Do you not know how blacks have been historically treated?

Would you want to get treated the way blacks in America have been and still are, in many ways, being treated?

Questions aren't the sort of thing that can be honest or dishonest. It's a serious question. Do you have some issue answering it?

Compelling argument against placing too much value upon personal liberty/freedom/rigged individualism.

Serious question here...

Would any one of you like to be treated in the exact same way as blacks are known to be treated by police and the criminal justice system in the United States of America?

My apologies. I would question that claim myself... Open mouth, insert foot. Should have read more carefully than I did.

I asked for the science that tells us that mask-wearing is better than personal liberty in the long term.
— Isaac

Are you serious?
— creativesoul

Of course he is.

"Better than" is a value judgement. Science doesn't make value judgements. — ChrisH

Isaac is perfectly capable of speaking for himself, but since you answered...



So what? I mean, that's not even in question here... is it? What difference does that make to the discussion here?

Science is not an agent. Science doesn't think, believe, wonder, or anything else that agents such as ourselves often do. Science doesn't make any judgments. That's not even in question, and I seriously doubt that the OP meant anything of the sort.

He was simply claiming that science could be used as a reliable means to help us make better moral decisions... how to act in order to minimize unnecessary harm and how to act in order to increase human flourishing. If those are moral concerns, then science, can be rightfully and reliably used as an important tool for doing so.

Science is the most reliable means of acquiring information from which to better make our own judgments, including the ones under consideration here regarding the ongoing pandemic and what we must do if we want to contain it and be able to get on with our lives on the other side of that task.

Science doesn't tell us that we ought do everything in our power that we can to minimize the death and suffering from the pandemic either. It does however offer us the best knowledge available regarding how to do so.

That's the point.

...why don't we say "good-bye" when starting a conversation? — Harry Hindu

Because that's what's often said in situations of parting ways, not the beginning of conversations. "Hello" is a greeting, and it is not always an appropriate/accepted method/means to begin a conversation. Rather, it is often just a pleasantry; just a nice polite way to acknowledge another's presence.

A short bit on names and pointing...

Names refer to something other than the name. They pick out some individual to the exclusion of all else. Saying that they 'point to something' is wrong-minded. "Trees" doesn't point to trees. We often point to trees when teaching a language learner how we use the term "tree", but that learner has not grasped the use/meaning of the term until they have drawn correlations between the name("tree") and it's referent(a tree). Street just offered adequate enough explanation regarding the indeterminate nature of the pointing part of those activities.

Austin is well worth reading for additional understanding of some of the other things we do with words.

The meaning of a word consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between the word(language use) and other things. Hence, the different meanings/accepted uses of the same word arise from the differences between the part(s) of that correlational content that is not the word(language use) itself.

For example...

"Shut the door" when softly spoken during a romantic encounter means something entirely different than "Shut the door" when spoken sternly by someone with authority to someone who just broke some rule or another, immediately upon their entry to the office. Both uses share some meaning in that they both consist - in part at least - of correlations drawn between the same behaviour(shutting the door) and the language use. Both often aim at increasing privacy of further interaction. However, it's the parts of the correlation that differ that make the meanings remarkably distinct. The former includes correlations drawn between the language use and sexual/romantic thoughts, beliefs, memories, and/or expectations, whereas the latter does not. The latter often includes correlations drawn between thoughts of following orders and/or perhaps avoiding punishment and/or consequences of not doing so. It could also include correlations between a sudden onset of fear regarding what's about to happen, whereas the former does not.

Both uses include the exact same words as part of the aforementioned correlations drawn between them and other stuff/things.

When we talk about 'looking to use' in order to find out and/or figure out what some particular language use means, I think that it is better to understand that we must consider not only the words being used, but also everything else that is happening during the use, and perhaps leading up to it.

Dictionaries just give us more words, they're not as helpful as looking towards the actual use, because none of the actual circumstances(the use) in which the term 'acquires' meaning are contained in therein. They are, however, sometimes helpful in recognizing misuse.

A sufficiently competent language user will already know that words have multiple different definitions. They are not all compatible with one another. It is prudent and wise to be clear in the beginning about which definition one is using in any given discussion/argument. Not doing so will inevitably increase the possibility for misunderstanding. So, there's nothing wrong with clearly setting out the definitions of key terms during philosophical debates and/or discussions.

To quite the contrary...

There's often something quite wrong if one refuses to do so. While I am not charging Banno personally, I am strongly suggesting that such a refusal can be a clear sign of self-contradiction and/or an equivocation fallacy hiding out somewhere, so to speak...

Isaac is being a dick.

I asked for the science that tells us that mask-wearing is better than personal liberty in the long term. — Isaac

Are you serious? Do you need to see it? Have you not already? Have you been living under a rock? You're being a dick to the OP for no reason at all. It pisses me off, particularly coming from someone who is a self professed psychologist whose job - so s/he says - is to make people 'feel better'. You've yet to impress me. I personally know professionals in that field who are in very important and powerful positions of oversight and they act respectfully and honorably, particularly towards others regardless of disagreements. Your words here are anything but respectable or honorable. Duplicity of that nature is reprehensible and disgusting. Your behaviour and word choices here are a disgrace to the discipline.

:rage:

The medical experts, you know, the most knowledgable people regarding infectious disease, they most certainly wear one. They most certainly strongly advise wearing facial coverings and changing and/or disinfecting/sterilizing them as often as possible. They most certainly have stated in no uncertain terms that if the public does not follow the guidelines, including but not limited to masks, that this pandemic will inevitable take far more lives than need be.

Certainly better for everyone else for me to wear a mask... Seeing how it's about everyone else, and it's all about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour from/by me regarding it's effect/affect upon others... it's of moral import. It also dovetails nicely with the notion of human flourishing.

But I do know some animal rights activists who are far more concerned about animal rights than about human flourishing. — Thomas Quine

I think that that 'exception' is not one. Animal rights activists are themselves long entrenched in human flourishing, otherwise they'd not be comfortable enough to concern themselves with the rights of animals.

Where there has never been human flourishing, there have never been animal rights activists.

Flourishing is as good a practical basis as it is an involuntary one for human morality. I think that you're definitely onto something with very strong ground.

Very nice.

I appreciated that input immediately upon reading it. It felt right. It made sense. It did not pose any issues of incoherence and/or self-contradiction.

A sound argument. One that makes valid inferences from true premises. — Pfhorrest

Soundness alone is sorely inadequate. Not all sound arguments are on equal justificatory footing.

Call the Green Apple bookstore in San Francisco, California. If you're lucky, they'll have something in their rare books collection. A few years back they had several volumes of some extremely rare set or other.

Hey apo!

:cool:

All things moral directly involve that which counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
— creativesoul

I don’t disagree with that at all, I’m just not sure where you’re going with it in relation to the OP. — Pfhorrest

If you apply that to all the times that you've used the term "moral" some things will begin to stand out... You'll reach incoherence and/or self-contradiction, and be forced to rethink how to better say some of the things you've said when using the term. It also dispenses with historical moral discourse and the taxonomy used within. The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive dissolves. All sorts of things change in one's logical train of thought when and if they hold to that. "Is" and "ought" are both sometimes a part of moral claims. I've briefly laid out some of this earlier... that part went unattended.

I've also not received notices after replies. I'm sure we're not alone. They'll fix it.

Just a friendly suggestion...

I wouldn't spend too much time arguing about some philosophical school of thought and/or position. It's much better to stop thinking in such comparative terms. Clearly, none of them have gotten morality right. Many have gotten some aspect or other right though! Much better to focus upon clearly laid out problems and/or arguments without the need to name where they came from, and/or how they may resemble some prior position or another.

With me anyway...

You may find that some things I say have been said before, but you will not find that the position I advocate suffers the same flaws as any historically well-known position. I'm unique in that way. Lovable too!

:wink:

...you're quite rude about clarifying your ambiguities for some strange reason. — Kenosha Kid

I certainly do not mean to be. Perhaps it's easy to mistake short concise answers and/or explanations of problems with rudeness?

All morality consists entirely of thought and belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. All morality consists entirely of moral thought and belief.

That's a 'framework' capable of accounting for the evolutionary progression of what existed in it's entirety prior to the namesake "morality". We gave that name to our thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and/or statements regarding acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief and/or behaviour. Those thoughts and beliefs existed, in simpler form, prior to language itself. They gained in their complexity along with spoken/written language use via statements thereof, until we isolated them as a subject matter in their own right by virtue of even more complex language use(metacognition).

Is that clear enough?

Yes, I agree, your language is sloppy. — Kenosha Kid

:brow:

The suggestion that there are two systems of creating and/or maintaining social norms was not mine. I was pointing out the inadequacy of that suggestion/framework. In order to do that, I must use those terms. I've further clarified some of the problems with that use, while granting it's ability to explain some practices and/or situations where norms are 'created' and/or practiced. You're the one that drew a false equivalence between the maintenance of social norms and an adherence to practices due to fear of punishment. So...

Given that the task of the thread is to offer an account of all morality that's amenable to evolutionary progression, I'm simply doing what's needed. There's much overlap or agreement between the position I advocate and the OP; quite a bit actually...

The linguistic framework we employ here is crucial. In addition to the problems with the notion of "maintenance", the term "moral" is being equivocated by a plurality of participants. Consistent terminological use is imperative.

Your apprehension here is based upon a self-defeating, untenable notion of what counts as a worldview. One need not have a view about all elements of the world in order to have a worldview. They are all limited... incomplete.
— creativesoul

And yet you said "almost entirely". That was what I was questioning. (I misquoted it as "completely" in my response.) — Kenosha Kid

I wrote "almost entirely" because there are undoubtedly some beliefs which are part of one's initial worldview that they do not adopt wholesale.

Maintaining a social norm(rule of behaviour) is acting to do so, which is endeavoring in a goal oriented task of maintaining some norm for the sake of it.
— creativesoul

Or in fear of the consequences of not doing so, which is a massive slice of the wedge if not the thick end. — Kenosha Kid

There is an inherent inadequacy hereabouts in the language being used to account for morality. Not all continued practice of some social norm amounts to "maintaining" them. A social norm can develop and be practiced - by some - out of fear of the unwanted consequences of not doing so, but maintenance of social norms is done for it's own sake. Performing an activity out of the fear of consequences of not doing so is practice for entirely different reasons than maintenance, which is done in order to keep them going, so to speak.

Punishment is maintenance.

Either that or mimicry as a means to get attention or as a means to seek affirmation during language acquisition does not count as rational thought
— creativesoul

It can and cannot. — Kenosha Kid

Are you saying that mimicry as a means to get attention or seeking affirmation can and cannot count as rational thought?

:brow:

That bit of mine was simply to temper the claim of Isaac who suggested two systems of creating and maintaining social norms. Copying(mimicry) was classified as 'passive' as compared/contrasted with 'active' such as influential members making themselves stand out. The problem with that dichotomy is the same with many others, in that they cannot take proper account of that which is both, and thus neither. Mimicry, as above, is one such thing.

Seeing how the thread involves attempting to take proper account of morality while being amenable to evolution, and morality is a social norm, suggestions regarding how morality emerges, and/or is created are important to consider quite carefully...

We all adopt, almost entirely, our first worldview.
— creativesoul

I'm wondering if you mean completely. In my experience, moral consideration is incremental. We are limited to the experiences we have had to date. I'd personally not call such a thing a worldview, since there will be many elements of the world about which, as a four-year old, I had no view at all. — Kenosha Kid

I meant what I wrote. During language acquisition itself, we adopt our first worldview.

Your apprehension here is based upon a self-defeating, untenable notion of what counts as a worldview. One need not have a view about all elements of the world in order to have a worldview. They are all limited... incomplete.

There are no thoughts about "goodness" or "the good" unless they are formed within a language user skilled enough to either learn how to use the name to refer to other things, or within a language user skilled enough to begin questioning/doubting such adopted use.
— creativesoul

Agreed. And in terms of origins, I don't see any area for contradiction here, since language preceded the advent of large social groups. — Kenosha Kid

I've raised the point above in order to begin establishing the groundwork for an evolutionary timeline of morality. Pointing out that talking of "the good" is existentially dependent upon language use, whereas some other moral thinking is not shows us that talk of "the good" comes later. Thus, whenever someone wants to delimit the conversation about morality to such terms, they've already began using a linguistic framework that is incapable of taking proper account of morality, particularly how it emerges and evolves over time.

Is there a meaningful distinction that we can draw and maintain between something or other being believed to be, hence sincerely called "good" and being good? I think there is. The historical facts and current facts support that answer quite well. Our moral belief, as humans, has evolved. Morality has evolved. There's no good reason to claim otherwise, and/or deny that that evolution continues. So, sometimes we're wrong, and what we once thought to be good is no longer believed to be.
...
I'm not claiming that believing and/or saying that something is good, makes it so. I'm not saying that what's good is relative to the believer in any way that makes moral claims true by virtue of being believed to be. Rather, I'm saying that we come to acquire knowledge of what's good over time with trial and error, and I am only pointing out that we've made and will continue to make our fair share of mistakes along the way.
— creativesoul

I actually agree with your interpretation of the trend; it is a point I have made myself. However... you must be aware that local, temporary moral trends can occur in different directions. We have a growing trend currently toward nationalism, for instance. By your reckoning, then, nationalism must be more morally good, since you assume that, whatever morality is, we tend toward it with time. — Kenosha Kid

I was simply laying a bit of groundwork. Stating the obvious, as it were, that morality evolves over time, and that we've made mistakes along the way. I do not assume that "we tend toward" morality with time(whatever that's supposed to mean here). That actually doesn't make sense at all according to the framework I'm employing. I also do not equate morality with good, and that is crucial to keep in mind, lest there will be more misunderstanding than understanding. In fact, an astute reader can see for themselves that I'm not even using the term "moral" as a synonym for "good" or "acceptable". That said...

By my reckoning, the growing trend towards nationalism is prima facie evidence that morality evolves. Nothing more... yet. I personally find that talking of "nationalism" is misleading, at best. It's a term used to place some candidate or another in negative light, by virtue comparison to some historical 'bad guy'. All too often, the comparison is found sorely lacking. That's another subject though. The point about the quote above is that you've misunderstood my reckoning...

Is there a meaningful distinction that we can draw and maintain between something or other being believed to be, hence sincerely called "good" and being good? I think there is. — creativesoul


I think so as well. It is the distinction between what it means for something to be good, and what it means for good to be something. Have to admit, though, drawing and maintaining the meaningfulness of it, is a lot harder than merely granting its possibility.
— Mww

I think this would be highly unlikely. We can't even agree on what constitutes a 'game', or where exactly the boundaries of 'here' are. The idea that our word 'good' picks out exactly one unified and inviolable concept identical in every mind which conceives it seems ludicrous. — Isaac

The contentious pivotal matter, historically anyway, involves whether or not the 'quality' of goodness is somehow a property of all good things regardless of whether or not we believe it to be. Charitable donations are often discussed here. Giving to charity is good.

I do not see how talking about what it means for good to be something is helpful here. It reduces to naming and descriptive practices employing the term "good'.

I agree that the word "good" means different things to different people. Furthermore, it's meaning changes within an individual user's lifetime as their moral belief system grows in complexity. That speaks to the 'subjective/relative' aspect of the evolution of morality. However, that is irrelevant to the point being raised.

The point involves whether or not there is a difference between changing one's belief about what's good and being mistaken about what's good. I say there is. If it is possible to change one's mind about whether or not something counts as "good", and that newly formed belief is mistaken - still yet - then it is clear that our belief about what counts as good is not equal to what counts as good.

Interesting thread. So many things have been said by so many different people. Although I've carefully read much of this thread, I'm working from memory here. I'll mention and/or further discuss different points and/or aspects of consideration that have been previously mentioned, but need a bit more fleshing out... to my mind. Please pardon me if I've missed some things. There's no way to cover it all and keep this post to an acceptable length.

...we have left the reasoning for what-is-to-be-done behind. And that will always be moral reasoning, when the thing to be done is primarily qualified by the goodness of it.
— Mww

Yes, I feel the crux upon us. So this is the rationalist view of morality: I am presented with a situation, I rationally deduce what the good outcome will be, and I rationally deduce how to realise that outcome. But where did the quality of goodness come from? What makes that outcome "good"? — Kenosha Kid

Is there a meaningful distinction that we can draw and maintain between something or other being believed to be, hence sincerely called "good" and being good? I think there is. The historical facts and current facts support that answer quite well. Our moral belief, as humans, has evolved. Morality has evolved. There's no good reason to claim otherwise, and/or deny that that evolution continues. So, sometimes we're wrong, and what we once thought to be good is no longer believed to be.

Morality, if that term refers to codes of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour, is relative, but it is so in broad-based universal fashion. All morality is subject to influence by individual social, cultural, and/or familial particulars. Again, history supports this quite nicely.

I'm not claiming that believing and/or saying that something is good, makes it so. I'm not saying that what's good is relative to the believer in any way that makes moral claims true by virtue of being believed to be. Rather, I'm saying that we come to acquire knowledge of what's good over time with trial and error, and I am only pointing out that we've made and will continue to make our fair share of mistakes along the way.


Touching upon the origen, and/or how morality emerged onto the world stage...(nice OP, by the way)


All thought about what counts as "the good" is borne of language use. It consists completely of correlations drawn between that particular language use and other things by the user themselves. Hence, the relative('subjective') nature mentioned earlier. Again, I'm not advocating moral relativism or moral subjectivism. Rather, I'm merely granting what ought be obvious. There are no thoughts about "goodness" or "the good" unless they are formed within a language user skilled enough to either learn how to use the name to refer to other things, or within a language user skilled enough to begin questioning/doubting such adopted use.

We all adopt, almost entirely, our first worldview. That is replete with moral belief and talk of "good". The problem is that we've already begun forming belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour long before.

So... talk of "good" comes later. Here, I am touching upon the timeline skirted around earlier regarding morality and how it relates to that particular language use.


On rational thought, mimicry, and morality...

Some rational thought - and all discussions of morality - consist(s) entirely of language use. Some rational thought does not. Some rudimentary thought about acceptable/unacceptable does not as well. Rational thought happens long before spoken and/or otherwise uttered language use; long before one adopts the moral aspect of their worldview.

Either that or mimicry as a means to get attention or as a means to seek affirmation during language acquisition does not count as rational thought, because we most certainly mimic prior to properly speaking. We mimic as a means of language acquisition.

That's rational thought being employed in language acquisition. So, not all rational thought requires and/or consists entirely of language use, particularly talking in terms of "goodness" or "the good", or any other commonly used terminological framework/dialiect/jargon commonly called "moral discourse".

Individuals mimick an other for a wide range of different reasons. Sometimes, this mimicry happens long before the actor(they) is(are) capable of talking about what they're doing in terms of it's moral import. They can describe everything it is that they are doing, but struggle to talk about where they picked up the idea that the behaviour being put on display is acceptable. This is the sort of mimicry that happens after language acquisition but before metacognitive endeavors meant to isolate and discuss pre-existing moral thought and belief.

We first learn to call things "good" by learning what is already called such by the community we're borne into. This is considerably different than deliberately delving into moral philosophy. I'm of the well considered opinion that that distinction has not been kept in mind near enough throughout the last several centuries.

Prelinguistic thought about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Linguistic thought and belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Thinking about pre-existing thought and belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Three distinct manifestations. All qualify as moral thought and/or belief. That needs parsed out, for it is very nuanced. For now, I leave it until someone shows an interest in doing so. It is quite germane given the topic and OP.

It seems to me that social groups have two systems for creation and maintenance of behavioural norms. One is active, the other passive. The active one is about influencial members trying to stand out, the passive one is like a game of Chinese whispers, each member simply trying to copy the other... — Isaac

While I readily agree with the relevancy of those two 'systems', I find that that suggested dichotomy is far from adequate. As it stands, it seems like an overgeneralization. I mean, it seems incapable of taking proper account of all the different ways we create social norms that do not rightfully qualify as either of those two suggested(exhaustive?) systems. I've said some things that speak to that tangentially. More directly...

Maintaining a social norm(rule of behaviour) is acting to do so, which is endeavoring in a goal oriented task of maintaining some norm for the sake of it. The problem, it seems to me, is that many social norms emerge and remain to be continued in practice without any deliberate intent to keep them in place for the sake of keeping them in place. Particularly regarding creatures without complex langage capable of talking about the behaviour.

So, the framework above cannot properly account for some of what happens that gives rise to morality.

There are also issues with drawing broad-based conclusions about all situations where we copy/mimic others based upon one particular situation thereof... the game of Chinese whispers.

Some copying is not like the game of whispers. If some copying is not like the game of whispers, but all copying passively creates and/or maintains social norms, then there can be no copying as a means to stand out... but there is. It is a common occurrence amongst young language learners. If copying another's behaviour is passive, and nothing passive is active, then no copying could be for the reason of making oneself stand out. If what is being proposed here were true, then it would be impossible for one to copy another's behaviour in order to stand out.

The problem, of course, is that that happens all the time. I would guess that it happens each and every day, without fail. Since we sometimes copy an other as a means to get attention and/or stand out, it is clear that the suggested dichotomous framework is found lacking.

This is not meant to completely discredit the proposed account, only to limit it's use to only certain conclusions. Keeping this in mind will help us to account for a wider range of everyday behaviours, and thus improve our account b beng able to do so. The suggestions do most certainly put a finger on a few important situations where social norms are being cultivated, created, and/or maintained. Just not all.

Do you understand the difference?

:brow:

I'm charging convention, both historical and current, with working from an emaciated notion of what counts as being moral in kind. Moral belief are a kind of belief. Moral claims are statements thereof.

All things moral directly involve that which counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. There are no exceptions. That's the strongest justificatory ground possible. If you disagree, then by all means feel free to offer an example. One is all it takes.

Thank you. Hoping this finds you and yours safe and well.

Cheers!

"Acceptable/unacceptable" is just another kind of judgement/assessment, so I don't see the difference here. — Pfhorrest

"Moral" covers both. It's a difference in criterion and/or taxonomy.

Meta-ethics isn’t about whether or not that kind of thing is true, but about what it means for something like that to be true (or false). What exactly is a claim like that saying? — Pfhorrest

I was asking about the truth of that claim in direct response to the criterion set forth - for what you claim we need - in the last paragraph of the OP. Particularly, the bit about being 'genuinely' truth-apt, which to me amounts to what sorts of claims are even capable of being true, in addition to what makes them so...

I see no reason for moral claims to be any different than any other claim in this regard. What I do not get is the confusion regarding what the claim means, or what it is saying. What's not to be understood about what the claim means, assuming we are competent language users? We all know what it means, don't we? If we do not, then we've gone horribly wrong somewhere along the lines in our meta-ethical considerations, because we most certainly used to.

My initial question was the beginning of a rather different sort of approach. Seeing how that's what you seem to be asking for, perhaps we can pursue one, at least momentarily; for the sake of argument, so to speak.

All of the different language use that make a claim a moral one as compared to not, have something else in common too. On my view, this other commonality is the determining factor. It is what makes a claim a moral one, conventional examples notwithstanding...

All moral claims - all things moral for that matter - are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. If being about that is what makes them moral claims, and that's what I'm currently advocating, then that completely leaves behind the personal value judgment aspect, which has some very interesting consequences.

The term "moral" would no longer be being used - on pains of coherency alone - as a value judgement/assessment. Rather, "moral" would be used to pick out things that are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. This, of course, broadens the scope well beyond where it is and would render moral facts as what's happened and/or is happening that had and/or has to do with acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. True utterances of "ought" would correspond to the moral facts, in the very same way that other true statements correspond to fact. Note here that I'm not using "fact" as a name for true statements. Rather, facts are events; what's happened and/or is happening; the way things were/are.

It's the very meaning of a claim that determines what ought or ought not be the case, just in case we look to see for ourselves, and even in the cases where we do not or cannot. If "the cat is on the mat" is a true statement, then a cat ought be on the mat should we check. If "the red cup is in the cupboard" is a true statement, then a red cup ought be in the cupboard should we check. That's what knowing the truth conditions/meaning for/of some statement amounts to. Why would it be any different for a moral claim?

Take a promise made to plant a rose garden on Sunday. "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday" is incapable of being true/false at the time of utterance, but claims about that promise, or based upon that promise are most certainly capable of being so. For example, if one promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then "there ought be a rose garden on Monday", is true for the exact same reasons that there ought be a red cup in the cupboard.

It's bad, immoral, wrong, and unjust to whack a little old lady in the back of the head with a shovel for no reason whatsoever...

What's the problem here regarding the truth of the above moral claim?

What counts as a moral claim, as compared/contrasted to all the other kinds of claims that are not?

:brow:

You've invoked the term "race" as something to focus upon. I'm not interested.

Explain to me please the boat I'm missing. Racism is presumably based on race and attitudes grown therefrom. Now take race out of it, because that's known to be a nothing. You tell me: what is the nature of what's left? — tim wood

Please reread my post that you initially replied to. This time look for your answers regarding what racist belief is, what racism is, and what systemic racism is...

All those answers were offered up front.

Usually when anyone refers to race, for any reason, they're either ignorant - they don't know any better - or almost certainly vicious, Actually probably vicious either way. — tim wood

This is perhaps the stupidest comment I've read about racism in a long while. If true... then you... are almost certainly vicious. Come to think of it, your suggested approach will and has do/done more harm than good. If and when racists change their language use, they'll still be racist and nothing changes except a minimized ability to identify them. Your approach could be used, and actually has been, by people like Richard Spencer, Richard Nixon, Donald Trump, and many others who are racist despite not using the term "race"...

Yeah... as I said. No thanks.

Race, racism. Two different words. To use your analogy, apples, apple pie. — tim wood

That's a misuse of the analogy. Racist belief and systemic racism. Both exist, The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The latter consists of the former. The former doesn't just stop existing because it's based upon a notion of categorization that is currently unsupported by genetics and the science involved. Nor does the latter.

The thrust of your approach here misses the boat entirely.