I've thought long and hard about whether or not there are such things as incommensurate schema as compared to non translatable ones. Ultimately, I think it comes down to whether or not the referents within any given framework are directly perceptible or not. I'm leaning towards the conclusion that some cannot be effectively translated one into the other without losing crucial meaning...

What are the underlying constituent parts common to both Jenny's world and ours? — Isaac

Directly perceptible things... common referents(says Davidson).

Human nature is diverse, and do not necessarily comprise the attitude of being satisfied with controlling those things which one can, and not being affected by those things which one can't control. — god must be atheist

Precisely... hence Stoicism!

You are making incoherent, vague assertions — Zelebg

Sigh...

Pots and kettles.

Aren't you the one forwarding a notion of consciousness that you yourself cannot explain?

I explained in the opening post why the problem is hard... — Zelebg

You claim something existed called "subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia".

I'm saying that "subjective experience of consciousness" points to nothing that exists in it's entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices, and yet consciousness does. So...

As for the last paragraph... I think it has to do with his attitude towards belief. — Banno

I appreciate you and Moliere correcting the setting.

Cheers!

...one of the cogent ideas in Davidson is the divide between belief and truth.

It's obvious that we can believe things that are true, and that we can believe things that are false. What is less obvious perhaps is that this implies a chasm between belief and truth. They are different sorts of things - or better, they do quite different things in our language. — Banno

Davidson holds that we become aware of the role that truth plays in our conceptual schema/belief via language use, or words to that affect/effect. He concludes, from this, that truth and language are inseparable. A coherent move.

Belief is insufficient for truth. A belief can be both coherent and false. Thus, there's a distinction between belief and truth. Truth is presupposed within all thought and belief somewhere along the line.

Why is it important to philosophers to find links between belief and truth? They want their beliefs to be true; and erroneously think that the answer is to find what it is that links belief and truth. THat is, they want to understand what counts as good reasons for a belief. — Banno

Warrant or justification does not guarantee true belief they do count as good reasons for belief. So, if they want to understand the links between truth and belief as well as wanting their beliefs to be true, then they had better understand what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so just as much as they understand the difference between being well-grounded and being convincingly argued for.

I think it helps... just a wee bit... to start out by knowing what belief is to begin with. That's another topic altogether though. Just pointing out a fatal flaw, in a largely coherent position.

...the world does not work that way. The world does what it will, regardless of what we believe.

And it's this segregation of belief and truth that is behind those last few paragraphs. — Banno

What about all of the things that world does as a direct result of our beliefs?

The problem is the historical notion of "necessary". When the criterion for what counts as "necessary" is being true in all possible worlds, then all we've done is cloud our own understanding.

Something can be existentially dependent upon something else(in this world), and if we adhere to that archaic notion of "necessary" we're forced to to either deny the existential dependency in this world or say that it matters less than what we can imagine another world to be.

Flies and bottles.

The irony of one who charges another with exactly what they are guilty of doing. I'm not interested in continually explaining with someone who doesn't even accept and/or understand when an adequate explanation has been given. I'll add this and see how it goes...

If consciousness is not adequately accounted for in terms of "objective" and "subjective", then any and all notions of human thought and belief based upon that dichotomy cannot take consciousness into proper account. Consciousness consists - in very large part - of human thought and belief.

The problem is based upon a gross misunderstanding(misconception) of human thought and belief as a result of being based upon the objective/subjective dichotomy. As is qualia...

The question is what does the "true", not to mention the "largely true", even mean here — Janus

I agree. Davidson waffles on "truth", much to my own dismay. It causes confusion when reading him.

Get human thought and belief right. That's where to start. The purported 'hard problem' is dissolved - as is many other so-called 'problems' - when we quit using utterly inadequate frameworks to talk about stuff.

Makes perfect sense...

Take away the term "apple pies" and apple pies no longer exist...

Jeez!

But I'm still most interested in the highest levels of human thinking, which, it seems to me, requires words. — Eee

Naming and descriptive practices.

Derrida was quite a prolific writer.

We know that something like 'pure meaning' is translatable. — Eee

These notions of exact meaning and pure meaning are foreign to me. The "pure" qualification makes no sense to me given that all meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. If "pure" is meant to denote something in it's most unadulterated uncorrupted and/or basic state, then it doesn't get any purer that what I've set out here.

How much more precise can a universal criterion be? There are no exceptions to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground. There are no simpler means of negation. All it takes is one example of the attribution of meaning that does not include a creature drawing correlations between different things.

What's not to love?

The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.
— creativesoul

By correlations you mean 'a mutual relationship or connection between two or more things'? — Eee

All meaningful use of the term "meaning" consists of the correlations, associations, and/or 'connections' drawn between it's use and other things. It's mutual(shared) when a plurality of individuals draw the same correlations between the use and other things.

It does seem clear that language largely deals with relationships. But surely there is more to say, even if that's a start. And maybe there can be no end to the talk about talk. Perhaps what we mean by meaning is largely dark for us, because what we can make explicit is just the tip of the iceberg. That doesn't mean I'm against trying to clarify. I just speculate that the nature of meaning might prevent an exhaustive definition of meaning. — Eee

I disagree here.

All attribution of symbolic/linguistic meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All attribution of meaning by language less creatures requires only the creature capable of drawing correlations between different things... none of which are linguistic devices and/or marks(signs/symbols), and all of which are directly perceptible things. That situates the kinds of correlations that are drawn at a level some call 'beneath' common language.

All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think.
— creativesoul

Excellent. And I think we agree that language is a social phenomenon, only possible for a community in a shared world. — Eee

Agreed.

The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.

Correlations being drawn between different things does not require language use to be one of those things. The meaning of "meaning" is existentially dependent upon language use. Correlations are not.

Is it really the case that a 'full' meaning is present that we are merely finding more words for? Or something else? — Eee

"Full" meaning is present?

I don't talk like that. Something else.


All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think.

Donald J Trump is really an Enemy of the State — Wayfarer

Sleeping with enemies does not necessarily make one an enemy.

Bring on the vote, I say. — Wayfarer

No.

After the indisputable well known accepted facts are laid out... and after the states finish the work Mueller began. Until then... let's have all the facts... and let the voters decide. In the meantime, let's punish those who deliberately mislead the public about the events that are transpiring and have been since 2016 for treason to defraud the American people. Those who are just wrong... let them say their piece in light of the evidence to the contrary. Hold them side by side. Show the relevant facts.

If you ask them what they mean by 'meaning,' won't they be forced to add more links to the chain of signs? — Eee

Undoubtedly, but that's true of asking anyone what they mean by any other term as well...

What do we refer to by 'I' ? Or 'you'? — Eee

If one does not know the difference between you and I, well, there can be no distinction between who says what.

Is there a finite chain of signs that can get this exactly right? If the signs are intelligible at all, they can be quoted or repeated in other contexts, among other signs, and be understood differently. — Eee

Is there a finite amount of signs that can get this right? What on earth is this? Is there a finite chain of signs that can be used to comprehend how we use the terms "I" and "you"???

Is that what you're asking me here?

It's us philosophers who find it difficult to determine the meaning of meaning, mostly because we want to do a good job, and perhaps because we're questionably attached to a project of juicing words for their maximally context-independent meanings. — Eee

Perhaps is right.

I like the game, but I also see it as an infinite game. The interpretation of any text is one more text that's open to interpretation. This is not at all to say that all interpretations are equal. It's just that to live is to be still determining and interpreting. I think even a dogmatic philosopher is always still figuring out what exactly he means by his dogma. We can repeat the words in our mind, but is this really a repetition of something like exact meaning? Perfect, exact meaning is like God or pure spirit. — Eee

Nothing likable about that game from this vantage point.

I very much agree, with only a slight suspicion about 'correlation,' and I associate this with Wittgenstein. One of my favorite philosophical themes is how radically embedded we are in language use. I don't think it can be over-stated. Even this 'I' that doesn't think it can be overstated is, as a sign, embedded in the way we learn to use 'I.'

To be a human is perhaps most essentially to be co-embedded in a language. The 'we' is utterly prior to the 'I' in the sense that the 'I' is only constructed within the 'tribe' and understands itself in relation to other selves. Far from being controversial, I think such things are obvious to those who are willing to make their tacit knowledge explicit against the resistance of theories that tell us otherwise (and often flatter us.) — Eee

There is no denying the affect/effects that common language use has upon human thought and belief. However, there's no good reason to believe that we cannot acquire knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to language. We do it all the time. There's also nothing stopping us from taking proper account of our linguistically mediated thought and belief.

You mentioned suspicion about 'correlation' - which is my notion of thought and belief. All thought and belief consists of correlations drawn between different things.

If behavior is the effect of some cause, the cause is the meaning of the behavior... — Harry Hindu

That doesn't follow. Rather it fails to draw the distinction between causality and meaning. "Neglects" may be a better word choice here. "Conflates" works as well.

Bashing on Godel... — Wallows

Making clear statements about someone's insanity is not bashing. Godel was one of the brilliant ones for many reasons... "Crazy" ain't always a slur my friend.

:wink:

Lighten up.

But that's just not true. If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour. — Banno

Yes. The tumour is the common referent.

I retired last night, when I realized how close I was to veering too far off Davidson. I'm thinking I'll re-read the paper again tonight prior to adding anything more. Moliere and fdrake have reset the focus... and rightly so. The paper is heavily laden with unspoken background. Easy to get sidetracked if we do not know what Davidson holds as well as what he rejects.

I know that he's visiting different popular ideas for good reason. I haven't tied it all together yet. Temporarily setting aside the difference between our views requires reminding myself to not object!

:razz:

I want to study it a bit more, as I said...

Sure. Pick any of them, as they are all related.

I'm more than happy to discontinue...

Be well.

:smile:

"It"...

We don't know where do we get the meaning for anything at all. We don't really know what the word "meaning" actually means. — Zelebg

Some of us do.

Come on, a little charity! — Isaac

I'll return it when I see it. I've been plenty charitable in past, and would be glad to continue being so.

ou're talking about 'perception' - the processing of visual stimuli, right? — Isaac

All physiological sensory perception. "Visual" points to one kind, one system, etc. There are more as you well know.

"One's understanding of the text as a whole is established by reference to the individual parts and one's understanding of each individual part by reference to the whole. " — Eee

I've no issue with this at face value. I agree. What I take issue with is the idea that that somehow applies to thought and belief that does not involve understanding a text. We're talking about all thought and belief and what they have in common at a basic level such that that content is capable of evolutionary progression...

Correlations.

He was paranoid about food and starved himself to death; but, not "crazy". — Wallows

If that doesn't count as being crazy... then nothing will.

Trump has taken every action he deems to be legal for him to take in order to impede the investigation into himself.

It doesn't matter if he thinks it's unconstitutional, because it's following those guidelines precisely...

Paul Manafort is evidence enough to warrant looking. The Republican change in platform no longer arming the rebels in Ukraine is another. Paul Manfort's immediate departure afterwards is another. The Trump tower meeting, yet another. The recent quid pro quo with Ukranian official is just an extension of the corruption in the form of looking for someone to return a favor(the disarming of the rebels), and withholding aid unless one does so.

Trump has taken every action he deems he can get away with to obstruct the investigation.

We are all fallible creatures prone to forming, having, and/or holding false belief. Other people are required - in some way, shape, or form - in order for one to become aware of their own mistakes.

Trusting our own mind is something one has no choice in doing, for the minute one surely doesn't they have arrived at insanity. Grasping one's own mind requires acquiring knowledge of not only what ones believes but where the belief originated... it's source... as well as all of the autonomous systems that the mind is itself existentially dependent upon... as well as what all thought and belief consist of, and/or require.

Baby steps.

What do you believe and why and/or how did you arrive at that belief? Here we look towards statements, claims, assertions of thought and belief. We pull out the operative foundational beliefs, the ones that are as unshakable as they can be... depending upon the individual. Some are more certain that others. It's a long road.

It sounds like you've just stated the equivalent of "perception is unaffected by the price of bread", no one ever thought it was. — Isaac

If you believe this, then I have to question your sincerity here. What I wrote sounds nothing like what you wrote. Read them aloud and see for yourself. Red herring. Non sequitur. Invalid objection. Unacceptable.

You'll have to do better than this.

Physiological sensory perception that is unmediated by language use.
— creativesoul

In opposition to what? — Isaac

Being unmediated by language use is not so much in opposition to anything... aside from being informed by language, and thus being existentially dependent upon language. Such things cannot be sensibly called "unmediated by language use". It's a comparative device/measure. Not all comparisons involve two opposing things.

Translation between different schema about the same world is Davidson's aim. Different names for the same referent can be demonstrated best by focusing upon directly perceptible things. That's all I'm doing, per Davidson's suggested method.

think about thinking itself. — Purple Pond

That's an imperative approach.

What do you mean by 'directly' perceptible? As opposed to what 'indirect' perception? — Isaac

Physiological sensory perception that is unmediated by language use.

Just giving you a little of your own condescension. — Eee

Touche.

:razz:

This is a theme I like. Universal criteria. And that's why the philosopher isn't exactly or simply the solitary ego. Whim or mere opinion is no interest, correct? Correct thinking isn't 'just me' thinking. It let's the thoughts evolve as they 'must.' I don't mean anything mystical. I'm just trying to analyze what we vaguely mean by universal criteria or being reasonable.

We already know how to be reasonable, so it's just a matter of bringing what we mean to a greater vividness, focusing. — Eee

Bein' reasonable is thinking about our own thought and belief, including but not limited to statements thereof. That's the best place to start looking. After-all, if our notion of belief is not amenable to evolutionary progression it can - and ought - be dismissed out of hand as soon as we realize that it's not. It must consist of that which is able to evolve into meaningful statements that presuppose truth somewhere along the line.

Correlations.

What is the gong-tormented sea? Is there a clear distinction between the metaphorical and the literal? What part does sound play in meaning? Or feeling? The 'correlations' approach seems oversimplified. What exactly is a correlation in this context? — Eee

All predication is correlation. That's more than adequate.

Perfectly simple.

"The gong tormented sea" is a linguistic device/characterization that could be sensibly and correctly used as a means to refer to any arbitrary situation or thing we like. Better ones(uses) would pick out common situations at sea. "The gong-tormented sea" can only be understood if one draws the same or similar enough correlations between it's use and something else as the user of the phrase.

"The metaphorical" and "the literal" are said to be kinds/types of meaning. Both consist of correlations drawn between different things.

The different things can and often include both feeling and sound, as well as all sorts of other stuff.