Some relations are prior to language.

What are we counting as a tree's relations?

Is a tree existentially dependent upon it's relations?

That question is very incomplete.
— creativesoul

It is definitely vague. But you know what its getting at. And what it is getting at is spot on.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That has yet to have been determined.

What are we counting as a tree's relations? — creativesoul

One example would be all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for its existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

Translation would render the question rephrased as follows...

Is a tree existentially dependent upon all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for its existence?

Looks like a bottle to me.

↪creativesoul Sorry - are you saying Quine treated "exists" as a predicate? — Banno

No.

For me it's not that Rorty finally gets things right but rather that he had the right attitude. The attempt to prove the futility of X seems as futile as X itself. A certain approach is discarded, not refuted. — g0d

I agree with Rorty's opinion regarding social responsibility regardless of strict determinism.

His discarding of truth is a huge mistake. He makes a coherent argument for it. However being based upon the idea that truth is a property of true propositions, it's is based upon a falsehood. Truth is central to everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. If it is a property, it is a property of true thought/belief and statements thereof. Some true thought/belief are prior to language. Thus, either truth is prior to language, and thus prior to true propositions, or true thought/belief does not require truth.

Truth is prior to language.

That's precisely how the use of "is true" becomes redundant when attached to a thought/belief statement. Truth is presupposed within all thought/belief somewhere along the line.

This is beside the thrust of the thread though.

Is a tree existentially dependent upon it's relations?

That question is very incomplete.
— creativesoul

It is definitely vague. But you know what its getting at. And what it is getting at is spot on. — Merkwurdichliebe

That has yet to have been determined.

What are we counting as a tree's relations?

I think that those are the kinds of frameworks and/or assertions that Quine is targeting.
— creativesoul

How so? — Banno

Because I took Quine to be targeting frameworks using the term "existence" as a predicate.

I also invoked the consideration of whether or not a thing's existence is dependent upon its relations. — Merkwurdichliebe

Is a tree existentially dependent upon it's relations?

That question is very incomplete.

I've no clear understanding of what the "psychological context of 'existence'" might be. Is it the context in whichi we might use the word 'existence'?

Much the same for "consideration of whether or not a thing's existence is dependent on its relations." Is this parallel Quine? creativesoul? — Banno

I think that those are the kinds of frameworks and/or assertions that Quine is targeting.

Strip away all the fancy specialist terms, and I think The Average Joe can and does get into these issues. — g0d

Normal everyday common language users do not get lost in mistaken accounts of what they're doing, unless they are unknowingly misled into such cognitive dissonance.

Canadais going to defeat the Warriors. — Grre

:eyes:

Existence, truth, and meaning are all irrevocably entwined within all human thought/belief by virtue of being presupposed and/or attributed therein. Some thought/belief is prior to language. Some notions of "existence" can come to acceptable terms with that, and some cannot.

It's like a fractal - however we magnify our cognition, the same pattern keeps appearing. That is where propositional logic has its merits, it explains the pattern. — Merkwurdichliebe

Propositional logic takes account of common language by means of propositional terms. Common language use existed long before it became a subject in it's own right. That is, there must be something to take account of in order to take account of something. Unfortunately, when thought/belief is accounted for solely in propositional terms, it cannot provide an example of thought/belief that is not propositional in content, because by definition/schema/framework/notion all belief is held/thought/believed to be.

That is false.

Not all thought/belief is propositional in content.

What pattern are you referring to? Does it suffer in light of the above true statement?

Trees existed in their entirety prior to being taken into account. Any thought/belief to the contrary is the bewitchment of language use that Witt couldn't quite elaborate enough upon.

All use of the term "existence" is language use.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition.
All language acquisition is existentially dependent upon rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief. All rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations and/or associations between different things.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation and/or associations between different things.
All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon non-linguistic rudimentary level thought/belief that is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All non-linguistic meaningful thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things.
All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are.

Pardon the sarcastic inflection, but...

It is no wonder that the value of philosophy proper has been considered on a steady decline for so long now by the average joe.

:yikes:

Does anyone here actually doubt whether or not anything can exist prior to our talking about it?

Some things exist prior to our account of them. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. All such things are existentially independent of our account. None of them require being taken into account.

Those things must be said to exist prior to our account.

So, prudent considerations about all acceptable use of the term "existence" will keep in the forefront of our minds that stuff existed long before any and all terminological use.

Existence does not require our account. All notions of "existence" do.

It's an odd comment coming from you creativesoul who so often talks about "existential dependency", apparently not being satisfied with mere dependency. — Janus

Understandable. I'm trying to work through Quine and the notion that "existence" is not a predicate.

I find that talking in terms of something's existence is just talking about the thing.

Existential dependency doesn't require talking in terms of something's 'existence'. It's more about a common sense method of approach. It requires talking in terms of something's elemental constituency. If something consists of something else, it is existentially dependent upon that something else. If something exists prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Etc.

Put to use:All statements consist of common language use, and thus all are existentially dependent upon common language use. Whatever common language is existentially dependent upon, so too are statements. Etc.

So, that's not talking in terms of a statement's 'existence'. It's talking about what statements consist of, which then offers ground for saying what it takes for statements to first emerge/exist.

Existence is presupposed within all thought/belief. All thought/belief is correlation. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

Any theory of consciousness that leans on quantum mechanics for justificatory ground carries along with it a notion of disembodied cognition(yet another mind/body dualism). That is a consequence of an inadequate understanding regarding the mental ongoings that predate and facilitate language acquisition and it's subsequent use(pre and/or nonlinguistic thought/belief).
— creativesoul

Could you explain this? I’m not talking about disembodied cognition, so I’m not sure where you drew this conclusion. — Possibility

No need for me to further explain my own mistaken account. If I've confused your position with some past memory(which is not at all out of the question), then I'll gladly apologize.

I did answer your point by asserting that only 'philosophers' tend to talk about 'a tree's existence' (period). — fresco

What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence?

That was the question. I'll let the reader decide whether or not the answer is relevant. By my lights, it's not. I did not ask who tends to talk about a tree's existence most. Besides that, more than just philosophers use the term, and often. So...

You'll have to do better than that.

I noticed this, too. As I said, it’s a work in progress. And I think relying on Descartes does the theory more harm than good. — Possibility

The mind/body dualism is completely unacceptable on my view.

My earlier quote from Rovelli offers a different way of looking at it, by pointing out that we can only talk about ourselves in relation to our interaction with a system that is not ourselves.

I don't understand how that could be true. We do talk about ourselves with language, which satisfies the criterion, because language is a system that is not ourselves. However, we can talk about ourselves - using common language - in many other ways. So, if we can talk about ourselves without talking about the language we're using, then we're talking about ourselves in a manner that is not in relation to our interaction with language. We can. Therefore...

I do not understand how that could be true. QED.

This is grounded in quantum mechanics and Shannon’s information theory. Applied to consciousness, it’ll make your head spin - but you may notice it doesn’t sit well with Descartes.

Any theory of consciousness that leans on quantum mechanics for justificatory ground carries along with it a notion of disembodied cognition(yet another mind/body dualism). That is a consequence of an inadequate understanding regarding the mental ongoings that predate and facilitate language acquisition and it's subsequent use(pre and/or nonlinguistic thought/belief).

Having acquired a good grasp of what all human thought/belief consists of, I'm subsequently acquiring a relatively good grasp of how human thought/belief emerges, serves as a basis for subsequent thought/belief, is accrued, and gains complexity.

I do.

Rubbish.

I asked a question. It is sensible and relevant and cuts to the core of my point.

Do you have an answer?

Canada can defeat the Warriors. God has no chance.

The distinction was between the imaginative effort required for novels that is not required for films/movies...

Denying that is foolish.

Imagination is thought, but not all thought is imaginative.

I am a fan of Faith No More... — Janus

You want it all, but you can't have it...

What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence?

I mean...

We can point to trees. We can name them. We can talk about features of the trees. We can talk about the differences between trees and other stuff. We can talk about a tree's color, it's bark, it's leaves, it's height, etc.

But...

What are we talking about when we talk about a tree's 'existence' if not the tree?

In any case, I disagree with your earlier statement that biology is required for experience, so I expect we have some discussion coming there. — Possibility

Probably not much on my end.

I briefly read through the link. There's much to like, but there are some serious issues...

In short, according to IIT, consciousness requires a grouping of elements within a system that have physical cause-effect power upon one another. This in turn implies that only reentrant architecture consisting of feedback loops, whether neural or computational, will realize consciousness. Such groupings make a difference to themselves, not just to outside observers. This constitutes integrated information. Of the various groupings within a system that possess such causal power, one will do so maximally. This local maximum of integrated information is identical to consciousness.

The above is an excerpt from the article. I like the notion of consciousness being existentially dependent upon groupings of basic elements(consciousness "requires"...). There seems a potential issue with talking about the groupings 'making a difference to themselves', and then calling that making of a difference to themselves "integrated information". Leaves me guessing how we can possible say that certain groupings of certain elements are even capable of 'making a difference to themselves'.

First, following from the fundamental Cartesian insight, is the axiom of existence. Consciousness is real and undeniable; moreover, a subject’s consciousness has this reality intrinsically; it exists from its own perspective.

Existing from it's own perspective requires having one. Add Descartes to that, and you've added an additional requirement of taking account of oneself. Having a perspective requires having a worldview. Taking account of oneself requires common language use. So, if we're strictly following these guidelines, and leaning on Descartes, we've already delimited consciousness to self-awareness of language users.

Second, consciousness has composition. In other words, each experience has structure. Color and shape, for example, structure visual experience. Such structure allows for various distinctions.

Third is the axiom of information: the way an experience is distinguishes it from other possible experiences. An experience specifies; it is specific to certain things, distinct from others.

Fourth, consciousness has the characteristic of integration. The elements of an experience are interdependent. For example, the particular colors and shapes that structure a visual conscious state are experienced together. As we read these words, we experience the font-shape and letter-color inseparably. We do not have isolated experiences of each and then add them together. This integration means that consciousness is irreducible to separate elements. Consciousness is unified.

Fifth, consciousness has the property of exclusion. Every experience has borders. Precisely because consciousness specifies certain things, it excludes others. Consciousness also flows at a particular speed.

The second axiom states that consciousness has composition. I would concur. However, the fourth axiom seems to contradict the second. If consciousness has composition, then it consists of individual elements. To know that consciousness has composition requires knowing what those elements are. Although, groupings of elements are not equivalent to individual elements, if consciousness has composition, it must consist of individual elements.

It seems that this distinction between the groups and the individual elements is what grounds the conclusion that individual elements are inadequate, whereas certain groupings have what it takes. I'm not at all opposed to that approach for establishing a criterion for consciousness.

The bit about all consciousness existing from it's own perspective seems to be a springboard from which the theory begins to make claims about consciousness that can only be satisfied by creatures capable of taking account of their own specific state. There's quite a bit of talking about consciousness in ways that we cannot sensibly attribute to anything other than creatures capable of language. The third postulate shows this...

Third, because consciousness is informative, it must specify, or distinguish one experience from others. IIT calls the cause-effect powers of any given mechanism within a system its cause-effect repertoire. The cause-effect repertoires of all the system’s mechanistic elements taken together, it calls its cause-effect structure. This structure, at any given point, is in a particular state. In complex structures, the number of possible states is very high. For a structure to instantiate a particular state is for it to specify that state. The specified state is the particular way that the system is making a difference to itself.

It seems that that is and/or may be the result of taking Descartes too seriously...

Descartes makes a good argument for being aware of one's own existence by virtue of talking about ourselves. However, if we take this too strictly, and posit it as a necessary condition for all consciousness, then we'll have no choice but to deny consciousness to all non-reflective thought/belief, to all non-linguistic creatures, or find ourselves guilty of anthropomorphism.

The theory rests upon the idea that different groupings of basic elements are capable of 'making a difference to themselves'. That's a big problem if we extend this criterion to AI and other animals without language.

I am saying that you can calculate probability with whatever information you have. That's what method of probability is for. The more information you have, the closest is result to the fact. It's a probability. Not a fact. But when you can calculate, with the information we have, 0% probability, that's game over, although it's still not a fact. It's a probability. — Henri

Show your work. Gratuitous assertions are not acceptable here. I don't think you know what you're talking about. Prove me wrong.

Show how you arrive at the probability. Show the info you used, the calculations performed, etc...

Show your work.

...can you understand that probability for random-based existence is mathematical or absolute 0%... — Henri

As it stands this is a gratuitous assertion.

Show your work.

How many outcomes are possible?

What are the factors influencing and/or determining each?

Are you saying that you need not know the answers to the above two questions in order to know the probability of an outcome?

So, we have a door closing as a result of an action of a conscious being, yet the act of the door closing is random. The same problem remains - probability for us to exist, as a result of randomness, regardless of a form through which randomness executes, is mathematical or absolute 0%. — Henri

If the door closing is the result of something else happening, then it is not random.

The bit about the probability for us to exist being a mathematical and/or 'absolute' 0% is rubbish. In order to know the probability of an outcome/event one must know all of the influencing factors as well as all of the possible outcomes.

You do not, nor does anyone else.

In my view, it’s more important in this discussion to talk about the similarities and development of ALL experience: both human and non-human. — Possibility

I couldn't agree more. The language used to talk about both ought be based upon a criterion that is amenable to evolution, has the strongest possible ground, and is adequate in it's explanatory power to exhaust both.

Oh...

And does not result in a reductio and/or special pleading.

We are reporting upon our own thought/belief.

All reports require something to report upon, someone to give the report, and a means for doing so. All reports of human thought/belief require pre-existing human thought/belief, someone to report upon it, and a means for doing so.

Some of our own thought/belief are prior to our reporting them. The first report needed something to take account of. Thus, some such thought/belief are prior to our awareness of them, and prior to our considering them as a subject matter in their own right; prior to our naming them "thought" and "belief". No such pre-reflective thought/belief requires our awareness.

Some language use is adequate/capable of accounting for that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account and some is not. Our aim is knowledge of that which is capable of existing in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or reporting upon it. In this case, we're aiming at pre-reflective and/or pre-linguistic thought/belief.

Criterion, criterion, criterion...

What do all known examples of thought/belief have in common such that it makes them what they are? What does all thought/belief consist of such that it can autonomously emerge onto the world stage in it's entirety in the simplest possible 'form' and continue to autonomously grow and/or gain in it's complexity all the way up to and/or including common language acquisition and/or mastery?

Would you at least agree with positing that there are such basic requirements, given the subject matter is human experience and consciousness?

A non-linguistic creature can recognize and/or attribute causality. If our knowledge that such a creature attributes and/or recognizes causality does not warrant further asserting that that animal has formed and/or holds thought/belief, then we're forced to admit that recognizing and/or attributing causality does not require thinking about what's happening.

A non-linguistic creature can learn that fire hurts when touched by virtue of drawing a correlation between touching fire and the ensuing pain. The creature's thought/belief is not propositional in content. My report most certainly is. The creature's learning experience does not require my report. The creature's thought/belief is correlation. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. The event leaves a long-lasting impression by virtue of affecting the subsequent cognition. The creature avoids fire thereafter.

First I have to clarify that I’m talking about anthropocentrism, rather than anthropomorphism, because I think the distinction is important before we continue. By anthropocentrism, I’m referring to the tendency to distinguish humans (us) as separate from non-humans (them). This leads to a difference in our terminology for qualities, features and traits that blinds us to what may be common to both/and - particularly when it comes to experience and the development of thought/belief. Recognising primitive pre-cursors to thought/belief without labelling them as such is tricky business when you have ‘human experience’ and all our related features and traits up on a pedestal.

You say that you typically reject dichotomies - I’m proposing we reject the human/non-human dichotomy for the purpose of this discussion. This means we either we embrace/forgive anthropomorphism (and I understand your resistance), OR we abandon ‘human’ as a distinct category (along with all its anthropocentric terms). I find there is very little common terminology available to explore the gradual development of experience and consciousness between the two.

In my view, it’s more important in this discussion to talk about the similarities and development of ALL experience: both human and non-human. — Possibility

Thank you for pointing that out. I had been misreading "anthropocentrism" as "anthropomorphism".

I would like to broaden the notion of anthropocentrism. There are quite remarkable differences between humans and other animals. Denying that is unacceptable, and surely results in anthropomorphism. That said, the other extreme is to deny all other animals any and/or all abilities that we commonly attribute to ourselves such as thought/belief. I take it that this is the extreme that you are trying to avoid, and I don't blame you. Rather, I joined you long ago in that fight.

However, despite that very strong agreement, I simply cannot agree with an outright rejection of the human/non-human dichotomy. That would pull all justificatory ground out from under our own feet, It would be like climbing high up into a tree, scooting out on a branch far from the trunk, and then proceeding to cut it off behind us. Human experience is the only acceptable comparative standard here, for both of us. Without establishing a criterion for all human experience, there can be no comparison between human experience and non-human experience. That's all we have to work with.

That said, I agree totally with what I understand to be your underlying concerns. There is very little common terminology available to explore the gradual development of experience/consciousness. The conventional frameworks quite simply won't allow it. Blame the philosophers who came up with the notions of human perception, apperception, conception, thought, reason, and belief. The consequences include an inherent inability to take account of thought/belief in terms amenable to evolution. None of them drew and maintained the actual distinction between our own rudimentary thought/belief and the far more complex linguistically informed varieties stemming from thinking about our own thought/belief(metacognition, reasoning, doubt, suspending judgment, etc.) Only humans are capable of these metacognitive endeavors.

Setting out the differences between rudimentary basic thought/belief and more complex thought/belief is required for being able to parse non-linguistic thought/belief. However, drawig and maintaining that distinction requires first taking proper account of the more complex, because that's precisely where we are. That's exactly what is available to us. A proper account of our own highly complex thought/belief will be parsed in terms amenable to evolution, and as such it facilitates understanding not only that non human animals have thought/belief, but also how and to some extent what the content of their thought/belief is, and/or could possibly be.

I don’t believe I’m redefining the term, rather highlighting one particular dictionary definition of meaningful that suggests ‘current convention’ may be limiting our understanding of the topic in favour of anthropocentrism. It wouldn’t be the first time.

I agree that meaning presupposes both a sign and what it signifies. But in my view the creature need not have sufficient awareness to correlate between the sign and what it signifies for the creature in order for the sign to be meaningful to the creature. — Possibility

Here, it seems there is some agreement between us. I agree that a thinking/believing creature need not be aware that it is drawing correlations between different things in order to be drawing them. Perhaps we can work with this...

Avoiding anthropomorphism is imperative on my view, and that is not an easy task. In order to avoid attributing human qualities, features, and traits to non-human creatures we must be able to compare/contrast between human qualities, features, and traits and non-human. Without getting too far into the details yet, in this discussion we're talking about the differences between human experience and non-human experience.

To do this, we must know what human experience consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon. We must have some basic understanding of human experience. Once that criterion is established to our satisfaction, we must then assess whether or not the candidate under consideration has what it takes.

Follow me?

What is a unicorn?
— Daniel

Only in philosophy. — S

Show him the picture...

I'll put as much as I can into a more formal presentation. It will be later on. In the meantime, you may want to click on my avatar, click on 'discussions' and have a look at a few of mine concerning these matters. It ought be helpful. Check out the successful reference thread. It's relevant to this particular topic.

It helps in this discussion to be mindful of anthropocentric assumptions and language, so we don’t seal off areas without searching them first. To be meaningful is to have an important or worthwhile quality. No thought/belief about ‘what’s happening’ is necessary. — Possibility

That is a highly problematic line of thought.

To be meaningful is to be meaningful to a creature. Current convention shows that all theories of meaning presuppose symbolism. That presupposes something to become sign/symbol, something to become symbolized/significant, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between the two.<-------------that is thought/belief formation. The content of the correlation exists in it's entirety prior to becoming part of the correlation.

So, while we ought take care in our discrimination between candidates, we must take care to not redefine common terms as a means to support our thought/belief.

You are wanting me to agree to a criterion for experience that does not include thought/belief.

I cannot.

Saying that an amoeba relates something to direction is to say that an amoeba has a sense/notion of direction. It is to say that an amoeba draws correlations between chemical stimulus and direction. It doesn't. It responds to physical stimulus and does so in predictable ways.

Wind vanes respond to wind direction.

To say that bacteria use trial and error is to impute/imply intention that is devoid of agency. Bayesian reasoning requires quite a bit more complexity in thought/belief than such simple cellular structures facilitate and/or will allow.

Flower petals tumble through the air at times. Other times they glide. Some things exhibit more than one behavioural pattern. It does not follow from that and that alone that they are engaged in trial and error activities.

Bacteria?

:worry:

Biology is required for experience. To what extent and how do we arrive at that conclusion?

That seems to be what's in contention.

Thought/belief is exactly what allows experience to emerge prior to language use and evolve gaining in it's complexity along the way.

You're describing behaviours that stimulus/response and cause/effect explain without loss.

I'm willing. You're attributing agency where none is warranted.

I’m not going to conclusively prove experience in order to disprove your assumptions about amoeba and bacteria... — Possibility

They are not assumptions. They are conclusions.

So...

We need to back pedal a bit.

Criterion.

You offered one. I negated it with actual example that met the criterion and is certainly not a case of impression, consciousness, and/or experience.

I offered one and you objected. Since, you've asked for subsequent reasoning.