We humans are equipped with only one cognitive system, whatever its description. — Mww

Could you set it out, this system you speak of?

Anyway......you asked, I answered. Critique as you see fit. — Mww

Seems unnecessarily complex and inherently inadequate all at the same time.

Some groundwork: All understanding, both pure from mere thought with no real object, or empirical from perception which requires real objects... — Mww

Doesn't pure understanding consist of thinking about our own thought/belief?

1) Universal (innate or inherent) if all neurotypical organisms of a particular type possess it. Human examples would include expressions of basic emotion (Plutchik, 1980) and morality (Brown, 1991). So, universal meaning is shared among a species by means of genetic predisposition (nature) rather than communication. — Galuchat

Could you put the first point above in statement form?

Emotional expressions are not equivalent to meaning on my view, so I'm having a bit of trouble understanding how the first point amounts to something other saying "neurotypical" is synonymous with "universal".

We all have emotional expressions. Emotional expressions are universal common denominators regarding all neurotypical humans.

From there, I cannot see the connection to universal meaning.

So, he didn't?

I think I might agree with you that the meaning OF “tree” is the relationship of how the word is used with the physical object it refers to — Noah Te Stroete

At least that’s what I got out of your use of the term “use”. — Noah Te Stroete

Let me clarify a bit. The meaning of the word "tree" is determined exclusively by the entire correlational process that it is an integral part of. We use "tree" to pick something out...

Trees!

That's how we use language - names in particular - to isolate, identify, and begin to think about the referent of the name. The referents all existed in their entirety prior to becoming an integral part of a mental correlation. That's how all meaning works. Sometimes referents are existentially dependent upon language, and sometimes not.


Written words - all alone - are marks on paper. At the end of the universe. Marks do not have locutionary force. Some meaningful language use does. Marks on paper are not accompanied by the facial expressions, intonation, and otherwise physically observable behaviours of the language users involved in verbal communication... Those things determine and establish the forcefulness of a speech act.

One has to look at the language use... as it is happening. A christening event...

Marks do not have facial expressions. Marks do not have behaviour. Some language use is driven by out of control emotion. The meaning of the language use is more than obvious to all who participate in such events. The behaviour was emotionally driven and great discontent was behind the wheel. All language users involved in such emotionally charge interactions draw correlations between the intonation and all the other physical behaviour put on display during the event.

All statements of thought/belief come from a living, thinking, and breathing language user. Unless there is an account such as the one you're reading, without the user there are no correlations being drawn. Where there are no correlations being drawn there is no meaning being attributed. There are common linguistic expressions which cannot be rightly understood unless one watches it happen.

"Shut the front door!"

"Block!"

"Game. Set. Match."

There are good reasons for looking at how language is being used. There are key elements of meaning contained therein.

Next.

Morality...

Everyone has one. The nuance will vary accordingly.

Til next time...

Cheers!

It's a hot mess...

:wink:

Well, Noah I'm not sure how long you've been interested in philosophy, but this particular topic is not at all one that is simple to understand. Academia has, for multiple reasons throughout history, caused it to be much more confusing and complex than it actually is. On top of that, the rhetoric lovers tend to invoke it for less than honourable reasons/purposes. At least, that's my opinion...

The relation aspect is crucial to grasp.

I find it helpful to avoid talking in terms of "the meaning of X" is...

Earlier I offered a bit on that.

The referent of the word "tree" is a tree. The meaning of the word "tree" is determined solely by virtue of correlations drawn between it and something else.

A language-less creature can learn that touching fire causes pain, by virtue of touching it, feeling the resulting pain and drawing a correlation between it's own behaviour and what followed. The creature has correctly attributed/recognized causality. The fire becomes meaningful and/or significant to the creature by virtue of the very same method and/or process that it becomes meaningful to us, the first time we touch it.

That creature cannot share it's own thought/belief about the fire and pain, and yet everyone who has been burned by touching fire has drawn the same correlations. We can talk about it.

What would meaning that cannot be shared amount to? — creativesoul

Correlations drawn between different things by a language less creature. Correlations drawn between different things by a language user, but not understood by the user.

We use the term "tree" to talk about trees. When a plurality of people draw a correlation, association, and or connection between the term and trees, meaning is shared and language use can ensue. The use of "tree" can then be a means for successful reference. Shared meaning.

shared meaning requires a plurality of language users.
— creativesoul
...but here, how does shared meaning differ from meaning? A meaning that has not been shared... a meaning that cannot be shared?

So, what is it that is being shared between language users? To answer "meaning" is not at all helpful nor informative.
— creativesoul

One thing that's important to clarify re "shared meaning" is whether someone is positing (1) one "thing" that's multiply present--a la the traditional concept of universals, where there's a solitary universal that somehow obtains in multiple things, (2) multiple "things" that are somehow the same (somehow identical despite not being numerically identical), or simply (3) something that can be observed by multiple people--sharing in the "show and tell" sense.
— Terrapin Station


Not like that... — Banno

Nope. Not like that.

There are plenty of situations where "shared meaning" could be replaced with "meaning".

The questions about meaning that has not been shared and/or cannot be shared may yield something useful and/or interesting.

Shared meaning must be shareable. That's obvious. We do that with language use. What would meaning that cannot be shared amount to?

I think that that's what you're after? Maybe?

And then there is the question in the OP: what exactly is the external thing? — Pattern-chaser

Meaning is neither external nor internal. It consists of both. It is existentially dependent upon both. What is being shared, can be, as a result of this.

The association in the mind between the word “tree” and the thing, trees. — Noah Te Stroete

That is what the meaning of "tree" amounts to, although the 'in the mind' part is unacceptable on my view. It presupposes spatiotemporal location. Meaning is not the sort of thing that has one, for it is a composite, a complex 'entity', of which a mind is not always necessary, unless one is willing to call the most rudimentary basic thought/belief such.

A mind, to me, requires being mindful... rudimentary level thought/belief doesn't have what it takes.

Well you said that meaning is what words refer to. "Tree" is a word. It does not refer to meaning. It refers to trees.

The last reply of yours is heading in the right direction.

This is why he posited thinking about thinking, as the most virtuous, divine activity — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting... He did?

Have a link?

Trees are meaning?

We discover the meaning by seeing the use they are put to, which is to coordinate action. We see that the meaning is shared by observing that the assistant presents and the builder is satisfied with what is presented in harmony with the word use. If there was a misunderstanding, or a mis hearing, one would see the disharmony that resulted as slab was thrown back at the assistant , along with some remonstration. — unenlightened

Yes. We discover the meaning by knowing what correlations are being made between the language use and other things.

Both builder and assistant draw correlations between the language use, the builder's wants/demands, and the block or slab. That is how meaning is shared. That is how it happens. We discover that meaning is shared, and learn what the language use means, by virtue of watching the language use in action or actually participating in it ourselves.

Is "tree" a word?

Meaning is shared only insofar as the context demands. Even words that seemed to create shared meaning in one context may, when used in a different context, demonstrate that the meaning was never shared to begin with.

Yelling "slab" may get a house built, but it could just be that in the context of a construction site, it was sufficient for the yeller to mean "hand me what is next on the pile" and the receiver to have understood the word to mean "hand me the hard rock thing cut into a manageable shape." — xzJoel

Indeed. This highlights whether or not we actually do share meaning, or at least questions the exactitude of doing so, or if there can even be such a thing.

The same terminological use can have different meaning depending upon the situation. This shows the importance of context in the attribution/recognition of meaning.

“Meaning” is what words, thoughts, representations, etc. refer to. My two cents. — Noah Te Stroete

The term "tree" does not refer to meaning.

I think this has a lot to do with the bidirectional nature of shared speech. I utter some words, and I intend for them to carry a particular meaning. You hear my words, and you discern from them a meaning. But the meaning I intend and the meaning you receive might be two quite different things. I think this is the core of the sharing question. — Pattern-chaser

Very good. Point well made, and quite relevant to the OP.

The only thing that seems problematic to me is talking in terms of "receiving meaning". Meaning, it seems to me, is not the sort of thing that one can receive. Rather, meaning is attributed, and I would say that the misattribution of meaning is often if not always the source of confusion and/or misunderstanding, particularly regarding an other's terminological/word use.

It’s what facilitates cooperation within social groups. It primarily requires shared values and goals. — praxis

Hmmmm...

It would seem to me that there are at least some values that cannot be conceived and/or agreed upon without meaning. If shared meaning requires shared values and goals, then shared values and goals would have to be prior to shared meaning.

I've read you enough to conclude that I've misunderstood. Can you help me out here? How does shared meaning require shared values and goals?

"What is it and what do you need?

This, of course, requires value. In general, we talk about language users when discussing common concepts. It is safe to say that many language users need general purposes.


If so, what is common to language users? The answer to "meaning" is usually not useful.

What do you say;"

___

The 'purified' version of the question. English - >Korean - >Russian - >Greek - >Finnish - >English.

I think it makes just as little sense as the original. — Isaac

Are you disagreeing that meaning is shared?

...what is it that is being shared between language users? — creativesoul

Understanding. — Mww

Can we unpack this a little bit more? While I would not disagree at all that there are times and situations where sharing meaning creates a bridge of mutual understanding, so to speak. I'm hesitant about the consequences of sticking to that equivalence. If we claim that sharing meaning is sharing understanding, we're faced with a bit of a problem when a listener completely understands and readily agrees with what a speaker is saying but what's been said amounts to falsehood.

Certainly meaning is shared here. Can understanding consist of falsehood?

Can I understand that Trump places what's best for the average American citizen above and beyond his own personal interests? I think not, although I can readily understand what the sentence means. I know what it would take in order for it to be true. So, in such cases the meaning is certainly shared, but I'm quite hesitant to say in such cases that understanding has been as well.

With regard to shared (intersubjective) meaning, whether communicated verbally, or non-verbally:

1) Communication requires message vocabulary and syntax which is understood by both message source and destination.

2) Semantic message encoding and decoding requires knowledge of the code used, corresponding mental representations, and the communication context.

3) A semantic message may be encoded differently and have the same meaning in each code.

In addition to intersubjective (social group) meaning, there is also: universal (innate or inherent), subjective (personal), and unknown meaning. — Galuchat

You've named some different kinds of meaning. Would you elaborate a bit upon universal and unknown meaning?

One thing that's important to clarify re "shared meaning" is whether someone is positing (1) one "thing" that's multiply present--a la the traditional concept of universals, where there's a solitary universal that somehow obtains in multiple things, (2) multiple "things" that are somehow the same (somehow identical despite not being numerically identical), or simply (3) something that can be observed by multiple people--sharing in the "show and tell" sense.

Note that neither (1) nor (2) can be held by nominalists, although (2) is maybe not too far removed from trope nominalism if we don't insist on identity. — Terrapin Station

Are those the only three options?

There are a variety of different language-games, as Wittgenstein notes at §23 of PI, but one thing that may be shared between language users across at least some of those language-games is behaviours or actions. The obvious example is giving and acting upon orders or requests, where the speaker uses (or behaves with) language to elicit the desired behaviours of the hearer(s). In this case, knowing the meaning of the speaker's words is knowing how to behave/act in response.

I doubt that this "answer" fits all uses of language, as there is probably more than one answer depending on the use. — Luke

Yes. Language can be used for many things, and saying "Block!" is to use language as a means for acquiring something. I think it safe to say that if the helper/listener brings something else, then the meaning was not shared/understood. The meaning of "Block!" is the mental correlation between the language use and something else. In this instance, the something else is a particular entity/object and it's being given to the speaker after the language use.

The insight of Witt, it seems to me, focuses upon the context surrounding language use and what it shows us. It helps differentiate between different senses of the same term. "Block" without the builder's context does have the same locutionary force. It's more of a namesake only.

Bald assertions do not garner much warrant when they conflict with sound argument/reasoning.

Language use is existentially dependent upon shared meaning.

My position adequately accounts for both.

Like one's thought/belief about the world and/or one's self.

Whenever it is not part of a correlation drawn between it and something other than it.

I'm unsure what to do to help.

I'm referring to the fact that not all speech words, written words, linguistic thoughts and thought images, actual images, literal symbols, signs, etc....

None of those always refers. There are other times when they all do.

I suppose I meant to say “symbols”, not “symbolism”. Speech words, written words, linguistic thoughts and thought images, actual images, literal symbols, signs, etc. What these things refer to are their meanings. Physical objects, a rock for example, has no meaning on its own. — Noah Te Stroete

Not all symbols refer.

Conventional theories of meaning presuppose symbolism.

Meaning is what symbolism refers to. — Noah Te Stroete

Is symbolism a name?