I’d said:
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Sure. But your conscious experience is of your perceptions, feelings, preferences, wants, likes and dislikes among your surroundings, Those are exactly what one would expect as the experience of an animal, or any other purposefully-responsive device. — Michael Ossipoff
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I'm not arguing against that.
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Then where’s the need for this additional Dualistic entity that you call “Consciousness”?
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I'm saying conciousness is the ontological starting point, which you seem to agree with.,
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Well, I said “Sure”, but I should be more specific about what I agree with:
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I suggest that all that’s objectively, or globally-assertably, real and existent or true are maybe some abstract logical facts.
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The rest of our life-experience possibility-stories consists of a variety of “if-then” facts, whose applicability is only within the inter-referring system of “if-then”s that they’re part of.¬
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Obviously the subject, and the central, primary, essential component of your life-experience possibility-story is you. The story is about your experience.
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So yes, you have special ontological status, in your live-experience possibility-story.
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We could choose to call you a Consciousness, but what are you in that story? You’re an animal. The story is about that animal’s experience.
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You insist on wanting to artificially, unnecessarily, dissect the animal into a Consciousness and a body.
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It’s as if you wanted to go around cutting every dime in half, into a “heads” and a “tails”. Or cut every magnet in half, into a “north” end and a “south” end (that wouldn’t even work).
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Most animals have no awareness of having or being a Consciousness. Only imaginative Dualist philosophers can create that fiction.
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Would you say that a squirrel perceives that it is a Consciousness, or that it just perceives that it likes acorns?
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If squirrels could speak English, and if you could ask a squirrel what it is, would it say that it’s a Consciousness? Or would it say, “I’m someone who likes acorns. Give me some acorns.”
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You think that you’re a Consciousness that “has” a body. This artificial and unnecessary dissection of yourself into Consciousness and a body is what I mean by an elaborate Dualism.
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You say that what’s ontologically-primary is a Consciousness that is separate from the body. How do you support that claim?
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You say it’s simple. Ok, but its artificiality and its un-necessariness, is a demerit, when your theory is compared to something much simpler (without that artificial dissection) that is completely consistent with experience, and doesn’t require assuming or positing anything other than what your life-experience story is clearly about: an animal’s experience.
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I’d said:
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It's just the simplest description consistent with our experience. — Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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But how can it be the simplest when consciousness is the proper starting point?
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You
say that Consciousness is the proper starting-point. Can you show justification for that claim?
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Consciousness what is directly observed? What’s directly observed is the experience of an animal in its surroundings, with its feelings, preferences, likes, dislikes, etc.
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You’re positing an abstract thing, a Consciousness, that has a body, and is the experiencer. That’s positing a contrived entity, and an artificial dissection.
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Your’re dividing yourself into a body, and…what?
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Say you total a car, but are unharmed. If you can afford to replace the car, then it’s no big deal. That’s because you’re separate from, different from, the car.
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Say you fall off of a bridge. If you aren’t the body, then why should that be a big deal? No, what happens to the body happens to you, because you’re the body.
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Conciousness does not present itself to you as "animal".
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What is presented to you is your surroundings, and your evaluation and impression of them, with respect to your needs, feelings, likes and dislikes.
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That’s exactly what an animal would feel and notice, as you’ve already agreed.
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You still haven't peeled back the onion layers far enough; I'm not talking about our conscious experience of our physical surroundings; I'm talking about the pure, simple, experience of your conscious mind: your bare thoughts and feelings.
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We don’t just perceive our physical surroundings. We analyze them, have feelings and impressions about them, and about what we want or would like, or what we need to avoid. And yes, as
human animals, we have an analytical capacity greater than that of other animals, and sometimes an interest in abstract things not directly related to physical needs.
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Thoughts and feelings are
about something. Maybe something of expected animal-interest, such as survival, food, shelter, avoiding trouble, etc. Maybe about things that you like. Maybe other things that aren’t directly survival-related. Remember that otters, birds, and even crocodiles have been observed to play. Why should it be surprising that humans likewise enjoy non-surival-related forms of play?
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None of those things are bare thoughts and feelings.
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By the way, maybe my saying that we’re nothing other than the animal matches some already-established variation of philosophy-of-mind Physicalism (pomp). (…even though I’m metaphysically an Idealist). But I don’t know of such a version of pomp.
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And, even if there is one, each pomp version, including mine, should have a name, by which to refer to it. If my version already has a name, then I’ll start using that name. But, in the meantime, my suggestion that we’re the animal and nothing more will be referred to by me as “Animalness”.
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I’d said:
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I can't prove that your elaborate Dualism is wrong. — Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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Where have I constructed an elaborate dualism in this thread?
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Alright, I admit that you haven’t been very specific, but I assume that you’re saying that, in addition to a physical body, in addition to the animal, there’s a separate entity called a Consciousness. You must mean that, when you say that we aren’t just the animal.
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That sounds like Dualism. Any Dualism is more elaborate than Animalness.
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Ironically, conciousness as the ontological starting point is the simplest possible way to begin a philosophy.
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…maybe a philosophy constructed abstractly, instead of from our actual experience.
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Yes, for example, I can’t match or equal the elegance or simplicity of Advaita’s extreme Monism, in which there is only one Existent.
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But does that make it more parsimonious than Skepticism?
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No, because it has an assumption.
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Years ago, I used to argue for Advaita, at a philosophy forum. When people told me that I expressing a belief that I wasn’t supporting, they were right. I’d read about Advaita, and wanted its details to be true.
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I was arguing something that I couldn’t really support, and I wasn’t comfortable with that.
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Skepticism and Animalness are free of assumptions.
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“You
are the body” describes our experience. As I’ve said, that was obvious to me even in pre-secondary school.
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A notion that we’re a noncorporeal Consciousness, different from the body, never occurred to me then. Why should it?
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I’ve said that Skepticism, it seems to me, qualifies as a Vedanta version, because its conclusions and consequences are the same. In fact, I’ve said that it seems to me that its conclusions and consequences don’t even really differ from those of Advaita. …leading me to say that Skepticism and Advaita could be regarded as just different wordings.
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Most likely there are many metaphysicses that lead to the same conclusions and consequences.
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Advaita is very popular. Is its metaphysics your metaphysics?
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It's the most intuitive. What you're perceiving as elaborate and unnecessarily complicated are the layers of the onion of your mind that you need to peel back in order to arrive at this simplest, purest starting point.
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That should set off an alarm-bell for you, when you know that your proposal can be perceived as elaborate and unnecessarily complicated. Your simplest, purest starting point is different from what our experience shows us.
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…not that it necessarily
contradicts experience. But it claims an assumption that isn’t in our experience.
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Simple, but not parsimonious, because of that artificial, unnecessary dissection-assumption that it involves.
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I’d said:
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Don't you see that "consciousness" of yours is your perception and analysis of your surroundings, maybe with a monitoring of that analysis, for purposes of optimization or communication? ...and your feelings of preference, likes, dislikes, fears, etc.? — Michael Ossipoff
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You reply:
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Peel back further; it's not only that.
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You’re assuming something different from our actual experience.
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You like it because it has a sort of ideal appeal. But I claim that parsimony, match to experience, and easy supportability are more important.
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If parsimony is about a count of Existents, then Advaita would win. But I feel that it’s more about absence of need for and use of assumptions and brute-facts.
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Michael Ossipoff