You've claimed that empathy cannot lead to better understanding people.

That's one thing you're wrong about.


You've claimed that no one can empathize with and/or understand a group of people because they are all different people with different personal experiences, or some such...

That's another thing you're wrong about.

You should know, because I'm telling you. What I'm telling you is true. It is about my understanding of thought/belief compared to what you've written here regarding thought/belief. Thus, if you believe me, then you'll know.

...when I talk about "feelings" re what we're doing when we make utterances about morality, I'm talking about "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour." — Terrapin Station

Feelings are not thought/belief.

I would be willing to bet that what you claim here cannot pass the test of salva veritate. That is, if what you say here is true, then one ought be able to replace all your use of the term "feelings" with "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" in all the situations where you are making utterances about morality, and the transformation not suffer any loss of meaning. I seriously doubt that that would be the case...

That's irrelevant really.

Do you want to get into concepts? I would argue that all concepts are existentially dependent upon language. All concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not everything conceived of is.

Morality, as it is conventionally understood is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. That's the basic conventional conception. Here I would argue that we already have some crude unrefined thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour long prior to learning how to talk about it. It would only follow that thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is prior to our conception(s) called "morality". We form and hold such thought/belief prior to our ability to describe our thought/belief.

Ok. so we both know that we work from different linguistic frameworks. The words "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" has a different referent on your view than mine. That may not cause issue. We are aware of it.

Concepts then...

I claim that they are all existentially dependent upon language. The concept of morality is no different. All concepts are. You say otherwise.

Let's flesh it out keeping it relevant to morality.

What is that supposed to mean? You don't have the answers you thought you did and you lack the humility to admit it? Or you are like a hungry lion who decided his prey is too much of an effort? — Judaka

Nah. Some things aren't worth pursuing. One who does not comprehend the words he reads isn't worth arguing with. You've quoted numerous things and then asked questions that were answered within the quote.

Meh.

All moralities are existentially dependent upon trusting the truthfulness of another.

Sincerity matters to everyone.

Meaning matters to everyone.

When one promises to plant rose garden, there ought be a rose garden planted, not because one ought keep one's word(which they ought), but rather because that is precisely what the promise means when spoken sincerely. That is not a vote of approval/disapproval coming from me. Rather, it is quite simply stating the way promises work in common language. That's what making a promise means.

Contentment and/or discontentment first happens autonomously. Thought/belief first happens autonomously. Emotions first happen autonomously. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour first happens autonomously. Wants first drive us autonomously. Needs first drive us autonomously. We first figure out ways to get what we want autonomously. Trust first happens autonomously. Truth is presupposed autonomously. Trusting the truthfulness of the teacher first happens autonomously.

One cannot even suppose that another is lying unless s/he already has a worldview. During initial language acquisition, one does not. There is no ability for such a student to be able to doubt much of anything that they're being taught, including social mores, customs, value systems, etc.

All of these things are true of each and every one of us, regardless of that which is subject to familial, historical, social, cultural, and/or other particulars.

Is this relevant to moral discourse?

It certainly serves as ground to reject contradictory claims/positions.

It certainly places a more appropriate amount of value upon sincerity. Every worldview is existentially dependent upon all these things. These things are all necessary elemental constituents of all world-views.

...thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul

When I talk about feelings in a moral context the above is what I'm referring to. So it's simply using different terms to refer to the same thing. — Terrapin Station

The above is a textbook example of a situation where an author's ground is purely imaginary. That's not totally unacceptable, unless it is ground for positive assertions that mistakenly presuppose understanding another's language use. You've done exactly that.

The irony here is thick.

You've no idea what the use of "thought/belief" entails on my view. Since you cannot know that, you cannot know that your talk about feelings in a moral context points to and/or further describes the same referent(s) as my notion of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

I can assure you that it does not.

You denied shared meaning in a debate with me on another forum(hence - the source of irony), maybe a year ago? Unless you've changed positions since that debate, our respective positions are irreconcilable. If that still holds good - if you still deny shared meaning - there is no possible way to reconcile your view with mine, for I am committed to a notion of thought and belief that quite simply is incommensurate with such a denial.

You may be lucky and guess what "thought/belief" entails on my view, but you cannot possibly know that - as of right now - either.

When I talk about feelings in a moral context the above is what I'm referring to. So it's simply using different terms to refer to the same thing.

In short...

The above is false.

Observing that pre-linguistic humans find certain behaviours unacceptable.
— creativesoul

Ah, so not agreeing that concepts are (necessarily) linguistic becomes important here. — Terrapin Station

Even more important is what counts as being necessary.

Meh.

I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul

That's simply terminological whims. The different terms aren't picking out different phenomena. They're simply different terms. — Terrapin Station

No. You're mistaken. If the terms picked out the same things, I wouldn't have an issue. They don't, so I do.

We don't agree re concepts being language constructs, but what I'm interested in is what you're taking to be evidence of morality existing outside of/prior to the concept of it. — Terrapin Station

Observing that pre-linguistic humans find certain behaviours unacceptable.

Are you making a general statement about belief in things and things in and of themselves or do you want to say that the idea or concept of God, specifically, is set up so that there is no difference between belief in God and God? — Echarmion

The latter.

This is the quintessential problem of empathising with "groups" or "categories of people", you have to ignore the millions of differences that exist within the group. That's good enough for you, not for me. — Judaka

This is absurd. Patently.

The differences are not what makes them a group. Rather, it is the similarities... Thus, ignoring the differences is required to even identify the group. It is certainly required to understand their plight, whatever it may be that binds them all together as a group.

I mean, when one empathizes with the homeless, one is considering the common problems of the homeless, and perhaps some possible solutions to help them suffer less. One doesn't get into personal individual particulars to empathize with the group of homeless. One does that to better understand a specific case.

Worldviews do not transcend anything... — Judaka

Oh, but they do. They consist of words. Words are meaningful. Meaning transcends the language user... most certainly.

...you have difficulty stepping into the shoes of someone else and seeing the world from their perspective.
— Joshs

Nobody can do this, not me, not you, nobody. It's your imagination at play. — Judaka

Why not?

If I understand the words another uses, how am I not seeing the world from their perspective?

What else would it take to do so?

Need I jump inside their head and look out at the world through their eyes, literally?

You have a long way to go. There are all sorts of things problematic with your worldview here. Far too much to take to task in one year, let alone one session here.

Empathy is the ability to recognize another's suffering/distress/discontent. That begins the road to better understanding others. Putting yourself in another's shoes requires more than just simple empathy. However, that is not to say that it is not a great tool that can be used for doing so. Just that it is not enough all by itself.

So, I'm not really disagreeing with some of what you're saying. I'm more or less pointing out that just because empathy alone is insufficient, it does not follow that it is not necessary for understanding another in the ways you've outlined. It does not follow that it is not a tool that can be used to better understand others. It's just not the only tool. Intellectualism in and of itself isn't either, by the way.

I don't know why you would want to avoid talk about feeling. Compassion and empathy are fundamentally feelings no matter how conceptually elaborated they might be. — Janus

I agree that without emotion there is neither compassion nor empathy. Emotion is necessary but insufficient for both. It takes thought/belief about another's situation/circumstance... understanding unspoken cues(facial expressions like wincing in pain, etc). Thought/belief like that includes emotion, as does thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Most talk about 'feelings' I find very unhelpful.

Nothing there that I would balk at... I just avoid the 'feeling' talk. I think it is no where near as nuanced as it need be. But yeah, I agree that compassion/empathy matters.

I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. These would include 'feelings', simple emotions. 'Feelings' are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief, moral thought/belief notwithstanding.

Moral injunctions seem a bit too complex for a pre-linguistic human. Although, I am attempting to provide a basis from which such complexities 'grow'...

Sorry, what do you think is misinformed? You said that empathy allows us to see "pain" in others and see that pain in ourselves, we feel their pain. — Judaka

Your expectation of empathy, and now your recounting of my words. I said no such thing.

If what counts as being real is having an effect/affect, then of course God is real.

What's the difference however, as a matter of elemental constitution, between belief in God and God?

None as far as I can tell.

Google formal debate fallacies. There's many. Opt for an academic sourced list.

To put it bluntly anyone who has an articulated opinion such that they are beyond good and evil or that they are nihilists sort of betrays in that act that they are more interested in right and wrong than most people are. — Moliere

Like a performative contradiction, yeah?

The Great Moustache was most certainly more obsessed with the God of Abraham than many believers.

I don't think it's fair to say empathy is responsible for being intellectually aware of the existence and nature of something like "heartache" or whatever else. — Judaka

So don't say that. I sure didn't.

I don't know what you disagree with. — Judaka

Read the post again. Look at what I quoted.

In general, I'm disagreeing with the criterion you're holding empathy to. While it seems evident that there are some aspects of understanding another that empathy - all by itself - simply cannot provide. However, even in those cases, in is a great way to start. Thus, it is a good tool.

What sort of understanding do you expect empathy to help provide one with?

Empathy is not about understanding one's socio-economic background, personality, or whatever...

It's about knowing how other people are feeling, knowing what they're going through, whether it be heartache, anxiety, suffering, death of a loved one, etc.

All humans go through these things. Expecting empathy to provide some sort of different understanding is quite the misguided expectation.

Empathy promises unrealistic results - even the idea of using it face-to-face implies intuitively understanding things you have no means to understand - you can only imagine. — Judaka

This is a bit misinformed.

In a face to face with someone you've never met, if you witness them in pain, you'll know it. Mirror neurons. If you witness them in pain and it makes you 'sad' for them, or want to help eliminate their suffering, then you'd be empathizing. If you witness them in pain and give it no further thought, or even laugh and/or make jokes about it, you're not.

So you believe that concepts somehow exist prior to people constructing them? — Terrapin Station

No. All concepts are language constructs. I hold that not everything conceived of is. Some concepts have referents that exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. Morality is one such thing. Truth(as correspondence) another. Meaning yet another. Thought/belief as well.

So there is no morality beyond conceived morality? — Janus

Rather, our conventional notions/conceptions of morality are constructs of language. All conceptions of morality involve in some way or other what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. I would argue that we already have some crude sense of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour prior to language acquisition.

Morality, at the very least, definitely has an artificial aspect. We came up with "good" and "bad", moral language, moral rules, moral principles, etc. We came up with moral concepts. — S

We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial.

Trees come to mind as an obvious example, or rocks, if you prefer. These are obviously not equivalent to our notions/conceptions of them, obviously not artificial. They are physical things. Only a moron would think that they are existentially dependent upon our names for them, or that they were artificial.

However, there are other things that are not physical objects that we've named, talked about, conceived, and misconceived even. Human thought and belief is one such thing. Morality consists entirely thereof. Thus, if one does not understand the former, there can be little hope of understanding the latter.

Our moral concepts, ideas, rules, and principles can be mistaken/false.

Here's a problem I find common when people are discussing morality. The use of the term "moral" quite often is being used in different senses by different people. The results aren't as productive as they could be. Some use "moral" as a means to indicate judgment/approval. Others use it to indicate a particular class or kind.

As a term of judgment, it is equivalent to what the user finds good/acceptable. It indicates an approval according to their own moral belief system. I most often use it to refer to a particular class or kind of thought, belief, and/or statement. This is commonly done by everyone using the phrase "moral discourse" to indicate the subject matter. I also just classified a kind of belief(moral belief system) earlier in this very paragraph.

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is. — Baden

Perhaps it might boil down to someone, somewhere, offering a better - more adequate - definition(delineation). That would need to include how it emerges unbeknownst to us at the time(because it does), and be capable of explaining how it evolves over time(because it does).

There needs to be a universally relevant, rightfully applicable account of that which underwrites all of the subjective particulars 'across the board'. That which is most important to us all. I've always held that that was to be gleaned through careful examination of language acquisition itself, including how all of us adopt our first worldview, replete with our first moral belief system.

We can even dig a bit deeper than that, and be justified in doing so.

Ethics is a synonym for morality. — Terrapin Station

Well it is in layman's terms, not typically in philosophical circles though, I would venture to guess...

Typically, as I understand it, the difference between morality and ethics, is that ethics involves what to do when we're faced with conflicting moralities(conflicting belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour).

I also think there's a significant difference between saying that morality consists in rules and saying that it consists in judgements. — Janus

Indeed. It consists in part of both. It consists entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and(mostly) behaviour including but most certainly not limited to statements thereof.

Some conceptions are of that which exist in their entirety prior to being conceived.
— creativesoul

It's a mystery to me what that might be saying/what it might amount to. — Terrapin Station

In short... we discover some things. Moreover, that which is discovered exists in it's entirety upon it's discovery. That is not to say that no thing discovered evolves afterwards. All things do and morality 'grows' solely by virtue of it's constitution(thought/belief). Morality existed, in a much less 'refined' way(compared to historical and current moral discourse), prior to our naming and talking about it.

There's much to be learned along such lines of thought.

Never mind the rest, it was poorly put.

Maybe a later day...

You mentioned concepts. I suggest that you be a bit better prepared to defend the notion next time.

I don't find your claim that goodness is a thing that's conceived of that's not linguistic disagreeable enough to pursue an argument against it. — S

Good.

I asked you to give me an example of what you meant when you said that "not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions" to help me understand what you're getting at. I brought up a rock, but that didn't seem relevant. You still don't seem to have provided an example. You instead seem to want to skip ahead and pursue your own agenda, turning this back around on me, responding to a question with another question which redirects, which I find quite annoying. — S

I was getting at the question of method.

Some conceptions are of that which exist in their entirety prior to being conceived. That holds for goodness. Thus, we find ourselves asking the question, or a similar one...

If goodness were nothing more than our own personal like/dislikes or something similar that arises from metacognitive endeavors, then it would be existentially dependent upon language, as would our knowledge of it. There would be no difference.

There is.

All for it. I'm not holding my breath for anything new. Has yet to have come.

Terrapin denies shared meaning. A fatal flaw that is contradictory to everyday events. I have negated his position, which falls apart at the seams, by virtue of establishing how shared meaning works. Another forum... but...

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it?
— creativesoul

No, please just clarify what you meant. — S

I did. All conceptions are linguistic. Not everything conceived of is. Goodness is one such thing.

So, the trick is as old as many a historical debate. How do we distinguish between our conceptions and what we're conceiving of? If you cannot answer the question, then you cannot know how to acquire knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and describing it.

How do we know if or that something exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it?

The objective/subjective dichotomy fails here, and regarding many things that consist of both and are thus neither.