Visuals, sounds, smells, feelings, etc. — Harry Hindu

Yep, those too are part of it(some of the content of some language-less belief).

Thinking in words is no different than thinking in visuals and sounds. — Harry Hindu

That is not true. All words are visuals and/or sounds. Not all visuals and sounds are words.

I can talk about the content of my cupboards. I can talk about the content of my cat's stomach. I can talk about the content of the ocean. I can talk about the content of...

I can talk about the content of the government. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the government is propositional in form.

I can talk about the content of a proposition. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of a proposition is propositional in form.

I can talk about the content of a lemon. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the lemon is propositional in form.

I've some sympathy for the idea that the limit of one's language is the limit of 'one's world', if by that we mean worldview or belief system. However, Banno proudly conflates word and world, by not drawing and maintaining the actual distinction between belief statements that are about language use and belief statements that are about mice and trees. Part of that comes as a result of overstating the strength of the case that the belief that approach makes. Another part comes from the idea that truth is unanalyzable. Another from his preference for a redundancy approach. Another from a conflation between truth as coherence and truth as correspondence.

Truth - as correspondence - is presupposed in all belief statements. That's how/why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language. However, "is true" is not equivalent to truth. "Is true" marks belief(assuming sincerity), and belief while it is necessary, is also insufficient for truth. <-----Banno would object to the necessary part, but the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. Belief is necessary for correspondence between belief and fact(what's happened) because when and where there has never been meaningful belief, there could never have been a meaningful correspondence between belief and what's happened. It's insufficient because some belief is false.

Human thought, human belief, meaning, and truth are all things that exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them. Those sorts of things are peculiar in that it requires language to become aware of them and their role in our lives, and we can most certainly get them wrong.

Since all belief is meaningful, being meaningful requires meaning, and language-less creatures can form, have, and/or hold belief, it only follows that meaning is prior to language.

The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of? Hence, this debate.

Not propositions.

Gotcha! My better half just informed me that Turkish coffee is quite strong, and too strong for her, which is saying something. You must prefer very strong coffee. Kona is more smooth, so. You're right then. No match for what you like!

:wink:

Go dark roast then! French press is not finesse! Makes the boldest flavour.

The general form of a correlation: P(x,y) — Banno

I'm not going to allow you to continue conflating our account of another's belief with the others belief. — creativesoul

Try 100% Kona. Freshly ground and prepared with a French press.

Besides that, don't worry about me... I'm just fine! My position has served me very well in real life... I do put it into everyday practice. Yup... obsessive, but well worth it!

:wink:

Obsessive?

:gasp:

Has any philosopher ever been anything but?

:smile:

All meaning is attributed. — Banno

Ah!

An important point. I would concur!

We draw correlations between different things for all sorts of reasons, as a means for doing all sorts of things.

Talking about how we use our beliefs, or how we use language(doing things with words) neglects how we form belief. How we form belief is germane to all belief, not just how we use our beliefs, or what we do with language. I'm not even sure if it makes sense to say that language-less creatures use their beliefs, so...

I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief, aside from supporting the claim that all belief is correlational in content, but never admitting that much.

Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness. — Banno

You did. Should the time ever come when I finally convince you to incorporate correlations into your position regarding meaning(and truth), I will have done my job.

:wink:

Left unexplained is how drawing a correlation is not propositional. — Banno

The latter requires language, the former does not always. That explanation has been expounded upon throughout the entire debate.

Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch. — Banno

Interesting that you'd draw correlations between talking of meaning and revving the engine without engaging the clutch, and in doing so change the focal point from how things become meaningful to doing it by virtue of drawing correlations between different things...

And then expect payment for borrowing the shovel.

Better self-worth comes from working to achieve worthwhile goals. — Bitter Crank

:up:

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?
— creativesoul

Do you have issues making sense of the above? — creativesoul

What does it do? Paraphrase it in terms of use. — Banno

It directs our attention to what we ought be paying attention to when taking account of another's belief; the content thereof.

What is meaningful and how does it become so?

I'm left a bit confused regarding how you've no problem assenting to "all belief is meaningful" but balked at "all belief is meaningful to the creature having the belief".

:brow:

Not sure if you remember Banno's recent Davidson thread on malapropism A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs, which was a critique of what counts as successful communication and/or learning/having a language. In that paper Davidson was repeatedly claiming that something more was needed aside from just learning, knowing, and/or following conventional rules, and that the conventional understanding did not offer an acceptable description of that, as the success of malapropisms show.

Attributing meaning and misattributing meaning is what we do when interpreting another's language use, and we do that solely by virtue of drawing correlations between the use and other things. When we draw correlations between the same things, we correctly interpret. What I've been arguing here is germane to that paper as well as Moore's paradox, Gettier, and so many other historically challenging philosophical 'problems'.

drawing correlations between things
— creativesoul

Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?
— bongo fury

Or is it only another way of saying having beliefs?

Which are irreducible mental stuff? — bongo fury

It's the basis, the common denominator, the basic process by which all minds emerge; by which all experience can be had; by which all thought, belief, and statements thereof are formed; by which all meaning emerges(via attribution); by which all successful communication happens.

The process is irreducible, but neither mental or physical(it's both after-all). It provides a basic outline which is rightfully applicable to any and all discourse. We can 'watch' people offer different correlations when needed to clarify what was originally meant by some use or another. Happens all the time, here in this thread even, within the side conversations going on.

and yes...

Trump is a walking, talking, living, eating, and breathing performative contradiction.

The speech act theorists paved some new paths, and some very good ones. They drew new correlations between some particular already meaningful marks. Austin's bit on promises left quite an impression on me. However, it's not the correlations they drew and captured our attention by doing so that is interesting and relevant here, in this discussion. It's the fact that they drew new correlations between already meaningful marks. They added to the meaning of some already familiar language use by virtue of using different terms to describe the same set of meaningful marks. Or perhaps, articulated some previously undisclosed meaningful aspects of familiar use...

No?

:brow:

Looking at use is all interesting and sheds some much needed light of all sorts of stuff regarding how we attribute meaning to language use.

However, what does that have to do with how a language-less creature forms, has, and/or holds belief? What does that have to do with how a belief can even be and/or become meaningful to a language-less creature capable of having one?

Well, it shows us that drawing correlations between things is something that both complex linguistic belief and simple language-less belief have in common with one another. It supports the very part of the claim that you seem to balk at.

Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux. — Banno

Of course it is. We begin drawing meaningful correlations between different things long before we start talking about it. That happens autonomously.

It puts your position to rest. Talking about the ways we use language aside from naming and descriptive practice is utterly irrelevant.

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief? — creativesoul

Do you have issues making sense of the above?

You need to do better than that.

Ok. Good.

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful?

l You keep talking about meaning. It obscures what's going on. — Banno

I don't think it does though; at least not when it comes to taking proper account of all belief. It provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts. Drawing correlations is attributing, and sometimes (mis)attributing meaning, so in that sense, you're close when you say I've done it already with correlations.

Finding a use though, that seems to me to be more about language.

I'm wary. Thanks for the heads up.

He claimed that all propositions are about the self, which is absurd on it's face. There's adequate ground for doubting his sincerity already.

However, the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though, even if that consideration eventually leaves counterpunch behind...

There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats - because they're not the same thing as an adult, human, articulated belief - with or without propositional content. If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief? — counterpunch

By virtue of acquiring knowledge of what all belief has in common. The insight is a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression. The result is a reliable standard by which we can discern between what counts as anthropomorphism and what does not.

Furthermore, think about the sheer scope of the consequences of getting our own thought and belief wrong...

Hence, in so far as we can talk of our beliefs as being true or false, we must also include that their content is also capable of being true or false. — Banno

This is a point I also agree with, with the additional caveat that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it.

The fire example is a case of learning that fire causes pain when touched. We know that that is the case. We know that that statement is true. A language-less creature can learn that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing correlations between the fire, the touching, and the ensuing pain. That could be described as a belief that touching fire caused pain, but the creature has no language, so this puts the claim that that language-less creature's belief is propositional in content in serious doubt.

There's certainly a bridge between the language-less belief and the simple belief statement, but it cannot be propositions, unless propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature is capable of drawing correlations between them, or having an attitude towards them, etc.

The bridge, it seems to me, is the ability to attribute meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. With the language-less creature, the correlations are drawn between the touching, the fire, and the pain in such a way that amounts to the recognition/attribution of causality. With the belief statement, it's all that in addition to the naming and descriptive practices.

the proposition is always...

"I am right that..." — counterpunch

No, it's not.

I'm imagining one who is first learning how to use names such as "mouse" and "tree" to pick mice and trees out of the world to the exclusion of all else.

In that circumstance, "the mouse is behind the tree" could be an answer to a question and carry along with it some considerable uncertainty.

Well, okay then creativesoul - good talk. Maybe give my approach a little more thought and get back to me if you wish to discuss it. I "believe" it's right, and largely for the reasons you state:

The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. — counterpunch

That's about propositional attitude. Not all belief is equivalent to an attitude one has towards a statement/proposition. So, it's right in that particular sense. Some belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude. Not all.

Read the rest of that opening post, perhaps the entire debate and then get back to me if you wish to discuss it further.

:flower:

The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive. — Banno

I almost concurred.

:wink:

That which is interpreted is already meaningful. Some meaningful belief and behaviour exists in it's entirety prior to language use. Thus, if we have two language-less creatures, we can have one interpreting the other's behaviour when that behaviour is already meaningful to the other, and that level of interpretation would not be at a linguistic level. It does follow the same process as linguistic level interpretation though... drawing correlations between different things. It's just that none of those things in the case of language-less animals includes language use.

Head shaking and...

Growling and...

Dancing and ruffling feathers and...

These statements are contradictory. — counterpunch

Bald assertions won't do.

You described metacognition. That is thinking about one's own thought and belief. In order to think about one's own thought and belief, there must be something to think about and a means for doing so.

You're not right if you believe that all belief is about the self, because that is not true.

I suggest that belief is belief about the self. — counterpunch

Some. Not all.