If Socrates is a man and all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal.

Does this argument beg the question?

Yeah, Michael is being nice.

Ignorance is not a fallacy. Trump is either ignorant of the facts concerning climate change, or is speaking insincerely.

There is a lot to be said for NOT reading some books too soon. — Bitter Crank

Hear hear...

Yes, yes, and yes...

Seems like you're grouping a bunch of separate philosophical issues together and wanting to address the group on a whole. That would, in my opinion, do a great disservice or injustice to otherwise perfectly intelligible notions.

I suggest breaking them apart and dealing with them separately.

I think the 'object in itself' is associated with something like inter-subjectivity. It's more like a distinction between the object for us and the object for me. — macrosoft

I object to Kant's notion of Noumena.

In order to know that all of our thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves is incomplete in some way, there must be a comparative analysis performed between our thought and belief and the world and/or ourselves. To compare between the two requires having complete access/knowledge to/of both. If we have access and knowledge to and of both, then Kant is wrong. If we do not, then Kant is unjustified.

I suspect that Kant knew this as well. Hence, he took pains to point out that the only sensible, reasonable, and judicious use of the notion was as a negative limit to our thought. On my view, it offers nothing more than an unknown 'realm'(that which exists in it's entirety completely unbeknownst to us).

As far as not being able to compare our cognition with the object to the object itself, this is mostly a matter of language. By 'cognition of the object,' we seem to mean the object as we have access to it. What would be left over is then precisely that part of the object that we cannot access. — macrosoft

Ok. This notion of 'cognition of the object' conflates the object and our access. The phrase "the object as we have access to it" is loaded chock full of dubious presuppositions. You've duly noted an obvious one(indirect or mediated perception).

Replace 'cognition of the object' with thought/belief formation(drawing mental correlations between the object and something else) by virtue of using physiological sensory perception, and we will be using a notion that is fully capable of accounting for meaningful cognition(thought and belief). This notion welcomes evolutionary process, can foster understanding of non linguistic thought and belief, provide a framework that not only avoids anthropomorphism but offers a standard by which to identify it, employs the fewest number of unprovable premisses, posits the fewest entities, and it also offers the capability of exhausting everything ever thought, believed, written and/or otherwise uttered. It was designed that way and continues to strive towards that standard. It situates both the presupposition of correspondence with the world and the attribution of meaning precisely where they belong by virtue of effectively taking account of how they originate/emerge within thought/belief formation. The justificatory ground for my notion of thought/belief couldn't be any stronger. The criterion has no examples to the contrary.

That's very useful, but the pragmatists don't seem to like it much. Odd that.

[What] we can do is observe how others talk and act in the context of objects we think are there. If their speech and action is appropriate (fits the object being there), then we are confirmed in our perception. For the most part this is so automatic that it never crosses the threshold of consciousness. — macrosoft

Well...

This notion of 'being confirmed in our perception' relies heavily upon that counts as perception. I strongly disagree with most philosophical use of the notion. On my view, perception is autonomous, but perception is not informed by the language of the perceiving creature(assuming it has language).

Seems to me that you're packing thought, belief and perhaps even a worldview into it.

When speech and actions are appropriate, they've been regulated. In order for us to autonomously confirm something by others' actions and speech being appropriate, then all we've confirmed is our notion of what's appropriate. That's moral thought/belief.

What you've described above looks a lot like an example of language acquisition.

I'm not asking you to defend my argument Michael. To quite the contrary, I'm just asking if you agree that... if the premisses of the argument are true, then solipsism is not. I already know the answer to that question(what it would take for the antecedent to be true), and I suspect that you do as well.

We can look at any and all examples of thought and belief. We can see that they are meaningful. We can know what that(being meaningful) takes by looking at the common denominators of all thought and belief and eliminating everything irrelevant to that. It takes precisely what I've put forth in the OP...

Ok. So, what would it take for the antecedent to be true? If it is true, then solipsism is false.

I thought anthropomorphism was what was happening when someone misattributes things(characteristics, traits, other such commonalities) that only humans have to non-humans(usually other life forms). — creativesoul

If the thread is not discussing how to overcome the above, it carries a poorly chosen title...

I thought anthropomorphism was what was happening when someone misattributes things(characteristics, traits, other such commonalities) that only humans have to non-humans(usually other life forms).

:worry:

Someone saying that their cat is jealous of another cat would be a fine example. Saying that an all knowing, all powerful, and all present being is angry is yet another.

I'm not following you. I'm offering an outline of a deductive argument. I'm looking to discuss the merits of that argument(outline first actually). Either one will do. Both would be better,

Are you willing to discuss those outlines?

n what way does referring to events that are either fictional and therefore don't happen, or hypothetical and therefore may or may not happen, or have happened, as 'events' lack utility? — Janus

Fiction, falsehood, and prediction all consist entirely of thought and belief about what has not happened.

Events do not.

You're making this all a bit too fun for me. Take as much rope as you need.

Talk about fiction is not talk about what has not happened.

Adopting a framework as a means for contemplating it's utility is not self-contradiction.

Piddling includes adopting foolish frameworks, and dealing with foolish people.

Hamlet is an account of events that never took place and of people that never existed. Hamlet exists only in the form of meaningful language. Statements about Hamlet are statements about imaginary events and people. Imaginary events and people are existentially dependent upon the imagination and language use. Statements about Hamlet are true if and only if they correspond to the story of Hamlet(the imaginary account).

We can say true things about Hamlet, even though Hamlet consists of imaginary events and people. That is solely as a result of the fact that we're offering an account of Hamlet and in doing so the only standard for truth is correspondence with/to the story itself. The story itself is the result of actual events. In saying true things about Hamlet, we're not saying true things about what has not happened. We're saying true things about what has. The writing of Hamlet has happened.

Events that never took place are described by false propositions.

Events that have yet to have taken place are described by prediction.

Both consist entirely of thought and belief. Both are about what has not happened. There is no other kind of belief about what has not happened.

So, here we have arrived at a group of imagined 'events' that have not happened. This group includes all false imagined events and all imagined future events which have yet to have been determined as either. — creativesoul

Utterances of hought and belief about what has not happened cannot be true at the time of utterance.

There are imagined events and there are actual events; they both involve concatenations of things, people, processes and/ or relations. — Janus

All imagined 'events' are linked together by thought and belief. All imagined events consist entirely of thought and belief. They are no where else to be found. There are three kinds of imagined 'events'. They include 1.thought and belief about what has already happened, 2.thought and belief about what is currently happening, and 3.thought and belief about what has not yet happened.

Imagined 'events' about what has already happened and/or is happening can be true/false. 'Actual' events cannot. Rather it is precisely the 'actual' events that render imagined 'events' true/false.

Imagined 'events' about what has not happened include all of the false imagined 'events' about what has happened(they are false because they did not happen), all of the false imagined 'events' about what is happening(they are false because they are not happening), and all thought and belief about what has not yet happened - all imagined future 'events' - regardless of whether or not they become true/false by virtue of happening or not.

So, here we have arrived at a group of imagined 'events' that have not happened. This group includes all false imagined events and all imagined future events which have yet to have been determined as either.

If all facts are states of affairs, and all states of affairs are results of actual events, and only the actual is real, then it only follows that there are no such thing as real or actual future states of affairs.

So, perhaps it is here, in this context, that a proposition about future states of affairs(imagined 'states of affairs' and/or 'events') can obtain the status of actual events/states of affairs(fact)?

This notion of facts 'obtaining' could be a means of distinguishing between imagined states of affairs that are false as a result of not happening and imagined states of affairs that aren't able to be true or false as a result of not happening.

Piddling.

Actual and possible...

The one consists of what has happened. The other consists of thought and belief.

Remove our language. What's left of the possible? Nothing.

The two are not the same. Why call them both by the same name?

There are imagined events and there are actual events; they both involve concatenations of things, people, processes and/ or relations. — Janus

All meaningful language use satisfies this criterion.

You don't appear to be understanding the distinctions between events which happen, are happening, will happen or might happen and events which are merely imagined to happen, to be happening, to be going to happen or to be likely to happen. — Janus

I understand just fine. You're calling things that have not happened "events". I'm not. You're calling imaginings "events". That is to conflate that which has happened with that which has not, to put it mildly... There are all sorts of other issues that haven't been mentioned yet. I'm being nice.

Piddling.

Yes, and future events will happen, possible events might happen and imagined events are imagined as happening. So what? — Janus

They have not happened. They are not events. They are imaginings.

Why must something happen in order to count as an event? — Janus

There is a distinction between actual and possible. That which is actual has happened. That which is possible has not.

If events rely on happening in order to qualify as events, then are past events no longer events since they are no longer happening? — Janus

Past events happened.

Your proposed elimination of usages of the term 'event' to refer to imaginary or possible happenings seems pointless, since the distinction between actual and potential, possible or imaginary events is perfectly well understood by most everyone (apart from you apparently). — Janus

Disagreement is not misunderstanding.

There is a difference between things that have happened and things that have not.

If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
What do words like "unicorn" and "phoenix" represent? — aletheist

Complex thought and belief.

If your statement is correct, how are we able to talk about things and events that are in the future - i.e., that do not (yet) exist, and may never actually exist? — aletheist

Talk about the future represents our thought and belief about what has not happened.

So, the imaginary events described in a work of fiction are not events in your view? — Janus

What you are calling "imaginary events" have not happened. Events happen.

Events take place. They have happened. Imaginary hypotheticals have not. They are not events. Calling them such neglects this.

States of affairs are what has already happened and/or is currently happening. That which may or may not happen has not happened.

There's a useful distinction in this context.

Meh.

Muddle.

Hypotheticals are not necessarily imaginary states of affairs; they may turn out to be actual. The utility of the distinction between actual and imaginary states of affairs seems obvious.

To make distinctions, provided there are real differences between the things being distinguished, leads to clarity and nuanced thinking. — Janus

That they are concatenations of real or imaginary events, processes, things or relations. — Janus

You do seem to be piddling... — Janus

That's all I ever do aside from systems analysis and creation...

What do all states of affairs have in common that make them what they are?

What good reason is there to call hypotheticals imagined states of affairs?

I've always been interested in this notion of states of affairs and how they obtain. Thus, I'm piddling around here...

To be clear, I'm not at all arguing or objecting to the use of hypotheticals. I'm asking what good reason there is to call them "states of affairs" when they are clearly not?

However, states of affairs cannot be exactly the same things as facts, since we can have imaginary or possible states of affairs, but it seems wrong to speak of "imaginary facts". — Janus

What reason is there to posit imaginary states of affairs or possible ones?

What do they have in common with actual states of affairs that make them count as states of affairs?

False propositions... ...represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things. — aletheist

Since unreal states of affair and relations do not exist, there is nothing to represent.

Hamlet sets out a plethora of unreal states of affairs. There are true propositions about Hamlet.

Something is definitely wrong with this account...

So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent. — creativesoul

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.

Hamlet didn't suffice...

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
This happens all the time. — aletheist

Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. — aletheist

Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. — aletheist

:yikes:

Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. — aletheist

If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent. It only follows that A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else.

Let the play Hamlet be A. Let B be Shakespeare's idea.

There is no way possible that the entire play Hamlet was complete in Shakespeare's thought prior to pen. Seems to me that the play and the idea are pretty much one in the same.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul

This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below). — aletheist

In order for A to represent B, A must stand in place for B.

Let Hamlet(the play) be A and a man named Hamlet who was the prince of Denmark be B...

Hamlet(the play) doesn't represent(stand in place for) a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him. B is existentially dependent upon A. That cannot be the case when A represents B. There must first be something to represent before it can be represented. The sign "Hamlet" represents both, the play and the main character. These things are existentially dependent upon one another. Without the sign "Hamlet" there could be no play or character.

Calling that a case of A representing B neglects/ignores the existential dependency.

Let A be "Shakespeare" and B be the person we call such. "Shakespeare" represents a particular person. Remove the name and the person remains...

That is a case of A representing B.

The thing we call a "tree" and a tree. Etc...