So what is it before it obtains?

There are contingent facts, i.e., a certain state-of-affairs that do not exist now, but may exist in the proper setting. For example, there is no mug on my coffee table at the present moment, but now there is, so the fact obtained based on me putting the mug on the table, among other things. There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts, and how they obtain varies, some are a necessary feature of reality, so they do not obtain in the same way, if they obtain at all. — Sam26

Same question to you Sam...

What do facts obtain?

What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand? — creativesoul

Yes, what is it? — Posty McPostface

I'm just trying to make sure that we are on the same page, so to speak...

Are you asking me to answer the question I posed to you?

I may be completely mistaken, for I do not find the notion of facts obtaining to be very helpful...

However, it seems to me that statements obtain truth(and thus become fact) if and only if they correspond to reality/events/states of affairs/the ay things are/were.

That framework presupposes that a thing is not a fact unless and/or until it somehow gains it's status of being so(unless, and/or until it obtains).

What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand?

What do facts obtain?

The rules of correct inference...

I never agreed to this. Knowing what certain statements mean makes transmitting knowledge much easier but young kids are obviously also capable of thought even though they don't know a language. Language is not necessary for thought, I think that proposition is absurd. It would even imply that cavemen were incapable of thinking but had that been the case we wouldn't have survived. You don't need a personal monologue running 24/7 to think

Reason is required for knowledge. Language is not required for reason. Language is a form of knowledge. You cannot define knowledge without having the word "justified" or "validated" in the definition or else arguing with you is futile because if you don't have something like that in your definition then literally any statement is knowledge if one believes in it strongly which defeats the purpose of having the word "knowledge" when it just means "strong belief" — khaled

You're arguing with your own imagination.

I bet 99% of the people in the civilized world would staunchly disagree with that statement. — khaled

No true scotsman

This is semantic. — Blue Lux

That is rhetoric.

Basically, I think my definition of knowledge is unproblematic because any form of knowledge must rely on a validation (or else it is not knowledge) and that validation can always be abstracted into a premise in a syllogism to give an accurate model of knowledge. I haven't come across any knowledge that cannot be put as the conclusion to a syllogism yet (as that would imply that there exists knowledge that does not need validation) — khaled

This conflates things. For one, you've offered a definition of knowledge that says that all knowledge must be the result of a syllogism. That's false, and I've already argued how. P3 in the OP is false, and I've shown how. Arguing by definitional fiat doesn't work here.

You're claiming that reason is required for knowledge. That's false. Knowing what certain statements mean is required for reason. So, either knowing what certain statements mean is not knowledge(which is absurd), or reason is not required for all knowledge.

What a statement means involves not the statement.
— Blue Lux

Why exactly is this rubbish? — khaled

A statement's meaning is about the statement. Being about the statement involves the statement.

Obviously understanding does not involve the language itself or else how do you explain that there are multiple languages but the same understanding? — khaled

Example? — creativesoul

"two plus two equals four"
"2プラス2は4"
"dos más dos son cuatro" — khaled

Are these examples of the same understanding in different languages? How does understanding not involve language seeing how in each case it is set out with language? Seems obvious to me that understanding has to do with language. Remove the language, remove the understanding.

What I see here is three ways of saying the same thing. That doesn't support the idea that understanding does not involve language. It supports the idea that different languages can say the same thing.

Right. An illusion of a dog is impossible without a dog. That is because an illusion of something is what it is as a result of it's resemblance to that which it is an illusion of. If there is no thing there can be no illusion of that thing.

One can believe that there is a dog when there is only an illusion of a dog. That belief would be false, but the belief itself is not the illusion.

Is this really that difficult for you to grasp?

Obviously understanding does not involve the language itself or else how do you explain that there are multiple languages but the same understanding? — khaled

Example?

False belief doesn't equate to illusion...

Let me help you...

There is no such thing as an illusion of the soul.

Exactly, What's the problem?

Show the argument, I just did.

If there is such thing as an illusion of an external world, then there is an external world.

Which means according to your own argument that since there has most certainly been the illusion of a soul... — Janus

I've never argued that.

What is an illusion? — Blue Lux

It's not what it is an illusion of.... Hence... there can be no illusion of X if there has never been an X.

What a statement means involves not the statement... — Blue Lux

Rubbish.

Stop hand waving and show the argument.

Is there an argument or objection in there somewhere? What of a unicorn?

P3: There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise — khaled

This is false. I've just argued for how that's the case. I also argued that reason is not necessary for knowledge. If you agree with everything I just wrote in the last post, then you have some self-contradiction going on if you still maintain that the premiss quoted above is true. It's not.

Doesn't follow.

That's a remarkable difference.

I find that there is a significant difference between assuming an external world and being existentially dependent upon one.

...in answer to your question as to what would qualify as proof; I will say again; deductively valid reasoning that is grounded on self-evident premises. — Janus

And exactly what premisses would you not say were assuming an external world?

My apologies...

:confused:

Exactly.

If knowledge requires reason, and reason requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, then knowledge requires thinking about one's own thought and belief.

Thinking about one's own though and belief requires complex language use. If knowledge requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, then it requires complex language use.

Complex language use requires knowing what certain statements mean. If knowledge requires complex language use, and that requires knowing what certain statements mean, then we've arrived at a big problem...

Either there is more than one kind of knowledge, or knowledge does not require thinking about one's own thought and belief.

One has to first know what certain statements mean before one can begin reasoning about them.

Get it yet?

We think there is shared meaning. If there is no real plurality of minds then there is no real shared meaning. — Janus

There can be no illusion of an X if there has never been an X.

It’s not clear to me what you mean by meaning being existentially contingent upon something else. Are you saying that we can only conceive of a thing if that thing actually exists? — Michael

If I've used the qualifier "contingent" in this thread it was inadvertently. I avoid that because I reject modality and severely restrict using possible worlds frameworks. Logical possibility alone isn't enough to warrant belief.

Ancient Aliens...

Existentially dependent is the notion I like. There are a few ways to determine what sorts of things are existentially dependent upon others and how/why...

The application of that knowledge is where the magic happens.

A review...

P3: There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise... — khaled

Show me a premise that can be known to be true without referring to any other premises... — khaled

One can know that "there is a cup on the table" is true by virtue of knowing what the statement is talking about, and then looking to see if the cup is on the table... — creativesoul

Does "there is a cup on the table" count as a premiss? On my view it can if and when one is using it as such. Use is what makes it a premiss, instead of just any ole' statement. Such usage doesn't change the meaning of the statement. We can know this solely by virtue of knowing that the truth conditions of the statement remain unchanged. This remains the case regardless of it's use.

One can say "there is a cup on the table" in normal everyday parlance and believe it or not. This would be to use the statement as a means to report one's belief, or perhaps even as a means to report an other's, or it can also be used as a means to deliberately misrepresent one's own or another's belief.

One can also report upon the meaning of the statement.

One could use the statement as a premiss to prove some other statement.

The truth conditions of the statement remain unchanged in each and every case.

Do we agree thus far?

:brow:

We can say "there is a cup on the table" around an other who knows exactly what we're saying, but has no clue how to use that statement as a premiss. S/he knows exactly how to determine if it's true or false. They look and see for themselves.

All of this clearly shows that "the cup is on the table" can be determined true or false without it's being used relative to another premiss.

Shared meaning requires another mind.

So your objection is that shared meaning doesn't require a plurality of minds, all it requires is an illusion thereof, and illusions thereof do not require the real thing?

Shared meaning requires at least the illusion of a plurality of minds. I'm not claiming that the apparent plurality of minds is an illusion; I tend to think the plurality is real, but i acknowledge it cannot be proven. In fact nothing that is not deductively true can be proven; all inductive and abductive belief is fallible. That doesn't mean I think we have any good reason to doubt that there is a plurality of minds, but that might also depend on the metaphysical context in which we are considering the question. Context is everything.

Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice.
— creativesoul

I followed the argument perfectly well and showed it to be flawed because it assumes what it purports to prove. You have provided no counter-argument just the usual insulting insinuations. I actually don't know why I continue to bother responding to you. — Janus

Cause it can be fun and informative. Don't act like I'm the only one of us that's a dick sometimes...

An illusion of a plurality of minds is not a plurality of minds. Shared meaning requires a plurality of minds. An illusion of something necessarily presupposes the existence of that something. Otherwise, the term is utterly meaningless... an empty concept.

What sort of proof would qualify as proof for you?

Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice.

You can't prove that solipsism is false, so as usual you resort to casting aspersions on the one who has shown you to be mistaken.

Of course I agree that solipsism is ridiculous and that no one in their right mind would sincerely believe it to be true, but I also think that no one in their right mind would believe they could prove it to be false. — Janus

Well, I'm certainly no angel here... However, you've shown no mistake. I'm more than willing to look at such a showing...

What sort of proof would it take for you?

Knowing what all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon is all it takes. Whether or not one chooses to apply that bit of knowledge is another matter altogether.

Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Language requires shared meaning. Shared meaning requires another mind.
— creativesoul

Again this assumes that the others you share meaning with are not products of your own mind, or for a more universal solipsism, products of the one mind. — Janus

Are you claiming that shared meaning doesn't require a plurality of minds?