You can communicate the same meaning in different languages. If meaning were bound to a language, this wouldn't be possible. — MindForged

Well, it could be if meaning were bound to language as compared/contrasted to "a" language.

Although, I do not hold such a position. At least not all meaning. Some meaning most certainly is bound to language. Such meaning transcends the individual speaker, but clearly does not transcend the regular language use itself.

Dead language is a dead culture. Colonialism and Jeeezus are adequate proof of that. Bibles translated into native tongues were often very useful tools in converting a community of speakers into English speakers. Where translation failed meaning was lost... entire cultures dead right alongside the last remaining speaker...

There are enough actual cases where something in one language cannot be effectively translated into another due to the unspoken contextual content bearing upon that meaningful expression. All of the correlations, associations, and/or connections therein(the unspoken context) combine to help create familial, cultural, social particulars... including idioms, colloquialisms, and that sort of thing. The literal translation cannot possibly account for the meaning in the original language. This is true of different dialects of the same language as well.

The fact that some expressions in one language have equivalent expressions in another doesn't bear the burden you need to carry the case. It's a bit more nuanced than that. It's all about thought/belief.

Meaning is not equivalent to a proposition to begin with. It doesn't follow from the fact that meaning transcends an individual speaker that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language.

You're not really making the case for your conclusion though. If propositions were somehow dependent on language, then as I said you would be committed to the view that before language existed humans had no beliefs. You said beliefs are Propositional in nature in your OP ("All thought/belief are propositional in their content."), so I don't see how you are supposed to be avoiding the absurd conclusion that humans once lacked beliefs entirely. — MindForged

The OP sets out a few examples of logical fictions. That particular absurdity is one that I've not seen any common school of thought avoid without asserting that propositions are somehow independent of language. I've noticed you've taken that route as well.

I avoid the absurd conclusion while maintaining that propositions are existentially dependent upon language. I haven't put arguments for my position out in this thread. but they are in some of my others, if you'd like to look. That's not the purpose here so much as taking proper account of logical fictions, although it often becomes necessary depending upon progress.

If different designators can pick out the same entity, then the content of these terms are not linguistic in nature because they transcend any particular utterance as they can be picked out by any appropriate one. Whether "The Sun is red" or "Taiyo wa akai", the same meaning is expressed. Meaning is not identical to language. Language is a vehicle by which to communicate meaning. — MindForged

Yeah, that makes little to no sense to me. I mean, I acknowledge the issue that you're trying to avoid, but do not see how you have.

"The content of these terms"

What is that?

The referents? The meaning?

Are propositions equivalent to meaning?

I reject the last claim. There are all sorts of way to use language that are not communicating meaning.

Can you answer this question? "Planet Earth is blue" refers to what?
A: Earth.
B: Planet Earth being blue.
C: Other. — Purple Pond

That question is based upon a misunderstanding of what and how reference works...

You're conflating a few things here. "Planet Earth" refers to a particular celestial body that we've named "Earth". "Blue" refers to a particular visible wavelength that we've named "blue".

"Planet Earth is blue" doesn't refer to anything. It uses pre-existing names and their referents to say something about the one.

"It" is a pronoun. Pronouns stand in as proxy for nouns. Nouns are persons, places, or things. "It" refers to a person, place, or thing, if for no other reason than that's just a matter of how English works people. It's not mysterious...

:worry:

When talking about the statement "It is raining", the term "it" refers to the current events/state of affairs/what's happening/etc. We all know this to be true. That's why we look outside to check to see if it is the case...

Validity is one aspect or test of an argument, truth a different test. Why expect two different tests to function the same? — tim wood

Why think that I am? :yikes:

There's some conflation between a report and what is being reported upon hereabouts.

I don't think 'What's happening at this time' is a subject that you can refer to because a subject is one word. — Purple Pond

Actual events aren't. That is what is being referred to.

:roll:

...what do you say truth means... — tim wood

That is answered by virtue of how the term is used.

That was referring to propositional truth(true statements).

beliefs are generally understood as propositional in nature... — MindForged

I think that that is a mistake too. I mean, I'm not denying that that's how they are generally conceived/understood/thought about, but that that understanding is more of a misunderstanding.

...it is often said that the same proposition can be expressed by different sentences, even ones in different languages. — MindForged

Here the term "proposition" is mistakenly separated from language.

Different languages can say much the same thing because they can use different designators to pick out the same entities and/or draw the same correlations between these things.

Different names, same referent.

It does not follow from the fact that different languages can say much the same thing(express the same proposition) that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language.

All propositions are predication. All predication is linguistic. All propositions are linguistic.

Can we judge the truth of a sentence without understanding it?

No.

Can we understand a sentence without the referring in a sentence being completed?

No.

Referring is independent of truth. Truth depends on referring being complete. — TheMadFool

I would concur up until the last claim, but find issues with it regarding two different senses of "truth".

One need not understand a propositional truth(true proposition) in order for it to be true.

A rudimentary thought/belief can be both meaningful and true without ever being spoken and/or otherwise uttered. Successful reference is existentially dependent upon language. Either truth and meaning are not or true thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon either truth or meaning.

Statements like: It is raining. It's my birthday. It's 20 miles to New Jersey. These are all possibly true statements without a reference. — Purple Pond

Not sure what you mean by "without a reference"...

"It's raining" refers to what is happening at the time. It's talking about actual events. It's what we say when water is falling from the sky in a particular form.

"It's my birthday" refers to a particular calendar day(the day of year that the speaker was born). Typically, when said it is referring to the day when it is being spoken. One could be talking about that particular day on another.

"It's twenty miles to New Jersey" refers to the distance between New Jersey and something else. Typically, one when something like that is said, the speaker is talking about the distance from where they are when speaking to New Jersey.

How do words refer? — Purple Pond

Not all words do. Names can.

All successful reference is picking out an individual entity to the exclusion of all others solely by virtue of shared meaning. What is referred to is the referent. The method of referring is language. Naming practices start it all.

Well, Kripke relies on actual practices, and it seems than nearly all who oppose what he's claiming here, which isn't some grand replacement theory but a better account of actual examples, work from logical fictions...

What the OP asserts as the primary methods of successful reference, are two commonly argued for.

Many folk will conclude that names(and thus naming practices) are not necessary for successful reference, because some actual and many written examples do not include names or obvious naming practices. Such cases are actual examples of descriptive practices being used for successful reference. Many of these - particularly the arguments here - are steeped in naming practices. That would be to successfully refer to that which had been already named and described.

Our notions of successful reference.

If the criterion for what counts as being "not necessary" is satisfied merely by virtue of what a written report of an actual example does not include, then then it would only follow that no description used for successful reference is existentially dependent upon it's referent.

That cannot be right.

I've demonstrated that your framework is inadequate and perpetuates confusion, yet you appear to be uninterested. So be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've not used the framework in the OP. Rather, you've used your own. It has been shown problematic by both of us...

Well, if you want your reference to be successful, I suggest you convince me that you do, in fact, have a cat which you have named Cookie. At this point, I truly believe that this is imaginary, so your reference is far from successful. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reference has clearly succeeded. You believe Cookie is an imaginary thing. You're mistaken about that, but you do use the name "Cookie" to pick out my cat, nonetheless...

Let me get this straight. You claim to have named something. I claim that the thing named is non-existent. Now you claim that you have successfully directed my attention toward this thing which I do not even believe exists. How do you propose that I have focused my attention on something which I do not even believe exists? — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the name of the thing you're talking about here?

Oh, yeah!

"Cookie"...

I'm not interested in self-perpetuated confusion by virtue of inadequate framework.

If you have an example of successful reference which does not include what I've set out, I'd like to see it. If you do not, then all you've done is gratuitously assert a contrary position... and a groundless one at that.

Well, if you want your reference to be successful, I suggest you convince me that you do, in fact, have a cat which you have named Cookie. At this point, I truly believe that this is imaginary, so your reference is far from successful.

You have successfully directed my attention to a subject, a matter for discussion, (an imaginary cat named Cookie) but you have not directed my attention toward any physical object or living creature. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need not believe that I have a cat named Cookie in order for you to be referring to her by name. You may think/believe that my cat is an imaginary one. You're still talking about my cat.

So, I believe that all of your objections have been adequately answered, despite the fact that not all of them deserved to be.

Do you have an actual example of a language less creature successfully referring by virtue of pointing alone?

If not, there's no reason to continue this charade. Nothing you've said here is a problem for the OP.

Would you rather talk about my ducks? We have Don Juan, Esther, Hattie, Lily, Fiona, Luis, Rudy, and BlackJack. We have others that we've not named.

And yet you speak of her!
— creativesoul

If that's what you call "successful reference" then I strongly disagree. I can speak about a cat named Cookie till the end of my life, but that doesn't mean I'm referring to any real living animal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all successful reference by naming practices picks out living animals Meta. Cookie is my cat though; one of them...

Invoking the subject/object dichotomy results in the inability to take account of successful reference, for it consists of both, and is thus neither...

The problems you speak of are the consequence of the framework you're using.

I actually don't even believe that you have a cat named "Cookie". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your belief isn't necessary... clearly.

I think you've just brought this idea up, "my cat named Cookie", as a subject for discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you're equivocating the term "subject". That's unacceptable.

Now you're getting to the point. I have not focused my attention on any physical creature named "Cookie". You don't seem to be getting that. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet you speak of her!

You have not used "Cookie" to refer to an object, because you have not shown me that a creature who bears that name even exists, so it is impossible that you have successfully referenced an object named "Cookie". — Metaphysician Undercover

This mistakenly presupposes that you must see Cookie in order to focus your attention on her. You haven't and yet you have.

Actual life trumps haphazard notions Meta... or at least, it should.

It's impossible according to your notion. It's actually happening though. Are the actual events mistaken, or your notion? I'd definitely go with the latter.

So tell me, how were you using "Cookie"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Pay closer attention. I've been answering this question thoroughly throughout our discussion here.

"Cookie" is the name of my cat. It's also the name of my favorite treat. It's not a cat treat, although Cookie has her favorites too.

The problem I explained to you, is that the same name refers to two kinds of referent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a problem. It's a feature of common language, of name usage. "Apple" refers to several different kinds of things. All of them are referents. "Meta" is the same.

The aim is not to reconcile different positions. Rather, it is to exhaust them all.

No puzzle or mystery...

Rather, just a whole lot of incommensurate positions involving meaning, sense, and/or reference, and all that those entail...

Talking about something does not qualify as successful reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you realize how self-defeating this is?

First, 1) is impossible, because I cannot direct your attention to something simply by naming it. This would require that you already know the name of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

First claim is false. The second provides how.

Next, 2) is highly unlikely, as you say. So we get to the others, 3-6 which are various combinations of naming and describing, and this is what language use generally is, acts which combine naming and describing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of both objects and subjects...

Your OP conflates with ambiguity, two distinct types of referring, referring to a subject and referring to an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Referring is referring. A subject is not an object. Subjects and objects are referred to in the manner laid out in the OP. That is two distinct names for different 'kinds' of referent, not different kinds of referring. A referent is what is picked out of this world by the designator/sign/symbol. Names and descriptions are designators.

Objects are named and described, as well as subjects.

Poisoning the well and/or fortune telling aren't acceptable here. If I use the same term in two different senses in the same argument, then we''ll address it accordingly. The baseless charge that it may happen if I do not use your framework is not at all compelling.

The subject/object distinction is utterly incapable of accounting for that which consists of both, and is thus neither... meaning is one such thing. Successful reference is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Thus, the object/subject distinction cannot properly take account of successful reference for it consists of both, and is thus neither.

The op directs my attention toward naming and describing, neither of which is essential to reference. So I'd say that the op is a failed attempt at directing my attention toward the concept of "reference". — Metaphysician Undercover

There is more than one conception of reference. Your disagreement does not render the conception in the OP mistaken. The fact that you work from a different notion than I has no bearing upon the explanatory power and/or verifiability/falsifiability of the one I'm presenting in the OP.

Things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them are not existentially dependent upon our account. We can get those things wrong by definition alone.

Successfully drawing another's attention to the same thing that one's is already upon is something that happens long before we begin taking account of those everyday events. Successful reference consists of things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of it.

You've gotten that wrong.

Your notion draws a false equivalence between showing and referring. Some cases of successful reference most certainly involve naming, describing, and showing. We can observe that as it is happening. You deny what actually takes place, by definition alone.

I could walk into the room, cat tucked under arm thoroughly enjoying her ears being scratched, and say "Hey Meta, wanna see my cat Cookie?"

Your notion denies that that is a case of successful reference.

Cookie is not under my arm...

Positing a product of one's own imagination as though it is something that has some kind of justificatory value above and beyond actual everyday events is insane.

When one's notion of successful reference includes, admits, and/or allows it to happen where there has never been naming practices and/or descriptive practices, then one carries an unbearable burden. There are no actual examples of a one creature drawing an other's attention to the same thing when dealing with language less creatures.

If that does not constitute adequate reason to think/believe that successful reference is existentially dependent upon common language then nothing can...

It certainly depends upon shared meaning.