What is a counterfactual existentially dependent on to successfully refer to it? — Wallows

Some notions of counterfactual are rubbish. Simply put, being counter to fact is existentially dependent upon prior facts.

What problems of reference and sense?

:joke:

Worst case, pointing is part of naming.

Directing one's attention by virtue of pointing is language use. Sign language is language. I'm not sure whether or not pointing alone guarantees that the listener and speaker are picking out the same thing. That is required for successful reference. Pointing alone is flimsy and my position allows it either way.

it is simply a matter of directing one's attention. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no issue with my premisses. I said "perhaps". Originally I included "arguably"... It doesn't matter unless pointing alone is sufficient/adequate for a case of successful reference.

...you're basically making the point I was trying to make. Two uses of the term 'Nixon' can be used in different senses, and so saying that any use applied to one must apply to the other is not necessarily accurate. — Isaac

I don't think we were making the same point.

You're talking about the rules of thinking about thought/belief:What we're doing here... now... You're then applying that to all reference and/or sense. Some of that is prior to your account, ya know? The methodological/terminological framework you've adopted cannot take that into account.

I'm talking about what all successful reference takes and applying that standard to the differing positions actively taking account of reference at any level.

Sense, on my view, is equivalent to accepted usage. Some of the same terminological expressions mean different things to different people. These are different senses. Sense is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Shared meaning is existentially dependent upon two creatures drawing mental correlations between the same things. That is existentially dependent upon a plurality of capable creatures.

The overly simplistic idea that if 'Nixon' means 'the individual named Nixon', then the sentence "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" would be obviously contradictory, relies on both uses of the word 'Nixon' having to have the same sense. I'm just pointing out that they needn't. — Isaac

I've no idea what you're trying to say here either. Here's what I do know...

If "Nixon" means the same thing as "the individual named 'Nixon'" then both are capable of standing in as proxy - one for the other - without losing coherence and/or changing truth conditions of the statement/proposition containing them. If two different designators mean the same thing, then we will be able to effectively substitute one for the other.

If we replace "Nixon" with "the individual named 'Nixon'" and reconstruct the claim in question, we arrive at the following, which I'm sure we'll all agree amounts to gibberish...


The individual named Nixon might not have been named the individual named Nixon.




That clearly doesn't work regardless of how we use quotes. Now, let's try the other...


Nixon might not have been named Nixon.

That makes perfect sense when spoken and/or written in lots of cases.

When written, successful reference may vary due to the different senses in use being represented by the same marks. So, depending upon both the reader and the writer the sensibility of the second can and often does make perfect sense. Other times can be more precise as well. Philosophers are the only ones to get themselves all befuddled... along with those around them at times.

"Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon'" is as clear as a bell. "The individual named Nixon might not have been named the individual named Nixon" is gibberish.

Because the already meaningful example loses all sensibility when we attempt to substitute one for the other, we can only conclude that...

...the name and description do not have the same meaning despite the fact that they have the same referent. That was the point. It has been made.

Unless you've solved the arguments around sense and reference I think what you meant to say was that having the same referent is not necessarily equivalent to meaning the same thing. — Isaac

I said precisely what I meant.

From the very beginning of rudimentary, elementary, and/or otherwise basic thought/belief formation throughout the ends of our lives and amongst some of the most complex linguistically informed notions of thought and belief that we can imagine...

During our entire thought-life, a referent is always picked out of this world. Meaning is part of the picking process. Having the same referent is not equivalent to meaning the same thing... ever. The meaning of a statement/proposition and it's referent are not equivalent... ever. Reference and meaning are not equivalent... ever.

That said...

I'm not all that clear on what "the arguments around sense and reference" is referring to, nor do I care much at all to get mired in such historical baggage. That is confidently said as a result of knowing that I haven't adopted the terminological framework, conceptual scheme, historical academic school of thought, and/or taxonomy/lexicon that those problems arose from. That much I can guarantee. Thus, there is ample good reason to doubt that I arrive at those same issues.

With that much in mind, it always behooves us all to remain aware of our own fallibilities. Very important. So, as aways I'm ready, willing, and able to learn better through better reasoning. I've not seen this yet. Unless someone here can show me how my framework suffers the same problems as the academic ones you're referring to, they're an utterly inadequate means by which to measure their own unseen problems. My position sets those out and simultaneously avoids them.

Don't get me wrong here. These aren't flippant dismissals I'm expressing here. Rather, I am more than happy to not only grant but readily acknowledge the tremendous mental abilities of philosophers of old, particularly given the familial, social, cultural, and/or historical particular circumstances. In the bigger picture, thought and belief begin simply and grow in complexity. The history of human knowledge supports this. Therefore, because we ought be confident in the kings' wisdom given their individual particular circumstances, we can conclude that if those problems were solvable by the available means(linguistic/terminological framework) at their disposal, they would have been solved already. They're not. There's no better reason to begin to question the framework itself.

It's taking an account of that which exists prior to the account itself. Therefore, it can be very wrong...


A thought/belief system is 'self-contained'. No one makes a mistake on purpose. We cannot see the flaws in our own thought/belief system. Godel shows that that is true of all axiomatic and/or otherwise purely inductive reasoning. Granted, not all thought/belief is purely inductive/axiomatic type thinking. However, that kind of thinking(axiomatic/inductive) - is itself - thinking about thought/belief. Thought/belief is something that exists in it's entirety, prior to our account of it. Our account of it is existentially dependent upon lots of things like shared meaning and/or language use itself. What we're taking account of is not always. Some thought/belief is prior to language. All thought/belief systems begin simply and grow in complexity.

If we could see our own flaws, none of us would ever have false belief. Rather, amongst other things, it takes someone else to show us our flaws. But I digress...

If two sides of a historical debate both shared the same flaw, then neither side would be able to see it. Some problems are consequences stemming from our terminological use and dissolve all by themselves when better language comes to bear. So, I suspect there's nothing for me to 'solve' despite others finding themselves needing to.

Open the lid...

'John Kennedy' is a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. 'Jack Kennedy' is also a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. In this actual world, they are the same entity, which means that 'John Kennedy' and 'Jack Kennedy' mean the same thing. — Isaac

Having the same referent is not equivalent to meaning the same thing...

The actual-world properties by which we identify the person depend on what our counterfactual is... — andrewk

:rofl:

You covered nothing...

It's not about the overrated use/mention distinction...

Just say he had been called not Nixon but Schuyler, do you think he would still have gone into politics?'

The subject of the question is not identified by the name 'Nixon' but rather by 'he', which refers to the person the friends have all been talking about. There is no de re / de dicto distinction in this sentence, because the subject is not identified by a word ('Nixon') or DD that is capable of such a distinction. — andrewk

You're describing that which had already been named and described.



The referent is not identified by the name "Nixon"? Really now?

Which person are we talking about again that could have been named otherwise, but was not?

:roll:

"He" is used to refer to Nixon. "Nixon" identifies the referent.

The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, — andrewk

The author above uses 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' as a means for critiquing an imaginary opponent.

Nixon might not have been named "Nixon" would be an actual one.

And then that same author says the following???

But don't critique a sentence that nobody has written. — andrewk

Nixon might not have been called "Nixon"...

:roll:

Nixon might not have been Nixon...

There's a difference here. The first makes perfect sense. The second is a contradiction because it is poorly worded/framed. It does not consider the difference between names and referents.

Both refer to the man named "Nixon", necessarily so.
— creativesoul
No. "Nixon" refers to Nixon. "The man named 'Nixon'" refers to the man with that name. — Banno

That is Nixon.

"The man named Nixon" is no less and/or no more capable of picking Nixon out of this world than "Nixon" is.

Amidst substantive revision...

....

In light of the actual world...

"The person named 'Nixon'" can be successfully used as a means to pick a person named Nixon out even if more than one person have been given the name. One of many. The same is true of "Nixon". Neither picks the referent out to the exclusion of all others in such actual circumstances.

However...

"The person named 'Nixon' is capable of being used to successfully pick out a unique individual to the exclusion of all others in the actual world. I mean, it does and can be used as a means for successful reference in certain actual circumstances. In other actual circumstances, the same descriptor cannot. However, this is also clearly the case with the use of "Nixon" as well.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The earlier account of four different actual circumstance is above . These deserve a bit more attention.



Here, we must bring the language users' thought, belief, and/or knowledge into the mix, because here is where their consideration sheds a bit of much needed light. I think a strong criticism of externalist accounts is that they do not do this, and the language users' thought/belief matters because thought/belief have efficacy. It is solely by virtue of thought/belief that any and all meaning is attributed. Kripke's notion of a causal chain of reference, Banno's invocation of shared meaning, Janus and andrewk's referring to context of historical use, and Un's recent introduction of ambiguity all skirt around it.


When listener and speaker know how to use the description, know how to use the name, and know of only one Nixon, then both the name "Nixon" and the description "the person named 'Nixon'" can be and are actually used to successfully pick out one individual to the exclusion of all others. That's always the case in those particular circumstances.

When listener and speaker know how to use the description, know how to use the name, and the speaker knows of more than one, but the listener knows of only one, then both the name "Nixon" and the description "the person named 'Nixon'" can be and are actually used to successfully pick out one individual to the exclusion of all others. That is not always the case in those particular circumstances. The speaker could be referring to a different individual than the one the listener knows of.

When listener and speaker know how to use the description, know how to use the name, and the speaker knows of only one Nixon, but the listener knows of more than one, then neither the name "Nixon" nor the description "the person named 'Nixon'" is capable of successfully picking out one individual to the exclusion of all others.

1a.)"using naming practices without ever having used descriptive practices"
1b.)"using naming practices without using descriptive practices"

2a.)"using descriptive practices without ever having used naming practices"
2b.)"using descriptive practices without using naming practices"

If there are no actual cases of 2a(None have been found) and one keeps aware of that, then it makes no sense to use 2b as justificatory ground for claiming that picking a unique individual out to the exclusion of all others depends upon descriptive practices.

That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Successful reference can and does happen in the actual world by virtue of naming practices alone. We do this without ever having used descriptive practices. Successfully picking out a thing by name identifies the thing. The thing is the referent. The name identifies the referent.

In all cases of 2b, there had already been naming practices.

The tree is not existentially dependent upon being named.

If the thing named "X" existed in it's entirety prior to our calling it by name. then it makes no sense at all to say that the referent of "X" is existentially dependent upon how we define "X".

If the meaning of a name is equivalent to "the thing named 'X'" then the descriptor "the thing named 'X'" should be able to stand in place of the name by virtue of substitution alone without sacrificing meaning, truth conditions, or pre-existing coherency should our candidate for substitution be a coherent expression excised from a larger framework.

It cannot.

Kripke shows that much.

If the meaning of a name(X) is equal to "the thing named 'X'" then the meaning of names would be equivalent to/with a referent and/or a description. Meaning is equivalent to neither one, that's true no matter how anyone fucking defines their terms.

That's point of view invariant. Meaning is attributed long before we take account of it.

The meaning of the following descriptor - "the thing named 'X'" - is not equivalent to the referent of 'X', but "the thing named 'X' can be used to pick out the thing named 'X'. The thing named 'X' is the referent of "the thing named 'X'" .X is the referent of "X".

Rather, meaning is attributed to solely by virtue of the correlations one draws between the name and something other than the name. After, and only after, meaning has been attributed to 'X' by more than one speaker by virtue of drawing the same(or similar enough) correlation(s) between 'X' something other than the name, can 'X' be used to pick out the thing named 'X'.

If we can successfully pick an individual out to the exclusion of all others by name, by description, or by both - in this world - then it doesn't make much sense to me for one to argue against that wholesale by virtue of stipulating specific possible world semantics that lead to claiming otherwise.

If A is necessary for a case of successful reference in this world, it makes no sense at all - to me at least - to say that it's not simply because we can imagine otherwise.

The deeper issue is this:Do rigid designators exist in their entirety prior to our calling them such, prior to our account of them? Are they discovered. Are they invented?

Successful reference most certainly existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Or if you'd rather... we most certainly successfully referred to many things in many ways long prior to our taking account of those facts.

Well methodology is certainly a big part of the problem, but I don't think that that report quite captures it. It runs much deeper than the scope of that account allows us to dig.

Both are rigid if they are qualified as such and neither are rigid if not. They are logically equivalent. — Janus

Above we have the supposition that being a rigid designator is no different than having been called such by a community of language users. If they are "qualified as such" is just another way of saying that they are called such, or defined as such. In other words, a thing is a rigid designator by definition alone; because we say so.

So, let's give this a bit of consideration. If we hold to such a notion, the only thing that makes a rigid designator what it is is it's having been given the namesake "rigid designator". I am being reminded of Witt's often referenced(pun intended) argument against essentialism:What counts as being a game is being called such. The only thing that some things have in common is that they've been given and so they share the same name.

Sure... One could say that. Lots of folk tend to think that that's the case or that that's a good argument far more often than I think it is. However, I mean, to be fair and all - that is how naming and descriptive practices work, right?

Furthermore, also supporting this kind of thinking is the fact that there are all sorts of different common ways to talk about possible worlds. Kripke suggests that whether or not "The man named 'Nixon' is a rigid designator is determined by what's going on during specific kinds of possible world discourse. There's more than one criterion for what counts as a possible world. So, right off the bat Kripke dismisses some of these other common ways to talk in terms of possible worlds, and stipulates cases when we pick an individual entity out of this world to the exclusion of all others by virtue of using it's proper name.


In light of the actual world...

"The person named 'Nixon'" can be successfully used as a means to pick a person named Nixon out if more than one person have been given the name. One of many. The same is true of "Nixon". Neither picks the referent out to the exclusion of all others in such actual circumstances.

However...

"The person named 'Nixon' is capable of being used to successfully pick out a unique individual to the exclusion of all others in the actual world. I mean, it does and can be used as a means for successful reference in certain actual circumstances. In other actual circumstances, the same descriptor cannot. However, this is also clearly the case with the use of "Nixon" as well.

...that is a fact about Nixon. Indeed, we can only posit that he might have had a different name... — Banno

Possibilities are not facts on my view. That's a quibble. Kripke talks like that too...

Contingent facts... I guess...???

"The man named 'Nixon'" and "Nixon" both pick out Nixon. I'm not suggesting that the former is rigid. Rather, I'm pointing out that either and/or both can be used for the same purpose in common speech. To pick the individual out.

Both refer to the man named "Nixon", necessarily so. Both do not necessarily pick out the same referent. Nixon could have had another name. Someone else could have had that name. "The man named 'Nixon'" is not a referent. Nixon is.

Logic is supposed to take proper account of thoughts and belief. Logic is the rules of correct inference.

For those others who may be so inclined...

It does not follow from the fact that there are purely logical coherent formulations consisting of unbound variables that there are a set of corresponding things in the actual world that are bound by the same rules that govern the variables.

Just because something is called "logical" or even a "logical rule" doesn't mean that it preserves the truth of the premises it's being applied to.

Saying that there is no logical difference, presupposes and/or leads to claiming logical equivalence.

Descriptions are not names.

...there is no apparent logical difference between the use of a name like 'Richard Milhous Nixon' to refer to someone and the use of the DD 'The person whose name is "Richard Milhous Nixon" '. Under that approach, use of proper names is just use of a certain type of DD.

What are your thoughts on that? — andrewk

I consider that in light of stronger ground.

Given that the facts clearly demonstrate the actual difference between them regarding everyday use for reference, that sounds like a problem with the logic to me.

Specific examples of successful reference do not include a proper name. Specific examples of successful reference do not include description. No examples of successful reference include neither. All examples of successful reference include at least one.

Descriptions are about things. They can also refer to things. Names are not about things. They can only refer to things.

We pick things out of this world by talking to others. We use nouns to do so. Nouns refer to people places and things. Prior to being able to describe something in detail, that something has to be identified, isolated, and/or otherwise picked out from it's surroundings in order to be more carefully examined in it's details. Names do that.

There are actual cases of using descriptive practices to successfully refer, to successfully pick something out, to bring another's attention to the same thing, while not actually putting name to paper by pen.

Conclusion:Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.
— creativesoul

There are actual cases of using naming practices to successfully refer, to successfully pick something out, to bring another's attention to the same thing, while not actually putting description to paper by pen.

Conclusion:Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.
— creativesoul

But... descriptive practices are existentially dependent upon naming practices.

That is... where there has never been naming practices, there could never have been descriptive ones. That seems to stand in direct contradiction to the first conclusion above. Not all successful reference includes both naming and descriptive practices. Some do not include one. Some do not include the other.

How can we make sense of this?

What is the relation between inclusion, necessity, and/or existential dependency?

How do you account for a reference to 'The man next to the window with champagne in his glass', which appears to be a DD that does not use proper names? — andrewk

This is written as if you're referring to the claim itself.

Not all cases of successful reference include overt proper name usage.

...they would have thoughts that roughly equate to those words...r — andrewk

This is based upon the dubious presupposition that all thought can roughly equate to words.

Roughly?

If thought is equal to words, and a creature has no words, then a creature has no thought.

It is also based upon a gross negligence. That is, it neglects to draw and maintain the distinction between thought and belief, and thinking about thought and belief.

Those words - the ones you're actually expecting me to believe somehow belong to a language less creature - are thoughts that only a creature that is capable of thinking about it's own thought and belief can possibly have.

:cool:

Some folk believe that it is possible for a language less creature to think along conceptual lines...

:yikes:

When further questioned, some folk adamantly point out - as if it were a good move to say this - that think, believe, and/or further argue that that is so by virtue of definition alone.

Sometimes, while doing so, they are actually in the midst of accusing others of circularity.

:gasp:

And this is the ground against what I've been arguing? In light of the fact that there have been no subsequent valid refutation of anything I've claimed and/or argued?

There's at least one important consideration, and it also serves to better answer the following question earlier asked of myself...

How do you account for a reference to 'The man next to the window with champagne in his glass', which appears to be a DD that does not use proper names? — andrewk

Well, it's a matter of what such rudimentary thought and belief are capable of actually having as their content...
— creativesoul
I can't see grounds for your objection here. — andrewk

They weren't given. What you've suggested as thought/belief content of a language less creature is a complex language expression. The child has no language. I reject the suggestion on those grounds alone.

How do you account for a reference to 'The man next to the window with champagne in his glass', which appears to be a DD that does not use proper names? — andrewk

You're referring to an expression, then calling that expression a DD(using names), and then further describing it by pointing out that it contains nothing that we've named "proper names".

If the entity being successfully picked out, pointed to, and/or otherwise referred to by the name "Santa Claus" does not count as the referent of the name, then what on earth would it take to be a referent?
— creativesoul

:wink: — creativesoul

:wink:

Where is the existential dependency for an empty name? — Wallows

There are no empty names. It is itself the name of a empty category. An empty container called "empty names".

Other than that, the question doesn't make sense to me.

The notion is the result of grossly misunderstanding how the attribution of meaning works.

I'm not sure still what you mean by "entity being picked out successfully" here. — Wallows

The referent. That which is given a name.

Suppose we place ten pictures on a table. One of them is Santa Claus(with suit, sled, and reindeer). All others are old bearded white guys... philosophers.

I ask the average American four year old... do you see Santa Claus?

She picks him out immediately.

Conclusion:Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. — creativesoul

Conclusion:Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. — creativesoul

But... descriptive practices are existentially dependent upon naming practices.

That is... where there has never been naming practices, there could never have been descriptive ones. That seems to stand in direct contradiction to the first conclusion above.

Not all successful reference includes both naming and descriptive practices. Some do not include one. Some do not include the other.

How can we make sense of this?

What is the relation between inclusion, necessity, and/or existential dependency?