The point is that in logical terms it is — tim wood

Then that's about what counts as being "in logical terms"...

My statement is one made in everyday discourse. It is not always made in answer to a question.

A position can be completely coherent(lacking self-contradiction) and based upon false premisses. Collingwood's is one such position. We do not look to Colliingwood's position to see if it includes falsehood. We look to what he's describing, in the real world. We look at real world examples.

I've given one, and it's certainly not the only one.

Collingwood's claim(prop i.) is about each and every statement made. He's wrong. Not each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question.

Kudos for actually engaging. I appreciate you keeping the implicit promise that many others did not.

Cheers!

The way to build a better scientific community is to keep it well funded so that the world, rather than the corporate world, owns the knowledge coming out of it, and keep it free from political interference... — Kenosha Kid

Indeed.

Science is a method of approach for acquiring knowledge about stuff. Science is neither good or bad. How science is used is another matter altogether. It can be used for horrible ends, but need not be. I, for one, agree with Banno in that in the big picture, science has been instrumental in marvelous things, and a marked improvement in the overall quality of human lives.

What Trump actually did during the occupation of the capital on Jan. 6 needs to be revealed to the public. He falied to defend the US government. He cheered the attack itself. He promoted it. He still promotes it. His supporters still promote it. One Republican party leader, McConnell, has said that there's nothing more to learn about what happened on Jan 6.

It's fucking disgraceful.

Trump lied about widespread voter fraud throughout his term, and particularly often in the last year and a half. That lie was repeated often in right wing news outlets and talk shows. He alone led the long string of lies that led up to Jan 6. Half of House Republicans and nearly all of Senate Republicans are complicit in this defrauding of the American people. Nevermind the nutjobs. Now, after conjuring up enough doubt in the minds of citizens regarding the trustworthiness of elections(based upon lies and falsehoods mentioned heretofore), the republican party iitself is using that distrust(that they manufactured from lies about widespread voter fraud) as a reason to make it harder and harder to vote.

For those who keep acting like and/or believing that the US is a democracy. It is not. Never has been. It's a republic with democratic traditions. A representative form of government. A group of elected officials, chosen by the people and for the people, who are supposed to be acting on behalf of the people.

The rules of logical entailment allow one to change the truth conditions of a statement, as Gettier so aptly demonstrated. That completely changes the meaning. I reject entailment as a logical tool(all of which are supposed to preserve truth) due to exactly that fatal flaw in understanding the meaning of a statement stemming from divorcing speaker from statement.

"I'm ready for bed" is something I say to myself often, or to my significant other. Sometimes, it is a statement made in answer to a question, and other times it is not. The point here is simple:It is a statement that is meaningful and it is not always made in answer to a question. So, it only follows that Collingwood's first proposition is false, as it is written.

Prop. 2. ’Every question involves a presupposition.

This is much better.

That is amenable to evolutionary progression. It also situates presuppositions prior to common language acquisition(prior to our learning naming and descriptive practices).

"What's that?" is a question that can exist in it's entirety; that can be formed by a language-less creature, and thus it's a question that can be formed prior to language creation, acquisition, and/or it's subsequent use, despite it's inability to be meaningfully articulated. It is one that has long since taken a linguistic form. We've all asked it at some point or other. It is perhaps the simplest of all questions; one that is perfectly capable of being completely articulated via language to the user's own satisfaction, but need not be in order to be formed by a language-less creature.

What's most notable is that it is a question that does not always require language use. It leads us to realize that we're in need of setting out what sorts of presuppositions such rudimentary questions can possibly involve. They certainly cannot involve presuppositions that are existentially dependent upon language and/or have linguistic content, because we're talking about language-less creatures.

At some of the earliest stages of human development, we can watch exactly and precisely what an undistracted, deep, and genuine curiosity looks like upon the face of another, and as a result we can also know beyond any and all reasonable doubt that curiosity itself does not require language. We all wonder about what we're looking at prior to, during the initial stages of, and long after our own language acquisition and/or the subsequent mastery thereof; all the while we're continuously learning the names of new things. Sometimes these things are directly perceptible, and sometimes not. That which is not warrants very careful attention. The point is that not all questions are existentially dependent upon language use(do not consist of language), whereas all statements are(do).

Long before using language to do stuff; long before ever adopting our first worldview; long before ever honing our initial worldview into what we may now call our 'very own' belief system/worldview; long before we ever became aware of the fact that we were already taking account of ourselves and the world before we came to realize that we were doing so; long before we ever even conceived of the idea of our having a place in this world; long before we ever even began talking about our own thought - like we are here; long before any of that, we began to wonder about what we were looking at. We can and do watch the face(s) of undistracted attention belonging to any creature after having just discovered something entirely new, something so interesting that it completely captured/captures their attention.

There are no statements about the world and/or ourselves possible unless and until there is a means for making them and a creature capable of doing so. If questions are asked prior to each and every statement that is made, as must be the case if every statement is made in answer to a question, then it only follows that questions give rise to statements. If questions give rise to statements, and all questions involve presuppositions, then all statements involve the same presuppositions as the questions giving rise to them(as the questions they were made in response to).




To labor the earlier point of refutation:There are any number of statements that can be, have been, and/or are currently being made about the world and/or ourselves that are not being made in answer to a question.

That's just the way it is.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question.<------That stands as an objection to Prop i, but it does not pose a lethal threat to the rest of Collingwood's project. I'm not looking to blow him up. To quite the contrary, the correction adds to the distinction between scientific thought and non scientific thought(in Collingwood's own sense of the terms). I'm not denying that all scientific thought involves statements that answer questions. I'm not denying that every scientific question involves at least one presupposition, and most involve a constellation thereof. I'm not denying that the role and/or operative function played by absolute presuppositions within scientific thinking are exactly as Collingwood describes. They act exactly like primary and secondary premisses, particularly those whose correspondence and/or meaningfulness is never questioned; those whose business it is to be believed. I'm not denying that it is not their business to be true/false. I'm not denying that the notion of verifiability/falsifiability does not apply to them, although they can sometimes be verified/falsified. I'm not denying that they are things left unspoken, unarticulated, and/or unpropounded by the candidate holding them.

I am most certainly denying the idea that absolute presuppositions are things that a subject can form, have, hold, and/or otherwise depend upon(infer from) when it is also the case that the subject themselves have never once even witnessed their being articulated. One can work from presuppositions that they've never witnessed being articulated without knowing that they are doing so. Such is the case whenever someone first learns that they've adopted some belief or another, or perhaps some set thereof, or to put it in Collingwood's terms, some constellation of absolute presuppositions, from someone else. For example, the absolute presuppositions that Collingwood concerns himself with through page 80 or so, are a group of three regarding causality. Some events were, are, and/or will be caused. All events were, are, and/or will be caused. No events have been, are, or will be caused.

All three of those are much too far along the timeline of evolutionary progression to be formed by anything less than a creature capable of taking account of it's thought, belief, emotions, feelings, and/or experience with a mastery that only metacognition can deliver. Such complex thought are the result of processes directly involving naming and descriptive practices(common language). None of the three are presupposed by any creature unless that creature has already found themselves at a loss to be able to take proper account of everything(all events).

It's well worth pointing out that Collingwood's notion of scientific thought aims to take proper account of that which already existed in it's entirety long before being untangled and re-arranged. It's a shame that he chose to dub the process itself as scientific, because in doing so he simultaneously devalued all other thought. It's akin to placing the utmost of importance upon lemon meringue pie, all the while devaluing the ingredients themselves along with the tools required for making/forming pies.

Scientific questions are asked long before any answers are ever offered. But we act as if we are very interested in all sorts of different stuff long before we ever being asking questions. Furthermore, there are some questions(most if I were to hazard a guess) about some stuff that quite simply cannot be asked until long after language use has begun in earnest. Questions about our own thought, for instance. Questions about one's own thought, belief, mind, feelings, emotions, experience, and/or all discussions about "what's it's like" to be another creature are just plain not capable of being articulated by language-less creatures.

The very capability of taking account of one's own thought requires something to take account of, something to take account of it, and a means for doing so. Collingwood is making a concerted attempt at taking proper account of metaphysics, and he begin doing so by virtue of cleaving the one common practice into two separate and distinct practices; ontology(the science of pure being), and the search for presuppositions(the science of thought). The former he relegates to the dustbin. The latter, he attempts to make good sense/use of.

Proposition 2 offers all of us a bit of knowledge regarding the evolutionary stages/development of human thought. It does not start out scientific. Just because something is true of scientific thought does not make it true of any preceding thought leading up to the scientific. Thought begins simply and grows in it's complexity. That is true with each and every individual thinking/believing human being that has ever existed. That is equally true of any and all thinking/believing creatures, regardless of the biological machinery. The complexity level of thought and belief is made possible, in part at least, by the biological machinery.

We are saying that the one is existentially dependent upon and thus precedes the other.
— creativesoul

Yes. — tim wood

Upon rereading, I deleted that bit. It's nonsensical as it is written, although I knew what I meant. Too bad I wrote the opposite. When something is existentially dependent upon something else, the something else exists in it's entirety either prior to or simultaneously alongside with,

He looks to have an interesting position...

...you need to be good - really good - at philosophy to be a professional academic... — Bartricks

Just look at all the marvelous lines of thought coming from those who are really good...

:death:

Really good at doing what, exactly?

I've studied that part many times over. He's just plain mistaken here. His case is not as strong as he'd like it to be. It does not have the universal scope of applicability that he'd like it to have. Not all statements are made in answer to a question, at the time they are being made. That holds good regardless of the source of the purported question being answered. I've already offered a clear, readily understandable example to the contrary. "I'm ready for bed" is a statement that is not always made in answer to a question, regardless of whether one is engaged in thinking scientifically or not.

Collingwood wants to draw a distinction between thinking scientifically and not, where the former is untangling and reordering one's own thoughts with the aim of shedding light upon the presuppositions and/or questions underlying one's own statements(thought), and the latter is not. His justification for claiming that "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" is one of arguing by definitional fiat. He goes on to claim that...

The reader’s familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and knows what that question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things.

He goes further by re-introducing the clothesline example. I've no real issue with that example. He parses it well, and his method could be used with equal success regarding all sorts of statements where something or other is being identified. However, not all statements are ones in which the speaker is stating what something or other is or is called. Thus, "what is that?", or "what is that thing for?" are questions that quite simply do not arise regarding many other statements, regardless of whether or not one is thinking scientifically. "I'm ready for bed" being but one of many.

I would agree with the first proposition if and only if it were further subsequently qualified in the following way...

The claim "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" would become...

Some statements are made in answer to a question.

For example, "I'm ready for bed" is a statement coming from someone who is ready for bed. Not everyone, when they're ready for bed, asks themselves some question or another which is answered by that statement at that time. Not everyone, when ready for bed, are being asked a question that that statement stands in response to... at that time.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question. Rather, some are.

I'll say one thing though; I strongly suspect that Collingwood is as brilliant as any other philosopher in the history of the world that I have personally had the pleasure of reading.

For now, Collingwood's piece receives reasonably high marks. However, I remain unconvinced that his first proposition is true at each and every point along the evolutionary timeline of human thought and belief(it's not always true). Do not get me wrong here. Collingwood does a fantastic job of describing exactly what many historical metaphysicians were doing, as well as clearly describing what he thinks we ought be doing instead, when he characterizes some historical lines of thinking. He uses the clothesline example to some degree of success to make his point. I agree with most of what he said in so far as it pertains to those peculiar lines of thought historically called "metaphysical", or those typically being articulated when someone in the past was 'doing' metaphysics(playing the sorts of language games commonly called "metaphysics"). No. That's all fine by me. I'm also not troubled by the rough mention of the commonality between metaphysical and scientific thought, even though I'm undecided regarding his arguments regarding that classification.

I'm also quite fond of the endeavor of disentangling thought and later rearranging it. He's talking about metacognition. That is to think about pre-existing thought and belief as a subject matter in it's own right. He mentions that not everyone practices. He's correct, for the most part. He admires systematic thinking. When we take account of our own thought with the sole aim of rearranging them in order of which must take place prior to the next, which is precisely what he does with the "fallacy of many questions" example as well as the clothesline, we are placing them into an order of emergence.

He lashes out at certain notions and thinkers in ways that sometimes may antagonize. I do the same here, often, so shouldn't I agree with his style? — Olivier5

No, you should not. Generally speaking...


Not - for that reason alone - should anyone conclude that some behaviour or another is acceptable or ethically permissible. If another's behaviour is, was, and/or will be judged as acceptable simply because one does it, then it always and only follows that all actual behaviour is morally acceptable and/or ethically permissible.

That conclusion is quite clearly false. Not all are.






When one agrees with another's behaviour based upon the fact that it is like one's own, then one is - at a bare minimum at least - being consistent. Consistency is admirable for a plethora of reasons. Dependability requires consistency. Dependability is good. However, consistency of behaviour alone does not warrant moral acceptance of that behaviour. Slave traders were consistent enough in their treatment of the enslaved that others could, and did, successfully plan on it continuing, for example. Hitler was consistent in his treatment of any and all perceived enemies of his goals. That's another example.

Now, I'm not saying that all people holding a consistent belief system are equivalent to people who've consistently committed horrible atrocities, or consistently acted in horrific ways. Rather, I'm simply mentioning tha prima facie evidence, I'm just reminding the reader of actual events that prove to us all - well beyond a reasonable doubt - that behavioural consistency alone does not warrant admiration, praiseworthiness, and/or moral consent of that behaviour.







We could also say of one - regarding such situations - that one is practicing what they preach, so to speak. That's a good personality trait to have. There's nothing wrong with that, in and of itself. There's inherent worth/value in dependability. When someone acts in a consistent manner, they are more dependable than someone who is more unpredictable. Here again though, that's not enough. I mean, we could certainly depend upon Hitler's behaviour to be a certain way towards Jewish people and his perceived enemies. Like clockwork. The point, in everyday terms, is that practicing what one preaches does not make the practice praiseworthy and/or acceptable.

So...

To sum it up as briefly and concisely as I can, if all one's behaviour is faultless, then there is no problem whatsoever with them assenting to any and all others' behaviours based solely upon the fact that they share such a propensity.

However, to quite the contrary, if it is the case that some of one's behaviours are in dire need of marked improvement; if any are shameworthy, if any are unacceptable, then there is a problem with one using one's own behaviours as the standard by which to judge the moral permissibility of such behaviours in general.

I'd be curious to see your work set out.

One is that I followed his reasoning and adhered to it, by and large. I share his analysis of presuppositions. I'm saying this just so my critiques below are taken for what they are: sympathetic overall. — Olivier5

I too am quite sympathetic. I would like to put his method of analysis to use here; play around with it, so to speak. I've read through around page eighty, but I keep getting the feeling that I need to read what I've already read, yet again. So, I've quite carefully studied the first five chapters reading through them multiple times taking notes and such. The more I read it, the more I actually want to make a concerted attempt at employing his method of analysis. However, I do not wish to do so alone.

Would you be interested in such an endeavor/discussion? As before, I'm very pressed for spare time lately, and do not see that changing anytime soon, so the pace will be slooow.

:wink:

I'm only through page 77, but I must say that something about this writing is quite striking to me, particularly that Collingwood keeps metaphysics connected to everyday events. I'm very impressed.

...it is better just to read him first and then take on the critics. — tim wood

Sound advice. I, myself, have just recently realized that I had spoken too soon earlier.

For you cannot insist that Hume was mistaken to question the uniformity of nature on the basis of it being an absolute presupposition, without adopting the dogmatic ontological standpoint that absolute presuppositions constitute objective existential claims — sime

Unless you first hold that absolute presuppositions are not claims at all, they are not propounded by those who hold them, and that what makes them what they are is their function as a basis from which questions arise not their truth value(not whether or not they are true). The uniformity of nature is not something that can be true. So questioning whether or not it is is mistaken. Hume's questioning of that much displays the logical efficacy of the absolute presupposition itself.

Glad you're reading this. Yes, it's interesting. That term jumped out at me as well. It plays a key role it seems. I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. Is it on par with "normative" on your interpretation?

This text is a pleasure to read. Elegant, amusing and precise. Seems like the writings of a true gentleman. — Olivier5

Indeed, it has been a pleasurable piece of reading at times. Of particular interest to me is that he avoids using inherently inadequate dichotomous terms like "subjective" and "objective", "internal" and "external", "noumenal" and "phenomenal", "object" and "subject", "perception" and "reality", etc.

I'm not at all certain whether or not he is what I would call a gentleman though. I do not have enough evidence before me to make such a declaration.

Actually, now that I'm thinking it over, although he's yet to have admitted this, I'm left with the impression that he has tested his theory out on other people. That would go a long way in explaining the sheerly remarkable level of confidence expressed by him. Now, to be clear, such experiments are not always unacceptable. I mean, not all such endeavors are based upon unacceptable moral grounding or ethical principles involving the deliberate treatment of others. For example, not all people strive to minimize harm. That guiding principle ought be strictly adhered to in that situation(where one is deliberately aiming to reveal another's presuppositions to them) as a matter of moral principle. I know not of Collingwood's.

So, with all this in mind, assuming that this particular essay consists of conclusions drawn from actual behavioural studies of people first becoming consciously aware of their own absolute presuppositions, I still do not know whether or not he let his desire to verify his hypothesis overwhelm his desire to falsify it. I also do not know whether or not he let his desire to confirm cloud his judgment regarding how he was effecting/affecting others. Both of those could possibly mark someone not such a gentleman. There's no doubt about it; if what he claims about how people react when faced with their own absolute presuppositions is true, whether sometimes or all the time(I'm tending to think he's overstated his case), I still do not know whether or not he intentionally avoided unnecessarily harming others during the course of his own experiments just to prove his point, or if he accidentally discovered how certain individuals react when their own thought and belief is being placed under such scrutiny and began recording and studying those circumstances in greater detail as a result. What I am sure of is that there's no anecdotal evidence in the essay to suggest that he witnessed any other reaction aside from one he described; which makes me wonder if he tried to elicit different ones...

If he accidentally discovered the reaction, as compared/contrasted to aimed at provocation thereof, and was the kind of person who cared about the effects/affects that his inquiry had upon others when he forced them to face their own absolute presupposition(I'm thinking of the pathologist), one would think that he would make a concerted attempt at lessening the negative impact. But again, there's simply no evidence to suggest that he even considered the negative consequences that his pursuit had upon others, and as a result, tempered his approach in such a way as to lessen it while retaining the benefits(whatever Collingwood thought they may be). No. To quite the contrary, he seemed to relish in the discomfort of others.

So was he a 'true gentleman'? That question is one that remains unanswered from my vantage point.

I've witnessed those same sorts of situations described by him up close and personal, and there have been times that people do react exactly as he so eloquently described. So there is some truth to what he says, no doubt. However, not all people react like that. The reaction is partly influenced, partly created, partly conformed by the conversation leading up to the exposure of the presupposition, and that much is crucial to properly understand. I mean, I've found that sometimes when someone values another's opinion, and trusts that their words are true, an appeal to the 'right sorts of reasoning' can go a long way in lessening the potentially negative impact that uncovering an absolute presupposition can have. To labor the point:An astute reader can see for themselves that the essay did not paint the picture of a pleasant unveiling, and there was no mention of his own responsibility towards the impact such an event has upon the subject in question. That lack of openly expressed concern towards who he is effecting/affecting concerns me and leaves his gentleness open to question. But alas, I've spent far more time than I initially expected talking about whether or not he is a gentleman. I do not know that. Could be.

I want to say a lot more about the aforementioned the appeal to "the right sorts of reasons" in the paragraph directly above. What I mean to say is that the practical and necessary reasoning required in order to show another's absolute presuppositions to themselves varies according to the individual. I am not of the opinion that everyone is even capable of understanding that they do hold such things if we restricted our endeavor to Collingwood's terminological preferences. There are also times which another can be shown that they are working from absolute presuppositions without inciting such angry resistance.

This essay is the only time I can remember seriously reading Collingwood(although I've seen him mentioned a number of different times over the past decade or so). What I can say with a fair amount of certainty is that if he is claiming that absolute presuppositions are discovered, then that claim alone rests upon it's own absolute presupposition that that which has been discovered existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Talking about a discovery is to make the claim that something or other has been found as it already is/was, existing in it's entirety, at that particular time... the moment of discovery. A claim of discovery itself rests upon exactly that absolute presupposition.

I strongly suspect Collingwood would agree, for he does not strike me as man beyond reproach. He was an archeologist afterall, and clearly seems like he was a reasonable fellow. I do wonder though, upon hearing this articulation, upon hearing me propound his absolute presuppositions for the first time, if he would act in the same manner so described by him when characterizing how other people act when one of their absolute presuppositions was first revealed to them, or if he could be gently led along a path paved by the right sorts of reasons?

No matter really...

Back to reading and glad so many have found interest.

Thanks. I'd be delighted to see what you think.

:smile:

In the preface Collingwood states...

This is not so much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics. What I have chiefly tried to do in it is neither to expound my own metaphysical ideas, nor to criticize the metaphysical ideas of other people ; but to explain what metaphysics is, why it is necessary to the well-being and advancement of knowledge, and how it is to be pursued.

In the second place I have tried to dispel certain misconceptions about it which have led (and, had they been true, would have led with perfect justice) to the conclusion that metaphysics is a blind alley of thought into which knaves and fools have combined these many centuries past to lure the human intellect to its destruction.

In the third place I have offered to the reader’s attention a few examples of metaphysics itself, in order to show how metaphysical inquiry will be conducted if the principles laid down in the opening chapters are taken as sound.

To anyone interested, there's no time limit here or strict reading schedule. It seems that most who've expressed interest prior to and since I posted the OP all share limited time. Given that, I'm in no hurry, and really a careful deliberate reading is required to begin with, so...

Everyone can read at a pace that is best for them...

There's no need for daily participation either. We can all do it at our own leisure.

Thanks for that link. I think I've corrected the one in the OP.

Good suggestions. Collingwood provided his own definitions though. So, one who knows that in order to understand such a piece of writing, one must grant definitions/senses of key terms. Should anyone here wish to argue definitions, they're in the wrong thread.

:wink:

Cool. Just trying to drum up some interest in carefully reading it...

No worries.

In case you may be interested...

Nice. Interesting parallels drawn between RGC and Witt's notion of forms of life, with both emphasizing the importance of language. The difference between them is RGC's focus upon thought.

No worries, my friend.



Looks like we're the only ones who want to read this...

:razz:

I'm only on page 56, and I'll not be able to spend much more than an hour or so, maybe two, a day reading and/or discussing it. However, I'd be happy to begin a new thread on the paper itself, because this thread is not about that. We could discuss it as we read... as needed. Maybe start the discussion by summarizing the first four chapters? That looks like it's though page 33. Or, perhaps do it chapter by chapter?

Talking about the shade of one's skin and devaluing one based upon the color of one's skin are two entirely different sets of circumstances. Being ashamed of the shade if it's considered 'too dark' certainly lands on the latter. No one is claiming that talking about what the baby may look like is racist except those who distort the narrative.

It's news because it shows that the effects/affects of institutional and/or systemic racism are very much still in play.

Extolling the benefits of both common enterprise and private property...

A nice way of hedging one's bets, self-contradiction, or just plain insincerity...

The problem, of course, arises when conflicts arise between private and common interests. Which takes precedence/priority, the common or the private? The answer... the private. The proof... look no further than the pandemic response.

Cool. Perhaps another thread is best for getting into the paper itself as a means for better understanding RGC. For myself, at least, I couldn't possibly have a clue whether or not another author's take on Collingwood is accurate, for I have not yet understood the paper myself. So, as a means for even being the least bit knowledgable about what others say about RGC, I find myself with the imperative of first having understood him myself.



Interested in a reading group, or another thread?

Whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in his mind than are expressed in his statement. Among these there are some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated: they are not merely its context, they are its presuppositions.

The priority affirmed in the word presupposition is logical priority. It is not a priority in time.

Only by a kind of analysis, when I reflect upon it, do I come to see that this was a presupposition was making, however little I was aware of it at the time.

Here lies the difference between the desultory and casual thinking of our unscientific consciousness and the orderly and systematic thinking we call science. In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor of its own cable, hanging upside down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all.

Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thought in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them.



Prop. 1. Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question.

A question is logically prior to its own answer. When thinking is scientifically ordered, this logical priority is accompanied by a temporal priority; one formulates the question first, and only when it is formulated begins trying to answer it. This is a special kind of temporal priority, in which the event or activity that is prior does not stop when that which is posterior begins.

Def. I. Let that which is stated [i.e. that which can be true or false) be called a proposition, and let stating it be called propounding it.

Prop. 2. Every question involves a presupposition.

Def. 2. To say that a question does not arise is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made.

Def. 3. The fact that something causes a certain question to arise I call the ‘logical efficacy' of that thing.

Def. 4. To assume is to suppose by an act of free choice.

Prop. 3. The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed.

Prop. 4. A presupposition is either relative or absolute.

In this context the word ‘presupposition’ refers not to the act of presupposing but to that which is presupposed.

Def. 5. By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its
presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer.

Def. 6. An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.

The above has been copied and pasted from the essay up to page 31. I think that the above part could use some considered discussion as a means to grasp what RGC is saying.

It seems to me that key to his position is Prop. 2.

How presuppositions relate to inquiry. While I immediately recoiled at Prop. 1., I have since been content to not pursue that objection for it seems rather inconsequential to the rest. Well, I've edited this now as a result of having read further. Prop. 1. seems to be key to his position as well. He returns to it shortly...

... Do you have any issue with delving into the above for the purpose of better understanding what RGC is doing here?

The "presupposition" is a bias which interferes with the true quest for knowledge, because it's an assumption of already knowing certain things... — Metaphysician Undercover

Knowledge must be true. Presuppositions need not be. Assumptions are sometimes different than presuppositions. Again, this is clearly laid out in the book. The link to the download was given earlier...

Thanks

That's laughable considering how you have approached me in this thread. — Janus

My apologies then. No offense meant. seems to be explaining the notion fairly well... if by that I mean in line with RGC.

Squabbling over the whether the terms "belief" and "presupposition" pick out the same thing is rather dull, especially when we're talking about RGC's use of "presupposition". Not interested in personal jabs.

Whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in his mind than are expressed in his statement. - Among these there are some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated : they are not merely its context, they are its presuppositions.

So, here we can see that for Collingwood, presuppositions are kinds of thought not expressed in one's statement. However, to get a good understanding of what species and/or kind they are, it requires a bit of study. I'm off again to do exactly that...

It doesn't show here.

I'm in the middle of cutting and pasting from the essay as a means to provide an acceptable and accurate portrayal of RGC's notion of absolute presupposition. ↪tim wood hasn't done a bad job here, from what I can see thus far, but I think there's much more going on with RGC than first meets the eye.
— creativesoul

When you're done with your cut and paste, please send it out to the rest of us. — T Clark

I will. It's proven to be necessary...

...not all beliefs have to be believed. — Janus

That's nonsense Janus. The paper is proving interesting enough for me to set aside my position on human thought and belief as a means to understand it. There's good stuff in it.

I strongly suggest that you take the time to read it. I'm still studying it myself, and suspect that I will be for some time to come. I do not agree with everything, nor do I need to. I am suspending judgment and for the sake of argument, seeing where his line of thinking goes.

(i) 'That all science is of the universal or abstract ; in other words, that its procedure is to ignore the differences between this individual thing and that, and attend only to what they have in common.

(ii) That there is potentially at least a science of every universal, that is, of everything which is common to the individual things we call its instances.

(iii) That there are degrees of universality or abstractness, and that these give rise to a hierarchy of universals and a corresponding hierarchy of sciences ; so that whenever a generic universal A is specified into sub-forms B and C there will be hierarchical relations between the superordinate science of A and the subordinate sciences of B and C.

(iv) That A is not only the indispensable presupposition of B and C, but their sufficient logical ground, so that the subject-matter of any superordinate science can be rightly described as generating or creating, in a logical sense, those of the sciences subordinate to it.

This is the general groundwork for the book/essay.

To adequately account for the existence of knowledge we need to understand the power which logic may have over will. — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that logic precedes thought.