Socrates' notion of human reason, thought and belief remains prominent...

I don't think what an eighteen-month old knows is anything like as philosophical as that. My guess is that what they know is that you make the 'cup' noise when you want to draw attention to a thing that looks like what's over there. It's a game, a language game. — andrewk

Yeah, you're probably right. I mean I wouldn't argue against that. It wasn't the best supportive reasoning...

I was more applying the consequences of drawing the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. All premisses are statements used for a specific purpose. All statements are belief statements(assuming sincerity). One can know that a statement is true long before ever knowing why and/or how they've come to believe it.

Look at your point one. It is comparing ‘objects’ and ‘agents’. So, you’re trying to argue on the basis of differentiating ‘the object’ on the one side, from ‘the act of cognising’, on the other; but in doing that, you’re assuming a perspective outside of, or above, what it is you’re wanting to describe. [Thomas Nagel has a good essay on just this point in his ‘The Last Word’.] — Wayfarer

Yeah, I've heard that argument in different forms before as well. Nagel is pretty good. I'll have to have a look at that. Thanks. However, here's what you're referring to...

All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable). — creativesoul

This perspective doesn't require being outside of, or above, that which is being taken into consideration. It's the same story...

Thinking about pre-existing thought and belief. There is no need to be outside of anything at all. Why would there be? We can look at every and any example of human thought and/or belief as a means for determining what they all have in common that make them what they are... aside from our calling them all by the same name.

Focusing on the author... is not necessarily an ad hom. This is true. It is also true that you have not focused upon the author as a means for objection(which is an ad hom). So... you're right. I'm mistaken... or speaking too loosely, for sure.

The paraconsistent stuff is referring to all the times you'll say that you're not saying anything at all. That's paraphrasing of course. Surely you'll not deny that it is often the case that you will openly express that you haven't claimed X and that you haven't claimed not X. Anyway...

I'm not interested in all this focus upon you and me. I actually find your replies in many threads to be worthy of much consideration. With me, well... evidently you do not like my 'style'...

:smile:

A child amidst language acquisition doesn't need to accept any premiss such as "auditory input is reliable" in order to know that that thing over there is a cup.

Does understanding how to use the English language count as referring to another premiss?
— creativesoul

Yes. You'd have to accept premises such as "Humans are capable of storing memories", "Auditory input is reliable", etc. If Auditory input is not reliable you can't learn English — khaled

No. This is confused.

One can know that the statement "there is a cup on the table" is true by virtue of looking. There is no need for one to refer to another premiss. Referring to another premiss requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. That's a metacognitive endeavor.

One can know that some statements are true, and they can know how to tell if they are long before one is able to use them as a premiss.

Thought/belief and statements thereof are long prior to logic. Logic is meant to take account of them. Your argument neglects these facts and suffers as a result.

I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it. — Wayfarer

I've heard this before. We've discussed this before as well. My viewpoint hasn't changed much regarding it.

Why would we need to step outside our mind to compare our thoughts with something other than our thoughts?

Jesus, man, take your hand off it, it's disgusting! — Janus

You're just jealous of the size and scope of this novelty... It is quite problematic for you. Your posts are beginning to degrade into nothing but rhetorical ad homs and/or some application of para-consistent logic. It's kinda boring.

Show me a premise that can be known to be true without referring to any other premises — khaled

Does understanding how to use the English language count as referring to another premiss?

All premisses are statements. Some statements are true. Some true statements can be verified.

Where's the need to refer to another premiss?

Verification/falsification

p3 is false

What's the point in telling me about something you were going to attempt to do? — Janus

Go back a page or two... I already did. No need to do it again. I won't reply to you here in this thread about that though. Banno's back on track.

Reality does not care what we find special or significant. It just is. — litewave

If reality includes other people it most certainly cares about that.

:wink:

For example, thoughts and ideas are connected and correlated. — Metaphysician Undercover

You asserted that physiological sensory perception isn't necessary for drawing correlations or meaning.

Now you claim that thoughts and ideas are connected and correlated. So if your objection want to be coherent, you must now admit that thoughts and ideas are not existentially dependent upon sensory perception.

Have fun with that. I'm out.

It's a misnomer of sorts anyway. QM is math. Math has rigid designations(meaning). Interpreting QM into normal language is bunk.

QM interpretations are fodder.

a hard core common sense presupposition inevitably involved in practice, — prothero

Doesn't the argument set that out?

:wink:

It does not follow from the fact that we cannot definitively know the causal sequence of events that there is no causal sequence of events.

This argument presupposes an external world in p4, or at least it could be argued that it does. So...

It's interesting to me on several different levels. It was not made in order to arrive at the conclusion that all philosophical positions presuppose an external world. I didn't have that in mind...

I think in both of these, 'corresponds' and 'agrees with' is synonymous with 'correlation' in the OP. — Wayfarer

Well, not quite actually...

Although my position - and this argument - situates the presupposition of correspondence within thought and belief formation, correlations are thought and belief.

Well, actually yeah to some extent. However, there's still much work to be done in terms of setting out the content of correlations. Progress is coming along well though... Thanks for asking.

No one anywhere in philosophy proper has drawn and maintained the distinction between thinking about thought and belief and thought and belief. That distinction alone can shed light on all soirts of things...

I'm quite fond of Kant actually. My position is remarkably similar to his in many ways., which ought be of no surprise. He was one of the first philosophers I read after my interest in philosophy was piqued. I'm just not a believer...

I was going to show the inherent inadequacy of "arbitrary" when defined as you have, but it's no matter now. Banno wants the thread back on track. I'll oblige.

I think I am going to just accept the "reality" of an external independent world as an axiom, a hard core common sense presupposition inevitably involved in practice, and try to make progress from there. — prothero

Nothing wrong with that.

God got in Kant's way...

Heiddy got in his own way...

Neither had a good grasp upon human thought and belief.

Doesn't seem very arbitrary to me.

Clearly there are different accepted usages for the term "arbitrary", and not all place adequate value upon our own thought and belief.

Thanks.

And a worldview(a collection of one's own thought and belief about themselves and the world)?

I would be more than willing to offer a separate argument/reasoning for all of the premisses(1,2,4,6,9)...

There are things such as organisms, planets, stars, land forms, rocks and so on which can be made up of other things. These are not arbitrary groupings of objects. — Janus

I'm just curious... you and litewave are talking about a subject that underwrote our discussion as well...

What's the difference between arbitrary and not? What's the criterion?

Correlations, connections, and associations, are drawn completely within the creature itself. The being does this completely internally. Therefore sensation of things exterior to the creature is not necessary for such activity, nor is it necessary for meaning, consequently. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are the contents of this purported correlation? What things are being connected, correlated, and/or associated with each other?

Do you have an example?

Knowledge of the changes in behaviour after introducing the bell. Knowledge of the physiological make-up of the animal. Knowledge of what the attribution of meaning requires. Judicious application of these...

That question has been answered more than once.

Do you have an example of meaning that does not consist of a plurality of different things and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between them? All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of connecting the two.

That's a strong claim. All it takes is one example to the contrary. It agrees with current convention in terms of theories of meaning, and there are no examples to the contrary. That's more than adequate reason to warrant belief that that statement is true.

And I'm accused of anthropomorphism?

Outstretched leaves of the rainforest undergrowth and sunlight.

Some thing eliciting a response from a creature does not equate to that thing being meaningful to the creature.

Venus Flytrap and an insect on it's interior...

It elicits a response; is that not what you mean by "meaningful"? — Janus

Unpack this...

What is "it" referring to...

...

How does it become so?

Are you actually denying that the sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to Pavlov's dog?
— creativesoul

Where have I denied that? — Janus

Oh good!

We agree then? The sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to the dog?

We know only because we can observe that they respond to things in appropriate ways. We have no evidence that they "draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things". — Janus

Involuntary salivation and heading towards the food bowl is more than adequate evidence that the bell is meaningful/significant to the dog.

What's the word "appropriate" doing here? Being appropriate requires following some pre-existing standard for acceptable behaviour.