Your claim is misleading for 2 reasons: 1. De re belief ascriptions make absolutely sense in some cases (e.g. when we try to solve belief ascriptions ambiguities wrt other subjects’ contextual and shared background understanding of the situation [1]), yet it’s not correctness the ground for de-re belief ascriptions! 2. Your de re belief ascription about Jack is based on a de-contextualised assumption that the description “that brocken clock” is correct by hypothesis (an assumption that nobody would take for granted in controversial real cases b/c even your belief ascriptions are beliefs after all!). — neomac

Is that supposed to be clearer and more accurate somehow than just admitting that we can mistakenly believe that a broken clock is working?

I don’t see what JTB about knowledge has to do with our understanding of belief ascriptions. — neomac

It has everything to do with it, for it is the basis of belief as propositional attitude.

Your understanding of belief ascriptions is biased by your philosophical understanding of propositional attitudes. While de dicto/de re belief ascriptions have an appropriate usage and make sanse to competent speakers independently from your ideas about propositional attitudes.
And there is a strong reason to prefer de dicto belief ascriptions over de re ascriptions b/c the former ones generally explain better believers’ intentional behavior, than the latter (assumed they are both correct). — neomac

My understanding of belief ascriptions is based upon my understanding of belief; how it is formed. how it becomes meaningful to the creature, what it consists of, what it is existentially dependent upon, and so forth...

Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is?

Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.

He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true. — creativesoul

Jack believed a broken clock was working.
— creativesoul

Sure. But jack did no believe that: a broken clock was working. All you have done is to stuff up the parsing of Jack's belief. — Banno

First you agree with my saying that Jack believed a broken clock was working, then you add a colon and claim he did not believe a broken clock was working...

Is that a magic colon? I mean, does it somehow change Jack's belief?

Help me out here. I think we agree, based upon your "Sure..." answer.

It seems that we both agree that although he believed a broken clock was working, during the time he did, that he would not assent to that belief if rendered in propositional form. In other words, while believing that a broken clock was working, he would not have an attitude towards "a broken clock is working" such that he believed it to be true. Furthermore, that after becoming aware of his error, he would no longer hold the belief, but would readily acknowledge that he had indeed believed that a broken clock was working.

Are we in agreement here?

Jack's mistaken belief that the clock is working when it actually isn't doesn't imply that beliefs are nonpropositional. Am I missing something here? — Agent Smith

No. Jack's mistaken belief has propositional content. A cat's cannot. Both can be rendered using propositions.

We know that substituting within the scope of a propositional attitude need not preserve truth value... — Banno

That is one of the places where convention goes wrong. That's Gettier's foothold as well. Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Smith believed that he would get the job. The substitutions made changed the truth conditions and thus the meaning of the beliefs. In both cases, as explained earlier, when we make such substitutions, we are no longer talking about Jack's or Smith's belief.

Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

The all share the same set of truth conditions. So, in that sense they're about the same things...

Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.

He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true.

...so far as I can see you have presented no argument. — Banno

I've given the simplest of them. They've not been given subsequent due attention. Not once.

What sort of argument would you say counts as a negation if not one that shows a belief that cannot be put into the form of a propositional attitude?

Why are you looking where the problem is not showing itself?

He does not - cannot - believe that "the broken clock is working" is true while believing that the broken clock is working, because he does not know it is broken.

If we were in Jack's room...

We could show Jack the error. Jack would readily agree that he had indeed believed that that particular broken clock was working. How else does one get lucky about what time it is after looking at a broken clock, if not by virtue believing that the broken clock was working?

This goes to prove my point. We can have belief that we are unaware of. Believing that a broken clock is working is one such belief.

It makes no sense to render that belief as a propositional attitude.

That's a problem for that practice.

It was a broken clock that he believed to be working.

The first rings hollow... the second is nonsense. The sentence "that is a tree" is not about language.

How can a belief, necessarily concerning reality, be nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

In the context of this discussion...

By virtue of not having propositional content.

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

Are you objecting to the above quote?

But you want to say more than just this, don't you? Somehow this is supposed to show the be;eifs are not propositional.

Fill in the gap. — Banno

What I said was enough. I admire your brevity, when it's appropriate. I'll mimic.

I'm genuinely confused by your hesitance to agree.

Russell, Gettier, and Moore all took JTB to task. It's not survived very well. No one seems to have figured out what the problem was because those who've been convinced by those critics still hold on to the same conventional notions that gave all three their foothold. Rendering human belief as propositional attitude has remained as a structural ledger. That's quite unfortunate, because that rendering was, and it remains to be a structural problem. It's not entirely wrong. It's just that not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes, and thus those exceptions cannot be sensibly rendered in those terms. That's what my broken clock example shows us, and quite clearly it seems to me.

We can and do know that at that particular time, and in that particular situation, they most certainly had to have believed that that particular clock was working, for there is no other way to come away believing what it said.

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it!

"I believe that clock is working"?

or

"I believe that stopped clock is working"?

Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes? — ZzzoneiroCosm

He does not believe the propositional form of the belief that he actually holds about a broken clock. That's the whole point of showing how that practice fails. Hence, the earlier allusion to Moore's paradox...

Okay folks, it's been a fun couple weeks, but I've got more productive things in life to do. Will be spending much much less time around here.

Be well to all...

:flower:

Which account is true?

Is it just any clock, or it is one that stopped?

The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true. — Agent Smith

If that is the case, then it is also the case that either language less creatures cannot have belief or propositions do not need language. Seems to me that a proposition is what is being proposed. We always propose things using language. So, holding that the content of belief is propositional leads one to the conclusion that language less creatures cannot have belief.

That conclusion is false. Language less animals can have belief. So...

Either propositions do not require language, which they do, or it is not the case that belief content is propositional. It is not the case that all belief content is propositional.

The scope of possible rightful application would be any and all claims and/or positions that are about human thought and belief, and any and all claims based upon those.

Scope could not be much broader.

The implications become known only as a result of critically assessing the aforementioned positions in light of what I've been arguing. I've done much of the work already here, in this thread. Moore. Gettier. Russell. All three simplified while adding some much needed clarity. Occam's razor applies.

If your side of this debate became orthodoxy, what would the implications be for this branch of philosophy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The position I've been putting forth spans several branches.

So you're including what you know about Jack's belief in your account of Jack's belief. What justification do you have for including that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why would what I know about Jack's belief not be included in my account thereof? It's my account afterall.

I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm the one making the positive assertion. The burden of proof is mine. Should you say I'm wrong, the burden of showing how is on you. I've more than satisfied my burden.

Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic... — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's one way to put it. It's not the job of common language to take proper account of propositional logic. If common language talks about things that propositional logic is incapable of, then we ought not fault the common language, for common language is not the accounting practice that has been found lacking...

Should your account of Jack's belief reflect what he doesn't know about his belief? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It should if Jack's belief is false.

I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same.

Your account of what Jack knows about his belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Jack's belief is false. Jack does not know that. My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't.

Some Trump followers believe a lie. They do not know that there was not wide-spread election fraud significant enough to have altered the outcome of the 2020 election. They believe there was. Their belief is false. We know this about their belief. They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Believing that a stopped clock is working is no different in that regard. We can know Jack's belief is false. Jack cannot. The clock was stopped. His belief was about that stopped clock. He did not know it was stopped. Hence, otherwise he would not be able to believe that it was working.

It's not that difficult to understand...

Is it?

The importance of rigid designators...

The first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?

To my view the two should match. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?

Surely not.

How about this:

First, lets substitute 'a' for 'the'.

Jack believes a stopped clock is working.

What is Jack's belief about? We have to say: A stopped clock.

Can Jack have a belief about a stopped clock if he doesn't know that he's looking at a stopped clock? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I've seen no good reason for denying that we can. Available evidence proves we do. I would venture to say that surveys would show us that it happens far too frequently to deny without sticking our heads in the sand.

Here's my question to anyone who denies this much...

What reasoning and/or justificatory ground could we possibly offer for doubting that we can look at a stopped clock and mistakenly believe that it is working? Surely, we do not surmise such a counterintuitive thought based upon the fact that we do not know it has stopped. That's makes no effin sense at all. As if we must know that a clock is not working in order to believe that it is?

That's patent nonsense. Reductio ad absurdum.

Jack believed that a stopped clock was working. His belief was about a stopped clock, despite the fact that he did not know it had stopped. We cannot say the same about ourselves...

Cue Moore's paradox...

The reason 'why' we can say that it is raining outside, and that another person does not believe it but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is simple. We cannot know when we're mistaken unless the mistake is somehow pointed out to us and/or otherwise brought to our attention. It always takes another, in some way shape or form, to show us our mistakes. Another's explanation is necessary for us to become aware of our own false belief.


Occam's razor applies.

In other words: even though the clock is stopped, Jack's belief isn't about - a stopped clock. it's about a clock. — ZzzoneiroCosm

See if this helps at all...

Jack does not know that the clock he believes to be running has stopped. Jack does not know that his belief about the broken clock is false. We do.

The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.

The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true.

I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true — Harry Hindu

Read the opening and second posts in the debate.

I see no reason to suppose that in order to have a belief one must be aware of the fact that they do. Not all belief anyway. Let's say Jack became aware of how he had luckily arrived at his true belief that it was three o'clock by virtue of having the fact that he believed that that stopped clock was working explained to him in those terms. If asked, he would certainly agree that he had believed that that particular stopped clock was working. How else would he come to believe that it was three o'clock after looking at it?

I'm just at a complete loss to explain how any objection to this makes sense in light of what I've put forth here. It's as if the simplest of adequate explanations for some of the simplest beliefs can no longer be understood as a result of placing far too much unquestioned faith in some of the conventional accounting (mal)practices historically and currently used for taking an account of belief.

We can and do have some beliefs without knowing that we do...

the relation between intension and intention. — Banno

The simplest explanation is the best, assuming there is no loss in explanatory power.

What I've presented here is as easily understood as it is explained. It's true and verifiable. It is impossible to believe that it's three o'clock after having looked at a clock that says so without believing that that clock is working. The same holds good of looking at and believing stopped clocks.

What twaddle.
— Banno

There we have it. It's all twaddle. :smile:

"Twaddle" is a nice word. :smile: — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yeah. That's odd to me. Not the word. The word I've seen and used. Odd that Banno would object to such a clear cut case.

For Pete's sake...

If we knew it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!

If we believed it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!

We believed it was telling us the right time, because we believed that that particular stopped clock was working!

When we want to know what time it is, and we look towards a clock to tell us the answer, we believe that that clock is telling us the right time. We believe that that clock is running. If that clock is broken, we believe that a broken clock is telling us the right time.

We do not know that that clock is broken. We do not believe that that clock is broken. We believe that that broken clock is telling us the right time.

I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it — Janus

There it is!

If he had thought about his belief that that particular clock was working...

Why would he do that? He wasn't engaged in a metacognitive endeavor. He was wondering what time it was. We do not go around second guessing such things as whether or not all our clocks are running when we look to them to know what time it is. We believe that they're working, unless there is some blatant-in-our-face-reasons to doubt that.

Where's the ambiguity? We're talking about a particular clock, a particular person, and a particular belief that that person has about that particular clock.

Are we taking our critical thinking caps off?