Comments
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EuthyphroSurely you adhere to the worldview that's prominent during your lifetime. You have to in order to interact with others. — frank
First, there is more than one. Second, I can interact with someone with a different worldview. Third, I can understand a completely different worldview and not agree with it.
So, no I need not adhere to any worldview that's prominent in my lifetime. Bits and pieces of lots of them, sure...
Truth is a relation between what's believed about what's happened and/or is happening and what's happened and/or is happening. I would not agree that "truth is relative". -
EuthyphroMultiplying entities... only for those entities to be different names for the same entity has it's own set of problems. Occam's razor.
As far as monism goes in light of this discussion...
One finger cannot point at itself. Distinction requires a plurality of things, as compared/contrasted to a plurality of different names for the same thing. -
Euthyphro...see if the dialogue has a range of meanings from the literal to the moral to the metaphysical. — Apollodorus
Well, Plato used the terms sensibly, and if he did so without equivocation, then pursuing a range of different meanings would be to say stuff that Plato did not. So, I would be hesitant to do anything aside from examine Plato's use/sense given what we can know about the historical context. -
EuthyphroHowever, if (a) we take the Gods (literally, all the Gods) to refer to the Divine (to theion) in a general or abstract sense, and if (b) we admit that the human soul is divine, then (c) knowing what is good amounts to the divine knowing what is divine. — Apollodorus
The human soul is all the gods.
That follows, you know? -
EuthyphroWe're just good at adhering to our own worldview. — frank
Some of us, perhaps. For my part, I built a worldview around things that I knew were true, and/or had warrant to believe. Disparate, at first, this worldview... but becoming more and more coherent as I go. Dependable and true as well, if lack of surprise is any indication.
:wink: -
EuthyphroThat would appear to be the logical implication. — Apollodorus
The text is ancient. The logical implications are what interested me. If we use the text as though it is infallible, we arrive where they did... nowhere. I personally think that we are well equipped to do much better. -
How Do We Think About the Bible From a Philosophical Point of View?The Bible is a collection of stories written by men long ago as a means for explaining things that were in need of explanation. Since then the stories have been used for all sorts of different things.
Philosophically, I personally want to know if the stories are true. In order to know that, we must first know what makes a story so. True stories are accurate accounts/reports of what's happened or is happening.
The creation story in the Bible is not an accurate account of how the world/universe came into existence. I've come to that belief as a result of knowing that our current knowledge base leads to conclusions that the world and universe are much older than what the stories in the Bible claim.
The notion of sin in the Bible is incredulous as a result of God punishing Adam and Eve for doing wrong before they even knew the difference between right and wrong.
The notion of God being the source of morality(doing what's good) is incredulous as a result of knowing that what so so much of what God commands throughout the Bible is not good.
The notion of God being a loving God is incredulous as a result of his creating a place of suffering for all of eternity as a place to put his disobedient children. Not my idea of how to treat someone you love. Seems a bit abusive to me.
The notion of Mary, mother of Jesus, being impregnated without being asked for permission... well...
Surely you get the point here. Philosophically speaking, the Bible is bereft, to put it mildly. I could go on and on, but need not. -
EuthyphroSo, either the good, just, and pious is completely arbitrary(at the whim of the gods) or there is a standard for being good, just, and pious that exists independently of the gods.
Neither is acceptable(to the believer anyway). I personally find the latter to be the case. -
EuthyphroSocrates’ question is, “Is that which is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? (10a). — Apollodorus
If what counts as good, just, and pious counts as such because it is loved by the gods, then all things loved by the gods are good, just, and pious merely as a result of being loved by the gods, and nothing is good, just, and pious unless or until it's loved by the gods. In this particular scenario, humans either have no direct access to the gods and thus cannot know what is good, just, and pious, or they somehow have access to the gods in order to be able to know what they love, and by doing so also know what's good, just, and pious.
That's one logical possibility, and it ends in the good, just, and pious being arbitrary(at the whim of the gods) and unknowable to humans as a result of humans not having knowledge of gods' whims/preferences, and/or some human(s) claiming to know the minds, whims, and preferences of the gods.
If the good, just, and pious is loved by the gods because that which is loved is already good, just, and pious, then there must be a criterion - independent of merely being loved by the god as in the example above - by which the gods compare/contrast things to the criterion in order to see if they count as being good, just, and pious. In this scenario, should the gods find that something satisfies that criterion, then the gods love it as a result. Should something or other fail to satisfy that criterion, then the gods do not love it. If this particular scenario is true, then what counts as being good, just, and pious exists in it's entirety completely independent of the gods approval because the approval comes as a result of meeting the criterion for what counts as being good, just, and pious.
This logical possibility drives an insurmountable wedge between what's good, just, and pious and the gods by negating the idea that divinity/gods is equivalent to the good, just, and pious. -
Euthyphro
As before. Not interested. Congratulations. You win. Argument by defnitional fiat. Gods are good. Gods love good things. Gods love themselves. Perfect reasoning. -
EuthyphroSocrates believes (and Euthyphro agrees) that the pious/good/just is pious/good/just because it is loved (sanctioned/approved/commanded) by the Gods. — Apollodorus
bolding above mine
So, piety, goodness, and justice somehow exist, in their entirety, independently of the gods...
:brow:
... which is the problem for divine command theorists, and it is also a problem for anyone who holds belief that god(s) created everything. -
Euthyphro
The problem with your particular line of thinking is that it results in the following...
The gods love themselves.
The question/problem is - of course - do the gods love something because it has the attributes of goodness, justness, and divinity or iare such things just, good, and divine because the gods love them.
Your answer was that gods loved things that are just, good, and divine.
So, either those properties exist in and of themselves independently of the gods, or the gods love themselves.
Not an acceptable answer to me. Results may vary. -
Euthyphro
Not interested. Revisit the argument/objection given. It's still an insurmountable problem. Believe what you like. -
EuthyphroIf the attributes/properties of just, good, and divine are divine, then they are part of the divine. — Apollodorus
That doesn't fix the problem...
If those attributes are independent of the godsReveal, but those attributes are part of the divine or are the divine, then the divine is independent of the gods...(as they must be if the gods love things as a result of those things possessing those attributes) -
Euthyphro...the pious is that which is loved by the Gods because it is good, just and divine. — Apollodorus
Clearly then...
The attributes/properties of being just, good, and divine are independent of being loved by the gods, which is an insurmountable problem for any position that believes in creator god(s) repsonsible for creating everything as well as the problems faced by divine command theory. -
Philosophical Plumbing — Mary MidgleyThe problem is that philosophy is not a monolith; so it might not be all that easy to decide who is "degrading" it. — Janus
Poorly worded on my part. I meant only to note that many many politicians will degrade a position by calling it "philosophical' or 'in theory' or words to that effect/affect. -
Philosophical Plumbing — Mary Midgley...you can't force philosophy on people. — Janus
Nor need we force anything on anyone...
Governmental policy is all about what ought and/or ought not be done. Politics is all about government. All political positions on the role of government are inherently philosophical. Thus, whenever a politician(or anyone really for that matter) openly degrades philosophy, they ought very well be taken to task.
What can be done is provide the American public with an accurate timeline of events showing which policies resulted in unwanted consequences for Americans overall, and which politicians voted for those policies, as a means to produce a well informed electorate. -
Philosophical Plumbing — Mary MidgleySure, that's an idea, an ideal, but I don't think it reflects the reality... — Janus
Hence, the need for philosophical style approaches to the matter...
... people simply have whatever influence they have acquired via their social relations. If they are acting within the law, then who's going to take their power and influence, whatever it's level might be, away from them?
That's another question altogether.
However, if the issues of not caring about those over whom an individual wields such power are clearly presented as such and supported by what's actually happened, is happening, or what the individual wants to happen, then in a democratic form of government, the citizens remove those people from power by virtue of voting against them or voting for people who will remove such people from power, should they not be elected officials, but some other private individual offering a public good or service in the American marketplace.
Of course, free and fair elections are totally dependent upon a well informed electorate, and that seems to be a major problem nowadays. -
Philosophical Plumbing — Mary MidgleySeems to me that the social contract is something that arose on it's own, through reasoned reflection upon the causal role that individuals have in a society. It is the acknowledgment of one's own power to effect/affect others. Individual behaviour has demonstrable and often predictable effects/affects upon others. It is in light of that that either the individual ought care about those whose lives and/or livelihoods they effect/affect, or such an individual ought not have such power.
I'm being reminded of Thomas Paine here: Power over people is acquired in but one of two ways. It is either usurped or it is granted by consent.
The social contract seems to me to have everything to do with that kind of power. -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.Are you going around again? — Banno
Nah. I asked, and later clarified what I was asking for. An argument meeting that criterion has not yet been put forth. So, I've not much else to say regarding that... -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.Bart has fallen back to ad homs — Banno
Yeah, that seems to be the go to response just before being drectly faced with a problem in the reasoning. There's probably not much left to discuss on that matter.
Euthyphro poses yet another problem for divine command notions, of which Bartricks seems to be arguing along such llines of persuasion.... -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.I presented the argument — Bartricks
You mean this one?
1. Imperatives of Reason exist
2. An existent imperative has an existent mind that is issuing it
3. Therefore the existent imperatives of Reason have an existent mind that is issuing them
4. The imperatives of Reason have a single source
5. Therefore there is an existent mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason — Bartricks
That argument is not an example which has "all moral norms and values are prescriptions and values of God" as a logical conclusion. That's what I asked for.
The sheer number of falsehoods stated by you about what I've said here is astounding. Those false accusations seem to be increasing as time goes on. No surprise really. -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.There are moral norms and values throughout the world that stand in direct contradiction to one another. If the one is true, then the other is false, and vice versa. In light of that, if all moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of God, then God is self-contradictory, or else not all moral norms and values are prescriptions and values of God.
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Belief in god is necessary for being good.
Okay. So either you will not or cannot support that claim by arguing for it as a conclusion. Neither is acceptable here. The claim assumes exactly what's in question, whether or not God is necessary for being good. In addition, Im forced to conclude that you have not reached your beliefs via reasoned conclusions, as you said earlier. Rather, you assume exactly what needs argued for, as can be seen below in two contradictory but otherwise logically equal(valid) arguments...
If it is the case that all moral norms and values are prescriptions and values of God, and being good requires following moral norms and prescriptions, then God is necessary for being good.
If it is not the case that all moral norms and values are prescriptions and values of God, and being good requires following moral norms and prescriptions, then God is not necessary for being good. -
Belief in god is necessary for being good....moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of God... — Bartricks
One more try...
Do you have an argument in which the above claim is a logical conclusion? -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.
There are arguments against the God of Abraham that do not apply to other beliefs in/of God. Hence, my question informed me that those arguments may not be applicable to Bartricks. It's not mysterious. Fairly simple really. -
Belief in god is necessary for being good....moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of God... — Bartricks
Perhaps it best to start over...
Do you have an argument for the claim quoted above? -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.Are all moral norms and values imperatives of Reason? — creativesoul
All moral norms are imperatives of Reason if one means by a norm 'an imperative' — Bartricks
Well, I'm asking what you are arguing here.
Are all moral norms imperatives of Reason? -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.
It's relevant in discussions involving the God of Abraham. Bartricks doesn't claim such a God, I suppose. So... no sense in pursuing those lines of thought here... -
Belief in god is necessary for being good.
It was not relevant to the current contention. Hence, I've not pursued it or revisited it except to answer your questions about it.
creativesoul
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