We can always rest easy claiming - but that all the more reason to remember it's just a claim. And good claims work - but none of that makes them true. — tim wood

That is the case with all good claims.

It's not easy to describe any animal action in terms that do not tend either to anthropomorphize or make hasty assumptions. — tim wood

I agree. It is not easy to avoid anthropomorphism. We'll keep an eye out for it.

My cat meows at the door; obviously it wants to go out. The evidence being that it goes out - except when it doesn't. Cat owners all share the experience of their cat, once the door opens, standing in the doorway, or lying down in the doorway, for an extended sampling of the day, no matter the weather. So what is the cat about? Who knows? All we get is the probability/possibility of certain behaviours. — tim wood

I do not see the relevance of your mistake to what I wrote.

The cat didn't want to go out. That cat meows at the door for more than one reason. You're the one saying it's obvious that the cat wanted to do something that he did not do. Not I.

What's the problem with what I wrote? I don't have that problem. By all means, if I ever attribute thought/belief/reason that only humans are capable of forming, having, and/or holding to a non human, let me know.

Problems with your account are being held up as an example used against my account. Does that move count as a valid objection these days? My oh my, what is the world coming to?

When one creature that has never done so watches another creature that is well rehearsed in doing so gather termites from a mound using a stick, it learns how to use a stick for the purpose of gathering resources. They want to eat termites. They know how to use a stick in order to do so. The one will break a small limb from branch, strip it of all external leaves and twigs, poke holes into a termite nest, and then poke the limb deep into the nest allowing the termites to climb upon the stick.

That creature does that on purpose. The stick becomes significant to the watcher. The stick is already significant to the user.

Does any of that count as anthropomorphism to you?

:smile:

'ppreciatchoo!

Suicide is not always irrational. That's the only point I was making.
— creativesoul

You don't have to convince me! While I would not want to live in a culture that values 'honour' -whatever they think that means - over life and happiness, I have my own exit strategy in case of certain foreseeable eventualities. — Vera Mont

No worries. Convincing you wasn't the aim. Clearly making the case was.

:wink:

But I have no reason to think I would disagree with you. I assume you mean that a dim bulb can illuminate meaning and significance, but that it takes something brighter to execute purpose. In any case I think none of it exists absent an agent in which it is thought/supposed. — tim wood

You may be getting hung up on my distinction between a capable creature and an agent. I think "agency" is fraught with historical baggage. The more I think about it, I'm not so sure I agree that all purpose presupposes agency either. Chimps. Crows. I'm hesitate to attribute agency to them, but I've no issue clearly explaining how they give purpose to rudimentary tools; how those tools become meaningful/significant to them.

I'm actively working this out as well. :blush: I'm not well rehearsed in the subject matter of purpose/teleology. I'm more seeing where my prior commitments leave/lead me on the matter.

A person can be hungry without knowing what he wants, but at least he's hungry. — tim wood

Sure, but being hungry without knowing what one wants to eat is more akin to being ambitious without knowing how to achieve the desired outcome. That is ambition without clear means. It is not ambition without desired outcome/goal.

X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use...
— creativesoul

Imho best to limit this to people because, so far as I know, there is no adequate language for making clear just what exactly animals are doing. — tim wood

Hmmm. People are not the only creatures capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. If a creature learns to use a stick to fetch termites out from deep inside of a nest, we can rest quite easy in claiming that the creature uses that stick for a specific purpose. The stick is a tool. The stick has purpose in strict relation to the creature intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting it to use. The purpose is 'given' to the stick by the creature under consideration.

Is that not adequate enough?

As to your distinction between purpose on one side and meaning and significance on the other, l don't quite get it.

All purpose is meaningful/significant to a creature capable of 'giving' purposes to things. All purpose presupposes meaning and/or significance. Not all meaning and/or significance presupposes purpose.

If the person believes the only way to rid themselves of misery is to end their own life, and they choose to commit suicide, then that is a completely rational choice. I do not see how false hope plays a role here
— creativesoul
The hope is that all suffering will end with life. It's false if there is a judgmental afterlife, in which suicide is against the law. — Vera Mont

Agreed, if there is some judgmental afterlife.

However, I was simply pointing out by anecdote that suicide is not always irrational, which is about being well grounded, justified, and/or arrived at from valid reasoning. That is quite distinct from whether or not the decision/reasoning was based upon true belief/premises. There are other stories as well.

Samurai will fall on their own sword rather than to be dishonored by virtue of being killed by an enemy. In that culture, it is most honorable to do so. Kamikaze pilots performed honorably according to the cultural mores as well. Suicide is not always irrational. That's the only point I was making.

That said, I suspect there are - sometimes - multiple other ways to rid oneself of misery, but that is definitely context dependent.
— creativesoul
Sometimes there are other means - or would be, if they were made available to the person contemplating death. But there are situations in which that person is powerless to affect change in their circumstances. (I'm thinking prisoner in some benighted country or terminally ill or catastrophically injured patient. those are extreme situations, but they're the simple fact of life for many thousands.)

Yup.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose.
— creativesoul

Purpose then emergent, requiring person, desire, goal, means? In this your "agent," the person, necessary, desire as catalyst. It looks to me like ends and means are unnecessary. As with a person said to be ambitious, that is, a person with purpose but not (yet, presumably) with a goal or means to achieve it. — tim wood

Means are purposeful. The purpose of means is to reach, attain, and/or acquire a goal/end.

Ambition without goals? What's that consist of?

However, I do agree that one can be ambitious without yet having, arriving at, and/or being capable of articulating a means to the desired end. Good call, but I can make no sense whatsoever out of ambition absent any goal, and/or desired outcome. General ones suffice. Being a good person, for example. One can be ambitious about life in general as well. So, there is little need for specificity, however there is most certainly a need for some sort of desired outcome/expectation. There's always something that one is ambitious about regardless of the complexity of the desired outcome.



I do feel compelled to admit/note that I wrote something earlier that I have come to disagree with in recent years. I misspoke. While I do hold that purpose presupposes agency, I do not hold that meaning and significance do as well. That is not my position, despite stating otherwise. Mea culpa.

X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. Whereas all things meaningful and/or significant are meaningful/significant to a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Purpose requires that and more. A simple/rudimentary thinking creature is all that's needed to attribute meaning and/or for things to become significant to them by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. However, "agency/agent" imply deliberate contemplation, abstract thinking, moral culpability, volition, a creature that 'cares', etc.

All that to say that I retract the claim that meaning and significance presuppose agency. Best to do that now, so as to avoid any confusion it will certainly cause otherwise, should this discussion continue.

That is why there have never been atheist societies in history. They don't last long enough to make it into the history books. — Tarskian

I question what counts as a non atheist society.

No doubt, yet the act is not rational (i.e. false hope). — 180 Proof

I'm not sure I understand that.

If the person believes the only way to rid themselves of misery is to end their own life, and they choose to commit suicide, then that is a completely rational choice. I do not see how false hope plays a role here my friend. If one ceases to exist at death, and misery requires one to persist, then their hope to end the misery and suffering by virtue of committing suicide will be well grounded, and their belief/hope that death ends misery... true.

That said, I suspect there are - sometimes - multiple other ways to rid oneself of misery, but that is definitely context dependent.

After all, from a rational standpoint, suicide is a disproportionately (ir-ratio ... absurd) permanent solution to a temporary problem. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Suicidal folk can see it quite differently. Trust me. The problems are not "temporary" until their gone. Death is believed to provide that.

It’s often said – not in so many words – that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. By purpose I tentatively mean, subject to adjustment, that which gives ultimate underlying meaning and significance. — tim wood

"X provides purpose" is about X, where all subsequent qualification of "X" is bound by/limited to that which is capable of providing purpose. If X provides purpose, it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to say is capable of doing so(providing purpose). For example, we could not substitute "potato chips" for 'X' and make any sense at all. Potato chips are not the sort of thing capable of providing purpose. They could help provide a feeling of satisfaction/contentment. Even then without eating them, that purported 'purpose' is left empty, unfilled, unmet, unsatisfied, unrealized. So, potato chips alone are not enough, nor are potato chips the sort of thing capable of providing purpose.

What thing(s) is(are)?

Seems to me that purpose presupposes agency. All things purposeful are so in strict relation to one's(the presupposed agents') aim, goal, prediction, and/or expectations.


The last claim in the quote at the top of the post asks the reader's acceptance of the author's potential future equivocation of the term "purpose". It also invokes "meaning" and "significance". All three presuppose agency.

Meaning and significance are not limited to providing purpose. They provide (mis)understanding. They provide a worldview. They provide the necessary preconditions for agency and hence help lay the groundwork needed for purposes to emerge. Purpose is nonexistent is complete absence of meaning and significance. Seems to me that meaning/significance is necessary but insufficient for purpose.

Thinking processes 'give' meaning and significance. The scare-quotes are intentional. By my lights, meaning and significance are not the sorts of things that can be given to another like a physical object. We could be said to 'give away' meaning and significance to another by virtue of helping them to draw correlations between the same sorts of things that we are/do.

Teaching a child how to use "tree" is a prima facie example. Teaching a child how pick oranges helps them to draw many of their own correlations between oranges and other things.

While both meaning and significance play a role in the child's mind/thought/worldview prior to learning how to pick oranges and/or call trees by name, there's no argumentative ground for attributing much along the lines of purpose to the child, as if they have one, or they've found other things useful.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose.

...religion is about the dimension of our existence called value. Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance

Metaethics is discovered IN the analysis of mundane ethics. — Constance

Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance

It follows that religion is about that which is discovered IN the analysis of mundane ethics. That's not true either. Religion was around long before we began doing that sort of analysis.

Religion is about metaphysics...
— Astrophel

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right.
— creativesoul

But metaphysics is not about thinking practices. — Constance

Red herring.

Some religion was before all such practices began. Not all religion is/was about thinking practices. Metaphysics IS a thinking practice. Some religion was before metaphysics.

Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry, and the narrative account is the first thing to go. — Astrophel

How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes?
— creativesoul

One discovers the basic level through inquiry. — Constance

Do you have a list of things found at the most basic level of inquiry?

If you're attempting to equate ethics with "being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights" then I'll have to walk. That makes no sense whatsoever.
— creativesoul

Just ask, what IS ethics? This is not to ask Kant's question, or MIll's, but it is a question of ontology; not what should one do, but what is the very nature of the ethical and therefore religious imposition. So, if you take no interest in such a thing, then you probably should, as you say, walk. — Constance

Who needs goalposts anyway?

Ethics is not equivalent to spinoffs and extrapolations from/of Heiddy's thought.

We move through life never questioning these engagements in a culture, and as a result, we never realize our "true" nature. — Astrophel

That's not true.

You are close when you say "It may refer to the fact that no one chooses the socioeconomic circumstances they are born into." Right. But when one does choose, she is already IN a lifestyle, a language, a body of meaningful institutions. This is one's throwness. — Astrophel

Right?

They don't get to choose so it makes no sense whatsoever to say otherwise...

Geez.

The assertion "Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry" is attributing wants to things that are incapable of forming/having them. I'd charge anthropomorphism; however, humans are not the only creatures capable of wanting things.

Philosophy is something that is practiced. Practices are not the sort of things that 'want to know' anything. Practitioners are.
— creativesoul

"Attributing wants to things"? A bit left fieldish. — Constance

Still having problems with spatiotemporal locations I see.

No, it's right there on everyone's screen!

The narrative account in question refers to the religious narrative that is the stuff that sermons are made out of, and all the bad metaphysics. Not about narrative as such. — Constance

Bullshit.

The narrative in question was all narrative.

...This is the metaphysical ground of ethics, where ethics, and therefore religion, acquires its foundation. — Constance

As if all religion is existentially dependent upon a fairly recent philosophical practice we've named metaphysics?

Nah.

Ideas' meanings are derived from the contexts in which they are found. But contexts are determinative or finite. "The world" possesses in its meaning "that which is not contextual" I am arguing. — Constance

Assertion, not argument.

I referred to metaphysics. This is about the lack of fixity our ideas have at the basic level. — Constance

Ya think?

How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes?

Religion is about metaphysics... — Astrophel

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right.

To be more considerate, given the historical timeframe of the supernatural stories, and the sheer explosion of very complex human thought and belief emerging from written language, it makes complete and perfect sense that such people used language in the ways they did to come up with such explanations for 'why' things were/are the way they were, and/or 'will be'.
— creativesoul

The Op asks, what is behind "such explanations"? — Astrophel

I didn't see that.

"Behind" here is, of course, not a determinative matter.

Nonsense.

"Behind" is one spatiotemporal location(or set thereof) based upon others. "Behind" is a spatiotemporal relation between things from a particular vantage point. This necessarily presupposes(requires) a plurality of locations. At least three.

"Behind" is also used to determine where we look, as in "Hey Bob, look at the cat. She's behind the fridge!"

Your use of the term is the single greatest determinate of how others take you to mean whatever it is that you claim to mean by such use. You do not seem to be following those 'rules'.

What "behind" means to you, good sir, determines what you mean to say, what you mean by what you say, as well as what I take you to mean after such usage had begun.

Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry, and the narrative account is the first thing to go.

The assertion "Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry" is attributing wants to things that are incapable of forming/having them. I'd charge anthropomorphism; however, humans are not the only creatures capable of wanting things.

Philosophy is something that is practiced. Practices are not the sort of things that 'want to know' anything. Practitioners are.

What would 'the most basic level of inquiry' be in complete absence of narrative account. I mean, the suggestion neglects the fact that it quite simply cannot be done. There goes the only means/method available to us for seeking such knowledge.

What does it mean to be "thrown" into a world...

I can think of a few different sensible uses of that term. It may indicate situations when/where one's spatiotemporal location is drastically changed as a result of being hurtled through the air, against their will/choosing/wishes. It may refer to all the different subjective particular circumstances during the adoption of one's initial/first worldview. It may refer to the fact that no one chooses the socioeconomic circumstances they are born into.

...being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights? Ethics does not simply deal with such things; it IS these things...

If you're attempting to equate ethics with "being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights" then I'll have to walk. That makes no sense whatsoever.

I do not understand how that counts as being 'on the other hand'. Looks like a different way to say "what causes what", both of which refer to causality, which is what I started with. Occam's razor applies.
— creativesoul

Right. What is IN the causal matrix of the world is not causality itself, but the world that is being observed. — Astrophel

Not only is this a performative contradiction, at best, it is self-contradiction. If we put the first step earlier offered by you into practice now, we would throw out your reply here. Self-defeating, impossible, and/or unattainable standards/criterions are unacceptable.

Givenness refers to "being thrown" into a world that is foundationally indeterminate. How is it foundationally indeterminate takes one to the issue of language. Language deals with the world, but does not speak its presence, so to speak. Long and windy issue. — Astrophel

Yup. Thousands upon thousands of pages. The introduction story in On The Way To Language is some of Heiddy's best work. Too bad he wasn't around enough individual's to grasp the full meaning underlying "that which goes unspoken". He was thrown into a different world, evidently where there were not enough Japanese traditionalists around him to help build correlational content.

Value and ethics are embedded within stories. They grow with stories. They change with stories. So, to say that values and ethics are 'behind' the religious stories, as if they are somehow the basis underlying/grounding of all those stories seems suspect, eh? Cleary not all. Some. Sure.
— creativesoul

It is not the story itself, but what gave rise to the story. Jump to the chase: Religion is all about our being thrown into a world to suffer and die. — Astrophel

Jump over the burden much?

I offered the single most comprehensive description of one thing that helped give rise to religious stories. Narratives such as yours are discussing all the different conditions/subjective circumstances into which one is born in terms of "being thrown into the world". That's certainly not enough to ground the claim that values and ethics are behind all religious stories. Some values and ethics emerge by virtue of those stories. It may be impossible to separate values from the stories in some cases.

Our dispute is beside the point of this thread. Another may be on order.

How would you respond to the trolley problem?

By pointing out that it is based upon impossible scenario. If such a scenario should ever arise, there's much better ethical considerations to be had than which 'choice' one would make. The focus ought be upon how we ever got to that point to start with...

:brow:

...there was a basic problematic built into existence that gave rise to the worshipping and the rest.
— Astrophel

Yup. Ignorance of causality. — creativesoul

As in not knowing, say, disease to be caused by microbiology. — Astrophel

That's a sharper example which makes good segue into broader understanding...

If that particular ignorance of causality is combined with strong conviction that supernatural entities can and do intervene in our lives and such intervention is guided/established by that entity's(or those entities') judgment of our behaviour, the result can be people believing that sickness is somehow, in someway, caused by the entity(entities) as a direct result/effect/consequence of the individual's behaviour. Such people misunderstand(are ignorant of) causality. As you may imply, they've an idea that things happen for a 'reason', so they may have a clue about the fact that they live in a causal world/universe, but are often ignorant of exactly "what causes what". That is ignorance of causality with efficacy(not really ironic, but very curious, nonetheless). Such folk often hold unshakable belief that everything happens for a reason, and that particular reason(say for a loved one's sudden onset of terrible sickness, suffering and death) belongs to the entity. Combine all that with another strong conviction that we cannot know the 'mind' of entity, and the result is we cannot know the reason(s). This is just off the top of my head, and there's a plethora of examples/explications available. For now, suffice it to say, that when all of that was, is, and/or will remain to be the case for some time to come, the inevitable result is a gross misattribution of causal relationships(layer upon layer of belief system/worldview built upon ignorance of causality).

Of course, by my lights, the whole story is permeated through and through with anthropomorphism, but that's a topic in its own right, and is not limited to only such belief systems/worldviews. All that said...

To be more considerate, given the historical timeframe of the supernatural stories, and the sheer explosion of very complex human thought and belief emerging from written language, it makes complete and perfect sense that such people used language in the ways they did to come up with such explanations for 'why' things were/are the way they were, and/or 'will be'.

Such 'compound/complex' ignorance of causality served as purportedly solid ground for scores of different belief systems/worldviews, many, perhaps most of which included some sort of ritualistic practices("worshipping and all the rest").

Not so much about causality itself, but of what causes what. — Astrophel

The part of your reply directly above presupposes relevant significant meaningful distinction between my use of "causality" and your use of "what causes what" aside from merely being two ways of pointing out the same thing. It's odd because I'm fairly sure you agreed with what I wrote... as written.

On the other hand, the question remains, what is there that is IN the causal matrix of the world? — Astrophel

I do not understand how that counts as being 'on the other hand'. Looks like a different way to say "what causes what", both of which refer to causality, which is what I started with. Occam's razor applies.

All one can witness is movement, change, and one can quantify these in endless ways... — Astrophel

Sensible use of "movement" and "change" presupposes some thing(s) to move, some thing(s) change as well as a means of doing so.

...the world as such is simply given. — Astrophel

Presupposes a giver. Occam's razor applies.

...here we find the mystery of value and ethics. This is what is behind all those stories. — Astrophel

A mystery is behind the stories? Seems like those stories spell it all out fairly clearly. So, I see no mystery to speak of. The stories are mistaken, but clear enough to be clearly mistaken.

Value and ethics are embedded within stories. They grow with stories. They change with stories. So, to say that values and ethics are 'behind' the religious stories, as if they are somehow the basis underlying/grounding of all those stories seems suspect, eh? Cleary not all. Some. Sure.

In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?... — Richard B

I also disagree with "The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction".

Language less creatures can be certain that touching fire hurts, and rightfully so. Being burned by fire causes one to draw the correlation between the behavior and the pain(correctly attribute/recognize causality). It only takes once.

Some who've been burned learn to talk about it, others prior to being burned.

One knows that touching fire hurts by virtue of touching fire and drawing correlations/associations and/or connections between what they did and the subsequent pain. In a language less case, the experience grounds the certainty. There is no justification possible, if that requires language use.

...Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."

A language less creatures' certainty is shown, not argued for. That certainty is based upon previous experience, and it depends - in no way, shape, or form - upon "the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty"

there was a basic problematic built into existence that gave rise to the worshipping and the rest. — Astrophel

Yup. Ignorance of causality.

I'd just like to show appreciation and support to the contributors. This thread initially piqued my interest since it seemed relevant to my own position on a few things, but given my lack of knowledge regarding formal logic, I wasn't at all certain. I've chosen silent reading until now. The recent tangents regarding the early development of human thought and belief(mind) have been interesting as well.

I've nothing much to add aside from gratitude.

Mistakes are equivalent to neither, harm nor foul. Mistakes have been made.

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience
— creativesoul

There is a physical activity understood by a certain relation; the relation is then cognized as picking oranges, and THAT is the experience. — Mww

Do you have a valid objection to what I wrote?

I’m never going to be happy with that approach.
— Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary.
— creativesoul

C’mon, man. Really? — Mww

My apologies.

Your proposal has several layers of complexity; several layers of existential dependency. We're looking for a bare minimum form of meaningful experience. We start with us. We set that out.
— creativesoul

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system.
— Mww

In the examination of “us” as the bare minimum form of the possibility of experience is itself a multi-layered complexity. — Mww

Another weird use of "I agree"; as if I said what followed it.

Your proposal is that in order for one to have meaningful experience they must at least be capable of describing the conditions of their own experience to themselves.

I would hazard a speculation... there is no human capable of doing that until long after they've already began naming and descriptive practices in full earnest... oblivious to the fact that they're learning language. Language changes the way the world is. Language changes the way the world looks.

One can be picking oranges as a very young child. Prior to potty training. One cannot describe the conditions of their own potty training until long after they experience it. It is here, at these early developmental stages that your notion of "experience" is incapable of taking proper account of basic simple forms of human thought/belief/experience.

...something we know so little about we are forced to speculate if we wish to say anything at all. — Mww

We know enough to figure some things out.

I've a more holistic approach that makes the most sense of meaningful experience as neither exclusively internal nor external, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively physical nor mental, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively material nor immaterial, but rather consisting of both.
— creativesoul

I’m never going to be happy with that approach. — Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary. Either meaningful experience consists of more than just internal parts/components/elements, or it does not.

Experience is an abstract conception, is entirely a mental construct, hence exclusively internal. — Mww

Nah. Maps and territories doesn't quite describe what you're doing here, but it's the same general kind of mistake. Conflation between distinct entities/things.

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience. Picking oranges on a rainy day does not consist of meaningful marks. All abstract notions do. It does not require meaningful marks in order to happen. All abstract notions do.

Certainly, at numerous times prior to the emergence of humans, oranges were picked. All abstract conceptions are existentially dependent upon language use. Picking oranges is not. Where there has never been language, there could have never been any notion of "picking oranges". Picking oranges quite simply does not share that existential dependency. It's an activity that does not require being take account of.

"Picking oranges" is a grouping of common experience(s). The group itself consists of all the separate instances of picking oranges. They do not require being taken account of. They would all be orange picking either way. Each and every uniquely individual experience of orange picking consists of orange trees bearing fruit, and a creature capable of picking the oranges.

A personal bit of my own life...

There were several different people and/or groups thereof who all participated in picking some very juicy, slightly tart, amazingly sweet and deliciously tangy tangelos from a very particular tree. They were sooo easy to peel, seedless, and virtually no chewy fibrous internal membranes to speak of. We did not reach inside of ourselves to fetch a few seductively acidic sweets. To quite the contrary, we all reached for the tree that grew in yard of the very special lady who cultivated and nurtured that tree. She was very good at what she loved to do. The sheer amount of fruit her plants produced was astounding. The height of that particular tree was such that all the glistening orange orbs were well within reach of the picker/basket she had thoughtfully placed beside the tree, ready at hand. Everyone loved them so much, and she was a very generous soul with them, hanging a basket of freshly picked fruit on the outside of the fence, with a sign bringing people's attention to them. She liked being a positive member of her community, even in such simple ways.

The exact same tree played a pivotal role within each and every single one of our respective individual particular subjective experiences that included fruit from that tree.

Without that tree, numerous experiences never could have happened. That tree was located in her yard. Her yard was not located internally within any single one of the aforementioned peoples' minds/bodies. It was a necessary elemental constituent of each and every individual experience mentioned heretofore.

That's back on topic as well.

...we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. — Mww

Mine doesn’t have form at all... — Mww

Self-contradiction is a form of unacceptable argument.

Meaningful experience requires - at a bare minimum - some things to become meaningful, a biological creature/agent for things to become meaningful to, and a means/method/process for those things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the biological creature/agent. — creativesoul

I agree with all that, which means I accept your general argument, perhaps while disputing the minutia of the grounds for it. — Mww

Perhaps, but I'm leaning more towards the idea that our positions are incompatible as a result of being based upon very different notions of human thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience. Hence, we have incompatible views about the third prong of the criterion. It's became clearer over time that our respective views regarding what exactly counts as the means/method/process for things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the creature are seemingly incompatible with one another.

In my world, apprehending the conditions for(one's own experience), manifests in the same mental process as drawing correlations between. — Mww

Correlations are no longer sensibly called "a mental process" on my view. The very notion of mental implies internal, in the sense of residing/existing/happening completely in the brain/mind, body, etc. I've a more holistic approach that makes the most sense of meaningful experience as neither exclusively internal nor external, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively physical nor mental, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively material nor immaterial, but rather consisting of both.

The language less creature has no inkling of just how important a role the sun plays in its own existence.
— creativesoul

I submit that kind of creature has insufficient rational capacity to apprehend the conditions by which the sun attains its role in a necessary relation to said creature’s existence, from which follows the only creatures known to function under such criteria, is the human creature. — Mww

I agree, setting aside a quibble about the use of "follows".

Stark differences between our views stem from what rightfully counts as meaningful human experience. I strongly suspect you're already well aware of this. My own view regarding what counts as meaningful human thought, belief, and/or experience permits/admits/allows much simpler iterations/forms of human experience than yours can. Again, on my view, one's position regarding meaningful human experience must be able to take proper account of the evolutionary progression of it. This holds good not only in terms of the overall evolution of the species, but it also pertains to all individual humans' lives. Our thought/belief about the world and/or ourselves(hence meaningful experience) evolves from birth(arguably a few months prior to) until death.

From past discussions, you're already aware of a foundational premise of mine; at the moment of biological conception there is no such thing as an experiencing creature. There is no such thing as thought, belief, or meaningful experience of the creature, for the creature does not yet have what that takes. Thought, belief, and meaningful experience begins simply and grows in its complexity over time.

Question: of all that supposedly attributable to lesser animals, in your opinion which is the primordial consideration such creature must attain antecedent to all else, in order for him to be afforded meaningful experiences? — Mww

This is an interesting question that I find helpful for better understanding the differences between our positions. I'm glad you asked it. The question presupposes any candidate under consideration be capable of what we'd call/classify a "consideration" of some sort or other prior to or perhaps simultaneously with being admitted of having meaningful experience. That's perfectly consistent with your own position. However, I reject that requirement altogether. There is no primordial consideration necessary for admission into the group of creatures capable of having meaningful experience(s). While the ability to consider things highlights perhaps the most significant difference between human minds and other animals'(which I completely agree with), the question points straight at the heart/source/basis of many of the differences between our views. Any notion of human thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that requires the capability of consideration to admit meaningful experience is utterly incapable of admitting that humans have meaningful experiences prior to and/or during language acquisition; prior to becoming capable of considering anything at all. I'm not at all claiming that language is necessary for all kinds of consideration. However, all kinds of consideration presuppose a creature that knows of more than one option(volition) as well as some basis or other from which to perform comparative assessment.

That basis is past experience.

To put this in the most telling context I can think of at the moment; <-------That's one kind of consideration, and a very complex one at that. Not all are. None are necessary for perhaps the simplest kinds/forms of meaningful human experience. The following example is a favorite of mine.

A toddler need not consider anything at all prior to touching fire for the first time. They learn that touching fire causes pain. They attribute/recognize/discover causality. No language is necessary here. I suspect this holds good for all other language less creatures capable of having meaningful experience. The attribution/recognition of causality may serve as a placemark/benchmark for rationality, reason, and/or the complex sort of cognition your criterion seeks(the distinction between considered acts and instinctual ones). I digress, the toddler is amidst a meaningful experience. The fire becomes meaningful to the creature(toddler in this case) by virtue of the correlations drawn by the creature between the fire, the act of touching the fire(their own behavior), and the immediate subsequent pain that ensues.

The next time they encounter fire, they will consider.

I think it's important to draw a distinction between what's important for the creature and what's important to the creature. The sun is very important for the survival of all creatures on earth, for instance. So, in that sense the sun is significant, it affords the creature the ability to live, etc. However, it is not necessarily the case that the sun is meaningful to the creature. — creativesoul

The sun is a necessary elemental constituent of all interactions between it and other things(all interactions it becomes part of). Not all interaction affecting/effecting individual creatures is meaningful to them. As before, the sun is important - vital, in fact - for all life on earth as we know it to emerge, survive, and/or thrive. The interaction is vital/causal. Significant for the creatures' emergence/persistence, but not necessarily meaningful to the creatures' mind(s).

The language less creature has no inkling of just how important a role the sun plays in its own existence.

Significance to the creature is what we're after here, not just significance for the creature to emerge and/or persist as they do/have.

Meaningful experiences of the sun require creature(s) capable of drawing a correlation, making an association, attributing, and/or otherwise discovering some sort of meaningful connection between the sun and something else. Meaningful experiences of the sun require the sun to somehow or other attain some sort of significance/importance to/within the mind of the candidate under our consideration. It does so by virtue of becoming meaningful to the creature(as compared/contrasted with significant for the creature). This is true concerning previously existing meaningful things as well as novel(newly connected) ones.

Earlier I mentioned the difference between something being significant for a creature and that same something being significant to a creature. In the paragraph above, I offered an outline covering all meaningful experiences of the sun. All meaningful experiences of the sun are meaningful to the creature drawing and/or discovering meaningful correlations, associations, and/or connections between the individual elements of its own thought/belief/experience at that time(to the creature having the experience).

Meaningful experience requires - at a bare minimum - some things to become meaningful, a biological creature/agent for things to become meaningful to, and a means/method/process for those things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the biological creature/agent.

The sun is a meaningful part of each and every individual experience of the sun. It is not meaningful to everything that it effects/affects.

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it.
— creativesoul

Oh, absolutely.
— Mww

How do you square that with your minimum criterion presented earlier which demanded being able to describe the conditions of one's own experience in order to count as meaningful experience?

You see the problem?
— creativesoul

There shouldn’t be one. I said describes even if only to himself. To describe conditions to oneself, is to think; to think is to synthesize conceptions contained in the conditions into a cognition. — Mww

Describing conditions to oneself is practicing language. One issue is that your bare minimum criterion for meaningful experience includes/requires language use and yet you've "absolutely" agreed that we have meaningful experience prior to ever taking account of it(taking account of it is necessary on your proposal and doing so requires language use). That is a contradiction. Either we have meaningful experience prior to being able to take account of it, or we don't. Your suggestion fits only into the latter. They are mutually exclusive.

Another issue(shown by reductio) is that the result of the criterion you've suggested, when taken to its logical conclusion, is that only humans capable of describing the conditions of their own experience can be admitted having meaningful experience.

At what age do we begin being capable of describing the conditions of our own experiences?

Bottom line….in examining meaningful experience the first thing to be done is to eliminate instinct, or any condition that could be attributed to mere instinct. And the best, more assured way to eliminate instinct, is to ground the necessary conditions for experience, as such, in reason alone. — Mww

If a cat instinctually chases a mouse, then according to your method, hunting mice is not a meaningful experience for/to the cat. That doesn't seem right M.

Instinct when compared/contrasted to reason is used when setting out why/how creatures behave(what drives/causes the behaviour). It has nothing to do with whether or not that behaviour is part of a meaningful experience for the behaving creature.

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. No experience is possible at all, without the coordinated systemic process incorporated in human intelligence. — Mww

Thought and belief. Thinking about thought and belief. Thought and belief come prior to thinking about
thought and belief. Some experience does not include a creature capable of thinking about its own meaningful experience. That alone refutes/disproves/falsifies your bare minimum criterion.

If meaning is a relation, wouldn’t the relations need to be describable in order to comprehend that they belong to each other... — Mww

Meaning is not just a relation. We need not comprehend that we are having meaningful experiences in order to have them. That sort of consideration requires talking about our own experiences as a subject matter in their own right. We have meaningful experiences long before we begin talking about it.

What does our own language less meaningful experience consist in/of? Bare minimum criterion.

If meaningful experience happens prior to our awareness of it(prior to language), then any notion of meaning under our consideration better be amenable. Evolutionary progression demands it as well.