One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree...
— creativesoul

...which can be put into propositional form; hence, all belief is propositional. — Banno

If something can be put into propositional form, then it is propositional?

Surely, you're not claiming that, are you?

:brow:

I would think that when something is put into propositional form, it was not propositional prior to the putting.

We might all agree that having a belief is not like having something in one's pocket. — Banno

I would think. Why then, continue talking about belief as if it is? I've certainly never claimed that having belief is equivalent to having something in one's pocket. I'm left wondering what the point of that post was???

Having belief about mice and trees is the result of having drawn correlations between mice, trees, and other things.

What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures?
— creativesoul

Ah, not a bad question.

One would suppose that misattribution would be the same for animals and people. — Banno

Trivially speaking, it's the same in that the misattribution is not what they believe.

Misattributing belief to another(regardless of whether they are language-less) is to provide a false account of the other's belief. In order to know whether or not that account is false, we must first know what the other's belief is, or at the very least what it could possibly be given what else we do know about the other.

What can we know about a language-less creature's belief?

We can know that it cannot include language use. All predication is language use. We can know that it cannot include predication. All propositions are predication. We can know that it cannot include propositions. All statements are language use. We can know that it cannot include statements. We can know that it cannot be about language use, predication, propositions, or statements.

Since language-less belief cannot include or be about predication, propositions, or statements, then the claim that all belief has propositional content is false, for language-less belief cannot.

Can there be a correlation drawn that cannot be put into propositional form?

I've always wondered why you believe that this is so important?

Putting meaningful language-less correlations(language-less belief) into propositional form does not make the language-less belief themselves propositional in their content. Rather, it makes them amenable to being talked about; which, evolutionarily speaking, makes perfect sense. That also speaks to my second post in the debate.

A mouse running behind a tree is an event. Believing that a mouse ran behind a tree is belief about those events. A language-less creature, such as a cat, can form such beliefs about such events. One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree. The event takes place regardless of whether or not any creature forms belief about the event. None of it - the occurrence of event or the occurrence of language-less belief formation about the event - includes or is about language use. None of it is propositional in content.

Our account most certainly is.

How am I to think of a cat as drawing correlations? — bongo fury

My cats know the sound of my car, as a result of drawing correlations between it and me. They believe I am home when they hear it. The sound of certain kinds of plastic is also meaningful to them by virtue of being part of the correlation they've drawn between it and getting treats, etc. I've already offered the directly perceptible things in believing the mouse ran behind the tree. Some other things are of course the cat's own hunting desire/instinct, or perhaps hunger pangs, etc. The cat wants to catch the mouse.

Banno's cat has drawn correlations between the sounds and smells of other cats(unfriendly ones) and those other cats. Hence, she spits and hisses because she believes that an unfriendly cat is outside. Certainly these correlations between her past fighting with such cats develop into a predisposition towards those cats and those sounds and smells, that's part of how belief about the world and/or ourselves effects/affects how we think about current events(what we believe is happening).

an example of how — bongo fury

This makes no sense.

The how part is autonomous. It requires certain biological machinery, etc. It just happens(at first anyway)... the drawing correlations, I mean.

Smart phones are not the sorts of things capable of attributing meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, including but not limited to themselves...

...and that is how all belief systems emerge/begin. Smart phones do not attribute meaning.

Not seeing the relevance of "smart phones"...

(Scratch that. I see now you want misattributed not mistaken.) — bongo fury

Yes, and for very good reason. I'm invoking the distinction between our reports of an other's belief, and an other's belief.

Drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, none of which are language use.
— creativesoul

Example? — bongo fury

Mice, trees, spatial relations between mice, trees, and the creature themselves...

Believing the mouse ran behind the tree...

The notion to be avoided is that different statements can say the same thing, and that hence there is a thing called the proposition, which is what the statement means. — Banno

Here we agree.

Drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, none of which are language use.

From the debate...

It seems natural that we attribute beliefs to animals and small children, despite their lack of language. — Banno

Indeed it does. We may make some headway here.

What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures?

It's worse than I thought, if "x" isn't even abbreviating "x is true". — bongo fury

Yeah. A simple substitution exercise shows the error of equivocation nicely.

By virtue of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things.

Naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

Cool. And,

a creature capable of attributing meaning
— creativesoul

might do so by other means or in other ways than are implied by such practices? — bongo fury

Yes. Some language-less creatures are capable of attributing meaning.

My purpose there was to distinguish them in a dependency sense. First-order beliefs are about the world. Second-order beliefs are about statements about the world. — Andrew M

That's close to what I've argued in the debate. Second post particularly. Existential dependency. However, some belief about 'the world' does not need/require language, and some does.

OK, so consider the scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.

That the cat chased after the mouse suggests that the cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.

If we agree about that, then the question is what to make of the that-clause "the mouse ran behind the tree". I think we would agree that it describes an event that occurred independently of the cat's belief, and also independently of language.

Now I think that is what you mean by language-less belief. And also that this characterizes much of human belief as well. Is that correct? — Andrew M

The clause describes what happened(an event). Nothing above strikes me wrong.

...what are you counting as language? — bongo fury

Naming and descriptive practices.

The content of a true belief is a state of the world which we, as human beings, can potentially represent in language. Would you agree with that? — Andrew M

Thanks for asking. As earlier, I would not invoke states of the world or states of affairs.

What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief? Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things.

You seem to be looking to disagree on things that, as far as I can tell, we have no real disagreement about. — Andrew M

Not looking to disagree, just simply pointing out that you've been equivocating "states of affairs" in the same way that Banno does.

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
— Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise inexplicable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out? — bongo fury

:point:

Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.
— creativesoul

Could be... — frank

Oh, it most definitely is, but it's not the only part. He does not seem to continue wanting to have this conversation when it gets to the point that his position is shown to depend upon one of two different falsehoods. We never quite get to setting the criterion/standard for exactly what it makes the most sense for us to say counts as "language-less belief". That is the standard by which we can tell if another is guilty of anthropomorphism.





Language-less belief cannot consist of language. It can consist of things that are themselves existentially dependent upon language, if and when those are directly perceptible, such as red cups full of hot Maxwell House coffee. All belief including cups is itself existentially dependent upon language, for the cup is. Language less belief can consist of that which is existentially dependent upon language, just not language use itself(no predication).

Predication is enabled and/or otherwise facilitated by the fact that language-less belief already consists of a plurality of different things. This further speaks to the first two of three beliefs explicated earlier in the debate. It is also germane to positions seeking some shared 'structure' between language less belief and linguistic belief. Mentalese is the wrong way 'round. Evolution demands that linguistic belief emerge from non linguistic. Semiotics fails miserably here as well, with it's attempt to break all meaning down into semantics and syntax. Syntax describes particular patterns in the structured order of meaningful marks. Some meaning is prior to such marks.





The bridge between language less belief about what's happened or is happening and meaningful expressions thereof is built directly upon and by virtue of correlations being drawn between different directly perceptible elements of those events. When one begins drawing correlations between the names of directly perceptible things and their referent(between "Jack" and Jack), one begins to be able to think(express their thought and belief about what's happened and/or is happening) aloud via naming and descriptive practices about those same events and elements therein.

One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree, and one need not know that one is doing so in order to be able to look for mice behind trees. They look there because they believe that they will find the mouse.

All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of a creature drawing correlations between different things. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief(drawing the correlations). All language less belief about what happened or is happening is capable of being true or false despite it's inability to be stated by the creature themselves. Some of it actually is true. Arguably most. Some true belief exists in it's entirety prior to language use.

The language less belief that the mouse ran behind the tree, and the simple statement thereof share the exact same truth conditions, because they are about the very same things. The statement need not be made in order for the belief to be formed and/or held. Such belief is prior to linguistic expressions thereof.

I've laid non linguistic meaningful true belief about what's happened or is happening down at your doorstep all packaged up in one neat little bundle. No need for deity. No need for cosmic judgment. No need for language use. Now, to be clear, our understanding all of this certainly requires language. However, all three - belief, meaning, and truth - emerge onto the world stage prior to language use via thought and belief formation(correlations drawn between different directly perceptible things). Therefore, neither truth, nor meaning is existentially dependent upon language.

What's the significance you ask?

Given the shameful fact that there has yet to have been an acceptable theory of meaning, it seems relatively germane to me.

This non linguistic belief exposition also speaks to the stark differences between what's said and what's believed. That has implications for Moore's paradox as well as the liar, and all it's reinforcements. But, notably it speaks to the difference between what makes belief statements true and what makes statements true(when there is a difference between the two but both are being characterized with the exact same marks). What one believes(belief) most certainly plays a determinative role in what would make a statement thereof true. What one believes is part of what makes their own statements thereof true. For example, Gettier conflates here by forgetting that Smith is talking about himself. He's not alone either.

Smith's belief is about himself, and as such it isn't true if anyone else gets the job!


P.S.

Oh, and having a good grasp upon belief and the role it plays in our lives also helps one to navigate the world with as few unhappy unexpected results and/or surprises as possible, regardless of the particular situation one may find oneself in.

Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated?
— fdrake

Yes. — Andrew M

Is omniscience a fashionable aim these days?

So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).
— Andrew M

Part of what makes statements true or false anyway...
— creativesoul

What else do you have in mind? — Andrew M

Language less belief and the content thereof. You are focusing upon irrelevancy.

You?

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated).
— Andrew M

Whatever else can potentially be stated?

:brow:

That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno. — creativesoul

No, that's a distinction between the world (which we can potentially talk about) and our talk about the world. — Andrew M

No? Try this...

States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...

We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not.

I would add that as you used the terms above, events, relations, and whatever else can potentially be stated are all states of affairs. Look for yourself.

So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false). — Andrew M

Part of what makes statements true or false anyway...

I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated). — Andrew M

Whatever else can potentially be stated?

:brow:

That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno.

...your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event). — Andrew M

Whoa!

Either (1) is one of three different statements that we might make about events, or (1) is the event being described. It cannot be both at any time. (1) is either a statement or it's an event. If it's both, it's an equivocation of key terms, and that is adequate ground for rejection.

(1) is clearly identified as one of a trio of statements we might make about events.

(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can.

It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.
— creativesoul

For me, the debate hinged on how you and Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.

Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.

Here are three statements we might make:

(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.

(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.

(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.

I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false. — Andrew M

As earlier, I would not invoke "states of affairs". Banno's use was rejected, and rightly so.

It springs from the widespread acceptance that life is a fluke and we're products of an accident. — Wayfarer

Accident presupposes intent, purpose, reason...

Great job!

Stacy Abrams should receive some type of reward for her lifetime of efforts. Remarkable. Astounding. Unbelievable.

losing the majority in the senate — praxis

Is that official? Did it happen?

It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.

Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.

Unspoken thought is not equivalent to a private language.

how is meaning created — Wheatley

Drawing correlations between different things.

All Creative had to do was to provide an example of a belief that has no propositional content; that is, a belief that cannot be put into the form "Fred believes that P", for some Fred. That's all the claim that beliefs have propositional content amounts to; It says nothing about cats and small children, let alone claiming that they cannot have beliefs. — Banno

"That cannot be put into propositional form"...

What does that have to do with the content of what's being talked about?

It does not follow from the fact that our accounting practices are propositional in content that everything we take an account of is as well.

Is it possible to have such experiences during death? I mean, if death was a process, could it be that these people simply did not complete the process? If the process includes lucid memories or imagination...

What illegal activity are you suggesting? — NOS4A2

Fraud against the American people.

The list is quite long.

Chess software doesn't program in emotion, so I think the way to win is entirely through rationality. — Hanover

:rofl: Yer such a smartass :rofl:

True.

It is a phrase that ought be associated with the position he argues for/from.

In order for the belief of a language-less creature to be an attitude towards a proposition/statement, then either i.)propositions/statements must - in some way, shape, or form - be able to exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature could be even able to develop an attitude towards them, or ii.)language-less creatures have no belief.

Neither is true.

You got me?

Read my final post in the debate. That's the best I could do given what Banno offered. Those were his words, not mine...