing a red pen, not the other way around. There is an existential dependency at hand here. It's important.

Third...

If there were no cake, then there could have never been anyone smelling one. If no one ever smelled a cake, there could never have been anyone dreaming or hallucinating cake smells. Likewise, if there is no creature capable of smelling cakes, there could have never been cake smelling, even if there were plenty of cakes being baked. It a complex process, replete with necessary elemental constituents.

So...

It takes more than just biological machinery. It also takes more than just cakes. Hence, to isolate only one necessary element in a complex process is to lose sight of and/or grossly neglect the fact that it's a process, and that process consists of different things, all of which are necessary for the emergence of seeing colors and smelling cakes.

You want to ignore the fact that dreams and hallucinations are existentially dependent upon veridical perception, excise the biological machinery from the rest of the process, and then claim that all three consist of only that machinery.

Depending upon one's notion of physiological sensory perception, it could sensibly and consistently be said that smell and color are both inherent in distal objects. Newton came close until positing "sensation". Colored things possess mind independent physical properties that are inherently capable of being seen as colored by a mind so capable. I think Searle holds something like that, but I'm sure his is more nuanced.

I personally reject the idea that color exists at all in the complete absence of both/either colored things and/or creatures capable of seeing color.

You're contradicting yourself at nearly every turn, in addition to the fact that your 'argument' leads to the absurdity of you claiming out loud, for everyone to see, that you do not conclude anything about stimulus from your experience all the while insisting that there is no color in stimulus.

There is a clear distinction between wavelengths of light and the corresponding colour... — Michael

Colors corresponding to wavelengths of light...

Are there colorless rainbows?

Your naive projection has long since been refuted by physics and neuroscience. — Michael

Strawdogs and ad homs... wonderful.

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. — Hanover

And yet... you and Michael are doing exactly that.

If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.
— creativesoul

Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress.
— creativesoul

These comments are inconsistent. — Hanover

The first paragraph shows the consequences of adding Michael's earlier claims to known fact.

The second paragraph is also known fact. It makes no difference to me whatsoever which one counts as "direct realism" or which one counts as "indirect". I'm neither. At least, I reject the idea of color as a biologically independent entity.

The homogeneal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make Objects appear so, I call Rubrifick or Red-making; those which make Objects appear yellow, green, blue, and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Blue-making, Violet-making, and so of the rest. And if at any time I speak of Light and Rays as coloured or endued with Colours, I would be understood to...

Be equivocating.

Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows?
— creativesoul

It's not clear what you mean by the question — Michael

It follows from what you wrote. I showed that.

Light is unlike chemicals.

The light without color?

Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.

Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.

Colorless rainbows.
— creativesoul

Light is just electromagnetic radiation. When it stimulates the eyes this causes neurological activity in the visual cortex, producing colour percepts. Just like chemicals stimulating the tongue cause neurological activity in the gustatory cortex, producing taste percepts. Colours are no more "in" light than tastes are "in" sugar. — Michael

Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows?

Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress.

Here's the visible spectrum. — Michael

The light without color?

Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.

Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.



Colorless rainbows. Earlier I was pointing out that possible unacceptable logical consequence. Here it is in it's glory.

They look that way because they reflect that wavelength of light, and our biology just happens to be such that objects which reflect that wavelength of light look to have that colour. That's all there is to it.

But the colour just is that mental percept — Michael

:yikes:

Colors are not simple entities. Nor are they equivalent to the biological machinery doing it's job... mindlessly.

The when and how it is caused to occur is then what distinguishes dreams, hallucinations, and non-hallucinatory waking experiences. It's a dream when it occurs when we're asleep, it's an hallucination when it occurs when we're awake and in response to something like drugs, and it's a non-hallucinatory waking experience when it occurs when we're awake and in response to light stimulating the eyes. — Michael

You've no ground to speak in such ways. The consequences of your claims - if true - is that you cannot further discriminate between those four things. What is the difference?

Nothing.



The experiences consist of mental percept. They also consist of auditory functioning. We do not conflate hearing a sound with the sound. We ought not conflate seeing red with red, dreaming red with red, and/or hallucinating red with red.

Those are very different in the constitution. They are existentially dependent upon one another.

Seeing red pens is an experience that always includes red pens, whereas dreaming and hallucinating them does not - cannot. That's one elemental difference. The pen.

There is no red pen while dreaming and hallucinating red pens.

I also asked what the difference was between the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur and seeing red, and dreaming red.

You claimed "nothing" as an answer to all three questions. If there is no difference between four things, then they are the same.

They're all experiences.
— creativesoul

The red part of hallucinating red, dreaming red, and seeing red are all the same thing... — Michael

Well, that remains a contentious matter. The 'red part', huh?

:brow:

There are common elements within each. The mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur is but one. It does not follow that seeing red, dreaming red, and hallucinating red are equivalent in every way. There is no distinction between four different 'things' according to what you've argued(claimed and reaffirmed when later asked).

It does not follow from the fact that seeing, dreaming, and hallucinating red all involve the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur that there is no difference between seeing red and the percept under consideration.

There are physical, non-physical, subjective, objective, internal, external, private, public, meaningful and meaningless elements. All three kinds of experience differ from one another in their elemental constitution.

I am being very explicit with what I mean by the word "red", which is the opposite of equivocation. — Michael

No. The opposite of equivocation is using one and only one sense of a key term in a logical argument about the ontology of our referent(s).

The red part of hallucinating red, dreaming red, and seeing red are all the same thing — Michael

Your equivocating "red".

I once seriously injured the thumb of my right hand. Almost cut the tip off, including half of the last skeletal digit. Immediate and constant pressure under tight wrap was applied. No pain. Perfect saw kerf visible in xray. Shattered beyond. Excellent job technician. Took nearly six months for the bone fragments to make their way to the surface and be expelled. Interesting scars.

Bad habits became muscle memory while always paying close attention to the relationship between the cutting tool and my body. Complacency won when I did not pay attention to how close my thumb was to the tool. Two things cannot occupy the same space during the same timeframe.

Reaching over a cutter to grab a push stick is a bad habit to form. I no longer have that habit.

because of this the god-of-the-gaps paradigm of the modern naturalist matches the theological paradigm of the modern fundamentalist — Leontiskos

Care to set out the match?

Hallucination, dreaming, and seeing are very different experiences. Seeing a red pen is a common experience that always includes a red pen.

Hallucinating a red pen does not.

Dreaming one does not.

They are not equivalent experiences. They are all existentially dependent upon red pens. They do not all include red pens.

They all include mental percepts. They do not all consist entirely of them. I'm cool with admitting that all dreams consist of little more than biological structures doing their thing. Dreams consist of biological autonomous neurological functioning. Red pens are not. Therefore... dreams of red pens do not consist of red pens. Hallucinations consist of biological autonomous neurological functioning. Red pens are not. Therefore...

Seeing red pens is not always and/or necessarily an experience that requires color vision. Hallucinating red pens does.

We can expose an individual devoid of the biological structures necessary for noticing color to a red pen. They are otherwise very similar in biological structures to us. They can then follow that red pen around. Clearly, they see that particular red pen. They're paying very close attention to it. They're following it with their eyes. I would not deny them of mental percepts. I would note that their percepts are not the entirety of their experience. I would not deny that they are fixated upon a red pen. Their experience of that particular red pen includes that pen, despite their inability to know it's color.

Color doesn't always matter.

They cannot hallucinate red pens. They cannot dream red pens.

Sometimes it does.

Meaningful correlations, associations, connections always matter. Red pens can become very meaningful to a color blind creature. That meaning neither results from nor consists of either hallucination or dreams of red. Red pens play a meaningful role in experience without any subjective private quale... redness.

What's the name given to the most blood-filled active biological structures "lighting up" in the scans?

What counts as an experience?

You asked me "what's the difference between hallucinating red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur." — Michael

I also asked what the difference was between the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur and seeing red, and dreaming red.

You claimed "nothing" as an answer to all three questions. If there is no difference between four things, then they are the same.

They're all experiences. Three different kinds of experiences. "Mental percept" is not one.

What do you take the pen to be when it isn't being perceived. — AmadeusD

Exactly the same as it is while looking at it.

Ok, right, so then there's a Yes/No answer here:

Are you suggesting the Red Pen is actually out there, in the world, whether or not it is perceived? — AmadeusD

There's a bit of an identity crisis here. I do not know what you're picking out - if anything - to the exclusion of all else with "Red Pen".

The red super fine one I last put in my wooden writing utensil holder, is still there despite my not looking at it now...

So, yes.

I would say that red pen is actually in that holder, on top of that back bench at that location, right now.

And that the mind merely does the perceiving of a mind-independent red pen? Yes? No? — AmadeusD

I wouldn't say that.

, if what we're happy to say is that all three obtain in the mind. — AmadeusD

I don't like the baggage of 'obtain'. Require minds... sure. Include minds... sure.

Aha! Not at all really. My bad if that got bad in your eyes.

:flower:

There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof.
— creativesoul

I think this is incorrect, depending on your response to what the difference would be between these and the "seeing" instance. That's all I'm asking... I would call it incorrect if we cannot pick out a feature of hte 'actual' seeing of a Red pen in contrast to the other two — AmadeusD

The red pen is not an elemental constituent within dreams or hallucinations thereof. The difference between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming pens is the pen.

I don't know how much plainer, clearer, or more precisely that can be stated.

There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof.
— creativesoul

I think this is incorrect, — AmadeusD

That's too bad.

I see the distinction you made as weak — AmadeusD

So you've claimed.

Which distinction?

I would like a conceptual analysis of the difference between the three cases... — AmadeusD

I've given a brief causal history as well as an in depth enough elemental constituency.

In all three cases we're experiencing the event of 'looking at an object we apprehend as a pen which will write with red ink", right? — AmadeusD

There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof.

None. This is literally something I am asking you to address. You drew the distinction. — AmadeusD

What distinction do you think I drew?

When do you actually 'see' a Red pen?
— AmadeusD

When 'you' have biological machinery close enough to our own. — creativesoul

This is unfortunately, quite unhelpful. That obtains in all three cases and provides no basis to delineate. — AmadeusD

We already drew and maintained the distinctions between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming?

Those still hold.

They all include biological machinery. They do not all count as seeing a red pen. Please keep up.