Self aware sentience has reproductive advantages.

Otherwise, what is evolution (theory itself) driven by then? — 3017amen

Natural selection.

I don't really see where logic comes into it. Logic, like mathematics and information is an abstract description of the world rather than being the world itself. It's an idea. Evolution isn't driven by ideaslike logic or mathematics.

One of the best books I've read for years, Metazoa.

In his acclaimed book, Other Minds, Peter Godfrey-Smith explored the mind of the octopus – the closest thing to an intelligent alien on Earth. In Metazoa, he expands his inquiry to animals at large, investigating the evolution of experience with the assistance of far-flung species. Godfrey-Smith shows that the appearance of the first animal body form well over half a billion years ago was a profound innovation that set life upon a new path. He charts the ways that subsequent evolutionary developments – eyes that track, for example, and bodies that move through and manipulate the environment – shaped the lives of animals. Following the evolutionary paths of a glass sponge, soft coral, banded shrimp, octopus and fish, then moving onto land and the world of insects, birds and primates like ourselves, Metazoa gathers these stories together to bridge the gap between matter and mind and address one of the most important philosophical questions: what is the origin of consciousness?

It doesn't operate from information. It's biological.

Nice OP, in that I concede to the informational distinction(s). As an example (which is worth redundancy here), matter relates to information just like abstract mathematics (metaphysics) relate to matter. — 3017amen

Well, you're right there, but that's exactly what's wrong with OP's idea.

Abstract can be defined as "existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence."

Mathematics is thought about aspects of the world. It is not the world itself.
Information is also abstract, it is our thoughts about aspects of the world.

Cosmologically, existing things eventually can only be described (for a lack of complete explanation) through abstract mathematical structures (neurons, protons, etc.). — 3017amen

Right again: abstract mathematical structures are only descriptions. Somebody is doing the describing. The neurons and protons are aspects of the world, the descriptions are ideas, thoughts. The neurons and protons carry on doing what they do regardless of our (incomplete) description.

The physicist Weiner said that the best model of a cat is a cat, and preferably the same cat.

The brain is not an information processing body, any more than the stomach is. The brain is biological, it works by electrochemical and other biological mechanisms. When you've explained the biological mechanisms, that's it, there isn't anything left for "information" to do.

1. Depressives don't lack stimulus, rather the stimulus doesn't seem to have the desired effects.
1b. The healthy activities I take part in (sports, cycling, walking the dog, sex) provide an immediate reward. Reading and writing are no more healthy than playing video games.
2. How do you end up classing sex as unhealthy? Are you religious?

Your (somewhat moralistic) theories lie in ruins around you.

I have often seen people saying "you can't even define consciousness so what's the good in talking about it?" or "how can we explain it if we don't know what it is?". Searle's point might be taken as implying that we do know what it is.

I'm afraid I don't recall where Searle says that @Amity.

We've been slightly at cross purposes @T Clark, no worries.

Ostensive definition
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colors or sensations). It is usually accompanied with a gesture pointing to the object serving as an example, and for this reason is also often referred to as "definition by pointing".

An ostensive definition assumes the questioner has sufficient understanding to recognize the type of information being given. Ludwig Wittgenstein writes:

So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand the word.... One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?[1]

The limitations of ostensive definition are exploited in a famous argument from the Philosophical Investigations (which deal primarily with the philosophy of language), the private language argument, in which Wittgenstein asks if it is possible to have a private language that no one else can understand.[2]

John Passmore states that the term was first defined by the British logician William Ernest Johnson (1858–1931):

"His neologisms, as rarely happens, have won wide acceptance: such phrases as "ostensive definition", such contrasts as those between ... "determinates" and "determinables", "continuants" and "occurrents", are now familiar in philosophical literature" (Passmore 1966, p. 344).

What does probabilistically (located) mean in this context?

Hi @Possibility,

Perhaps I should have said "affect" rather than "emotion". I was speaking quite loosely and I did put "emotion" in scare quotes.

Would you be happy with "affect is primary and is located in the brain stem"?

Can you say why you don't buy the "hard problem" thing? In a new thread if you think that's best.

My definition of ostensive definition wasn't a non-standard definition of ostensive definition. HTH.

His take is that "emotion" is primary, and is located in the brain stem, a more "primitive" part of the brain. We've been looking in the wrong place. — Daemon


I think @Possibility would disagree with this.

I'd like to know more about this @T Clark @Possibility.

No, there isn't a single correct definition, so it's a waste of time looking for that. I think you have to state your own working definition, in the specific context.

John Searle says that, like many other terms, consciousness is best defined ostensively, that is, by pointing to examples.

Thank you, I have enrolled.

I have been very struck by this recent video lecture by Mark Solms, who is both a neuroscientist and a psychiatrist: https://youtu.be/CmuYrnOVmfk

He draws on his experience with patients who lacked any cerebral cortex, observing that they are nevertheless able to experience emotions. He notes that while the absence of cerebral cortex allows "feeling" to exist, the removal of only a few cc's of the brain stem causes irrevocable unconsciousness.

His take is that "emotion" is primary, and is located in the brain stem, a more "primitive" part of the brain. We've been looking in the wrong place.

I don't agree with you there Apollodorus. In the present context the way the word has been used for centuries is irrelevant. OP wants to know how we are using the term now, in philosophical discussion.

And, pace 180 Degrees, I don't think "awareness of self-awareness = consciousness" is right: I think that is a higher level of consciousness. I think "consciousness = feeling" would be better.

If an entity can feel something, it's conscious.

I have a degree in Linguistics, and my teacher in the area of definitions was Professor Noel Ossleton, who was at that time President of the International Association of Lexicographers. He told me once that I am good at definitions, and should seek to work in that field. And I became a translator, which is of course all about what things mean.

I don't however claim to be a great authority. Nevertheless I have something to say about definitions, and it's this: in order to know whether you have come up with a correct definition, you must already know what the term means.

Do you have a page reference please?

What exactly does Searle say about intentionality and background abilities?

I've found if you ask two Buddhists about Buddhism you get 3 contradictory answers,

"Abstract: Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way."

But "fields" doesn't solve those problems.

I've thought for some time that phenomena involving waves may be a crucial aspect of the mechanism of consciousness. There certainly are synchonised waves of neuronal activity, and one can easily imagine how that could lead to unification, integration. But I don't think this explains conscious experience, it's just speculation at this stage. The "fields" idea also seems like speculation. I'm surprised to see an academic article like this about it.


"However, they’ve never been analysed together as a whole, which hinders evaluations of them. This article tries to rectify this. It concludes that while field theories face challenges, they aren’t easily dismissed, for they draw on considerable evidence and may avoid serious problems in neuroscience concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, causality, and ontology."

Shouldn't we be hearing about some of that evidence in this abstract?

Those who speak don't know. Those who know don't speak — Laozi

He said that did he?

If you mean "Are there things that could never be seen" then we move into modality. You will never see a round square, or a four sided triangle, but these are not things, just words put together without standing for anything. There's an interesting debate around whether we might find, say, unicorns on a distant planet; — Banno

I did have in mind things that could never be seen, but not in the way your examples suggest. It would be better to say "could never be experienced " rather than "seen". Things that (I'm assuming) do exist, say the forces between subatomic particles, or the centre of a black hole, which we can't experience.

So their question changes "Can we see the world as it is" to "Can we see the world as it is in itself" or "Can we see the world as it really is". The idea is that there is a world that stands outside our perceptions of it, and hence is outside of our capacity to discern. Further, this world, beyond our ken, is the actual thing. Since we cannot discern the goings on in this world as it is in itself, we cannot make statements about it, let alone true statements. On this view, there is precious little that we can say that is true. — Banno

What if it was just "an actual thing" rather than "the actual thing"?

Thanks for all the thoughtful posts, I've had a minor medical emergency, I will respond soon (I'm getting treatment).

Hi Coben,

I'm working towards an understanding.

[I've decided to make this a new topic.] — Wayfarer

Has that happened yet?

I remember how I mashed my finger in a door when I was seven. I still have the scar. The memories are in my brain, nobody else's, the scar is on my finger, nobody else's.

I think "selfhood" arose billions of years ago with the emergence of the biological cell. There for the first time there was a "self" and an "other".

I was saying that I think the notion of a non-relational aspect of the world is incoherent. — Janus

How do you identify what is entering into relation with what? Those two asteroids are where they are because of Jupiter's gravitational effect, Jupiter is where it is because of the sun, and the Milky Way galaxy.

Does "everything is relational" get us anywhere?

That sums up the philosophical dispute. Is "the world as it is" that which human beings ordinarily perceive when not mistaken (i.e., per a human standard)? Or is it an ideal that transcends human perception? — Andrew M

Thanks Andrew.

Perhaps the words are being used in a technical sense but I feel there's something jarring about "ideal" and "transcends" here.

Could we say that the meaning of "the world as it is" depends on the context? The world has perceptible and imperceptible aspects, and on a day to day basis we usually want to talk about the world we perceive.

Where did you get that pronunciation from Olivier? — Daemon

New York. It’s meant as a parody of a smart ass talking. — Olivier5

The local dialect where I come from, Tyneside, North East England, is certainly among the most extreme accents of British English, and we say "ya kna" to mean "you know".

The dialect and accent is called "Geordie". You can hear a Geordie joke here: https://www.hawaii.edu/satocenter/langnet/assets/geordie.rm and read a translation here: https://www.hawaii.edu/satocenter/langnet/sounds/geordsound.html The joke includes somebody saying "ya kna".

↪Daemon
There are aspects of the world that are inaccessible, but none of those are non-relational. It's just that we don't possess the right properties to enter into relation with those inaccessible aspects. There are no non-relational aspects in other words; if something were entirely non-relational it would be nothing at all. — Janus

Thank you.

So do you think aspects can enter into relations with other aspects, let's say an asteroid hits another asteroid?

ya kna — Olivier5

Where did you get that pronunciation from Olivier?

↪Daemon
There are things we don't know that we don't know, therefore we don't know anything. — Banno

My interest was initially piqued by Andrew M's suggestion that we can see the world as it is, and his subsequent acknowledgement that colour-blind people can't see the world as it is.

Andrew then added something about "standards", Platonic or Idealised standards, versus creature specific standards.

I guess "Idealised" is the same thing as "the world as it is ("in itself").

The tetrachromats are interesting because it means all men and most women are colour-blind. So if you've ever wondered what it's like to be colour-blind, now you know. Fascinatingly, it seems that tetrachromat women themselves often don't realise that they can see colours the rest of us can't, and it isn't tested for routinely, it wasn't known about at all until recently. The robin's ability to see magnetic fields is interesting because it seems so bloody unlikely and it's like a superpower.

I realise these are capacities that we know are inaccessible to the rest of us, but they give us something to talk about, and they provide a pointer towards other capacities we don't know about at all (after all, we only just found out about these ones, and there was no guarantee of that).

There are things we don't know that we don't know, and they are part of the world as it is, so we don't know the world as it is.

?

How did Austin deal with it?

But we know they are inaccessible...? Think on that. — Banno

There are also the unknown unknowns.