it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about any meaningful connection/association/correlation for a thermostat.
— creativesoul

Well, exactly. That's why I'm calling it mere syntax. We agree on much, as I keep saying. — bongo fury

We agree upon less, I think, than you seem to think/believe.

There is no syntax for the thermostat either.

Syntax is existentially dependent upon pre-existing meaning. Syntax is the structure of common language. Semantics is the study of meaning. The term "syntax" was invented as a means to separate meaning from structure. The problem is that that is prima facie evidence of an utterly inadequate *metacognitive* notion/conception/idea of meaning hard at work. The structure/grammar/syntax of common language is one part of the meaning. That move, that separation, is a mistake in thought/belief about meaning. It is a mistake in the study of meaning.

By the way, I'm not making up the idea that semantics is not equivalent to meaning. I'm just pointing it out. So, you can reject and/or dismiss that if you so choose. However, in doing so you'd be showing unshakable certainty in false belief.

Thanks for sketching your approach to that question, and thanks for looking at mine! — bongo fury

:smile:

Thanks for the nicety.

So, taking the bull by the horns, what distinguishes, for example, conscious meaning from unconscious meaning... — bongo fury

I've set out my own view. You've invoked the "conscious/unconscious" dichotomy(problem). I've already explained how to dissolve it(how it's not a problem on my view). That's been left sorely neglected while you continue to fly around in the bottle that you popped the cork to.

All meaning is attributed by conscious creatures. Not all of those creatures realize what's going on.

Does consciousness equal:

Awareness?
Attention?
Experiencing?
Thoughts/mental ongoings?
Belief?
Reasoning?
Meaning?
Thoughts about thoughts?
Mental correlations?
Mental associations?
Mental connections?
Expectation?
Fear?

Does any of these do the trick? Or can all of them be unconscious?

I suspect they all can, on any definitions plausibly grounded in common usage. (Fear, maybe not yet, but soon, when we start attributing it to some gratuitously cute robot.) — bongo fury

The invocation of "unconscious" is unhelpful.

Being conscious of the trees involves drawing correlations between the trees and other things. That takes place long before the creature can become aware of that. The tree is significant to the dog as a result of the dog drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between the tree and other things. The dog is conscious of the tree. It is aware of the tree. It is attentive towards the tree.

The dog does not know this.

Brains all work pretty much alike, so it s quite relevant to our brains. — Bitter Crank

Indeed.

- Does consciousness = Awareness ?
- Does consciousness = Attention ?
- Does consciousness = Both ? or Something else ? — Basko

Consciousness = the ability to form, have, and/or hold thought/belief and all that that entails. The complexity level of the consciousness is proportional to the complexity level of the creatures' thought/belief.

Thought/belief consists of mental correlations, associations, and/or connections drawn between different things.

All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things.
— creativesoul

Agreed. But then, the same old problem. Conscious (mental correlations), or unconscious? — bongo fury

And yet that's not a problem on my view. That's part of the point I've been painstakingly making here. When we're discussing consciousness, the discourse needs to include not only the candidate(creature), but also what *exactly* the candidate is conscious/aware of, and/or attentive towards?

That approach/framework dissolves the purported problem.

To ask whether or not mental correlations are conscious or unconscious is to ask whether or not the thinking/believing creature is aware of their own thought/belief(mental correlations). Being aware that one is thinking, being aware that one has beliefs, being aware that one is in the grip of expectation/fear, being aware that one has mental ongoings, being aware that one is drawing correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things requires complex natural/common language that is replete with names for mental ongoings.

So... not the same old problem!

Hence, in the very beginning of our exchange I clearly expressed the need to take proper account of thought/belief, paying particularly close attention to the actual differences between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. One result of employing such a method is that realize that people are not even conscious of the fact that they are thinking/believing creatures until long after language use has begun in earnest. As it stands, you've neglected this.

Genuine meaningful language use does not guarantee that that user is capable of thinking about it's own thought/belief.

On my view, being aware of one's own consciousness is being aware of one's thought/belief. That kind of self-awareness(self-consciousness) can only come after/with complex natural/common language use replete with names for mental ongoings. That level of consciousness - being aware of one's own mental ongoings - is existentially dependent upon quite a bit more than mere meaningful language use.

I'm suggesting, conscious where the meaning is genuine, in the sense of not reducing, like the light-heat connection for the thermostat, or the salivation-bell connection for Pavlov's dog, to syntax. (You don't like widening linguistic terminology to symbolic functioning in general, I do. That difference between us is negotiable, I expect.)

I'm not going to agree that consciousness requires meaningful language use, because everyday facts show otherwise.

I've offered more than adequate argument/ground against this notion of 'genuine meaning' that you're working from. It's inherently inadequate for taking proper account of prelinguistic and/or nonlinguistic thought/belief, and hence meaningful attribution(as well as some amount/degree/level of consciousness) that first happens/emerges and/or persists prior to either the structure of language(syntax/grammar) or the study of meaningful language use(semantics). As heretofore argued, it's also inherently incapable of taking proper account of self-consciousness.




I want to say a bit here regarding the characterization/terminological choices displayed in the above quote.

The salivation-bell 'connection' for Pavlov's dog?

That correlation was drawn by Pavlov, not the dog. The dog's correlation was between the bell and being fed. Hence, the salivation is evidence that the dog has/holds expectation. He believes he's about to eat(expects to be fed) when he hears the bell. That is - in part - because of the consistency of past events. Expectation(thought/belief about what's about to happen) ensues as a result of the dog's successive repeated mental correlations drawn between those things.

The light-heat connection for the thermostat?

Because all meaning is attributed and the attribution of meaning requires a creature capable of drawing mental correlations between different things, and thermostats are not, it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about any meaningful connection/association/correlation for a thermostat.

:blush:

Pardon my lack of social etiquette Basko. I haven't even addressed the OP directly, although if anything I've said is worth anything at all, hopefully there have been some purely accidental connections/relevance to it.

I'll read it and at least address it.

You're more than welcome. I find most of the talk about consciousness to be... well... errr.... um.... misguided, to say the least.

Always upholding precedent - because it happened - will lead to repeating mistakes.

I’m dead serious. I also have my grandfather’s burial flag, a picture of my grandpa when he was a sailor, and a picture of my nephew in his Marines uniform on my mantle. — Noah Te Stroete

As you should.

You have to read between the lines. — Noah Te Stroete

Not when the lines are clear.

I think our concerns are very similar... — bongo fury

I've written more than enough...

I want to read. Your concerns have yet to have been expressed here. Care to?

Meaningful language use is adequate enough evidence to warrant thinking/believing that that user/individual is conscious. With that I agree. However, language use is not necessary for being and/or becoming aware/conscious of everything.

All consciousness requires a creature capable of attributing meaning. All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things.

So, in short...

Consciousness is existentially dependent upon meaning.
Meaning is not existentially dependent upon natural/common language.
Consciousness is not existentially dependent upon natural/common language.

This - of course - is too vague. Meaning, like thought, belief, and knowledge begins simply and grows/evolves in complexity.

Meaning predates natural/common language solely by virtue of rudimentary level thought/belief.

...maybe worth bringing up after all. — bongo fury

Interesting to me. You writing all this down?

:wink:

Some meaning is prior to the ability to sign, speak, write, and/or otherwise utter a common language. Some pre-linguistic meaning is shared between different individuals without any of them realizing, discovering, and/or otherwise becoming aware that that is happening. Some shared meaning is prior to common language.

Can a plurality of different creatures draw mental correlations between the same things without realizing that they are doing it?

Of course. We even do that all the time.

Doesn't drawing a mental correlation between different things require being aware that one is doing so?

Of course not. We do that(draw mental correlations between different things) unbeknownst to ourselves at the time it is happening. We've all been on autopilot when suddenly we realize we've been doing all sorts of stuff without paying much attention at all to any of it.

Our being able to even realize that much is existentially dependent upon being able to talk about it. Autopilot happens autonomously. We need not turn on our physiological sensory perception. We must be already having experiences prior to being able to report on and/or talk about them. Being conscious of oneself, and/or one's own worldview requires complex common language replete with the ability to talk about one's own pre-existing thought/belief(mental ongoings).

Does consciousness require being aware and/or attentive to oneself(self-awareness) and one's own worldview? Isn't there an actual distinction to be drawn between the kinds of things a creature is even capable of becoming and/or being conscious of? Certainly these groups of things we can become aware and/or conscious of vary according to both, the capability of the creature(humans notwithstanding) under consideration, and the complexity of the thing that we are becoming aware of. What does that thing consist of? What is it existentially dependent upon?

What is the creature under current consideration conscious and/or aware of?

Are they becoming aware of that which directly perceptible? Certainly whatever one is becoming aware of existed in it's entirety prior to any creature being able to become aware of it. That's true regarding all discovery regardless of whether or not the discovery is directly and/or indirectly perceptible. Invention is another matter altogether. All invention consists of some novel correlation somewhere along the line. But I digress...

Being/becoming aware of directly perceptible things does not require common language. Feelings of contentment and familiarity subdue instinctual fear of unfamiliar things. These states of mind help produce expectation. Certainly there is some degree/level/amount of consciousness in these basic cases despite the obvious lack of common language?

There's shared meaning pervading the flock, despite none of the individuals knowing that much. The group is well nourished, content, and resting. The creatures and their senses are on always on autopilot. Without language not only can they not talk about it, they also cannot have the experience(consciousness) of doing so. The same things are familiar to different individuals nonetheless. Things are familiar nonetheless.

Unexpected things such as sudden events disrupt such circumstances. A mongoose snatches up a young duckling and runs off as suddenly as s/he appeared. Fear of the unfamiliar/unexpected retakes the wheel from the autopilot of familiarity, contentment, and rest. Not really. Ducks, including the mothers, do not seem at all fearful, and/or otherwise altered in their directed behaviours by such commonly occurring events. Familiarity.

An unfamiliar stray dog is another matter altogether.

Do such situations require consciousness? Certainly. Common language? Certainly not.

There are very simple, repeatable experiments that can be performed in a closely controlled environment which would create the circumstances necessary in order for us to watch it happen. We can provide what it takes for a list of individual creatures make the same connections between different things(between some things of our own choosing). We can monitor these events carefully and watch the creatures' further develop their own 'self-contained' expectations based upon regular and consistent series of events.

Is that not a real life example... a demonstration... of *some* amount/degree/level of consciousness hard at work?

I'm not interested in rhetoric. There's already more than enough of that on this forum. If you're interested... I've offered an argument. If you want me to spend any more of my time here discussing this with you, clearly state which part you're disagreeing with and particularly what that disagreement is based upon.

Semantics is not equivalent to meaning.
Semantics is the study of meaning.
Meaning exists prior to semantics(the study of it).

Syntax is the way in which linguistic elements (such as words) are put together to form constituents (such as phrases or clauses) b : the part of grammar dealing with this.
All syntax is existentially dependent upon common language use.
All common language use is meaningful.
Meaning exists prior to syntax.

Semiotics is a general philosophical theory of signs and symbols that deals especially with their function in both artificially constructed and natural languages and comprises syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
All semiotics is existentially dependent upon pre-existing common language use.
All language use is meaningful.
Meaning exists prior to semiotics.

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Meaning cannot be existentially dependent upon semantics, syntax, or semiotics. Rather, all three of those consist of pre-existing meaning. That which consists of something else is existentially dependent upon that something else. Semantics, syntax, and semiotics are all three existentially dependent upon pre-existing meaning.

So...

The thread is about consciousness. The contentious matter between us is whether or not it makes sense to draw an association between consciousness and 'genuine meaning', whereas the latter is language use replete with both semantic and syntactic content. The problem, of course, is that that notion of 'genuine meaning' cannot provide a basic enough - read *prelinguistic* - account of meaning. Some meaning exists prior to language. That is genuine meaning.

Is it enough for consciousness?

Who knows? I mean what counts as consciousness - according to current conventional standards - is akin to how many grains it takes to make a pile. The criterion for what counts as consciousness has yet to have been clearly set forth in this thread. I'm claiming that some cases of consciousness do not require common language use, whereas others most certainly do.

Is meaningful language use proof of consciousness? Certainly. I'm guessing that that is what Searle's Chinese Room is all about(what exactly counts as meaningful language use). Is it required for consciousness in it's most simplistic manifestation(s)? I think not.

Semantics involves thinking about (pre-existing)meaning. Prior to thinking about X, X must first somehow exist.
— creativesoul

Prior to the chicken, the egg? — bongo fury

:brow:

You'll have to do better than this.

Manana...

:up:

You would think it uncontroversial, unfortunately it's not. If the current running documentaries on animal thought/belief/reasoning skills are any indication, academia has gotten lost somewhere along the line(the unwarranted leaps and bounds into anthropomorphism astound me). The syntax/semantics focus is undoubtedly one culprit. Semiotics is not the only approach to meaning. Academia has yet to have gotten thought/belief right, so...

Complexity in language use does not equal better language use. What we're taking account of cannot be so complex. If a theory of meaning has it right, it will become obvious to those capable of following along.

Seems that you and I are largely in agreement in the end(humans are not the only creature's capable of thought/belief). Consciousness evolves in it's complexity. Common language use is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Shared meaning, some sort of rudimentary consciousness.

Sorry to put it all out there. I'm short on time. Priority is real life. Time is money right now.

:smile:

Reply however you see fit. I am willing to hear an argument for consciousness being existentially dependent upon language use, and would agree as long as that claim/argument was properly quantified. Some consciousness is... Not all.

So, I'm unsure what "genuine semantics" is supposed to be referring to.
— creativesoul

One that doesn't amount, on closer inspection, to just another layer of syntax. Suppose we endow a thermostat with a sub-circuit containing a coloured light-bulb. This is genuine semantics for us, as users, but for the device itself, only more syntax. — bongo fury

Perhaps it be best put like this...

I would readily agree that consciousness is itself existentially dependent meaning, as compared/contrasted to semantics. Pre and/or non-liguistic meaningful thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language, whereas both syntax and semantics are. To split our focus upon meaning into an inadequate dichotomy is a mistake. Neither syntax nor semantics are prior to language. Some meaning is. Some thought/belief is. Those prelinguistic thought/belief cannot be properly accounted for.

Consciousness. Consists - in large part at least - of thought/belief about the world and/or oneself. Seems pretty important to get thought/belief right, lest the mistakes will be transmitted
into our notions of consciousness. We'll get it wrong as well. The inevitable result is not knowing what one is looking for.

That's been going on for too long.

What exactly is the criterion for consciousness to emerge onto the world stage? What is it existentially dependent upon? What does it consist of?

I put it to you that thought, belief, and meaning are part and parcel of all conscious experience. By no means am I saying that those are sufficient for all instances/cases of consciousness(conscious experience). They are necessary(required) none-the-less. Consciousness grows in it's complexity level. It must, lest it is an incommensurate notion with evolution. Highly complex thought/belief(consciousness) such as our ability to take account of prior language use is to be aware and/or attentive of how language is used.

Is language part and parcel of all cases of consciousness? I don't think so. I'm also quite certain that some language less creatures are aware of things around them to such an extant that their attention can be fully captured by those things. They are more than capable of drawing mental correlations between different things. They can develop expectation(of what's about to happen) as a direct result of witnessing consist and/or repetitive events happening in relatively quick succession and in the same general order. They are aware and/or attentive to what's going on around them. This is demonstrable, falsifiable, and verifiable.

If this doesn't count as consciousness at a rudimentary basic level, then the notion of consciousness isn't much use. Ours is much more complex. A chimps is as well. A robot has none and cannot ever although it can be programmed to fool nearly everyone into thinking/believing otherwise. Robots are utterly incapable of drawing mental correlations between different things. That is at the root of all consciousness, humans' notwithstanding.

Well, my fascination is primarily with plain old "assertoric" speech acts, which may or may not coincide with production of declarative sentence tokens (utterances or inscriptions) but more generally amount to (as I see it) pointing of words (or pictures) at objects. As though we drew an arrow from one to the other. Which we generally don't, so we are talking here about a social skill which is in the practice of a mutually agreed pretence, and is of the highest order of complexity. — bongo fury

Consciousness is not existentially dependent upon such high order social skills.

Things were meaningful to us long before we became aware of it.
— creativesoul

I guess that nicely expresses denial of the association I proposed? — bongo fury

It follows from some basic common sense assertions. Meaning is not equivalent to semantics. Semantics involves thinking about (pre-existing)meaning. That includes all cases of thinking about pre-existing language use(all language use is meaningful in some way or other). Prior to thinking about X, X must first somehow exist. Some meaning is prior to semantics, as is some language use.

So...

Yes. I'm denying the characterization of consciousness as 'genuine semantics'.

Talking of language...

Some people (i.e. Searle) associate consciousness, in particular, with a linguistic capability having an irreducibly semantic component. Or at least, they associate lack of (or failure to demonstrate) consciousness with a reduction of semantics to syntax. (As in the Chinese Room.)

This particular association (i.e. consciousness <---> genuine semantics) seems a useful one, to me. What about you? — bongo fury

Perhaps. Semantics, by my lights, is the study/theory of meaning. It's all about meaning. This endeavor also requires thinking about thought/belief. Things were meaningful to us long before we became aware of it. So, I'm unsure what "genuine semantics" is supposed to be referring to.

While I do have a couple of Searle's books they are as of yet unread, and I'm not familiar enough with Searle to get into any great detailed account of his work(including the Chinese Room). However, unless I'm mistaken he is a speech act theorist, or was. They work from thought/belief having propositional content, so it would seem that Searle would also hold - on pains of coherency alone - that meaning must also be somehow tied to propositions - hence... common language. Unless one wants to bear the burden of explaining how propositions and meaning are not existentially dependent upon common language use.

Personally, while talk of syntax pervades current convention, I think it's incapable of taking proper account of obvious prima facie meaningful and attentive thought/belief of language-less creatures.

Earlier, you mentioned what we can do that chimps and babies and robots cannot. Point to both an actual symbol and it's referent. That's thinking about thought/belief, and it most certainly requires language. Thought/belief itself does not, at least not all thought/belief.

Being conscious/aware that one has thought/belief requires directing one's attention towards it. We do that with terms like "thought" and "belief", and any number of other terms all of which refer to our own mental ongoings - in part at least.

I could be misunderstanding your position. I've always thought that you had argued along Heraclitus' lines(one cannot step into the same river twice).

That's the notion I'm warning against. It is said that because the river is always changing(everything is always in a state of flux) that one cannot step into the same river twice. If the reason for saying that is the constant state of flux, then one cannot step into the same river once either because it is always changing. Thus, to make any sense of talking about the same thing despite the flux, there must be some amount of acceptable change(some duration of time and/or specified amount/kind of change in which we can still call it by name).

So, with Heraclitus' river if we accept saying that we can step into the same river once, there must be some acceptable amount of change allowed in order for us to be able to say that and remain coherent with our standard regarding what counts as being the same thing over time(regardless of the constant state of flux).

On it's face it's untenable, incoherent, and nonsensical language use that - if strictly applied - would make talking about anything and everything literally impossible because in order to talk about something we have to name it/identify it and by the time we've done that - if any and all change makes our referent(the river) no longer the same thing - then by our own insistence, we've already lost all coherent ability to call it by it's namesake, and thus we would not be able to successfully refer to anything by namesake.

And yet we do it all the time without issue until some philosopher becomes bewitched by otherwise incoherent use of "same".

The same river is changing.

Talking of language...

Some people (i.e. Searle) associate consciousness, in particular, with a linguistic capability having an irreducibly semantic component. Or at least, they associate lack of (or failure to demonstrate) consciousness with a reduction of semantics to syntax. (As in the Chinese Room.)

This particular association (i.e. consciousness <---> genuine semantics) seems a useful one, to me. What about you — bongo fury

This deserves more attention.

The relations or the river?

What's changing?

:brow: :zip: :brow:

Attention. Awareness. Consciousness.
All too vague to be of much use.
— creativesoul

Harsh but true! No one of them guarantees either of the other two. — bongo fury

That would depend upon the notion/definition/delineation/explanation of each term. Some may by definition alone. Some definitions may take account of that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language acquisition. Others may take account of that which is existentially dependent upon common language.

Which notion, idea, and/or conception points us towards and/or properly takes account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness, attention, and/or consciousness of it?

Some frameworks quite simply cannot take account of that which existed prior to language and other frameworks have kept that in mind. The former are inherently and utterly inadequate for successfully performing that task. Some language use impedes. Some does not.

Which report/account/notion/definition/explanation of "attention", "awareness", and/or "consciousness" is amenable to evolution over time? Which can set out in sensible coherent terms what attention is, what awareness is, what consciousness is while also setting out how each develops through time?

Which one is based upon an understanding of human thought/belief regarding how it evolves/morphs over time? Which can offer a sensible, reasonable, and coherent explanation of all thought/belief?

Put forth a duration.

I know based upon my own driving experience, my own understanding of math and physics, and a strong sense of spatial relations that there are forces acting upon this world that are completely unexplainable by those frameworks. What happened to me is physically impossible by those standards, and yet... it most certainly did happen.
— creativesoul

I've experienced a couple things like that, when I was tripping pn LSD. — Janus

I know the difference between a hallucination as a result of ingesting LSD and a normal everyday driving experience where suddenly things quickly became not. I do not base any belief I have about unexplained forces of nature on experiences of tripping.

Fireworks are cool to watch though.

:wink:

Don't fall for that crap. If one cannot step into the same river twice then s/he cannot step into it even once.

That strict criterion for what counts as being the "same" is untenable nonsense.

:smile:

Well grounded true belief. That's the epistemic standard.

I'll go this far...

I know based upon my own driving experience, my own understanding of math and physics, and a strong sense of spatial relations that there are forces acting upon this world that are completely unexplainable by those frameworks. What happened to me is physically impossible by those standards, and yet... it most certainly did happen.

My mistake. Sarcasm can lose it's umph when presented with written word alone. It's easily mistook for sincerity. That's my default position. Trusting that a speaker believes what they are saying.

No one who takes it literally is taken seriously these days. I suppose that could just be a sign of Satan’s rule and the End of Times, though. — Noah Te Stroete

Noah, I like your honesty here. The bravery, knowing the potential for ridicule...

The end times thing has been going on since the death of Jesus. On a regular basis - throughout the history of 'Western' civilization - many believers in the God of Abraham have been looking at what's going on in their lives and saying the same thing...

Looking at the world through the lens of that book - especially if one believes what it says; especially if one believes that all of it is the word of the almighty God; especially if one believes that there is a war between God and Satan; especially if one believes the world and humankind has predetermined destiny and that ending that is foretold in the Bible; especially if one already believes these things...

They will be looking for signs of the end. What I'm saying here is that that has always been the case since Jesus' death, and shows no sure sign of ever being any different. The time period actually foretold within the book has long since passed. People continue to look nonetheless.

It was a black swan scenario, I think Janus. Sorry to be nitpicky. Came with the hardware I was born with. Hear me out here, I think you'll agree.

All definitive inter-subjective cross cultural corroboration is built upon some sort of prior agreement. Not all of those agreements are empirical matters. There is much cross cultural agreement regarding how people ought be treated and/or governed(for example). Those people are more than capable of intersubjective cross cultural collaboration. I'm being reminded of "We Are The World"...

Attention. Awareness. Consciousness.

All too vague to be of much use.

Funny thing is, that none of the above require our attention, awareness, and/or consciousness thereof. All three exist in their entirety prior to language.

Funny because it certainly seems that no one has gotten that right in some solid irrefutable explanatorily adequate way.