A lot of philosophers seem to believe in something like a soul, and they call it Mind, a metaphysical substance separate from matter. They're called Dualists. I often call them Spiritualists.
As Wayfarer brought out, the imagined dissection of us into body and soul, body and Mind, or body and Consciousness is artificial and cultural.
There aren't separate body-and-soul. There's just the animal.
Everything in your experience is consistent with what an animal would be expected to experience.
That position has been called "philosophy-of-mind Physicalism. (..not to be confused with metaphysical Physicalism, which I
don't subscribe to.)
For brevity, I abbreviate philosophy-of-mind Physicalism as "pomp". When I say "Physicalism", without a qualifying-phrase, I mean metaphysical Physicalism.
Some here don't like it, but the scientists are right this time, about that anyway.
There's something called an Elminative Physicalist, who (if I remember correctly) takes a more extreme position, and says that the external, objective, 3rd-person point-of-view is the only valid one, and that our own 1st-person experience is fictitious. A ridiculous position, I'd say.
That view is probably common among scientists, and, in that instance, they're wrong..
Your life is a life-experience possibility-story, and it's centered on you, its Protagonist. You're its primary and essential component. So the person (or other animal) is
primary in its life-experience story.
So I believe in the primacy of the person (or other animal), in their reality, which consists of a life-experience possibility-story.
People sometimes confuse a philosophy-of-mind position with a metaphysical position. It's true that, when someone states a philosophy-of-mind position, that seems to raise the question of what metaphysical position they subscribe to.
When a philosophy-of-mind position is stated, the question of "What is?" isn't far beneath.
So let me outline my suggestion about that. It would probably be called Eliminative Ontic Structural Non-Realism.
Physicists Michael Faraday (1844), Frank Tippler ('70s or '80s), and Max Tegmark (more recent) have pointed ot that experience, observation and experiment are completely consistent with the physical world consisting only of relation in mathematical/logical structure. No need for "concrete" objectively-real "stuff".
That position that that structure is all that the physical world consists of has been called Eliminative Ontic Structuralism.
Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis has been called Ontic Stuctural Realism, suggesting that Tegmark regards our external world as having its own existence, maybe the primary existence. That was my impression, too, when reading things that he's said.
That's where I disagree. As I mentioned above, I point out that your life is centered on your own experience. The relevant inter-related if-then structure is your own life-experience possibility-story, in which you're primary, and the essential component.
So, I'd replace the "Realism" with "Non-Realism".
A physical world, like ours, consists of a system of inter-referring if-then statements.
Physical laws are hypothetical "if" facts that relate some other hypothetical "if" facts called "quantity-values".
Those physical laws and some quantity-values are parts of the "if" clause of "if-then" facts. Those "if-then" facts' "then" conclusions consist of other quantity-values.
Mathematical theorems are if-then facts whose "if" clause includes (but isn't limited to) a set of axioms.
There are also abstract logical "if-then" facts.
Experience, observation and experiment are completely consistent with the physical world consisting on nothing other than that system of inter-referring "if-then"s.
Of course our experience with the details of that physical system consist largely of hearing from physicists about what they've found out by their experiments. But, in any case, statements about our physical world can still be stated as "if-then" statements.
For example, if I say that there's a traffic roundabout at the intersection of 34th & vine, that's the same as saying that if you go to 34th & Vine, you'll encounter a traffic-roundabout.
Declarative grammar is convenient, but maybe we start believing too much in our grammar. Maybe conditional grammar is what more accurately describes our physical world.
Anyway, where I differ from others who have suggested Eliminative Ontic Structuralism is that I suggest that this hypothetical system of inter-related "if-then"s, this "possibility-story", consists of your own personal life-experience possibility-story.
Hence "Eliminative Ontic Structural Non-Realism".
I call my that metaphyiscal proposal "Skepticism", because it makes no assumptions and posits no brute-facts. Complete rejection of assumptions is certainly skeptical, justifying my name for the metaphysics that I propose.
I claim that Skepticism is the parsimonious metaphysics, favored by Ockham's Principle of Parsimony.
A also claim that Skepticism qualifies as a version of Vedanta. Vedanta has several versions, of which Advaita is the most popular. Skepticism differs from Advaita, and the other usual Vedanta versions, but I claim that it shares the basic conclusions and consequences of Vedanta.
Michael Ossipoff