I'd not care to guess why it's seems so important for others.

It's odd to me.

I find it rather telling that it's never used when making things clear.

What you mean by “the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. Do you mean “the experience of red cups for me is identical to others” in which case I think we both would disagree. Otherwise do you mean “the experience of red cups includes what each of us individually classifies as a red cup” which is literally what I said? Because it seems to be the latter from your replies. — khaled

I meant exactly what I said.

What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups?

I've no idea what seems so difficult about this for you to understand.

Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups.
— creativesoul

So what are they... — khaled

They are illusions and hallucinations of red cups seen in past. They are illusions and hallucinations, in part, because of the fact that there are no red cups involved at the time of the event. Such illusions and hallucinations are made possible, in part, because of prior conscious experience of seeing red cups.

Go back and read.

You're all over the place...

You know what I meant. I — khaled

Say what you mean.

...“the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. — khaled

Oh, brother...

If the experience is identical but in one there is a red cup in the other there is a drawing of a red cup how do we differentiate? — khaled

Well, the experiences are not identical if in one there is a red cup and in the other there is a drawing of a red cup.

You two seem to be imagining some sort of problem. Do you believe that I've somehow contradicted myself?

We all know what red cups look like. We know that each and every experience of seeing a red cup always involves seeing red cups. It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup for we know that the experience - most definitely - includes red cups. Since we know that that much is true, we also know that what you've said here above is not.

That's exactly what was said... verbatim. It was in response to the following...

I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. — khaled

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. — Luke

That's what I said, but taking it out of the context ignores the support that was given that you have since claimed was not.

Your other questions have been answered despite the fact that they're basically irrelevant to the position I'm arguing for/from, and the arguments given in support of that position.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly?
— creativesoul

How colours appear to each of us, for starters, e.g. what a colour in the chart above "looks like" to you. — Luke

You first. What does the square named "rosewood" look like to you?

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup? — Luke

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I.
— creativesoul

But you claimed that you do know... — Luke

No, I did not. Quote the entire post please.

There are variations in our biological machinery.
— creativesoul

Of course. That variation somehow produces the color difference. — Marchesk

Not all by itself.

But thing is that we don't always see the same colors. — Marchesk

There are variations in our biological machinery.

Is the idea/notion/concept of "Qualia" useful? Perhaps you missed this...

The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pick out or emphasise the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects of conscious experience of seeing red cups are we picking out and emphasizing - to the exclusion of all else - when we say "qualia"?

What qualia?

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes seeing red cups?

Gotta love it when folk ask someone to compare something that is nowhere to be seen to a color chart.

Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors.” — Luke

We'll all pick out the frequencies that appear to us all individually over and over again, time and time again, each and every time we pick out red cups.

"Public colored" is an odd turn of phrase...

:brow:

“Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors.” — Luke

Those entirely different subjective colors are always like the little man who wasn't there. They're quite clearly not entirely different. We all pick out the red ones.

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup? — Luke

I do not. Nor need I.

How can you know that red objects appear the same (colour) to everyone?

Has something to do with certain frequencies of visible light spectrum being picking out. — creativesoul

Yeah, its weird how everyone always picks out the red ones. I'm fairly certain that that's because those frequencies appear exactly like those frequencies each and every time someone is picking out red cups...

Does that appear red to you?

Yep.

Cool.

You might know how red objects appear to you (or what red objects “look like” to you), but how do you know how red objects appear to other people? — Luke

Red, I would think.

How can you know that red objects appear the same (colour) to everyone?

Has something to do with certain frequencies of visible light spectrum being picking out.

Are you saying that not all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups?

The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pick out or emphasise the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience. — Luke

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly?

it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, t
— creativesoul
Dennett set up this strawman all by himself. You are not paying attention.

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours.
— creativesoul
You are welcome to obliterate your own concepts, and not use certain words.

Personally, I treat words as tools. I need tools to do stuff, and I am not going to jettison a concept without a good replacement. So what other concept do you propose, to replace qualia? — Olivier5

This presupposes that there is a need to replace the notion of 'qualia'. What is it taking proper adequate account of that some other language game does not already do a much better job of?

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently?

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out in the last few pages?

They are not an example of what we're talking about. We're talking about conscious experience of seeing red cups.

...

Rubbish. Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups.

No description(s) of any specific experience is equal to having the experience(whatever it may be). No two specific kinds of experiences are exactly alike in every way, even if we're talking about the same creature seeing a red cup on multiple occasions.

How do we arrive at the need for "qualia" from here? Is the notion just being used in a sort of closeted subjectivism stance?

When someone refuses to agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups, there's not much more that can be said is there?

:meh:

In your view, where there are only boxes and no need to talk of what’s in them... — khaled

Never a good sign...

That's not even remotely close to anything I've written here. It's closer to the exact opposite.

Be well .

Unobservables aren't experienced. But they can be described. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to those who cannot see it. The description counts as the totality of the conscious experience of red regarding such people.

There's a huge difference between our reports of conscious experience and conscious experience. No one is saying otherwise. Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so, especially if they've already learned that there are colors that they cannot see. My model cannot account for that???

Pfft.

Slogans with global appeal.

here are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables.
— creativesoul

Those unobservables aren't red. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to the candidate under consideration in that particular example. Being cute/coy by feigning ignorance is nice though.

That is not a wish of mine.

I've found myself unexpectedly surprised on more than one occasion.