To doubt what is being taught, one must have a baseline from which to doubt. All doubt is belief-based. To doubt 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true. Let X be a statement of thought/belief.

During the formation of one's first world-view, the teachers can be many, and the teachers can be few. It is entirely possible to doubt the truthfulness of what is being taught in all those cases, if the student has pre-existing thought/belief that is contrary and/or otherwise places the teaching under scrutiny. If one attempts to teach a child that all people of a certain group are this or that, and the student knows someone of that group that is not, then the student already has the black swan in mind.

Sapientia's candidate does not preclude this.

If the candidate had but one teacher or set of teachers all of whom held the same sort of unshakable certainty, and whose belief system actually glorified and looked fondly upon continuing to hold that belief even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary...

In these cases it ain't so easy to change one's mind.

But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please.
— Isaac

You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say. — Mww

Double standard hard at work.

Is morality the sort of thing that can exist in it's entirety prior to language acquisition?

If we follow current convention, it cannot, unless the written rules for acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour are not existentially dependent upon common language. They are by definition existentially dependent upon common language use.

So, according to current convention. No. Morality cannot exist in it's entirety prior to common language.

This comes up against my own understanding of what counts as moral thought/belief. If moral thought/belief is about codes of conduct, then it only follows that moral thought/belief is itself existentially dependent upon common language. Moral thought/belief then, it must be admitted, is a product of thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief.

That would fail to draw the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. It would relegate all moral thought/belief as metacognitive in it's nature. But it's not. All deliberate oppositional change in one's original adopted morality is.

Something is wrong here... Clearly.

Interesting things happen when considering this; language is not required for thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. It is required for thought/belief about unacceptable thought, and/or belief.

So here we must make some sort of decisions.. Some may include...

1. Deny that a non-linguistic and/or pre-linguistic creature can form and/or hold meaningful thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour
2. Deny that all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour counts as moral belief
3. Admit that current convention is found to be lacking explanatory power in this regard
4. Reject the framework(my method or convention's definition of "morality")

Or...

5. Come to the realization that the written rules of conduct consist entirely of and/or are otherwise underwritten by thought/belief statements:Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

If all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour counts as morality, then morality - in rudimentary form - is not existentially dependent upon common language.

Morality, as current convention has it, is a term used in many ways. It is well-worn. There are a plurality of referents, conceptions, notions, and/or ideas referred to by the one who uses the term. That is true of all terminological usage. To avoid misinterpretation, I am using the term "morality" as a rigid designator. It always refers to codes of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. I want to see where this leads when held in light of my own notion of thought/belief.

When I use the term "moral belief", it refers to belief about the aforementioned rules(belief about morality). It is a kind of belief that is determined solely by virtue of it's content. All kind of thought/belief is determined by virtue of what it's about.

What counts as "moral" behaviour follows from one's notion of morality. Here I've not used the term "moral" as a synonym for good and/or acceptable. It is not being used to indicate my approval.

Yes. I'd like to confirm points of agreement and/or mutual understanding.

One can change one's mind about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Everyday fact bears witness to this. We can look for ourselves. There are accounts/reports of it all over the place. We can look at those. We can be a part of it, and/or watch another go through it. We can - as a matter of everyday fact - help another go through it iff we know what it takes, want to do what it takes, and circumstances do not stand in the way.

That's a bit of our agreement, I think. Correct me if I'm wrong.

If all the above is acceptable enough...

So, one can doubt their original morality. It happens. How does it happen was the question I then sought answer for. You and I gave differing answers. I do not think/believe that they are utterly incommensurate/incompatible with one another. There seems to be much agreement. Although, I do think that there is a choice to made between which account is more reliable, truthful, dependable, trustworthy, etc.

We're talking about the same events. We're talking about the necessary preconditions of those events. The notion of a priori reason may well be capable of taking account of such an event. Everyone can understand the event despite not being able to use Kant's terminological framework as he did. So, neither the event nor understanding the event requires Kant's framework.

What is it doing here?

The "too entrenched" bit was about your answer being in Kant's framework. The good man bit was about Kant.

How can one overcome racism in the example provided s/he has no external source aside from the racist imbedded language use s/he learns?

That is our focus, right?

You’re right, it’s not impossible, if something new is available.
— Mww

New thought/belief.
— creativesoul

Yes, but there is still the question about a possible instantiation for it. — Mww

Indeed. We must know how deliberate change in one's deeply inculcated moral belief happens; what it takes in order to happen; what is required; etc. We need to know what the event itself needs to have already happened, in order for it to be able to. Otherwise, there is no way to know what it is that we're looking for and no way to know when we've found it.

We know it happens.

If a society is of a certain moral persuasion, and a fully inculcated member is nonetheless subsequently in moral opposition to some part of it, the question is raised as to where the opposition came from.

Indeed.

Without experience, without some external influence, he is subject to his own a priori practical reason as the source of his opposition. But where did reason get the idea the societal norm should be opposed in the first place? What enables a subject to declare that whatever some norm might be, he is opposed to it? If it be supposed the opposition arose from mere feeling, for lacking experience reduces the means to nothing else, then it becomes manifest that feelings have the power over reason, which is impossible because feelings have no object until reason cognizes one as belonging to it necessarily.

See, that's far too entrenched in the mistake of a brilliant man. If he did not deliberately misrepresent his own thought/belief, then I would be quite confident in saying that he was a good man. With that in mind, good men make mistakes just like bad men. In Kant's case, his categories of thought cannot take the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief into consideration.

What is the notion of a priori doing here?

I'm not entirely certain of Kant's actual stance. Seems to me though, that conventional understanding of a priori ought at least be capable of clearly and accurately setting out Kant's delineation. Correct me if I'm off here, but isn't a priori the name of a very particular kind of thought/belief; one of which Kant himself claims is existentially independent of all experience:That which we can deduce and/or induce while sitting in a chair? That which must be presupposed within all experience. I've also entertained that notion. That which is necessary for all experience. I've thought in those terms as well. I find none of them reliable for taking proper account of the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.


------------------------------------------------------------------------


Deliberate oppositional change to one's morality always happen through complex common language use. There are no exceptions and/or actual examples to the contrary. It is a series of connected events. Undoubtedly one's morality must already be an operative element within one's thought/belief system(world-view). Otherwise, one one cannot question it. One must already be following some set of behavioural rules in order to place them under suspicion.

These things are true of everyone who is placing their initial worldview under suspicion, regardless of the particulars.



If the only way to question a certain kind of thinking is by virtue of using a specific well-defined set of linguistic terms in a conventionally accepted manner, then it only follows that that particular kind of thinking is itself existentially dependent upon complex language acquisition replete with the terminology. Some accounts of morality pride themselves upon such complexity. Questioning such an inculcated morality is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief. All thought/belief about the rules of conduct requires first isolating the rules as a means for subsequent consideration.

Some thought/belief does not have such existential dependence. Some moral thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language.

Prior to common language no one approves of another harming them. Everyone disapproves.

One's initial worldview includes one's initial morality. Both are subject to the influence of individual particular circumstances. World-views and the morality that they always include are relative.

That's as far as moral relativity can take us.

Go ahead Sapientia.

:wink:

What is it that you keeping referring to? Oh yeah, now I remember. The Oracle.

Please. Mythology?

Everything ever written, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered comes through a subject.

All codes of conduct do as well.

What is the term 'objective' doing here aside from putting an utterly inadequate framework to use and creating unnecessary complexity? Not all complexity is admirable.

All people deserve to have a certain amount of respect already bestowed upon them prior to actually meeting them, or knowing anything about them.

Sometimes people from all walks of life do things that are not good. One of those things is judging a whole group of people without adequate ground to make that judgment. Not all judging of a group of people is to be avoided. To quite the contrary, sometimes it is necessary.

I do not care that someone is black in any other way that I care that anyone is any 'race'. The scare-quotes are a nod to the guys that argue dna based objections to race. Rather, I care that there are people from all walks of life who are assholes as a result of not giving a fuck about others. Sometimes those not cared for can be other races, religions, ethnicities, families, cultures, etc., as a group.

The fallacy is gross overgeneralization. Sometimes, the product is racism. Sometimes those committing the fallacy of thought about a group of people can wield tremendous power over the very groups that they do not give a fuck about.

That power is governed by the perpetrators moral thought/belief.

How does that happen?

I mean... WTF?

We all surely agree on some moral utterances of ought. Universal agreement is neither equivalent nor adequate for truth. So, while it is certainly aim-worthy, it is not truth worthy.

By the way...

Can one of the participants here that is using the notion of moral truth offer a criterion for truth, and then one for a kind of truth called "moral", and then again for a 'universal' and 'moral' truth?

:smile:

All are originally acquired solely by virtue of being adopted via common language acquisition. Regardless of all individual subject particulars, all original adoption of worldview(language acquisition) requires a pure and unadulterated lack of doubt in what's being learned. Unquestioned trust in the truthfulness of what is being learned.

One cannot doubt unless one already has/holds some pre-existing thought/belief upon which the doubt is grounded. Early on during initial language acquisition, there is no such baseline.

What is universally true of all moralities?

Something original would be a novel correlation. Something new could be a novel correlation to the individual, but it also could have already been made by someone else.

Is that more what you're looking for?

I've no idea what purported sense of 'universal' is being put to use here?

It takes something else. It takes thinking about one's own thought/belief(worldview) in terms of the re-evaluation of behaviour and/or the historic 'moral concepts' such as good/evil, good/bad, praiseworthy/blameworthy, etc.

Thinking in such terms requires being able to use such terms in some acceptable form or other.

New thought/belief about the societal/familial rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

All new moral thought/belief that knowingly and deliberately goes against the societal grain begins by questioning the truth, veracity, and/or dependability of the morality that one already has.

The ability to do that takes something else. Something aside from the rules we first learn to live by.

In Sapientia's candidate, we could very well have all this and more. So, yeah...

It is possible for one to learn to how to disagree with the morality adopted within his/her/their original worldview.

You’re right, it’s not impossible, if something new is available. — Mww

New thought/belief.

Careful.

Doubting that requires being exposed to something different.
— creativesoul

If this is indubitably the case, you’d have to either find or assume something different in order for the doubt necessary to counter the societal norm to manifest. You won’t be able to find it, because it wasn’t given, and if you assume it, you’re open to accusations of assuming the antecedent.

It should be the case that an offset for the norm is impossible, but you’ll never be granted a successful argument. — Mww

It's not impossible. It does require something new. New correlations between some old things and some new things. Not worth getting into here, but it cannot happen until one first has a baseline from which to doubt/question.

This recent talk about 'universal' and 'truth' and 'moral truth' seems misguided to me.

In the thought experiment, I am white, and so is everyone else in my village. I've never even seen anyone of a different skin colour in person. My culture is very much racist. My parents are racist. But I am not. — S

I'll concede this...

For those capable...

Here we have yet again another position based upon a sore lack of understanding what thought/belief is and how it all works.

All world-views are adopted via language acquisition. Those include morality. Racist morality is adopted. During the initial adoption process(language acquisition), one cannot doubt what they're being taught. Doubt is belief based, and one's first worldview is the ground of doubt. A child borne into a village/culture where everyone is racist cannot doubt what they're being taught.

Doubting that requires being exposed to something different. Sapientia's hypothetical is impossible, despite his certainty.

Where did the hypothetical person's worldview come from Sapientia?

I'm a monkey in a jungle. I've been raised by other monkeys just like me. I'm taught all about the others who are not like us. I learn how to talk and think about us and them. They are not to be admired. None of them. We do not like and/or respect others who are not like us. We do not know any of them either.

I am not us.

In the thought experiment, I am white, and so is everyone else in my village. I've never even seen anyone of a different skin colour in person. My culture is very much racist. My parents are racist. But I am not. — S

Impossible.

Logical possibility alone is insufficient for belief/assent.

Agreed. I’ve yet to experience ontological conditionals as anything but complicating, rather than clarifying. I mean...whatever I’m talking about must already be somehow, and must already relate to what I’m talking about....or I wouldn’t have anything to talk about. AAARRRGGGGG!!!!!! — Mww

What matters is existential dependency...

The distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief is imperative. All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon the latter. Some of them take proper account of that which is not.

It's your nonsense. You explain it.

:wink:

Hume's mistake is conflating simple, rudimentary, and/or basic thought/belief with the linguistically informed/ladened
— creativesoul

Might this hold some relevance to your thought/belief characterization? I’m still working on it, how I might find something comparable in my own mind. (I still need to separate them; it’s my cognitive bias at work....sorry) — Mww

Yes. No apology necessary. The position I argue from/for is not a conventional one.

The very conceptions of 'pure reason' and 'passions' that Hume employs stem from a gross misunderstanding of what all thought/belief consists of and how it all works. The result is clear. His conclusions are false.

“....Certain statements have strong existential implications; we might say that they are 'ontologically loaded." There is a tendency to equate the making of these statements with the making of an ontological commitment. But to do so would be a mistake, one that has prompted Quine to devise a formula to help keep our tendency in check. Quine draws a distinction between linguistic facts and ontological attitudes. The fact is, as Russell and Quine have pointed out, that statements can be meaningful without referring to anything. A person can play with linguistic objects to his or her heart's content without embracing any ontology that might be said to be "included" or "inherent" in the objects. We can tell stories about Pegasus without committing ourselves to its existence. Of course, with certain linguistic entities, the ontological implication can be strong, and the game can be dangerous. These days, we have quite happily accepted the Russell-Quine doctrine, and do not see ontological commitments in statements employing certain linguistic entities. We now accept that we only commit ourselves when we specifically give the variable a value....”
(A. T. Nuyen, 1985)

I personally find the categorization of philosophical subject matters much more of a problem than not. Talking about "ontological implications" is to identify that which is relevant to our classification of certain kinds of thought/belief. It leads nowhere useful if those classifications are grounded upon an inherently inadequate notion of thought/belief.

If one cannot replace the namesake with it's referent and carry on, then one doesn't know what s/he is talking about.

All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

And then we devolve into ad homs...

Wonderful.

From the SEP...

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.

Two ways to use "morality". Both refer to codes of conduct.

Read the link...

The verification of what we're talking about when we are talking about morality is provided by how current and past convention used the term...

If you want to talk about something other than the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, then I suggest that you quit using the term "morality" as a means for doing so. No one will know what you're on about.

Intellectual honesty starts with the ability to admit it when we're wrong.

The first premiss is both true and verifiable. How do you reconcile ignoring truth and/or holding a position that does not square with the way things are?

It seems to me, when Hume said....

“Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions”

.....he should have realized his own words suggest morals are antecedent to passions. And when combined with......

“a passion must be accompany’d with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment”

.....suggests an undefined chronology between an unreasonable passion and the false judgement that goes with it. Is the passion unreasonable because of the false judgement or is there a false judgement because the passion is unreasonable? — Mww

Yes. Hume worked from an utterly inadequate framework, including a sore lack of understanding existential dependency. Again. He was/is not alone.

I'm confused then, I suppose. Did you not quote me and charge the excerpt with ignoring and/or neglect?

Yes, that actually happened.

Three charges of neglect. None true.

When I wrote "non-sequitur" I was drawing your attention to the situation at hand. None of those charges follow from my position. You quoted me, and then aimlessly opened fire. "Non sequitur" was not about your argument, it was about the fallaciousness of your inquiry.
— creativesoul

"Non sequitur" refers to something being stated in the context of an argument as if it follows--that is, as if it is valid, but it actually does not follow, it is not valid.

All you're saying really is that you disagree with me that "Morality is codified rules of behaviour. Code is language" "amounts to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc"--well, we should hope you disagree with that, otherwise you'd be forwarding stances more or less dishonestly, because you'd think that you're ignoring something but you'd not care.

Nevertheless, what you stated amounts to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc. — Terrapin Station

p1.Morality is the codified rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
p2.Codes consist of common language.
C1.Morality consists of common language.
p3.Common language is existentially dependent upon shared meaning.
C2.Morality is existentially dependent upon shared meaning.

Agree or disagree?

Hume's notion of "passions" contradicts that which has happened everyday, and is still happening.

It leads to false conclusions; they do not square with fact. Validity is utterly inadequate for truth. A position can be very complex, very coherent/valid, and arrive at falsehood.

That's just the way it is. I'm not making it up. I'm just pointing it out.

I already have very little reason to believe what you say about Hume. — S

And yet you've been handed more than adequate reason on a silver platter.

Hume is washing down Heraclitus' river...