No such thing as essential meaning.

Good question! — Blue Lux

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief? — javra

The best one yet! I've been wanting and waiting for this one for a while.

...we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them. — javra

Much to agree with here...

There is plenty of evidence to support the conclusion that, while in utero, humans are drawing correlations between auditory sensations and their own level of comfort/discomfort. That satisfies my own minimalist criterion for what counts as rudimentary thought and belief formation.

Those innate beliefs(a creature's thought or belief at the moment of birth) would have to consist of correlations drawn between things that exist, in their entirety, prior to being a part of the correlation. Drawing the correlation is belief formation. The correlation itself is the belief. The content of the correlation is the belief content.

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?

I'm still wrapping my head around your framework...

Conceptual analysis led to knowledge of black holes. Black holes are pre-conceptual. Conceptual analysis led to knowledge of all sorts of mental ongoings that are prior to language, and thus pre-conceptual.

Thanks for the offer, but it seems I do not need your help.

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken.
— creativesoul

I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:

-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.

Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do. — javra

We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.

Premiss 2 presupposes that the creature experiencing uncertainty understands a plurality of possible outcomes. I find that presupposition dubious for a language less creature.

Here's why/how I've arrived at my own understanding of the matter...

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct.

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is? — javra

Next post...

BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard. — javra

I appreciate the offer, and you're more than welcome to end this discussion if you so choose. For me though, you're one of very few people that I've debated or had discussion with on any philosophy forum who seemed like they a)had an interest in non-linguistic thought and/or belief and b)had some well thought out notion of what that was.

I'd rather flesh out our agreements as well as our disagreements, with the main focus being upon the agreements. I'm about to work on a reply to the rest of the last post, paying particular attention to the question regarding how I conceptualize non-linguistic belief, because that method is pivotal to arriving at a convincing criterion for what counts as being such.

That is to conflate what our knowledge of pre-conceptual entities requires with what the existence of those entities requires.

Not trivial at all. Quite remarkable actually given this...

...we often make the mistake of projecting the entities of our analysis (such as "transcendental apperception" back into our pre-reflective experience and imagining them to be primordial and a priori 'substantive processes' as opposed to being merely conceptual modes of understanding. Whitehead calls this the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". — Janus

Now, to be clear, I certainly agree that we can mistakenly project the entities of complex analysis back into our pre-reflective experience. However, it is also clear that we can become aware of that which is pre-reflective solely by virtue of complex analysis.

Thus, I asked...

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

What knowledge of trees as existing prior to any conceptualization can you arrive at through "complex analysis"? — Janus

I know that trees existed prior to our conceptualizations of them. My knowledge of that requires language. The trees did not. The same holds good of non linguistic(pre-reflective) thought and belief.

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

Try again?

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)? — creativesoul

...no parts/ entities of analysis are pre-reflective. If you think they are, then you have committed a fallacy of misplaced concretenrss and/or succumbed to a transcendental illusion. — Janus

Are you claiming that we cannot use complex analysis as a means for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to the analysis? — creativesoul

Of that which existed prior to any conceptualization or analysis at all, yes. — Janus

So why are you asking me whether they existed prior to any conceptualization, rather than dealing with the question of whether we can preconceptually know anything about them? — Janus

I'm asking that because it is the crux of the issue, as is shown here...

The question is you ask here is irrelevant. Our knowledge of non linguistic thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language(concepts). I've never claimed otherwise.

You, however, clearly stated that no entities of analysis(which I took to mean posited within) are pre-reflective. That's quite simply not true. Seems we've misunderstood one another though.

Yes.

Pavlov's dog and it's correlations/associations between the bell and the expectation of being fed?

Are you claiming that none of these things existed prior to our analysis? That none of these things are rightfully or properly called "pre-reflective" things/entities?

Surely I've misunderstood?

Synapsis?

Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example. — javra

Yes. Let's not conflate that which is prior to language with that which is not though.

If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt... that is... where one intentionally places confidence in the truthfulness and/or reliability of something or someone else... usually a source. I'm reminded of Russel here...

Trees?

Simple answer: we can't because no parts/ entities of analysis are pre-reflective. If you think they are, then you have committed a fallacy of misplaced concretenrss and/or succumbed to a transcendental illusion. — Janus

That would explain some things...

Are you claiming that we cannot use complex analysis as a means for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to the analysis?

I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptua — javra

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken.

Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...

There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures.

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt?
— creativesoul

My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be. — javra

I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake?

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes.
— creativesoul

Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be.

Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real. — javra

I agree with the overall sentiment.

I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind? — javra

No.

I’m mainly wanting to see the extent to which there’s common ground so far as concerns understandings of what trust is. — javra

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt?

Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief.
— creativesoul

To me, this very presupposition you address is one of maintained trust that, namely trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality". And here, I'd uphold this to be an innate (or genetically inherited) trust. — javra

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. I do not see how a non linguistic creature can have a maintained trust based upon understanding a linguistic conception of "truth".

I do, have, and would continue to argue that correspondence is prior to language, and thus prior to conceptions thereof.

I think it is only the living actuality of pre-reflective, pre-subjective/objective experience that allows us to make the reflexive move of talking about things in terms of subjects and objects. But then we often make the mistake of projecting the entities of our analysis (such as "transcendental apperception" back into our pre-reflective experience and imagining them to be primordial and a priori 'substantive processes' as opposed to being merely conceptual modes of understanding. Whitehead calls this the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". — Janus

So clearly there is a need here. How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

Ok. I'm much less interested than I was. That was a direct relevant question. The entire project hinges upon the answer.

Do you have a standard by which you determine what counts as non linguistic thought and/or belief content? If so, what is it and how did you arrive at it? If not, by what means are you determining what counts as being non-linguistic?

Thus understood, though, to believe is other than to think—for the latter requires connections made between givens whereas the former a) does not and b) is a prerequisite to thought’s occurrence (each associated given must be trusted in some way prior to associations between them being made). — javra

Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief.

I’m currently interpreting the following to be in line with your outlook, and since it fits into the thread’s subject:

I’ve come to understand belief as the content to that which is trusted to be (including to have been and to will be). I’ve also come to find at least three categories for trust: trust-that (trusting that X in fact is; e.g. trusting that the earth beneath one’s feet is solid); trust-in (roughly, trusting that X can or will do Y; e.g. trusting in Ted’s capacity to do well in a marathon despite the uncertainty to this); and trust-between (roughly, trust existing between two or more agencies as pertains to implicitly maintained contractual obligations; e.g. Alice’s trust that Bill will not deceive her). “To believe” is to me then fully synonymous in all instances with “to trust”.

Curious to know what criticism of this overall proposition could be offered. (I’ve addressed one potential criticism below) — javra

Which of these kinds of belief is not existentially dependent upon language? I cannot see how any of this belief content is existentially possible with a language less creature. I'm working from the premiss that at conception there is no thought or belief. With that understood, the belief content you're offering directly above seems far too conceptual and/or language laden to be existentially prior to language.

The first suggestion is almost acceptable...

I cannot be convinced that a language less creature is capable of believing/trusting that the earth beneath it's feet is solid, unless that belief can be formed by virtue of a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things(including but not limited to itself), and all of those things exist in their entirety prior to being part of the creature's correlation.

Regarding the belief-that approach...

The belief that approach fails to draw and maintain the distinction between belief and reports/accounts thereof, which is part and parcel to neglecting the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. A belief statement always follows the words "belief that". It's always propositional in form. The belief that approach targets statements of belief. The belief that some statement/proposition or other is true.

The content of non linguistic belief cannot be propositional. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Non linguistic thought and belief cannot have propositional content.

...if there’s something more specific that you’d like to address in terms of the capacity to reason among more intelligent non-linguistic beings, let me know what it is. Also, to the extent we differ in this just addressed outlook, I wouldn't mind finding out how. — javra

There are some differences in our frameworks. I think it would be helpful here to revisit our agreements and then offer an overall outline for the purposes of keeping our vein of thought and thus the discussion on the path of discovering what all thought and belief have in common. This is a nod to something you mentioned earlier about metaphysical work needing to be done.

We're using the same methodology, it seems to me. That's huge, because I'm looking to further hone my own position, and it seems that you're doing the same. That said, I'm planning on addressing the general outlook you've offered...

What I was hinting at leads back to the way all languages I’m very familiar with (roughly, two: English and the other one being largely Latin based, Romanian) are structured. They very often presuppose linguistic capacity in the cognitive attributes they specify. In a way this makes a great deal of sense: we’re addressing these concepts to ourselves, not to non-linguistic creatures. In another way, to my mind, it handicaps philosophical enquiries into what is by predisposing our abstract thought to limit itself to that realm of linguistically-dependent cognitive givens. Add to this ego-centeredness and the anthropocentrism that naturally ensues in light of the problem of other minds and, to me, there’s something of a near universal cultural bias that obfuscates the way we, humans, contemplate all things pertaining to mind, most especially non-human minds. (And, for fairness, on the other side of the isle there’s the occasional character that believes lesser animals are just as aware of things as humans are, the anthropomorphizing crowd. Me, I’m stuck somewhere in the middle between what I deem to be these two, to me not very well-grounded, extremes.) — javra

I too find myself between these two extremes:The one side denying any and all non linguistic thought and belief based upon an utterly inadequate framework that sorely neglects to draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief; and the other side neglecting to draw and maintain the equally crucial distinctions necessary for taking proper account of the complexity of belief.

To this point, there's nothing jumping out as incommensurate to my own understanding of thought and belief. I mean, it seems trivial that there's an allusion to something you called "the problem of other minds". It seems that you're tying it to attributing human thought and belief to non human entities without offering adequate justification for those assertions. Anthropomorphism is to be avoided. To be clear here, I'm not outright denying that different creatures can form virtually the same thought and belief as humans. It's just that those are not able to be shared by them, at least not in the form of belief statements.

Again, I think we agree here.

For example, we deem that one must first understand what “validity” and “inference” point to as words prior to being capable of engaging in valid inferences—for how can one engage in valid inferences (further complicated by the sometimes very formal structures we associate with them) when one does not know what the language-demarcated concepts are? — javra

Yes. To such a skeptical reply, I would answer like this...

Following the rules of correct inference.

Does that require either knowing the rules or knowing the strict academic meaning(s) of the terms "validity" and "inference".?

Getting burned by fire doesn't.

A language-less creature has it's first encounter with some small form of fire. So small is this danger, in fact, that it doesn't trigger anything fearful within the creature. The creature has a bit of curiosity, and so touches the fire and feels the resulting discomfort/pain. The creature refuses to do that again. Rather, it has become - quite literally - painfully aware of what happens when you touch fire.

On my view, this creature has formed meaningful thought and/or belief by virtue of the attribution and/or the subsequent recognition of causality. Who would deny that that creature correctly attributed causality by virtue of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between it's own behaviour and then ensuing pain/discomfort?

Post hoc ergo prompter hoc?

Does that apply to the recognition of a well-known causal chain of events?

I think not. While it is true that just because something happens after something else it doesn't mean that the first was the cause of the other, language-less creatures can't think like that to begin with. Feeling the pain from touching fire most certainly happens afterwards.

The fallacy applies to situations where the believing creature is offering the temporal order as ground for it's own belief. The creature didn't contemplate a temporal framework. One must contemplate a temporal framework in order to be guilty of post hoc ergo prompter hoc.

Language less creatures can draw meaningful correlations between different things. They can acquire knowledge of what we have long since already known:Touching fire causes discomfort/pain.

They come to know what we come to know by virtue of making the same causal connections between different things(touching fire and feeling pain).

I concede the point and will resist talking about non linguistic logical inference. It adds only unnecessary confusion and isn't necessary. Thanks for taking me to task on it. It's not a common thing for me to write. Good conversation javra. I'll get to your latest post the next time around...

:smile:

As to the criteria for “evidencing” … again, this would get deeper into interpretations of mind than I’d like. I’ll try though: that which evidences is that which suggests the truth of. One might object in that non-linguistic beings lack our linguistic concept of truth. Clearly they lack any account of what truth is; yet, again, for lack of better terms that are ready present, I uphold they do have understandings of that which conforms to reality, i.e. of that which is true.

I’ll provide an example (there are far better ones when it comes to lesser animals, such as those pertaining to great apes, but keeping this sufficiently common): a person’s petting a dog on the back typically evidences the person’s affection toward the dog to the dog. The dog’s memories of being petted will then evidence to the dog that the person who pets him holds affection for him. The data here non-linguistically justifies the given belief-that (haven’t yet come up with a novel term for the concept, though). — javra

I would readily agree that language less creatures presuppose both reality and the correspondence of their own thought and belief with/to reality. I cannot, however, agree that language-less creatures have an understanding of that which conforms to reality.

It seems that you're using this notion of 'evidencing' as a manner of talking about sufficient reason to believe... or warrant. It's commonly called "ground" for belief. Seems like nothing is lost if we swap "evidenced" and "justifies" with "grounded" and/or "warrants"...

You're more than welcome javra.

You are free to do as you see fit with regard to this discussion, but for me at least... it looked like it had a certain potential that I've not seen for quite some time.

I thoroughly enjoy critiquing others' and my own writings, and do appreciate valid objections. I seek them out, in fact, often. Unfortunately, they're few to be found hereabouts. That said, you didn't elaborate upon one, but hinted at it. I agree with the sentiment about some saying that valid inference requires language use. I could probably make that argument against my claim. Kudos.

That said, we've just bee skirting around some stuff thus far. This last bit, in particular, piqued my interest...

If I’m not mistaken, seems like our primary disagreements are over the words that should be properly used. And that no proper words exist for the intended concepts. To me, however, this is not to say that the concepts are lacking or that they’re not well-grounded, to use your semantics. — javra

I'm not even sure that we disagree here. I was just trying to help you better develop this concept/notion you've been alluding to with the terms "justification" and "justify". Best advice I can offer follows from a translation technique I like to use when folk are using terms in a way unfamiliar to myself. We can replace the term with it's definition in every instance of use. If the overall writing still makes sense, then it's an acceptable manner of speaking.

For completely different purposes, I suggest that you could intentionally avoid the terms "justification" and "justify" but instead use the description or definition that you've called such. It may be a bit unwieldy at first, but it will result in a better conception.

If they are well-grounded, then these currently ineffable (?) concepts do relate to the thread’s contents; this by illustrating how linguistic justification can be a more advanced, abstracted form of what occurs in pre-/non-linguistic intelligent beings so as to result in “well-grounded beliefs”. But it’s hard to debate most of this if the concepts are not understood via the words used. So, presently, I’m contingently planning on backing out of this discussion.

This part rings very relevant and true...

From a naturalist starting point:At conception there is no thought or belief. History shows us that our knowledge is accrued. Knowledge consists of belief. Belief is accrued. With that in mind...

The bit above regarding justification being a more advanced form of what occurs in pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic creatures is not at all problematic for me. In fact, it would have to be that way, or similarly so, if my own position is right.

I would imagine, that if you have an obligation to inform the cheated, you have at least the same obligation to inform the cheater of your intentions, and give them a chance to own up on their own part, or else bump you off to keep you quiet, or possibly to let you know that they have that sort of open relationship, but prefer to be discrete with each other about the details, so butt out. — unenlightened

Yup...

If you feel obligated to tell one cheated on, I would think you ought tell the cheater that...

Guaranteed they would want to be the one to let em know, if they did not already know. And your moral obligation is met.

The act of justification is when a speaker provides the ground for his/her belief statement to another person.
— creativesoul

In my previous post I addressed what I intended by the term "to justify" as process and "justification" as an instance of this process. The concept I have in mind and have described does not require language--thought it also applies to linguistic expressions. And, so far, I have no better term for it than that of "justify/justification". I won't rewrite it, but its there. — javra

I saw that. Not trying nor wanting to be pedantic about it, but while I can understand the desire to use an already existing phrase it can become quite problematic. That is particularly the case when in situations like this. We are involved in a discussion that is based upon a conventional notion. When the topic of discussion is the conventional notion of JTB, then we must maintain the standard meaning for it. That is what we're discussing afterall.

If one wants to argue against the conventional notion, as I am doing, one must argue against the conventional notion. One cannot be expected to be taken seriously if one argues against the conventional notion of JTB by virtue of re-defining what counts as being justified and/or what counts as justification.

That said, I can understand and fully appreciate a situation where ones finds that conventional notions are inadequate for taking account of what one wants to take account of.

Time to coin a new phrase...

This is all a bit irrelevant to our agreements though. Let's discuss those and take things form there.

Linguistically, when asked, "how do you justify X?" what is typically asked is, "what are your reasons for believing X to be true?"... ...if reasoning is provided among us linguistic beings and if the reasoning is found valid, then the believed truth is then deemed to be justified--or, as I previously addressed, is "evidenced to be just/correct/right". — javra

May I first suggest something here?

It looks to me like you are conflating truth with either belief or statements thereof in your use of "believed truth". If you drop the "truth" part and keep the "belief" part, you'd end up with the following...

...if reasoning is provided among us linguistic beings and if the reasoning is found valid, the belief is then deemed to be justified--or, as I previously addressed, is "evidenced to be just/correct/right". — javra

Yeah, pretty much. The key part here, as it pertains to my own critique regarding the notion of justification as it pertains to JTB, is that it is the listener who 'deems' the belief "justified". That's a problem. Think Copernicus. The listeners of his time did not deem his beliefs justified, nor true, but many of them were both.

The underlying problem with the JTB notion of justification is clear. It is not required in order for a belief to be either well-grounded or true.

It is required in order for a speaker to be able to talk about his/her own belief in terms of it's ground(how/why one believes what they do). It's useful as a means for helping a capable listener further discriminate between competing and/or contradictory claims. It's useful for helping a listener determine whether or not they can and/or should trust the reliability of a speaker.

Intelligent animals and toddlers don't provide the reasoning for their beliefs to themselves or to others; of course not; they have no language by which to do so. But they can infer, reason, all the same. And via their inference their beliefs can be well grounded or not.

I guess what I'm driving at is that well-grounded-ness is always itself fallible, never infallible/absolute.This is what makes surprises possible in intelligent beings. As well as learning by trial and error.

In due measure with intelligence there are reasons--inferences--held for certain beliefs being maintained. And it is this reasoning that I'm currently terming "justification"--again, the evidencing of being just/correct/right. — javra

Of course we're fallible. There are steps we can take that decrease the likelihood of our being mistaken. The whole point of some folks' methods and philosophies are to minimize error. Methodological Naturalism comes to mind. I tend to work from it's tenets.

How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language.
— javra

The same way it does within language use. It is validly inferred from pre-existing true belief, actual events, the way things are/were, and/or some combination thereof. — creativesoul

How then do you believe this non-linguistic valid inference is different from “[non-linguistically] evidencing [that concerned] to be just/correct/right”? — javra

Well for one, I do not find that it is possible for a non-linguistic creature to be involved in any activity that meaningfully and sensibly qualifies as 'evidencing'... not to themselves nor others. Both require the same things(the ability to take account of one's own mental ongoings - ahem, language), and a creature without language quite simply does not have what it takes to be actively involved in 'evidencing'.

I'm not sure what you're talking about though. Try to explain this notion in terms of what it takes to do it. I mean, what is the criterion for it - which when met by some candidate or other - counts as being a case of "evidencing [that concerned] to be just/correct/right."

On my view, that may be three completely different criteria with being just and being correct both requiring language.

Being 'right', if that is to mean forming and/or having true belief, well that one doesn't require language. At least for forming and/or having some belief. However, even with this one, I find no sensible way to talk about a language less creature 'evidencing' that sort of belief.

How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language. — javra

The same way it does within language use. It is validly inferred from pre-existing true belief, actual events, the way things are/were, and/or some combination thereof.

There is no way to sensibly talk about pre-linguistic justification. There is also no need.

The issue I've been at pains to point out goes unnoticed more often than not. Treating the terms "justified" and "well-grounded" as equally interchangeable synonyms is a mistake if one also holds that being justified requires justification. It's a mistake because being well-grounded does not. That is always the case. Always. I mean think about it...

The act of justification is when a speaker provides the ground for his/her belief statement to another person. It can be the case that the ground is insufficient/inadequate. They would be insufficient and/or inadequate prior to being given to another, and they would be insufficient and/or inadequate after. The same is true of ground that is sufficient. From this common sense understanding we can glean something significant about the notion of justification.

The act of justification is not required for well-grounded belief.

The act of justification does not make a belief well-grounded. Being well-grounded is the criterion for being justified. The act of justification is unnecessary for the belief to be well-grounded.

Who would deny that when a creature is learning that fire hurts when touched that that creature's belief is not well-grounded?

Learning how to use language is experience, as is getting burned. Why privilege the former and not the latter?

Is it more important that one be able to talk about the reasons they believe something or other, or is it more important that those reasons are good ones; that they warrant belief?

There's more than one reason people complain. There's also more than one reason people do not.

Can you think of any expressive behaviour that does not predicate? — tim wood

My ducks, the wee ones that is, express their hunger by virtue of partially opened mouthes and walking back and forth between my chair and the food bin, all the while looking up at me.

No predication necessary.

Is there something primordial to language? There must be, imo. But I don't know what it is. And the theories about what that is all seem to arrive at analogously the same conclusion that flight engineers come to with bumblebees: they can't fly. — tim wood

Gotta love those foregone conclusions...

I put it to you that the flight engineers aren't considering all of the relevant facts. The same is true of your method and any other that ends without knowledge of what all thought is.