If the experience is identical but in one there is a red cup in the other there is a drawing of a red cup how do we differentiate? — khaled

Well, the experiences are not identical if in one there is a red cup and in the other there is a drawing of a red cup.

You two seem to be imagining some sort of problem. Do you believe that I've somehow contradicted myself?

We all know what red cups look like. We know that each and every experience of seeing a red cup always involves seeing red cups. It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup for we know that the experience - most definitely - includes red cups. Since we know that that much is true, we also know that what you've said here above is not.

That's exactly what was said... verbatim. It was in response to the following...

I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. — khaled

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. — Luke

That's what I said, but taking it out of the context ignores the support that was given that you have since claimed was not.

Your other questions have been answered despite the fact that they're basically irrelevant to the position I'm arguing for/from, and the arguments given in support of that position.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly?
— creativesoul

How colours appear to each of us, for starters, e.g. what a colour in the chart above "looks like" to you. — Luke

You first. What does the square named "rosewood" look like to you?

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup? — Luke

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I.
— creativesoul

But you claimed that you do know... — Luke

No, I did not. Quote the entire post please.

There are variations in our biological machinery.
— creativesoul

Of course. That variation somehow produces the color difference. — Marchesk

Not all by itself.

But thing is that we don't always see the same colors. — Marchesk

There are variations in our biological machinery.

Is the idea/notion/concept of "Qualia" useful? Perhaps you missed this...

The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pick out or emphasise the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects of conscious experience of seeing red cups are we picking out and emphasizing - to the exclusion of all else - when we say "qualia"?

What qualia?

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes seeing red cups?

Gotta love it when folk ask someone to compare something that is nowhere to be seen to a color chart.

Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors.” — Luke

We'll all pick out the frequencies that appear to us all individually over and over again, time and time again, each and every time we pick out red cups.

"Public colored" is an odd turn of phrase...

:brow:

“Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors.” — Luke

Those entirely different subjective colors are always like the little man who wasn't there. They're quite clearly not entirely different. We all pick out the red ones.

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup? — Luke

I do not. Nor need I.

How can you know that red objects appear the same (colour) to everyone?

Has something to do with certain frequencies of visible light spectrum being picking out. — creativesoul

Yeah, its weird how everyone always picks out the red ones. I'm fairly certain that that's because those frequencies appear exactly like those frequencies each and every time someone is picking out red cups...

Does that appear red to you?

Yep.

Cool.

You might know how red objects appear to you (or what red objects “look like” to you), but how do you know how red objects appear to other people? — Luke

Red, I would think.

How can you know that red objects appear the same (colour) to everyone?

Has something to do with certain frequencies of visible light spectrum being picking out.

Are you saying that not all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups?

The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pick out or emphasise the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience. — Luke

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly?

it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, t
— creativesoul
Dennett set up this strawman all by himself. You are not paying attention.

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours.
— creativesoul
You are welcome to obliterate your own concepts, and not use certain words.

Personally, I treat words as tools. I need tools to do stuff, and I am not going to jettison a concept without a good replacement. So what other concept do you propose, to replace qualia? — Olivier5

This presupposes that there is a need to replace the notion of 'qualia'. What is it taking proper adequate account of that some other language game does not already do a much better job of?

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently?

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out in the last few pages?

They are not an example of what we're talking about. We're talking about conscious experience of seeing red cups.

...

Rubbish. Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups.

No description(s) of any specific experience is equal to having the experience(whatever it may be). No two specific kinds of experiences are exactly alike in every way, even if we're talking about the same creature seeing a red cup on multiple occasions.

How do we arrive at the need for "qualia" from here? Is the notion just being used in a sort of closeted subjectivism stance?

When someone refuses to agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups, there's not much more that can be said is there?

:meh:

In your view, where there are only boxes and no need to talk of what’s in them... — khaled

Never a good sign...

That's not even remotely close to anything I've written here. It's closer to the exact opposite.

Be well .

Unobservables aren't experienced. But they can be described. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to those who cannot see it. The description counts as the totality of the conscious experience of red regarding such people.

There's a huge difference between our reports of conscious experience and conscious experience. No one is saying otherwise. Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so, especially if they've already learned that there are colors that they cannot see. My model cannot account for that???

Pfft.

Slogans with global appeal.

here are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables.
— creativesoul

Those unobservables aren't red. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to the candidate under consideration in that particular example. Being cute/coy by feigning ignorance is nice though.

That is not a wish of mine.

I've found myself unexpectedly surprised on more than one occasion.

Again, you cannot explain what “red” is to someone who’s never seen a red object. — khaled

I do not see why not...

There are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables.

Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones
— creativesoul

It also makes perfect sense in the case of creatures who can talk about past experience — khaled

I would agree, but when it comes to people who are supposed to be describing their own conscious experience of red cups, saying that that conscious experience is ineffable is considered a flaw, not a defining feature like it is with language less conscious experience of red cups.

But also to say “I do not know what’s in your box” (private) also makes sense. — khaled

Now apply the context...

You do not know what another's conscious experience of red cups consists of. Why do you keep saying that?

You do know that another's conscious experience of red cups consists - in part at least - of red cups. There are red cups in the box.

We're talking about pretheoretical conscious experience...

"Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones. A language less creature cannot say anything about their own conscious experience of red cups, for doing so requires talking about what happened and/or is happening, and they've no such ability. Such conscious experience of red cups is ineffable in the sense that it belongs to a creature incapable of speaking.

It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing
— creativesoul

Not necessarily. Check my discussion with Banno about this. It is possible for us to be having a different experience and to still have no communication problems. — khaled

Irrelevant.

We know that all conscious experience of red cups includes red cups. If you cannot agree, there's not much more to say.

Private: I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. — khaled

I'm sorry, but I'm not sure I understand...

We all know what red cups look like. We know that each and every experience of seeing a red cup always involves seeing red cups. It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup for we know that the experience - most definitely - includes red cups. Since we know that that much is true, we also know that what you've said here above is not.

The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation... — Olivier5

And here I thought it was via physiological sensory perception apparatus. Who knew it was through symbols and signs. No perception of objects for those poor language less beasts...

So, I'm asking any of the proponents of Qualia...

What meets these standards? Better yet what could?
— creativesoul

My question would rather be: who gives a flying rat’s ass, and why? — Olivier5

Well, given that it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, they ought give several rats' asses.

:brow:

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours.

What is a “pretheoretical condition”? — khaled

If you're advocating for qualia, this is pivotal.

It is the requirement that something be able to exist in it's entirety prior to any theoretical considerations, and it serves as the standard to meet in our assessments. For example, most everyone would agree that some conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to being named and described. Since all theoretical considerations about conscious experience consist of descriptions thereof(in large part at least), and all pretheoretical conscious experiences exist in their entirety prior to theoretical considerations, pre-theoretical conscious experience cannot consist of descriptions thereof.

Proponents of qualia invoked the "pretheoretical" standard. The source concept of subjective conscious experience that "qualia" are supposed to be refinements of(properties thereof), is claimed to have this "pretheoretical" status. In order to qualify(pun intended) as being pre-theoretical, qualia must exist in it's(their) entirety within pretheoretical conscious experience prior to being named and subsequently described. The burden to meet that explicit criterion belongs to those who advocate for it's use. It's quite common to see that burden be shifted to opponents or just simply neglected altogether during debates such as the ones within this thread. In fact, this thread is nearing fifty pages, and I challenge any and all proponents of qualia to clearly set out some conscious experience which actually meets that standard, and requires invoking the idea/notion/conception of "qualia" for doing so.

This is where qualia claims run into very serious problems. It's a 'hard problem'(again pun intended) to sell to someone like me that some property of 'subjective' conscious experience, say the color of the cup, is private, ineffable, and intrinsic if the experience itself consists of, or is existentially dependent upon - in any way - external things like red cups. Our conscious experience of red cups is most certainly existentially dependent upon red cups. In addition, the frequencies of visible light that we've recently discovered to have named "red" long ago were being emitted/reflected by certain external things long before we ever named and described them in color terms, and long before our becoming aware of the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups.

We need not discuss the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups in order to have conscious experience of red cups. However, we most certainly need to discuss such things in order to immediately apprehend that conscious experience of red cups comes in different varieties, some of which do indeed satisfy the pretheoretical criterion, but none of those require the idea/notion/concept of "qualia".

What does this mean “talk about experience as a subject matter in its own right”? Does it mean understanding words such as “red” or “bitter” etc? — khaled

"Talk(ing) about experience as a subject matter in it's own right" is not equivalent to understanding words such as "red" or "bitter". Understanding words such as "red" or "bitter" is a necessary prerequisite for subsequently talking about any conscious experience thereof as a subject matter in it's own right, but just using "red" or "bitter" is inadequate for doing so.

Understanding the words is not necessary for seeing red things or tasting bitter red apples. That is because some red things are pretheoretical. Red apples are such things, and the ability to eat them and experience the involuntary autonomous response that bitter apples induce in biological machinery is also pretheoretical. So, conscious experience of eating bitter red apples can happen pretheoretically. That said...

One can also learn how to use the terms "red" and "bitter" to talk about the pretheoretical conscious experience of eating bitter red apples. The learning process itself also counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. Once that process begins to turn inward on itself, and we begin discussing seeing and tasting bitter red apples in terms of our "conscious experience" thereof, we've begun to talk about experience as a subject matter in it's own right.

This thread is a prima facie example of talking about experience as a subject matter in it's own right, whereas a first grader's use of the terms "green" and "red" to pick out different colored apples is not. The grade school experience is a conscious experience of red and green apples that is not talking about the experience itself as a subject matter in it's own right. Rather, it's a conscious experience of talking about the apples. To tease the nuance out, it's a conscious experience of red and green apples that includes language use, but is prior to any theoretical considerations. Thus, some conscious experience of red and green apples consisting of language use counts as pretheoretical as well as all language less conscious experience thereof.