That's an odd account of what's taken place here. Accounting malpractice clearly to anyone who looks for themselves.

I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.
— creativesoul

Christ, this is tedious. No. You. Haven't. — Bartricks

Did you miss this?

Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent of "the man" is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.

Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.

Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.

You certainly have not given in subsequent due attention.

:brow:

Or this?

I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.

We all know this is true.

It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky. — creativesoul

Tedious?

Fairly straightforward if you ask me. Which part of any of my arguments, in particular, are you objecting to and what are grounds supporting that objection?

You'll have to do better than that...


JTB is in no need of any solution. There's no problem with it. There are no examples of well grounded true belief that we would be unwilling to call knowledge if we first knew the flaws in both broken clocks and Gettier cases.

I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.

We all know this is true.

It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky.

And...

It is just absurd to deny the following...

Reason is quite simply not the sort of thing that is capable of making assertions. Reason is not equivalent to a person. All Reason is language use. People are not. All Reason owes it's very existence to language use. People do not. People are prior to language use. Reason is not. People are prior to Reason. Reason cannot be equivalent to that which existed in it's entirety prior to it. People did. Reason cannot be equivalent to people.

Now...

Can we move on yet?

Reason does not use language. All assertion, direction, and prescription is language use. Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe. — creativesoul

Yes she can and does. — Bartricks

It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons.
— creativesoul

Yes she is. — Bartricks

This is just ridiculous. I cannot take it seriously.

S = A has a truth value — TheMadFool

That may be correct. I'm unsure. Either way, we need to draw and maintain the distinction between truth conditions and truth value.

Unless I'm working from a misunderstanding of the two, truth value results from following the rules of correct inference. Whereas truth conditions are what makes a belief true. True belief are prior to language acquisition, and definitely during. Being true does not require following the rules of correct inference. Having truth value does. Truth value is not equivalent to truth.

Truth value is shown by truth tables. True belief is long prior to the rules of correct inference. Long before being taken account of and used as a premiss. True belief requires being true. True belief that is prior to language does not - cannot - require truth value.

All of this is just to remind everyone that logic meant to report upo human thought and belief is the classical kind, and it presupposes truth as correspondence(the kind with truth conditions). That's what the "ifs" are all about.

So...

Either truth is prior to truth value or being true doesn't require truth. Of course, I'm going with the former. It also follows that having truth value does not guarantee truth, which we already knew. Coherence does not guarantee truth, it does guarantee truth value. Truth value is not equivalent to truth. The former is earned by following the rules of correct inference, whereas the latter is presupposed - correctly and mistakenly - prior to, during, and long after one's initial language acquisition.

A contradiction can't be true and the liar sentence leads to a contradiction meaning that the liar statement has to be false, but that means it is true which means it is false...ad infinitum or ad nauseum, depending on your constitution. The liar statement is a paradox.

I'd like to run the following argument by you and others about a possible "solution":

A = this statement is false
P = A is true
~P = A is false
R = A is a proposition
S = A has a truth value

1. If R then S
2. If S then (P or ~P)
3. If P then ~P...................................the liar paradox in action when A is taken as true
4. If ~P then P...................................the liar paradox in action when A is taken as false
5. R...............................assume for reductio
6. S...................1, 5 MP
7. P or ~P.......2, 6 MP
8.P.........................assume for CP
9. ~P.....................3, 8 MP
10. P & ~P............8, 9 Conj
11. If P then (P & ~P)..................8 to 10 CP
12. ~P.................................assume for CP
13. P....................................4, 12 MP
14. P & ~P...........................12, 13 conj
15. If ~P then (P & ~P)..........12 to 14 CP
16 (P & ~P) or (P & ~P)........7, 11, 15 CD
17. P & ~P..........................16 Taut ( a contradiction)
18. ~R.................................5 to 17 reductio ad absurdum
~R means A is NOT a proposition.
The logical conclusion it seems is that the Liar statement (A) is NOT a proposition. — TheMadFool

A has no truth conditions, therefore A is not truth-apt. P neglects this and arrives at nonsense as a result. It makes no sense to say something incapable of being true/false is either.

A belief that may be false can be known to be false. — Bartricks

Not all belief can be falsified. So, not all belief that may be false can be known to be.

Now, if a belief can be useful yet not true, then we know - or those of us who have powers of reason can know - that truth and usefulness denote different properties — Bartricks

That's true, if one holds that truth and usefulness count as properties then the terms "truth" and "usefulness" are used as a means to denote different properties.

Not all powers of reason lead to that...

Just saying, it seems you're overstating the case you have.

This claim:

Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values

is 'true'. — Bartricks

What makes it so? — creativesoul

See the thread on Truth! And our evidence that such claims are true is that our reason represents them to be. — Bartricks

Looks like you're squirming to me...

What makes that claim true? What makes the other claim false?

Straight forward questions. Given that truth is prior to all language, it ought be a pretty straightforward answer.

No, I should assume neither until I have good evidence to do so. You are fallaciously mounting a kind of "argument from authority" here. — Janus

He's been all over the place...

Fun though...

And what has not proven to be false can for the time being be considered true. — ovdtogt

Nah. There are some pretty outrageous claims, ones none of us believe, that cannot be falsified.

That said, being unable to be falsified does not always warrant casting such beliefs aside. Context matters here. We can have knowledge that is unfalsifiable. Our certainty ought be tempered.

All knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our reports on and/or of it is unfalsifiable.

You just don't know what a normative reason is — Bartricks

Or you're using all sorts of commonly used words in odd ways?

:wink:

Truth is falsifiable, belief is not. — ovdtogt

This makes no sense to me. Truth cannot be false. Belief can. Thus, belief can be falsifiable. Truth cannot.

The words are trying to describe two categories that, given our fallible in situ, in time, nature we will never be able to fully dimabiguate in practice. We can certainly come up with different definitions for them. — Coben

I have no trouble telling the difference between belief and truth... even in practice, sometimes...

We can check often enough to know that sometimes we cannot.

Indeed, you are an "Absolute Truth" follower. More of the same, as always.. — Gus Lamarch

Nah, you're just wrong about my position...

This claim:

Reason does not assert, require, demand, bid, favour, or value

is 'false'. — Bartricks

What makes it so?

This claim:

Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values

is 'true'. — Bartricks

What makes it so?

:brow:

Yeah. Nice addition.

Seems to me that those are examples of incoherence, self-contradiction, equivocation, and/or untenability. Intimately connected to one another via having the very same same elemental constitution... human thought and belief.

I'm working on attempting to account for better explanations of such scenarios in better terms of belief, than history uses... a more universally applicable criterion. Long, involved, very confusing for some... many... but it appeals to my meticulous nature.

:smile:

Why doesn't "This sentence is false" have truth conditions when "This sentence is short." Does? — fdrake

Because there is nothing that makes the Liar true or false, but there is something that makes the other true. When the truth conditions are met, the sentence is true. When they are not the sentence is false(or not truth apt, in the case of prediction).

"This sentence is short" is falsifiable/verifiable(has truth conditions) because there are standards for what counts as being a short sentence. It's true if it meets those standards. It does, as vague as they may be, four words make for a short sentence. "This sentence is false" is also a short sentence.

This sentence is short.
This sentence is false.

Why is the first truth apt but not the second? — fdrake

Nice.

It has truth conditions.

But if Reason asserts, directs, prescribes, and so on, then Reason must be a person, for it is a self-evident truth that persons and persons alone do that kind of thing. So it is not a mistake. — Bartricks

This is just nonsense.

Reason does not use language. All assertion, direction, and prescription is language use. Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe.

It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons.

Neither X nor Y are capable of being true or false.

It has nothing to do with conventional standards - indeed, we judge the appropriateness or otherwise of conventional standards by considering to what extent there is normative reason to accept them — Bartricks

This is incoherent and/or self-contradictory. When we use something as a means to judge what's acceptable, it is a standard by which we determine what's acceptable. The standard has everything to do with what is being determined by it's use.

So, it makes no sense at all to say that normative reasons are not conventional.

Trump obstructs the process daily, calling it a hoax witch hunt and forbidding WH staff from answering legally issued subpoenas. — VagabondSpectre

Undeniable open and public attempts to discredit and derail. He's done everything he thinks is rightfully in his power to put an end to all investigation of anything having to do with him. If that doesn't count as impeding the investigation, of impeding congress from carrying out the responsibilities clearly laid out in the constitution, and/or of obstructing justice... nothing else possibly will.

The professor has left a good impression upon me as well... Looking forward to reading more of his input. Wishing I would have paid closer attention to the due dates...

:joke:

How about the statement: 'I saw your brother today' and you reply my brother died yesterday. Wouldn't that be a true contradiction? — ovdtogt

No. It would be a false statement followed by a true one about the same referent. It is a contradiction, but only the latter half of it is true(assuming the brother died). Or, if the brother did not die, and was seen by the speaker, it would be a true statement followed by a false about the same referent, with the first half of the contradiction true.

However, since the liar paradox is a paradox of natural language that is it's own meta-language, as opposed to being a paradox of formal language, my preferred resolution is to consider the liar paradox as being a meaningful sentence (since we can understanding the paradox), that isn't a contradiction, rather it is a self-negating sentence with alternating truth value. — sime

Could you continue on to an explanation of what counts as an alternating truth value? Is that what makes it self-negating? If it's true, it is false, etc...

You are correct. it's not a contradiction, but rather, an unresolved paradox. Any self-referential statement represents the un-computable in nature. It stems from self-awareness/consciousness. It's also found in mathematics (Godels theorem). — 3017amen

I don't see the direct link between The Liar and Godel's proof that there is always an assumption buried somewhere within an inductive system of logic that cannot be proven by any means within that system. Nevertheless, I'll attend to the other example you've offered for consideration...

Socrates: What Plato is about to say is false.
Plato: Socrates has just spoken truly. — 3017amen

How is this a true contradiction? This reminds me of an amended Liar, or reinforced, or whatever they call it. It is a contradiction, but it is neither true nor false. The two claims are about one another, and are in direct conflict with one another. The same lack of truth conditions of the Liar, but with an improvement on the referents. There is nothing that can make either one true/false.

It's a confused way to speak. It's a contradiction, but contradictions aren't able to be true/false.

How does a language less creature possibly have a true belief based upon normative reason?

:brow:

Perhaps it is necessary to return to the agreement...

We agree that language less creatures can have justified true belief.

Now the disagreement...

For you, that(justified true belief) means having a true belief supported by normative reasons(a notion I can't make sense of if that does not include some conventional agreement). That's what normative is... what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Those are notions usually reserved for discussions of ethics/morality. I'm puzzled what you think such statements have to do with justified true belief... unless it is normative belief. That's not the only kind of belief... and certainly not the kind historical notions of JTB and their proponents are concerned with.



For me, that(justified true belief) means having well grounded true belief. The difference between well grounded and justified I've already delineated.



The example of the broken clock and my earlier account of that belief still stands neglected. You started to respond, but the notion of "well-grounded" caused you pause. I've since cleared it up. So, let's revisit where we were prior to the distraction shall we?

Believing that a broken clock is working is false belief. Subsequently believing that the time indicated on the broken clock is accurate is belief based upon falsehood(false belief). It is never logically or reasonably acceptable to base belief upon falsehood. Believing a broken clock indicates the correct time is not well grounded belief.

I was giving a definition of a normative reason. — Bartricks

The explanation(definition) seems to be synonymous with warrant, a notion that is sometimes taken up in lieu of justification. So, surely you can see the similarity?

Both lines of thought are about what counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe something or other.

It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not.
— creativesoul

yes, but with that example I was refuting the theory that knowledge is well-grounded true belief... — Bartricks

By offering another kind of knowledge? I don't think adherents of JTB deny all other kinds of knowledge, do they? If they do not, then my quote above still applies... that's what Russell and Gettier attempted to provide, a case of JTB that was clearly not knowledge.

normative reason is a reason to do or believe something. — Bartricks

Warrant?

What counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe?

Okay, so a 'well grounded' belief is one that is in some sense 'based' on a true belief? — Bartricks

I wouldn't say that.

For example, let's say I know full well that I am in a town in which all but one clock has stopped. I see a clock. I believe that the clock is working. That belief is clearly unjustified. But it happens to be true — Bartricks

But it doesn't matter. It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not.

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims.
— creativesoul

I am using 'justified' far more broadly to mean just 'a belief that there is a normative reason for the person to believe'. So that it includes beliefs that have not been inferred. Some of those are, I think, correctly described as 'justified'. After all, inferences have to proceed from some beliefs and those beliefs cannot themselves have been inferred, yet we do not - presumably - want to say that all such beliefs are unjustified. So I would say that a belief is justified just if there is a normative reason for the person to believe it, a reason they may well be unaware of. — Bartricks

We're in agreement here, it seems.

I take it that a belief is justified when there is a normative reason to believe it. Perhaps well-grounded means something different.... — Bartricks

That... I would not take issue with... perhaps. I'm tentative here, though. I mean, you and me have a past so...

:joke:

It looks ok on it's face, and seems amenable to my own notion of being well-grounded. If you agree we can swap them at will without loss of meaning.

Hmmmm....

On second thought, the term "normative" could be problematic. That would amount to agreement with conventional standards. All paradigm shift begins with rejecting convention somewhere along the line. So... I'm unsettled about the normative aspect.

The difference between justified and well grounded, from my vantage point...

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims.

Being well-grounded does not require being argued for. Rather, a belief can be well-grounded and formed/held by a language less creature... on my view anyway.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. — creativesoul

That ought be put a bit differently...

The person believes that a broken clock is working... that's better.

I don't see a difference - for they are all cases in which a person acquires a true belief in an epistemically responsible fashion... — Bartricks

Well, that's not true at all actually. Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.

Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.

Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. That belief is false. It also serves as ground for the subsequent belief regarding what time it is. So the belief about the time is not well-grounded. It is based upon false belief.