Hmmm...

We're talking about historical and current convention with regard to theories of reference.

Given this...

Are you asking me why should we care whether or not we know what counts as successfully referring?

Are you claiming that you do not understand what "successful reference" means?

Are you claiming that there is no sensible interpretation? Are you claiming that even if there is, there is no way to use knowledge of what it takes to successfully refer to something?

I'm puzzled...

Are you claiming that a listener's knowing who the speaker is talking about is somehow inadequate for being a prima facie example of successfully referring?

I'm claiming that whatever criterion we decide, it cannot be a criterion that is existentially dependent upon thinking about thought and belief. However, it must include language use.

We successfully refer solely by virtue of language use. We do so long before being able to talk about our own thought and belief. We successfully refer long before we take our doing so into account with language use. Any position and/or notion of reference which cannot take that into proper account is unacceptable.

If you think that that suggested comparison is helpful to the question I'm raising about whether or not false description alone is capable of successfully referring to an individual, then I'm game for reading how.

Care to elaborate?

False description unaccompanied by proper name will not pick out the individual, will it - regardless of the speaker's belief?
— creativesoul
Beth works in an office and occasionally sees a person that works on a different floor of the same company, That person has a disability that causes him to slur his words and need a walking stick to get about. Beth doesn't know about the speech disability and thinks the person is always drunk.

One day she sees him trip over in the lobby and goes to help him up. Later, talking to a workmate she says "You know that guy that walks with a stick and is always drunk? He fell over in the lobby today".

She has picked him out, despite the belief about him being drunk being false.

In practice, we have false items in our DDs of just about everybody. Usually they don't matter, because the item is redundant. — andrewk

This doesn't seem to help. What's at issue is whether or not false description(false belief statements) are capable of successful reference all by themselves. Seems to me that they are not. The example you've provided above is not a case of false description(false belief) being able to successfully refer. The guy does walk with a stick. That description/belief statement is true.

The only case I can think of where false description can successfully refer are cases where everyone involved in the discussion shares those false beliefs. Although, even then they have to be beliefs/descriptions of something. Fixing the reference is required for those cases as well then. Description alone cannot fix the reference, can it?.

However, unless a proponent of descriptivism holds that descriptions must be true, I think that some of his remarks about that are off target. On second thought, I suppose that one would have to hold that descriptions be true... wouldn't they? If they were not, they most certainly could not pick out the individual unless they were accompanied by a name.
— creativesoul
I think all that is required is that the speaker believes the DD to be true. — andrewk

False description unaccompanied by proper name will not pick out the individual, will it - regardless of the speaker's belief?

I think the example of false belief is very very interesting. It shows that one need not say something true in order to successfully refer to something. It also shows the primacy that the proper name has with regard to referencing in such cases.

However, unless a proponent of descriptivism holds that descriptions must be true, I think that some of his remarks about that are off target. On second thought, I suppose that one would have to hold that descriptions be true... wouldn't they? If they were not, they most certainly could not pick out the individual unless they were accompanied by a name.

Yes. I could definitely agree with the idea that there are often times that we point to and/or otherwise fix a reference with ostension, initial baptism(first naming), and/or learning the name of what we talking about prior to being able to talk about it. Here, it is certainly clear that fixing the reference is prior to talking about the referent. So, I would readily agree that fixing the reference by ostension and/or naming must be done prior to being able to say anything more about the thing. But ought we limit this to the timeframe when one is first learning how to use language to talk about some thing? I think that with regard to language acquisition, fixing the reference must be prior to further describing the referent.

However...

There may be a bit of nuance here. More specifically, the means he's using to make his point do not warrant concluding that it is always the case that fixing a reference is done exclusively with proper names. I think that there are times between language acquisition and the ability to posit hypotheticals that we can and do fix the reference by virtue of description alone.

I see no reason to deny that we also can describe something that we do not know the name of. I would think that doing that is both - iafter learning how to fix a referent(by pointing, learning the name, and/or naming), and prior to being able to posit hypothetical scenarios.

Strictly speaking - on my own view - that would certainly amount to all description(even with regard to this in-between cases) being existentially dependent upon naming. However, I clearly work from a different framework than Kripke, so that much is irrelevant to the lectures.

So, the question then becomes is that description both necessary and sufficient for picking out the individual thing and only the individual thing. I do not think that this serves as ground to for wholesale denial of N&N. So, my intent here is not to discredit Kripke. Rather, I'm having trouble seeing any flaw in his work, aside from the fact that he's retaining the notions of necessity/contingency from possible world semantics(to put modal logic to good/better use I'm guessing?). Thus, he's also working from a notion of truth that I abhor. To his credit, he must grant these notions in order to most effectively discredit the versions of possible world semantics and/or theories of reference he's targeting.

If - in the actual world - positing hypotheticals, counterfactuals, and/or possible world scenarios is itself an activity that is existentially dependent upon reference by description, then it cannot follow that description is not necessary for reference even if it is the case that we can often drop the descriptions and retain identity and/or still successfully refer to an object with proper name alone when positing such scenarios.

I'm done with this side issue Janus...

It amounts to differences in our frameworks.

Use of (spatiotemporal) distinction is not seeing something as distinct? — Janus

No. Motion detectors do not see something as distinct but they make use of spatiotemporal distinction nonetheless.

In any case when toddlers point to objects, how do you know they want to ask "What's that?". — Janus

Because they do.

They have picked out whatever they point at from the rest of the environment; they know it as distinct. — Janus

Well, I would be more than willing to admit that spatiotemporal distinction is required for pointing at something, naming something, and referring to something. It is required for all attribution of meaning too. I would not not go so far as to say that all use of spatiotemporal distinction is equivalent to knowing something as distinct.

So, I stand by the claim that one need not know anything true about some thing(aside from knowing it's name) in order to successfully refer to that thing.

But I've been saying all along that description is only required in order to know what we refer to, in those cases where the object referred to is not present. — Janus

Ok.

If the object is present and you are pointing at it then you must know something about it, in any case. — Janus

I don't see why. Toddlers point to things all the time as a means to ask "What's that?"... Sometimes they do so(point and ask) simultaneously. Do you hold that they already know something about the object they are pointing at?

Seems as though "that' must be nothing, in which case you are referring to nothing, which amounts ot not referring at all, as far as I can tell. Or, if "that" is not nothing, and yet not anything either imagined or sensed, then what is it? — Janus

That would be the thing I'm pointing at in your presence while naming it.

So you know what it is that you are calling 'X'? — Janus

I know that that is what I'm calling 'X'. There's no need for anything else I believe about that to be true.

I do not see how this disagrees with what you've been saying.

So you know that it is called "X"? You know that what is called "X"? Is it called 'X' only by you, or by others as well? — Janus

I know that that is called 'X'.

Does it matter if it is just I or others?

I think not. The first time a name is coined it is by one person. It refers to a thing nonetheless.

All my other belief about 'X' may be false. That holds good even if my belief is commensurate with common understanding about 'X'.

All you need to know is that that is called 'X'.

Yes, but there must be some true things said about it if we are to successfully refer to it; otherwise reference itself would become meaningless... — Janus

Hmmmm...

I do not think so. We could have nothing but false belief about 'X'. We would still be referring to 'X'.

What I was asking for is an explanation of how we are able to (without being nonsensically arbitrary) "say so". I say it is on account of our socially shared and more or less entrenched stories (histories) which consist in descriptions. — Janus

Yeah, you and I largely agree on that much. It seems that it is only as a result of that that we can later talk about setting descriptions aside. We've already identified the particular by virtue of using descriptions.

We cannot successfully describe something with falsehood. We can say false things about something though. We can successfully refer to Hitler even when we say things that are clearly not true, and we all know it.

How?

Because description does not equal reference.

The tool is to look at a sentence that presents an erroneous description, and notice that nevertheless, it is about the thing misdescribed.
— Banno

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that? — Janus

A description is determined to be about the thing because it is something said about the thing.... — creativesoul

Great! But you haven't answered the question. Take another look. — Janus

Facts aren't determined on my view. That makes no sense to me. Facts are events; states of affairs; what has happened. So, I took the question to be about how we determine that a description is about something in particular. Cause we say so... how else?

My question was in regards to counterfactuals and their existential dependency, as you call it. Is it not important that the world we can stipulate is existentially dependent on the one from where the stipulation originates from? Therefore, I am confused about how can anything be called necessary in another possible world if they are contingent on our own.

I think I can't express this any more clearly than the above. — Wallows

Well, I've no use for classic notions of necessity/contingency. Understanding my position will not help you to make sense of their use.

All possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon the actual world.

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that? — Janus

A description is determined to be about the thing because it is something said about the thing. An erroneous description does not successfully describe the thing, but it does successfully refer to it.

Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water.
— creativesoul

I don't understand. What's the point being made about this? — Wallows

I'm just trying to answer your questions, which seem irrelevant by my lights. I'm trying anyway...

Prior to these questions...

The point is that a definite description does not necessarily pick out a unique individual. It can pick out a unique group of individuals, all of which are picked out by the description when nothing else is. The group can share the same name as other things that are not described by the particular description.

Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water.

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing.
— creativesoul

I see. So, the simplest atomic constituent is self-evident? Isn't this logical atomism or Leibnizian monadology rehashed? — Wallows

I do not call them "atomic constituents", and no, they are not self-evident. If they were, there would be no need for first focusing upon the composite in order to acquire knowledge that they are - in fact - a composite.

tI's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use.
— creativesoul

What are elemental constituents? — Wallows

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing.

Hydrogen and oxygen are elemental constituents of water.

Fuck. What a mess. — Banno

Ah now...

Do me a favor, and begin with the last post of mine prior to this one of yours...

Start at the top and explain to me where it goes wrong. What is claimed that is false?

No. It's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use. It's about existential dependency.

If a thing consists of other things, then it is only by virtue of definite description that we can know that. Our knowledge of composites requires descriptions. In such cases the definite description does not single out a particular unique member of the group. Rather, it picks out a particular kind of group, and nothing else.

Any notion of definite description which requires that it pick out a unique particular individual thing(a single entity) and nothing else is inherently incapable of taking proper account of composites. — creativesoul

So...

What happens when we put this knowledge to good use?

We know that A consists of B and C. We know that no other thing consists of B and C. We know that without either B and/or C, there can be no A. We know that without definitive description we could not know any of this. When we use this knowledge in reference to A, we are talking about the composite of B and C. The combination of B and C always results, and only results, in A's.

Given that we know all that...

What do we make of the fact that we've used "A" while denying B and C? It shows that we can refer to something by virtue of using a name and false description. It shows that knowledge of elemental parts is not necessary for naming a composite. Descriptions need not be true in order to successfully refer to some thing. They most certainly need to be true in order to successfully describe that thing.

There's a difference between successful reference and successful description. The former picks out the thing, and the latter describes the thing picked out. Saying something false about a thing does not describe the thing even if it successfully picks out the thing. Successfully description requires correspondence to this world(the actual world).

There are no false definitive descriptions. If description is both necessary and sufficient for identification, then we could successfully pick out an individual by virtue of description alone, and nothing other than that individual would be picked out by the description. Knowledge regarding the actual composition of water would be acquired via definitive description. That description is both necessary and sufficient for picking out a particular group of things that we call "water" from the other things we call "water".

It(successful description) would do this(pick out this particular group of elemental constituents) even if we had called the composite thing and/or it's elemental constituents by other names.

This brings up something pivotal...

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our account of them. Some things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them consist of elemental constituents. None of these things nor their elemental constituents are existentially dependent upon our names. All of these things are existentially dependent upon their elemental constituents.

If a thing consists of other things, then it is only by virtue of definite description that we can know that. Our knowledge of composites requires descriptions. In such cases the definite description does not single out a particular unique member of the group. Rather, it picks out a particular kind of group, and nothing else.

Any notion of definite description which requires that it pick out a unique particular individual thing(a single entity) and nothing else is inherently incapable of taking proper account of composites.

No.

I'm pointing out that it is the case that some things are composites. That is, they consist of other things. We can state otherwise. According to possible world semantics, it would follow that none of the elemental constituents are necessary for the existence of the composite, simply because we can state otherwise.

I'm also pointing out that there is an issue with the notion of "particular" being used within the notion of definitive descriptions. A definitive description can pick out a particular group and nothing else. It does not follow from the fact that that definitive description cannot single out an individual within that group that it does not successfully refer to and identify a particular kind of thing(all things in that group and nothing else).

Water.

Do they just pop into existence all by themselves?

Of course.

I'm pointing at inherently inadequate frameworks...

Why would we need to be able to pick out an individual water molecule in order for a definite description to pick up all water molecules, and nothing else? — creativesoul

Think about this for a moment or three...

It's about existential dependency.

Are those the only two choices?

The purpose of a definite description is to uniquely pick up an individual, not just to pick it up under a description that it will never (and could never) cease to satisfy.
— Pierre-Normand

Then definite descriptions do not always take account of elemental constituents. — creativesoul

Are what you call "elemental constituents" something akin to essential properties? In that case, the item referred to could not persist though the loss of those properties, but they may still not guarantee that the item is uniquely being described by them since other items of the same essential kind also would have those properties.
— Pierre-Normand

This misses the point. Indeed, all of those particular items cannot exist without their elemental constituents.

We can state otherwise. — creativesoul

Why would we need to be able to pick out an individual water molecule in order for a definite description to pick up all water molecules, and nothing else?

I agree that what is actually true at all times of Gödel (and hence might figure in a definite description of him) isn't necessarily true of him. — Pierre-Normand

If being necessarily true requires being true in all imaginable possible world scenarios, and being actually true requires being true in this world(regardless of what's imaginable), and what is actually true is not necessarily true, then what is true in this world is not part of the criterion for what's true in all possible world scenarios.

That's a big problem.

When we say "what is actually true at all times of Godel" we are talking about true statements about Godel. When we say these statements aren't necessarily true of Godel, it is as a result of the fact that we can and do stipulate alternative circumstances while using the name "Godel" without sacrificing successful identity/reference of the name "Godel".

We can say anything we want about Godel and still be talking about Godel. There is no need for what we say to be actually true. So, we can imagine circumstances that aren't actually true. Our ability to do so, while retaining identity/reference, somehow purportedly warrants our saying that the imagining of false circumstances is adequate ground for saying that what is actually true is not necessarily true.

Such are the pitfalls of what counts as being necessarily true(the historical possible world notions of necessity/contingency).

It seems that we cannot stipulate any specific circumstance(s) that must always be stipulated in order to retain identity and/or successful reference. We can always stipulate alternative ones and still know who/what it is that we're talking about. It only follows that identity and/or successful reference in possible world scenarios is not dependent upon specific circumstances.

How does this hold up to scrutiny regarding composites?

If all A's consist in/of B, C, and D in this world, and there are no examples of B, C, and D - in combination in this world - that do not constitute being an A, and the removal of B, C, and/or D results in insufficiency for being an A, then it is the case that B, C, and D are elemental constituents of all A's. It is also the case that all A's are existentially dependent upon B, C, and D both individually and in combination. When and where there are no B's, C's, and/or D's, there can be no A's. When there are no B's, C's, or D's in combination, there can be no A's.

Let A equal water. Let B equal hydrogen. Let C equal oxygen. We'll lose D here.

We can posit a hypothetical/counterfactual/possible world scenario "what if water doesn't require oxygen"? We could go on and continue to stipulate all sorts of other circumstances which lend logical support to that. We do this sort of thing all the time with "what if's". We think in terms of what else it would it take for a "what if" to be true.

So, we can imagine that water is not existentially dependent upon and/or does not consist - in part - of oxygen.

Are we still talking about water in such cases?