Actually both materialism and idealism have both been falsified. The fact that the material interacts with the mental, and vice versa, is falsifiable evidence that the universe is neither one or the other, but something else entirely. — Harry Hindu

...according to an unverifiable and unfalsifiable belief called "Dualism".

The metaphysics that I've proposed here (an Idealism) makes no assumptions, posits no brute-facts, and says nothing that anyone would disagree with.

There are abstract if-then facts. ...where "are" is used in the weak sense that such facts can be stated, with no claim made about their "reality" or "existence", whatever that would mean.

I've spoken of complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, and pointed out the uncontroversial fact that there's inevitably one such system whose events and relations are those of your experience. ...again, with no claim about the "realty" or "existence" of that system.

There's no reason to believe that your experience, and the world in which it is set, are other than that abstract logical system of abstract if-then facts.

What I've suggested is unfalsifiable? Well, it would be falsified if you could show that one of my statements about it is false or leads to a contradiction.

I'll remind you that an if-then fact can be true without its premise being true. There's no particular reason to believe that the premises of the abstract if-then facts that I speak of aren't all false.

When we criticize propositions for unfalsifiability, there's an implication that they're unverifiable too.

What does it take to verify my claims? I claim nothing other than that there are abstract if-then facts, in the sense that they're statable.

Michael Ossipoff

Hopefully no one here will claim that all of Reality is knowable, discussable, describable. If he does, then ask him if he really believes that words can completely describe everything.

If he persists in that belief, remind him that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.

Michael Ossipoff

Who knows? But, for whatever reason, the unfalsifiable proposition known as Materialism is very popular here.

Michael Ossipoff

Almost all atheists nowadays define their atheism as "the lack of belief that gods exist" or something similar. — Jerry

Then they're self-declaring as Agnostics, not Atheists.

"Atheist" means someone who believes &/or asserts that there isn't a God.

All of our politicians are closet Atheists. Though they don't assert Atheism, they evidently believe in it.

Someone who doesn't take a position on the matter, who doesn't claim to know, is an "Agnostic".

So yes, the people calling themselves "Atheists" are espousing Agnosticism.

...until they start espousing Atheism, as they always do, sometimes in their next breath.

So, such people, even aside from the name that they call themselves, routinely and regularly contradict themselves about Atheism vs Agnosticism.

What to call them? Does it matter?

Also, it seems like an escape from burden of proof to take the "lack of belief" side. To "believe god doesn't exist" holds a burden of proof, but most atheists claim that only the theist has a burden of proof, even those that clearly believe no god exists.

There's no burden of proof. Religion has nothing to do with proof, argument, or convincing anyone.

I define metaphysics as statements about what is, where such discussions are, arguable and provable, and are about matters and things that are fully describable and discussable. Other matters, feelings and impressions of what is, I don't regard religion as part of metaphysics. I suggest that some, maybe many, Theists don't regard God as an element of metaphysics.

If you're interested only in matters discussable, describable, arguable and provable, then stick with science, metaphysics, etc.

Those are my rough thoughts on the issue. I'd like to hear why you think atheists insist, or why you insist, on this understanding of atheism. I can think of some reasons, but I'd rather hear from others and discuss them then.

it's probably because they want to believe, and show you, that they're "more scientific than thou", and are believers in the religion of Science-Worship, a pseudoscientific religion characterized by the belief that Science covers and explains all, and that the material world is the ultimate reality and the ground of all being. and that physical science describes all of Reality. (In other words, the religion of Science-Worship is either the same as the metaphysics of Materialism--a metaphysics that doesn't hold up to examination--or is at least believed-in by the same people. But Materialism's insupportability is another topic.)

Michael Ossipoff

Purple Pond--

Let me first answer a question in the later part of your post:

Can all these assumptions be supported?

No, if you're referring to the propositions consisting of the "If" premises and "Then" conclusions of the if-then facts. But the truth of the propositions isn't the important thing. It's the if-then facts themselves that are the basis of our experience-stories, It isn't about the truth of the propositions (an "If" premise and a "Then" conclusion) in those if-then facts.

How can the if-then facts be real if their propositions can't be said to be true? Who offered a guarantee about "real"? I suggest that "real" has nothing to do with the if-then facts, and the system of inter-referring if-then facts that is a person's life-experience possibility-story.

Forget about "real".

The epistemic regress problem goes like this:
— Purple Pond

In order to have knowledge of a proposition you have to rely on other propositions for support. Those other propositions in turn have to be supported by other propositions. Since you can't have justification for every proposition without going into an infinite regress, or going in a circle, any knowledge of a proposition relies on propositions without support. So any knowledge is at bottom without support.

Yes, when you're talking about the truth of the propositions,.

How many assumptions does the regress argument make? Here's a list I've came up with.

All knowledge is propositional.

I don't agree that the propositions themselves, or their truth, are the basis of our experience. It's the if-then facts that are the basis of our experience-story and the world in which it takes place.

Knowledge of a proposition requires support by other propositions.

Yes, of course the truth of a "Then" proposition depends on the truth of some "If" proposition.

Those other propositions also require support. And so on...
There is something wrong with an infinite chain of justification

What's wrong with it is that it needn't be true. Whether the propositions are true or false, there nevertheless inevitably are the abstract if-then facts. Call them unreal or nonexistent if you want to, It doesn't matter. I make no claim about "real" or "existent".

And what is the point of the regress argument? So what if all knowledge at bottom is without support? Therefore what?

There's no need for support, because there's no need for any of the propositions to be true, There are the abstract if-then facts, and what more do you want?

Someone can argue that those abstract facts "aren't". Fine, I'm not making any claims about that. "Are" or "Aren't", "Real", "Existent", or not, whatever that would mean.

Whether those abstract if-then facts "are" or "aren't", they can refer to eachother, in systems, one of which has the events and relations of your experience.

Forget about "Are", "Aren't","real" and "existent"/.

Michael Ossipoff

Sure, regret for past mistakes bothers us. I guess it's natural to avoid future similar mistakes. To that end, it's right to analyze and evaluate our mistakes, what went wrong, how we let it happen.

But of course it's unproductive to let that be a source of unhappiness, to let regret dominate. The fact is that, at that time, when a past mistake was made, it was unavoidable (even if, in hindisight, it seems avoidable). What you did then seemed best at the time. In fact, that wasn't really you who made that mistake--That wasn't the same person that you are now.

There's an etherealness and insubstantiality about what happened in our life-experience-story, which must be why. Nisargadatta said that, from the point of view of the sage, nothing has ever happened. Your experience-story went a certain way. Ok. But nothing is lost, gone, or final. It isn't as if there's some finite supply that gets used-up.

Michael Ossipoff

Nobody wants to die but everybody wants to go to heaven — On a T shirt


A few facts:

1. Religion posits a place called heaven where , it's supposed, we all go after we die. Heaven is a place of happiness, no suffering - a great place everyone should be happy to go to.

2. It doesn't take a lot of effort to see that life has a disproportionate amount of suffering - disease, poverty, crime, etc.

If 1 and 2 are truths then we should be happy to die. We go to heaven and escape worldly pain.

Yet, death invites tears and sorrow instead of what should be laughter and joy.

Comments... — TheMadFool

We've been in this life for a long time. ...so long that it seems as if it were the most natural, normal and ordinary state of affairs (Of course it isn't. The sleep at the end-of-lives is the most natural, normal and ordinary state of affairs).

For that reason, there's a tendency to want this life to go on forever, though we know that it can't.

Additionally, we rightly know that, while here, we'd like to do all that we can, toward various goals, such as being there for others (or at least one other), and various other things we like to do. We're right to not want this life to end unnecessarily soon. We rightly want to make it last for as long as it's worthwhile, because, in this life, there are so many things we like, and want to do. Of course that's in fact why we're in a life in the first place.

Yes, there's nothing wrong with the end of this life; it's nothing to fear. We just, rightly, want to continue it for as long as it remains an opportunity for the things that we like and want to do.

I always point out that if we're in a life for a reason (we are), then, if, at the end of this life that reason remains, then of course, for that same reason, we'll be in another, next, life.

I agree with the ancient Indian philosophers, about our being in a life because of our needs and predispositions. I suggest that your sequence of lives began because of the hypothetical person who was prior to, and the reason, for the start of our sequence of lives. ...and that that sequence of lives will continue until we're "life-completed", when we've perfected our lifestyle, and have no remaining needs. Then comes the end-of-lives, the sleep at the end-of-lives. That will happen only when we're ready for it, when it's the right next thing.

Why expect the end of what we're not done with. How likely does that sound?

Michael Ossipoff

we are far apart on the idea that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, i.e., I look at it as having some precision, but also having areas of blurred boundaries. And even the word precise falls into the category of being blurred, depending on context/use. For example, I can say, "Stand precisely here," without having an exact spot in mind, i.e., if you come over and stand roughly where I was pointing, that will do. I'm not going to say, "No, your not standing exactly where I pointed," as you get down and point to a piece of gravel. Now of course sometimes we do have an exact spot in mind, but the point is that much of language is very vague, and yet we use these concepts in ways we understand, we do it all the time. — Sam26

Of course everyday conversation is particularly imprecise. That that doesn’t mean that metaphysics must be.

Of course I don’t say that all metaphysicses are precisely stated. But I claim that my presentation of my metaphysics doesn’t have ambiguity. (…other than the fact that no dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.)

Or, if there’s some part of my description of my metaphysics that’s ambiguous, then that ambiguity, is just a wording-error that could be fixed.

I speak of abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals (hypothetical things). I speak of inter-referring systems of such abstract if-then facts.

I avoid words that I can’t define, such as “exists” and “real”, and make no claims about such matters in metaphysics.

I point out that, inevitably, there’s one such system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, whose events and relations are those of your experience.

I say that there’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than the life-experience possibility-story consisting of such a system.

We’re used to declarative, indicative grammar, because of its convenience. But I suggest that conditional grammar is what more fundamentally describes our world and experience.

I emphasized that I don’t claim that the elements of some other metaphysics (like Materialism’s concrete, fundamental universe and its things) couldn’t “be”, as a superfluous, unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, duplicating, and having the same events and relations as, the system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts that I describe.

Second, let's consider the statement "God exists." My contention is that we can refer to such a being without having a very precise definition, and still have an idea of what we're talking about, at least generally. To explain this further let's use this example: For the sake of argument let's suppose that we were having an argument about whether Augustus Caesar existed, do we need a precise definition of who we're talking about in order to have a sensible discussion/argument? What kind of definition could one give that someone else couldn't say, that's not very precise? Someone might ask you, "Who or what is Caesar," i.e., give me a definition? Whatever definition you give, surely it isn't going to explain Caesar's exact nature or character, but it's probably going to be close enough for us to have a sensible conversation.

I can specify Augustus Caesar by saying, “The Roman emperor who was called ‘Augustus Caesar’.

That unambiguously states whom I’m referring to.

My point would be that this is true of the concept God

No way!

Augustus Caesar was a human. In fact, we can specify exactly which human he was.

In contradistinction, there are dramatically different conceptions about God, dramatically different meanings.

As I mentioned, some Science-Worshippers define God as the physical universe.

A Biblical Literalist will tell you his anthropomorphic, allegorical conception.

(I’m not criticizing people who believe the allegory. How wrong are they? If they don’t have it exactly right, and haven’t heard the discussion distinguishing a concrete assertion as distinct from a meta-metaphysical impression, they still have that impression. I say that they’re right about the central matter, though they don’t know that it’s the central matter, and think that the matter is primarily about concrete anthropomorphic assertions.)

That’s very different from being able to specify exactly what species Augustus Caesar belonged to, and exactly which member of that species he was.

And it’s not just a matter of “what”. It’s a matter of what it even “exists” means, or “real” means. We take those things to mean physically real and existent, or some quasi-physical kind of “existence” and “real-ness”, which would widely miss the mark, when it’s a matter of an impression beyond assertion, discussion or description.


Words can’t describe Reality. Does anyone at this forum think they can? …that they can be a perfect match, or even a good match, to Reality?

We’re physical beings in our physical world and our metaphysical world. Many of us know that there’s something very good about what is. Like the insect that you rescue from the kitchen sink, we might know, vaguely know, that there’s good intent behind what is.

Sure, it’s an impression. But is there really a difference between what-is seeming really good, and being really good? So the distinction between an impression and a belief (or even a fact) isn’t really so distinct.
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I got on that subject to show how vastly, incomparably, different the various conceptions and notions of God can be.

So, if someone says, “Is God real”, we don’t know what he means, and he doesn’t know how to rightly interpret what his answerer means.

That’s why I suggested an alternative wording for the question.

But, if that question is taken to mean the wording that I suggested, then, as I said, I’d answer “Yes”. I broadly define Reality as all that is, though I don’t regard “real” or “existent” as a meaningful distinction among elements of metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

On the whole, I'm satisfied with my answer to your post. But there are two statements to which I could have replied better, I don't mean for this post to replace or negate my previous reply, most of which I like.

So I'll just re-answer two statements in your post:

The word real isn't always as clear cut as we would like it to be, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word in reference to metaphysics, i.e., simply because it has no clear cut meaning. The word real is vague by it's very nature, even when used in reference to the physical universe. However, it does get even more problematic when discussing metaphysics, but that doesn't mean we can't know what people mean by real in terms of the metaphysical. You seem to want to limit its use because it's vague, but many words are like this, and yet we understand their use. — Sam26

I claim that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, and that there's no need to use words with vague or unknown meaning.

You said that in ordinary conversation we use vague words and understand their use. Sure, but in mathematics and metaphysics, we want to say things unambiguously.

But yes, there's always the problem that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words. But it's still possible to have less vague meanings in metaphysics than in ordinary everyday conversation.

For example, we often ask, "Is God real?" without any precise definition that applies, and yet we seem to understand the implications of the question.

My previous reply to this had an argumentative, critical tone. I was tired that day, and I answered according to my first impression of that quoted question. In forums that I've been to, when someone asks if God is real, the questioner is never a sincere questioner. He's always a committed Atheist who's looking for an opportunity to name-call someone, and show how much more "scientific" he is.

Also, I want to apologize for lumping all Atheists together with Science-Worshippers. Though most Atheists are also Science-Worshippers, of course at a philosophy forum there are some who aren't.

So let my address your statement about that question in a more objective and civil manner:

I emphatically disagree with the statement:

For example, we often ask, "Is God real?" without any precise definition that applies, and yet we seem to understand the implications of the question.

We most certainly do not.

For one thing, I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, and so, as i regard the matter, that question isn't a good example for discussing metaphysical word-usage.

I regard religion as meta-metaphysical, not metaphysical. So I feel that all the philosophical attempt to discuss religion is twaddle.

If someone is an Atheist, then religion isn't their cup-of-tea. Fine, but then why try to discuss it, in your framework of metaphysics, or (silliest of all) your physical sciences world-view.

As I've said, "real" and "exist" aren't metaphysically-defined, and I don't use them, to try to distinguish real things from not-real things, in metaphysical discussion.

But, though "real" isn't a meaningful distinction in metaphysics, I use "Reality" to refer to all that is.

In agreement with a website I looked at, I take "Reality" and "Is" to have broad meaning.

That website (unlike me) didn't criticize the use of "exist" in metaphysics. It said that "exist" doesn't apply outside of metaphysics. I agree with that part. The website said that "exist" isn't applicable to God, and I agree. People who think "exist" means something in metaphysics can debate whether such things as a boulder, a kangaroo, a human, or the number 5 "exist".

The question you quoted "Is God real?". is very unclear in its meaning.

We don't know what the questioner means by "God" or "real".

We don't know what he expects the answerer to mean in his answer.

There are Science-Worshippers who define "God" as this physical universe, and believe that this physical universe is objectively "real".

What God is the questioner asking about? The God that Biblical Literalists believe in, and that Atheists so devoutly, loudly and fervently believe in disbelieving in?

You know, that isn't the only meaning meant when religious people refer to God.

Here's a perhaps better way of wording the question:

"If some people with whom you agree regarding this matter speak of God, then, according to how they mean God, then in your opinion, is there God?"

Though this isn't the topic here, and though you didn't ask, I answer "Yes" to that question.

I've explained that statement at slightly greater length at other topic-threads, though it isn't a topic that gives much verbal scope.

But I myself don't usually use the word God unless I'm replying to someone who has used it. ...largely because that would encourage people to hear it as Biblical Literalism.

As I've said elsewhere, I don't regard religious matters to be subjects of assertion, debate, proof, or argument.

Debate, proof and argument are relevant to metaphysics, but not to meta-metaphysics. By "meta-metaphysics", I refer to matters of what is, that aren't covered by metaphysics, or subject to discussion, or description. assertion, proof or debate. (...which of course automatically implies the first statement in this paragraph)

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

Real” isn’t metaphysically-defined. I have no idea what people at a philosophy forum mean by it. I try to avoid that word. Or, when I mention it, I emphasize that I don’t know what it would mean—as I did in the passage that you quoted.

You wrote:

Sorry I don't always get back to every response.

Always take your time, and just reply when you have time. I’ve been at a few other forums this week, forums about sundials, calendars, and map-projections.

On some of these ideas we're in agreement, or at least close, but in other areas we seem far apart, but I guess that's natural.

People here don’t always word things that same way, but I feel that much, most, or all of the disagreements here are about how things are said. Someone else here expressed that too. That relates to my claim that my metaphysics is uncontroversial, and that, when describing it, I’m not saying anything that anyone would disagree with.

More about that later, as it relates to what you say below:

One area of disagreement has to do with the use of the word real as it pertains to metaphysical questions. The word real isn't always as clear cut as we would like it to be, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word in reference to metaphysics, i.e., simply because it has no clear cut meaning. The word real is vague by it's very nature, even when used in reference to the physical universe. However, it does get even more problematic when discussing metaphysics, but that doesn't mean we can't know what people mean by real in terms of the metaphysical. You seem to want to limit its use because it's vague, but many words are like this, and yet we understand their use.

I believe that a huge amount of unnecessary apparent disagreement is caused by different people’s different meanings for “real” and “existent”.

“Real” and “exist” get philosophical discussion all fnurled-up.

As I mentioned above, I claim that there’s nothing about my metaphysics that you disagree with.

When I say that, people object:

“It isn’t uncontroversial. I disagree with your claim that your abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, and your system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, are real and existent, and that they can be the basis of a real and existent world like the one we live in.”

My answer:

Who said anything about “real” or “existent”?

For example, we often ask, "Is God real?" without any precise definition that applies, and yet we seem to understand the implications of the question.

How sure are you of that?

Atheists and Materialists and Science-Worshippers talking about God don’t have a clue what they’re talking about, or what they mean by “real” or “exist”.

I recommend: Never waste any time arguing or talking with Atheists (about their Atheism, or about Theism).

I’ll discuss with Materialists and Science-Worshippers, when they claim to have an argument against my metaphysics. But I no longer engage them otherwise.

I’d said:

I haven’t heard of those [NDEs that speak of previous lives]. I’ve read a few books on NDEs, and haven’t heard of ones that suggested knowledge about past lives. So probably not a high percentage of NDEs report that.

You replied:

I've divided NDEs into three categories - category 1 is just a very basic NDE where someone might experience an OBE and observe things taking place around them while their body is unconscious. Category 2 has more information, i.e., they may see deceased relatives, go through a tunnel, experience a life review, etc. And then there are category 3 NDEs, which give us even more information about the experience. An example of a category 3 NDE would be Dr. Eben Alexander's NDE, which gives more detailed information about the experience, but there are many category 3 NDEs that give more information than is generally known. Many of my conclusions about past lives has come from what people have said about their category 3 experience, and yes, this category isn't as pervasive as category 1 and 2 NDEs, but there are still many thousands of them. So there is plenty of evidence, but not enough to be dogmatic about it. All I can say is that it seems to be the case that based on these testimonials that certain conclusions follow. Moreover, there is also testimonial evidence of past lives from people who have experienced DMT, and these experiences are closely related to NDEs, i.e., they have some of the same experiences and more.

We don’t disagree on anything there.

As I’ve said, I believe that past-lives are indeterminate, not just un-knowable.

I believe that there’s reincarnation.

Whatever the reason why we’re in this life (…and I’ve discussed that.), then, if that reason still obtains at the end of this life, then what’s the obvious implication?

Though past-lives are indeterminate, there still might be a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story whose end is consistent with the beginning of this life. “Real”? Not a meaningful question. Maybe in an NDE there’s sometimes insight about that. I don’t deny that possiblility.

We don’t disagree about any of this.

Michael Ossipoff

So we have no telos- final ends we are working towards except survival and entertaining ourselves. — schopenhauer1

This notion of an "end" consisting of entertaining yourself, is the way you live. Why? Only you know that. Evidently that instrumental living is something that you hold very dear, because you're quite unwilling to let go of it. You can let go of that way of your instrumental way of life anytime you're willing to--in other words, never.

Obviously there are routine matters of getting-by that must be taken care of. That isn't the purpose of your life. But you needn't strive for and pursue things that you like. Even if you devote yourself to getting by and being helpful to others, things you like will continue to come your way, without your pursuing them.

But of course you can also intentionally do something you like, but needn't live instrumentally, living for results. If the present is never good enough, then obviously, when the future becomes the present, it won't be good enough either.

In your talking about the misery of instrumentality, you often say "We". No, it isn't "We". It's "You", and those who live instrumentally, as you do. I guess there are lots of you. Most likely, most people are like that. But they needn't live that way.

I call this concept "Instrumentality". It is the idea that we [No, you do] do to do to do, because we [No, not "we"] can [are willing to] do no other.

It's more a matter of whether you're willing to let go of your instrumentality.

What people will often say is meeting some goals or preferences- achieving goals in other words, is what we should strive for. That is what we [Not "we", but you] do anyways, however modest those short or long term goals are, but this is not "THE PURPOSE".

Who says there has to be a "PURPOSE"?

Rather, [your] life consists of a lack that is constantly deprived and we [No, you] are always trying to fill with goals, lest we [you] get bored and find other ways to entertain ourselves.

[...]

Lastly, you will have your "free time" for entertainment, which is just a way of saying you [No, you do] try to flee from boredom with various activities so you achieve some sort of flow state or engaging cognitive/physical task so you do not have to think about the boredom that is mainly the default state [for you] when there is nothing else going on.

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You've heard a lot of comments about your much-cherished instrumentality, and, instead of answering any of them on their own terms, you just continue repeating the Existentialist-Angst.

Don' t you see that you're determinedly, doggedly, clinging to instrumentality, and the misery that you're able to derive from it, because it's what you want, like and need? Admit to yourself that you like it, and that you're doing what you like.

Michael Ossipoff

I think that the matter of discussability and describabiliy has been resolved.
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I’d said:
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I don't doubt that NDEs are real (whatever that means), valid and true. And they seem tell of an impression of something good after life.
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But it should be emphasized that NDEs occur early in death, and therefore don't give any evidence about the specifics of what happens later--reincarnation or sleep.

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What does it mean for an NDE to be real? That must be a difficult concept for you to apprehend.
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“Real” isn’t metaphysically-defined. I have no idea what people at a philosophy forum mean by it. I try to avoid that word. Or, when I mention it, I emphasize that I don’t know what it would mean—as I did in the passage that you quoted.
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And, in that passage, I agreed that NDEs are valid and true, and that their implications are meaningful.
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Real in the sense that any of our sensory perceptions are real. In other words, they're not hallucinations, illusions, dreams, imaginings, etc.

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Yes, I don’t think there’s reason to believe that they’re any of those things.

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Actually many NDEs do tell us that some things about living out other lives, not the specifics obviously, but enough to draw the conclusion that there probably something to the idea.

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I haven’t heard of those. I’ve read a few books on NDEs, and haven’t heard of ones that suggested knowledge about past lives. So probably not a high percentage of NDEs report that.
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I haven’t claimed that it can be ruled out that there could be some such memory. Nisargatta suggested that too, though he didn’t claim that it would be frequent or detailed. Conceivably the NDE condition could bring it out.
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But, though reincarnation is metaphysically-implied, it’s reincarnation without knowledge of past lives (…though , in agreement with Nisargatta, I don’t claim that it entirely rules out the possibility of rare and un-detailed memory, maybe brought-out only in NDEs).
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If someone remembers overheard conversations at a time when no brain-activity was measured for them, then the measurement wasn’t accurate enough.
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I can’t explain why or how such a memory could be unusually vivid, but that vividness doesn’t prove an out-of-body origin.
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I shouldn’t use the word “supernatural”, because that term is so favoritely used by Materialists and Atheists, neither of which I am. What I meant was that there seems to be a principle-of-equivalence, that whatever happens in our physical world is consistent with the usual physical laws, and that that doesn’t contradict Idealist metaphysics or reincarnation, or such nonphysical matters.
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For instance, my metaphysics doesn’t contradict the accepted physical laws. Reincarnation needn’t contradict those laws either. Physical laws don’t apply to those matters. NDEs don’t contradict known physical law either. They’re consistent with that principle-of-equivalence.
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But physical laws do apply to the information that a person can report about a shoe on the roof. For someone to report a shoe on the roof, without any of the usual physical means of knowing about it—that contradicts known physical science. That’s in a whole different category from Subjective Idealist metaphysics, reincarnation, and NDEs, all of which I consider valid.
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When something is claimed that outright contradicts physical law, then we should be skeptical of such reports. Prosaic explanations like hoax, unintentional embellishment, coaching by interviewers, unconscious sharing of information by others…etc. There are lots of such prosaic explanations, and, they should be considered as alternatives to accepting, at face value, reports that contradict known physical law.
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Of course any one (or some) NDE can be explained away with other explanations, that's why it's important to look at a wide variety of reports from a variety of sources and cultures.

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I don’ t doubt the validity of NDEs/.
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And to compare these reports with UFO accounts, ghost stories, and past lives, etc., is to show complete ignorance of the facts as presented in my original argument.

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I don’t compare NDEs with those things. Those things (maybe with the qualified partial exception of some past-life reports) are examples of reports that have prosaic explanations, making them not compelling.
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I can’t say for sure that, maybe, it isn’t impossible that rarely, something about a past life could truly be reported.
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But, by my metaphysics, and that principle-of-equivalence, the report would have to also have a prosaic explanation, even if there’s something true about it too. But, if past-lives are completely indeterminate, as I claim, then the meaning of saying that such a report is “true” isn’t quite the same. Maybe true in the sense of being not inconsistent with the person’s current life and its beginning.
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Ghosts? I don’t know. The only report s that I pretty-much rule out are the reports of ghost visible to someone who didn’t know the deceased, or when that observer is fully awake, or which can be recorded by cameras or other physical measuring equipment.
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If the observer knew, was close to, the deceased, and wasn’t fully awake, I don’t say that “explains away” the ghost report. It merely means that the report meets that principle-of-equivalence, which says that anything that results in something physical, like a report, should be consistent with the known workings of the physical world (or else you’re claiming some new physical science not yet discovered).
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UFOs? It’s a bit of a reach to say that someone would come (or send robotic vehicles) here, across interstellar distances, only to observe, and scare a few people in remote locations. And, if they only wanted to be observe, does anyone think that, with their advanced technology, they couldn’ observe unobserved by us? That would give “candid-camera” observations that would surely be more informative…if they didn’t give us any reasons to believe they were here.
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So there’s a motivational argument against extraterrestrial UFOs.
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Definitely the burden is on the person advocating them.
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A person could hold up a UFO book, with an account that defies explanation, and say, “How do you explain this?” . The answer, of course, is that the author made it up.
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I read that that turned out to be the case with Von Daniken. He reported things that pretty much couldn’t be explained without extraterrestrial visitors. …but was later found to have just made it up.
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Have you heard of Dr. Rhine’s ESP experiments at Duke University? Very convincing, until we hear about his cherry-picking methodology. Again, the convincingness resulted from faulty reporting.
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These testimonial statements are just as strong as any testimonial evidence.

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The reports of overheard conversations sound plausible to me, and don’t necessarily contradict physical law.
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The report about the shoe on the roof, without any known physical way the person could know about it—that contradicts known physical law, and the prosaic alternatives seem, to me, more likely.
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It's not that difficult to rule out the possible explanations you've presented. It's been done many times.

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If we’re talking about the alleged contravention of physical law, then that’s the issue-of-contention: Yes, an author can claim that all physical-consistent explanations have been ruled out. People lie. People sometimes believe what they want to—wishful thinking. People sometimes are unconsciously, unintentionally, unduly careless or permissive, about reports that they want to believe. That includes people who write books. It could sometimes include academic researchers. Remember Professor Rhine at Duke University.
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you make it sound like your possible answers explain these NDEs away

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Whoa! I never said anything about explaining NDEs away. I consider them valid. And their implications are meaningful.
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I was only “explaining away” reports of alleged contravention of physical laws and physical facts that have a long and consistent record of holding.
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, but they're just the kind of responses that someone would make who never studied NDEs, and who never closely studied the testimonial evidence.

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I’ve read books of NDE reports, and I consider NDS to be valid, and their information meaningful and useful.

I recommend Proof of Heaven, written by a surgeon, about a NDE that went much farther into death than most other NDEs.
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Michael Ossipoff

Death will be like going to sleep. If there isn't reincarnation, then death will finally become sleep. .

...and that doesn't depend on there being an "afterlife" (if I can borrow a term popular with Atheists and Materialists).

Forget about "not existing". You never reach time time of your complete shutdown at death, or any time after it. Only your survivors experience that time.

When people say that (even from their own point of view), they "won't exist", one can only wonder what they think they mean.

Michael Ossipoff

'Objective' and 'subjective' are categories of human understanding; so nothing wrong with trying to clarify the differences ever more precisely. Nothing incoherent about that! — Janus

I define "objective" as "perceieved by more than one individual, and, in some (not necessarily specified) manner, more than hypothetical".

Michael Ossipoff

But the sages themselves are by no means attached to metaphysics, nor do they see them as profound.

Actually sages are quite dismissive of metaphysics and philosophy. Ramana Maharishi used to say, they're like a stick you use to get the fire going - once it's burning, you throw the stick into the fire.) — Wayfarer

Yes, certainly. But there are two people at these forums who are giving me humungous flak for even suggesting a word for a matter of what is, but isn't covered in metaphysics, and isn't a subject for assertions, argument, debate, or accurate, complete descriptions.

Michael Ossipoff

Saying that "words don't accurately and completely describe any reality, — Sam26

By the way, I didn't say that words don't accurately and completely describe any reality.

I said that words don't accurately and completely describe all of Reality.

Not quite the same thing :D

Michael Ossipoff

Then when you admit to yourself that you don't have reason to doubt something, then, by definition, you have belief in it. — Banno

Yes.

If you don't have reason to doubt it, that's because there's reason to believe it's true, and no reason to believe that it isn't true..

Or maybe you don't care about the proposition (whatever it might be), or have enough interest in it to know or care whether you doubt it or believe it.

But then you don't believe it, and, by definition you doubt it, even if you completely-disinterestedly doubt it.

Michael Ossipoff

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make? — Michael Ossipoff

I think that makes a lot of sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

To each their own :D

So my objection holds.

It must--You say so yourself :D

Why would you mention, or bring up for discussion, something which you claim cannot be discussed.
That's nonsense.

Indeed it is. I didn't bring it up for discussion.

(...but it seems to be getting lots of discussion :D )

I define meta-metaphysical matters as regarding whatever is, but doesn't come under my definition of metaphysical matters.

But I don't assert that not all of Reality can be accurately and completely discussed and described. I don't assert it, and I'm not going to debate it. I've already said that. Perhaps you missed that part :D

Are you clear about that yet?

Either they really cannot be discussed, in which case you wouldn't be able to mention them for discussion

I didn't mention them for discussion. You insist on discussing them, but don't blame me for inviting you to or telling you to.

, or your assertion that they cannot be discussed is false.

I don't assert that there's anything that you can't accurately discuss and describe. As I said, I don't make assertions on the matter, and I'm not going to debate it.

Clearly your assertion is false

I didn't make an assertion. I stated a definition. See above.

because you are saying "I cannot talk about the national secretes which I am talking about".

You're getting yourself all confused. Re-read my definitions of metaphysics and meta-metaphysics.

In those definitions I don't talk about matters of meta-metaphysics other than to define them as "What else is."

That definition isn't a statement about "whatever else is". A definition of a topic isn't a statement about that topic's matters..

Therefore, I think that unless you can explain your distinction between metaphysical and meta-metaphysical, in a way which makes sense

My definitions of metaphysics and meta-metaphysics state their distinction.

Only you know what makes sense to you. I won't tell you what should make sense to you. That's entirely your business.

You know, we've been over this several times, and you keep repeating already-answered claims. Continuing this conversation would serve no purpose.

It's time to just agree to disagree.

Michael Ossipoff

Because there's no assurance that an assumption is righ — Michael Ossipoff

Nor an assurance that it is wrong.

So why is it rational to doubt without reason, yet not to believe without reason? — Banno

Because when you admit to yourself that you don't have reason to believe something, then, by definition, you have doubt about it.

Michael Ossipoff

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is — Michael Ossipoff

So you are positing something which is, which is other than that which is. Isn't that contradictory? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. It's completely contradictory.

Of course I didn't say it. :D

I didn't say that metaphysics is the discussion of all that is. I said that metaphysics is the general discussion to the limits of what discussably and describably is.

I know that you say the one "is" refers to what we can talk about, and the other "is refers to what we can't talk about

No, the "Is" s don't have different intrinsic meanings. But one of them is accompanied a limiting-quailfier.

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, but haven't you just talked about it by saying it "is". So if it's not contradictory, it's at the least, very hypocritical. How is it possible that you can mention the thing, and have a meta-metaphysics to talk about the things which we can't talk about?

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make?

Are we grasping at straws?

I've often used the additional adverbial qualifiers "accurately and completely" with "discussable and describable".

Add that, if you like.

Michael Ossipoff

But sure, all assumptions should be subject to question, and radical doubt, skepticism, is the right approach to philosophy. — Michael Ossipoff

Why? — Banno

Because there's no assurance that an assumption is right.

But it was just a comment, not an assertion, and it isn't something that I'd argue or debate.

I don't mean or want to tell others what to believe or what their attitude should be. So, if you don't think that your assumptions are subject to question, then I have no argument with, or criticism of, that.

Michael Ossipoff

What do you mean by meta-metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is.

But I emphasize that some people think that everything that is, is discussable and describable, and that i'm not making any claim about that matter, or arguing a position about it, or inclined to debate it, or qualified to explain it or give details about it.

I'm the first to admit that I don't claim to know about the matter.

Michael Ossipoff.

In neither Plotinus nor Advaita is physical death understood in terms of non-existence or non-being. — Wayfarer

Then I agree with them. Whether reincarnation, or timeless sleep, it isn't nonexistence or non-being.

Only Materialists believe in the non-existence and non-being, though it's unlikely that they know what they mean when they say it.

What it does mean however is obviously not going to be an easy thing to say or to fathom. — Wayfarer

I don't claim to know what it will be like, other than it will be a lot like going to sleep.

Of course, if there is, or isn't, reincarnation, we won't know, because, by that time, we'll be too unconscious to know that there was this life. One thing for sure is that death will involve going to sleep.

After that, if another life begins, it will be like the beginning of this life was, and we'll have no idea that we lived before.

Suffice to say that the common aim of those traditions is to realize an identity that is not subject to death. — Wayfarer

I'm the first to admit that i don't understand that.

Everyone dies.

I don't understand that goal. I have no such goal. The Neo-Advaita teachers, who probably have counterparts among Buddhist teachers too, offer the drive-through Enlightenment that Westerners want to buy. I have no idea what Enlightenment is. That's ok, because I'm sure that it isn't time for it,

I agree with the Hindus when they say that life-completion comes after many lifetimes, during which a person eventually improves his lifestyle.

Instead of "not subject to death", maybe it's "eventually not predisposed to rebirth".

Plotinus, that is through seeking the identity of the soul with the One - very similar to Vedanta. — Wayfarer

I think there's reason to believe that there's good intent behind what is,

...and cause for gratitude because of how good what-is is.. That's an impression, not something to argue, debate, or convince anyone about (...so if anyone disagrees, don't ask for proof, description, explanation, justification or debate) This paragraph isn't about metaphysics, by which I mean the topic of what discussably, describablly is.

Anyway, that impression is all I know about meta-metaphysics. What you referred to in the above passage that I quoted--That's meta-metaphysics, rather than metaphysics, isn't it?

If it's true, it isn't knowable to me.

...unless you're talking about a metaphysical position that can be explained. But it doesn't sound like that. I've always gotten the impression that sages were referring to an emotional, attitudinal understanding, and that isn't metaphysics. But that advanced attitudinal, emotional understanding might only be for the longtime life-completed person.

Some Neo-Advaitists think that if they attend enough lectures or satsangs, they'll "get" it. I have no idea what they're talking about, or what they want or mean.

It seems to me that the experiencer--the primary component of the hypothetical reality that is his/her experience-story, the protagonist that it's about, the reason why it's an experience-story--could be what is meant when people refer to a soul.

So the purpose of the spiritual discipline or sadhana is to ‘realize the Self’ (in Vedantic terms) instead of identification with ego and sense-objects. — Wayfarer

I don't know what they mean about realizing the Self, but maybe part of the eventual life-completion would include less egoism, subconscious and conscious wants, needs and recently-earned feelings of guilt.

Realizing that identity is called mokṣa. — Wayfarer

...something that I have no understanding about the meaning of, and which will probably only be for, and understood by, the longtime life-completed person.

Michael Osspoff

The difference in meanings and interpretations described in your quote was what my story was intended to illustrate. As I said, that was the whole point of the story.

Your "research" seems to be cherry-picked. — Harry Hindu

Actually no, the standard 2-valued truth-functional implication truth-table was unanimously identical at every academic website that I checked.

But we've already been all over this several times.

Michael Ossipoff

Are you saying that you think metaphysics must be completely uncontroversial to be metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't mean to go that far. I just meant that I myself want to avoid saying things that can be convincingly disagreed-with, and that a metaphysics that depends on controversial statements, or needs assumptions, or brute-facts isn't very competitive with metaphysicses that don't..

...like the metaphysics that I've been proposing.

For example, the statement about Plotinus's position sounded a lot like Advaita. I used to assume that some Advaita statements were probably right, as metaphysics, just because I have great respect and regard for the philosophers of India.

I even tried to rationalize those statements into the metaphysics that I was proposing in a different forum some years ago. The result was that my metaphysical proposal was criticizable as unsupported.

Then I decided that I didn't want to say anything that can be disagreed-with, or anything that depends on any assumption or brute-fact.

But, in my previous post to this thread, I mentioned 2 possible interpretations for what Advaita and Plotinus said: Metaphysics, or else meta-metaphysics that I don't understand.

The latter interpretation is maybe the better interpretation of those statements from Advaita and from Plotinus.

Meta-metaphysics isn't a matter of proof or argument, or any claim of complete or accurate description.

It's about impressions.

So the Advaitists' and Plotinus's meta-metaphysical impression is different from mine. I don't say that they're wrong. As I said, my feeling is that they're saying more detail than can rightly be said about meta-metaphysics. ...but that's just my impression. I certainly don't claim to be in a position to say someone else is wrong about meta-metaphysics.

I feel that we're exactly what we seem to be: Individual animals. Sure, at the end-of-lives, identity and individuality don't remain. And, as I've said, the timelessnesss of that identity-less sleep beats the temporary life (or lives) during which we strive as individuals. The final and timeless state-of-affairs is the more natural and normal state-of-affairs, I claim.

So there is a sense in which we (eventually) won't be individuals with identity.

So there's that sense in which I don't disagree so much with Advaita. I just claim that right now we're individuals, instead of saying that we aren't, but seem to be individuals. But, because I also don't make any claim that our life-experience possibility-story, or its constituent if-then facts, are "real", then it could be said that my disagreement with Advaita is about a matter of wordings.

I've also been saying that the Nothing that's the quiescent background behind the hypothetical if-then facts is arguably what's more fundamental and natural. ...and it's what we approach at the end of lives.

So, the difference could just be a matter of wording.

Michael Ossipoff

What?! Saying that "words don't accurately and completely describe any reality," contradicts the statement "Are there objects in this reality, is there light and darkness, is there space, are there beings?" — Sam26

That isn't a statement. It's a question. It's meaningless to speak of "contradicting" a question.

In any case, light, darkness, space and beings are, not only elements of metaphysics, but they're also things of a physical universe. I've repeatedly emphasized that metaphysics and the physical world are discussable and describable. For example a physical universe, and its things that you listed, are discussable and describable by physics.

You also asked about "objects". Not all objects are physical, but they're all metaphysical, and therefore discussable and describable.

So much for that question.

In any case, I also clarified that I'm not interested in debating whether or not all of Reality can be accurately and completely described. If you think so, then that's your business. I repeat that it's time to just agree to disagree.

Where in the latter statement do you see me accurately and completely describing any reality? — Sam26

Nowhere

I make no claim that your statement (that I contradicted a question, or that your question is a statement), accurately or completely described anything. :D

These are general statements that have very little specificity to them in terms of kinds of objects, the kind of light that may or may not be in this reality, whether it's 3 or 10 dimensions of space, and, are the beings biological or composed of pure light. — Sam26

You'd need to be a little more specific about what that's relevant to. Regardless of that lack of specificity, most of what you listed are elements of a physical world. And objects can be physical parts of a physical world, or metaphysical "objects", such as the often-discussed "abstract objects". In either case, they're physical &/or metaphysical, and therefore discussable and describable.

If anything the statement supports the contention. It surely doesn't contradict the former statement. — Sam26

Who knows what statement and what contention you're referring to.

Is the "statement" you're referring to, the question that you call a "statement"?

In trying to reply to you, it's difficult to know what you mean. Before you post, you need to be sure that you know what you mean. That would help.

Otherwise, you're wasting people's time.

NDEs, and whether they support the inference that consciousness survives bodily existence. If you people want to talk about whether your opinions support some theory of metaphysics, start up another thread. Thank you. — Sam26

Nonsense. The topic, when I replied to it, was far from NDEs. The survival of consciousness is a metaphysical topic, and the discussion had moved away from NDEs.

I don't doubt that NDEs are real (whatever that means), valid and true. And they seem tell of an impression of something good after life.

But it should be emphasized that NDEs occur early in death, and therefore don't give any evidence about the specifics of what happens later--reincarnation or sleep.

But I suggest that your question is a pointless one: As I've been saying, consciousness survives, in the sense that no one ever experiences a time when they don't experience.

Though your survivors will say that you're dead, and completely shut-down, you'll never experience that time.

...whether what follows the NDE is sleep, or reincarnation.

As for the accounts of people repeating conversations that took place when they were supposedly dead, it has been observed that people who are apparently dead can hear, and later remember what they heard, much better than anyone would have expected. So, no need for a supernatural explanation for that.

As for people observing things (like a shoe on the roof) that the couldn't have known, there are various explanations that don't require out-of-body-ness:

Maybe the person had previously seen that, from another building, etc.

Maybe someone else had mentioned it to them, either before or after the near-death.

In either of those instances, their account of perceiving it could be genuine, or could have been unintentionally later subconsciously embellished from the information received.

Or, on the other hand, it could be a hoax, on the part of the patient, or a family-member, or someone else who wanted a better NDE story.

The trouble with some of you guys is that you refuse to consider the possibility of hoax or honest subconscious embellishment.

"How do you explain that?!!" Well, the original reporting person, or the author of the book, made it up.

That goes for UFO stories, ghost accounts, alleged memories of past lives, etc.

(Though there probably is reincarnation, there's no reason to believe that people could remember a past life. In fact, I claim that past-lives are indeterminate, not just unknowable.)

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
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That was the whole point of the story, ...to illustrate that the standard truth table for such implications can give results that differ from what people ordinarily expect.

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You replied:
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No. The point is that you can know a language, but translating the meaning to another can give results that differ from what people ordinarily expect when you don't translate it correctly.

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Incorrect. As the person who posted my post, I’m the one to say what my point was, in posting it.
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Re-quoting you:
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…you can know a language, but translating the meaning to another can give results that differ from what people ordinarily expect when you don't translate it correctly.

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The truth-table that I (and others) quoted wasn’t complicated. It’s unambiguously expressed in English. No, there was no mis-translation of it in my story.
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I’d said:
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A computer program doesn't interpret an "IF...THEN" statement as a logical proposition that a conclusion follows from a premise.

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It takes it as an instruction to do something if a certain proposition t is true.

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Loosely said, it often takes it as an instruction to make a variable take a certain value if a certain equality, inequality, or proposition is true. ... when the action called for is the execution of an assignment-statement.

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...but it can also just specify an action, such as "IF x = a, THEN PRINT(x)"

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You replied:
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Exactly. The sign is written as an IF-THEN statement. IF you give the clerk $5000, THEN you receive the diamond. IF-THEN-(ELSE) is how we make ANY decision.

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One point that I was making was that a computer language’s IF…THEN statement isn’t the same thing as a logical implication-proposition (…in this case one that’s interpreted in the standard manner of 2-valued truth-functional logic).
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At no time did the clerk tell the customer that the sign was a computer-language statement that was going to be executed after the payment. The clerk merely (correctly) stated the truth-value of the implication-proposition, by the standard 2-valued truth-functional interpretation, at a time before payment was made.
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No mis-translation. No lie.
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You simply need to rewrite the sign so that it actually translates correctly.

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As I said above, there was no mis-translation.
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You still haven't given us the relationship between giving the clerk $5000 and receiving the diamond. Is it a causal relationship, or what? What does the arrow between p and q actually mean?

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It’s called an “implication-proposition”. Depending on what kind of logic one is referring to, there can be various truth-tables for it. In the standard 2-valued truth-functional interpretation, an implication-proposition is true if its premise is false.
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I’d said:
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No one is claiming that words always mean the same in logic and in human language.

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You replied:
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Human language is logical.

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:D
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Well, some languages are more logical than others.
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If you like language to be logical, then I recommend Esperanto. It’s more logical than English, and more logical than at least nearly all natural languages.
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Harry, this conversation has, for some time now, consisted only of repetition. It’s time for us to agree to disagree.
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I’m at these forums to discuss metaphysics.
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Michael Ossipoff

Like before we were born, but without the prospect of coming to life at some point in time. — CuddlyHedgehog

You can't be sure that there's no prospect of a next life. I'm not trying to make an issue about that, but it can't be proved that there isn't a next life.

In the East, it's widely-accepted that there's reincarnation. At these forums (as I said in my other reply), any mention of it is an unfashsionable "no-no".

Though reincarnation is implied by my metaphysics, the question of reincarnation doesn't much bear on our topic here. But I just wanted to briefly comment that we can't be sure that it doesn't happen.

So easy and yet so difficult to comprehend. We accept those short periods of absence when we are asleep or unconscious because we know we will be coming back round to being the centre of the universe. The prospect of never existing again though...

As I was mentioning in my other reply, even if there isn't reincarnation, or even if this life is a person's last life, the person won't know or care about the matter of a prospect of existing in another life, because s/he'll be comfortably, restfully, peacefully asleep.

Millions of years go by, the planet gets inhibited by another form of life or gets sucked into a tiny black hole. The universe continues to be there, as it always has, occupying infinity with no beginning or end, in time or space. Forever evolving, contracting and expanding. And where are we? Absent. Like before we were born but no starting point this time. Non-existent... FOREVER. Harrowing or liberating?

Liberating. You won't know or care about whether you're going to wake and live more. ...or any other concern, worry or incompletion.

Mark Twain said something that I like:

"I was dead for millions of years before I was born, and it didn't inconvenience me a bit."

Michael Ossipoff

This is an edit of a post from a few minutes ago:

Thus, when Plotinus says that Intelligence emanates from the One, and the Soul emanates from Intelligence, and the multiplicity of beings follows from the Soul, this appears to be completely backward and unintelligible to a perspective of emergence, so it's just designated as mysticism, and ignored. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't call that metaphysics. As I mean metaphysics, it's the discussion of what discussably, describably is.

In your quote of Plotinus, he's talking about something other than metaphysics. He isn't discussing, but only asserting.

Or, if his statement is taken as metaphysics, it's unsupported metaphysics:

Metaphysical statements should be supportable and supported. Because there are one or more metaphysicses that neither have nor need any assumptions or brute-facts, then there's no need for brute-facts or assumptions in metaphysics.

I don't think that metaphysics can cover, describe or discuss all of Reality.

(But, to me, "emergence" is part of Materialist or quasi-Materialist philosophers' Spiritualist mumbo-jumbo.)

From your quote, it sounds to me like Plotinus is expressing an opinion or individual feeling, and that's legitimate. But it seems to me that he's saying more detail than can be said about meta-metaphysics.

...and, as I said, if his statement is taken as metaphysics, then it's insufficiently-supported metaphysics.

Plotinus's statement sounds similar to things that are said in Vedanta writings. Those Vedanta writings, and Plotinus's statement, could be interpreted as meta-metaphysics that I don't understand, and which (I feel) says more detail than can really be said about meta-metaphysics--or else as metaphysics that doesn't meet my standard of support, and absence of assumptions or brute-facts. ...and of complete uncontroversialness.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

We'll be there until complete shutdown of consciousness, awareness and perception, but, before that, we'll be in sleep, maybe deep-sleep (because it isn't known whether or not deep-sleep is fully unconscious). ...and, in that sleep, we won't know or care about such things as life, it's problems, menaces, striving, lack or incompletion. ...or time or events. So we also won't know or care about the matter of whether we're going to wake up later.

...because we'll just be in comfortable, restful, peaceful sleep.

I say that's our natural state. Eventually we return to it.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
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Your survivors will experience the time after your complete shutdown. You won;t.

What will you experience then? Going to sleep. Basically like every other time you went to sleep.

Sime says:
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But here lurks a problem, for our notion of sleep is empirical, even for so called "maximally unconscious sleep."

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Nonsense.
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There’s no “empirical” evidence for “maximally unconscious sleep”. The fact that you don’t remember it doesn’t mean that you weren’t conscious to some degree. Maybe so, or maybe not. You can’t know.
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Maybe there’s a sleep in which you’re genuinely completely unconscious, or maybe not. You have no evidence one way or the other.
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It goes without saying that your experience is “empirical” :D …if, by empirical, you mean based on observation instead of numerical calculation.
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For example, the meaning of a "fully unconscious sleep" from a first-person perspective is the experience of being presently awake but without having memories of being asleep.

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Again, nonsense. That isn’t evidence of “fully unconscious sleep”.
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Having no memories from deep-sleep doesn’t mean that you were “fully unconscious”.
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Maybe you were, maybe not.
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This is the first-person empirical definition of "fully unconscious sleep".

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Ridiculous. There’s no empirical evidence of “fully unconscious sleep”. See above.
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Without the experience of being awake yet having no previous memories of being asleep, one cannot assert the existence of fully unconscious sleep.

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“One cannot assert the existence of fully unconscious sleep” because absence of memory from deep-sleep isn’t evidence that one wasn’t at least somewhat conscious during sleep.
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I don’t guarantee that there’s no awareness, no consciousness at all during deep-sleep, including the (eventually) deep sleep at the end-of-lives.

Obviously complete shutdown will occur. You won't experience it...or any time after it. Only your survivors will experience that time.

Not only will you not experience it. You won't know or care about its impending arrival either, because you will be without waking consciousness of such matters, while you're still aware and concsiojs to some degree, before the shutdown of consciousness and awareness.
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Hence the notion of an infinitely long and unconscious sleep…

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I haven’t made any such claim.
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But it’s obvious (or should be) that you’ll never experience a time when you don’t experience.
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Eternity isn’t an infinite amount of time. It’s timelessness.

I haven't claimed that deep-sleep is completely unconscious. I've emphasized repeatedly that you never experience a time of complete unconsciousness. ...in ordinary deep-sleep, or in the final sleep at the end-of-lives.
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Other than in Biblical Literalist interpretations, it’s pretty much agreed that there’s an end-of-lives (even if it’s just at the end of this particular life), when you’ll go to sleep without waking.
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We can agree to disagree about whether, at the end of this life, you’re likely to wake into a next life.
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…is a meaningless sequence of words that contributes nothing to any discussion.

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You need to get it straight about what you mean. Rather than waste everyone’s time, it would be best if you would do so before continuing to post on this topic.
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Michael Ossipoff

You wrote:
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What do you think about the possibility of everyone's consciousness continuing indefinitely once it has been awakened?

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It does. It never ends. None of us will ever experience a time without experience. Consciousness never ends.
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Typical Materialists and Science-Worshippers will say otherwise, but they’d be confusing their survivors’ experience with their own experience...without giving sufficient consideration to what they mean.
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Each conscious entity has its own possibility-story that adapts to allow its consciousness to survive within that possibility-story. For example, someone could die in a car accident in my reality, but in theirs, the paramedics are somehow able to revive that someone, so that their reality can continue.

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Interesting idea, one that hadn’t occurred to me.
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But I think that every life always leads to the person’s death, even in that person’s own experience. The experience-story has to be self-consistent, in terms of the physical laws of the world that is part of that story. The person’s death is a consequence of the rest of the story.
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When that death arrives, the person’s experience would just be that of going to sleep. But full unconsciousness, with no experience or consciousness never arrives.
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But, strictly speaking, it can’t be said for sure that that final, peaceful, and well-deserved rest and sleep—which I call the end-of-lives, will arrive at the end of this life.
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Though it’s an unfashionable “no-no”to say so in our dogmatically Materialist culture, there’s no particular reason to believe that the end-of-lives will arrive at the end of this life.
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I’ve discussed the reason why each of us is in a life. If that reason remains, at the end of this life, then what does that suggest? Referring to what happened before, the beginning of a life, due to that reason—Why wouldn’t that happen again, if the same reason still obtains?
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That suggests a sequence of lives, for as long as the reason for birth remains.
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India’s philosophers have been saying for millennia that the sequence of lives continues until we achieve life-completion, after many lifetimes.
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Or perhaps there is no interdependence between realities - each conscious entity's reality branches off from one of many source realities at the time of birth of consciousness.

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Every life-experience possibility-story is timeless, as are the abstract if-then facts of which it’s composed.
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Yes, each life-experience possibility-story is a completely separate, independent logical system.
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The relation between all of our life-experience possibility-stories is that they all take place in the same possibility-world. Inevitably, for self-consistency, your story’s world must include a species to which you belong, with other members of that species. Among the infinity of life-experience possibility-stories, of course there’s one for every possible being, including the other people in your life-experience possibility-story.
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Since I can only have conscious self-awareness in one reality, I guess this would mean that I would be the only truly self-aware conscious entity in my reality...?

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Yes and no. You’re the protagonist of your story, which is a completely independent logical-system story entirely about your experience. But the physical reality in your experience includes other conscious beings, of many species, including your own species.
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Michael Ossipoff

Ceasing to exist. No consciousness, no thoughts. Eternal absence. — CuddlyHedgehog

That time never arrives. It will never arrive for you. You never experience a time when there's no experience. There's no you distinct from your experience.

Your survivors will experience the time after your complete shutdown. You won;t.

What will you experience then? Going to sleep. Basically like every other time you went to sleep.

Like before we were born, but without the prospect of coming to life at some point in time.

When you're asleep, and going into deeper sleep, you won't know or care about prospects, worldly life, identity, time, or events. Don't worry about it. I guarantee that it won't be a problem.

To be continued tomorrow morning.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

If you can't say for sure that that's true, then any claim about all of Reality is questionable.

You replied:

That's what I mean. Radical doubt is, must be, painful to philosophers because it undermines everything, from their axioms to their logic. — TheMadFool

But I was just referring to doubt about the controversial claim that all of Reality is discussable and describable.

I wouldn't say that logic is in doubt.

I claim that uncontroversial things can be said about metaphysics, and that much about what is, is unontroversially discussable, describable. That discussable, describable domain of what is (other than the physical sciences), I refer to as metaphysics.

But sure, all assumptions should be subject to question, and radical doubt, skepticism, is the right approach to philosophy.

For example, I suggest that people be skeptical about Materialism's big brute-fact.

Michael Ossipoff

I was up all night with the matter of the choice of a map-projection. When I was younger, I used to stay up all night whenever I was reading something interesting, or pursuing an interesting math-problem. I thought that I knew better now. Anyway, I was up till 8 a.m., and that’s why I’m a bit late in getting on the computer.
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Additional comments in more detail:
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You wrote:
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I’m not saying that I'm familiar with what you believe to be original in your model.

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Litewave has suggested something similar to what I propose. He posted it before I did. His proposal probably isn’t identical to mine.
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The first Westerner I’ve heard of, who beat me to it with Elminative Ontic Structural Idealism was Michael Faraday, in 1844. But I couldn’t find details of his metaphysics.
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As I was mentioning last night, I got the idea of possibility-worlds (and that term “possibility-world”) a long time ago, from a book whose author and title I don’t remember. But he spoke of possibility-worlds. It seems to me that if he’d spoken of, let alone emphasized, individual subjective life-experience possibility-stories, I’d have remembered that.
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Also, although if-then facts might be implicit in possibility-worlds, I don’t remember him emphasizing if-then facts. I don’t remember mention of logic in the book.
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So, so far as I know, my metaphysics is original in some regards.
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Also, another difference from other Eliminative Ontic Structural Idealism proposals is that I claim and emphasize that it’s completely uncontroversial.
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For example, Tegmark calls MUH a hypothesis.
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Tegmark has said that his proposal explains Reality. I certainly don’t make that claim. I think that’s too much to ask of metaphysics.
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Tegmark emphasizes the objective, universe-wide point-of-view for MUH. In fact, he states the External Reality Hypothesis as a starting principle.
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Tippler believes in, and emphasizes, the Simulated-Universe Theory, and has spoken of a future time when the entire physical universe will be converted to one big computer, to simulate everyone’s lives.
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Some computer-scientist authors have made that suggestion too.
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I don’t think the Simulated-Universe-Theory makes any sense, because possibility-stories are timeless, and aren’t “created” by the writing of a program or the running of a computer. They could only displayed for the computer’s viewing-audience.
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Tegmark has expressed support for the Simulated-Universe Theory.
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Those considerations seem to suggest that my proposal might have originality.
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But the main difference between my proposal, and the other Eliminative Ontic Structuralisms that I’ve heard of is that mine is from the individual subjective point of view.
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It's possible you’re reinventing the wheel.

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That’s entirely possible. I can’t say for sure that there isn’t already a proposal that’s just like mine.
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If anyone has heard or read my metaphysical proposal before, from someone else, I hope you’ll mention it.
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The mention that there’s a hypothetical experience-possibility-story, consisting of a system of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts, whose events and relations are those of our experience in our apparently objectively-existent world--a world that we describe in declarative indicative grammar—and that there’s no reason to believe that our experience is other than that, is a lot to ask someone to accept. But I claim there’s no objection to it, and that there aren’t really any controversial statements in that proposal.
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My suggestion is that our world is better described by conditional grammar, rather than our useful and convenient declarative, indicative grammar.

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They say that schizophrenia and autism are physically-caused. Hereditary, or physically-environmental. There are physical-environmental theories of autism’s cause, to explain the drastic increase in the incidence of autism in recent times.
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But, aside from that, obviously people can mess-up eachother’s lives, without any hereditary or physical-environmental help, especially when socially-caused damage to someone’s life starts in early life. The familial and societal environment in which someone is raised can surely make all the difference.
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But if you are trying to use your model to get a better understanding of ethics, aesthetics, affect and emotion, the nature of psychopathologies like schizophrenia and autism, biological evolution, the development of culture, social relationships, empathy, then I would argue that you are handicapped by the metaphysical
tradition from which your concepts are derived.

I can elaborate further on this if you could say a few worlds about how your model deals with any of the areas I mentioned above.

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It seems to me that metaphysics has implications.
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I suggest that the metaphysics that I propose is about a metaphysical reality that is insubstantial and ethereal, and implies an openness, looseness, and lightness. …in contrast to Materialism’s grim (and insupportable) “objective” accounting.
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I don’t mean to say that you always live in logic, facts, verbal description, etc. But, when you visit them, they aren’t as bad as you’ve been taught. In fact they’re pretty good.
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Metaphysics is a verbal discussion about what logically, factually is. What factually is, is pretty good.
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So it’s my impression, and that of some other people, that what-is, is pretty good, and inspires gratitude.
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An impression that the whole overall metaphysical what-is, is very good—Is that different from an impression that Good is the character or basis of what-is?
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These are impressions, or the same impression. But if your subjective impression is that something is good, then isn’t there a real sense in which it is good, as far as you’re concerned? So the distinction between impression and belief isn’t really so distinct.
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…because none of this has anything to do with convincing anyone else.
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And, if there’s an impression that Good is the basis of what-is, then isn’t that really just another way of saying an impression that there’s good intent behind what-is?
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Also, what motivated you in the first place to create your model? What specifically were you dissatisfied with in the way that other philosophies address the issues above?

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As I mentioned, the question of why there’s something instead of nothing leads to such a metaphysics.
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I wanted a metaphysics that doesn’t have any brute-fact, and which doesn’t need or make any assumptions.
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And I’ve tried to avoid saying anything controversial, anything that anyone would disagree with.
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I wanted to send this as soon as possible, having said that I’d reply in the morning today.
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Thanks for the references. I’ll check them out now.
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Michael Ossipoff

What is it exactly that you're claiming we can't describe? I can't make any sense out of a reality that can't be described. — Sam26

Well, let me quote you:

Words don't accurately and completely describe any reality. — Sam26

But now you say:

Are there objects in this reality, is there light and darkness, is there space, are there beings? — Sam26

You mean the one about whose complete and accurate describability with words you're contradicting yourself? :D

Which is it?

that's different from saying we can't describe some reality. — Sam26

Did I say there isn't any reality that we can describe? I've been saying that there's a domain of what is (apart from the physical sciences), that can be discussed and described, and it's what I mean by metaphysics.

And if it comes down to being able to accurately and completely describe some reality your [sic] not saying anything new or significant. — Sam26

Did i say that it was an original statement? :D

Actually, many agree with me about that.

As I've already clarified more than once, I'm not interested in debating whether or not all of Reality is describable and discussable.

If you think it is, then fine. Let's just agree to disagree on that.

Michael Ossipoff

As it's almost dinner-time, this will be a brief preliminary reply, in which I try to say something about a few of the most easily-answered or important topics. But it'll be real brief, and my main reply will be tomorrow morning (February 21).

Thanks for the response. The challenge in our discussion I think is this: I'm familiar with the history and nature of the ideas you're presenting. Im not saying that I'm familiar with what you believe to be original in your model. — Joshs

Good question. I'm not sure how much is original my metaphysics is.

I got the idea from a book, a long time ago. I don't remember the author's name, or the name of his book. Nor do I remember enough detail about it to know where, how much, or if my metaphysics differs from his.

At that time, I hadn't heard about Faraday, Tippler or Tegmark.

I haven't found any details of Faraday's metaphysics.

I disagree with Tippler and Tegmark about a number of things. I once listed them in a post at these forums.

A few details tomorrow.

But the history of Western metaphysics going back to the Greeks is something that I am well acquainted with, and what you've come up with is, as youve indicated, a variation on the modern scientific metaphysics. So you're prepared to go back and forth on definitions that come from various eras and chapters in that history, picking and choosing among them to build your own approach(I'm not sure how well versed you are in German Idealism or the analytic tradition. It's possible youre reinventing the wheel).

I don't know much about those two things, but I've heard at these forums that Wittgenstein said that there are no things, just facts. That sounds lot like a brief summary of what I've been saying.

What I wrote you was not coming from that tradition, so all of my definitions will be alien to you, and they would not be something I could explain in a single post. So your response is not just a matter of disagreeing with my assertions, it's not having a sense of what kind of metaphysics ( or post-metaphysics) they're coming from. My terms will essentially be a foreign language to you unless you're well versed in writers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Heidegger, Derrida.

Yes, fair enough.

For instance, you say there are aspects of reality that language can't describe. In my chapter of philosophy , reality isnt a collection of things

Things are elements of metaphysics. I don't claim that metaphysics or its things are all of Reality.

, and language is not a tool to describe those things. Language is a transformation.

Yes, I regard language as a way of describing things, events, and relations. But if it's worded as a transformation, then i still don't claim that words apply to all of Reality

Imagine trying to insert your ideas into a conversation that is taking place among Ancient Greek philosophers. You would be able to intepret their concepts and state your preferences among their various models, but their unfamiliarity with modern scientific metaphysics, the empiricism of Locke, the idealism of Berkeley, the subjectivism of Kant, would make it impossible for them to make sense of your approach before you taught them this new language.

Yes, but I've heard here, and read elsewhere that Aristotle said that Good is the basis of what is, and that's my impression as well. I regard that as meta-metaphyscs, not metaphysics, and not a matter of debate, proof or argument.

Because I can understand where you're coming from, I could choose to keep my own terms within the confines of the part of Western scientific and philosophical history you're familiar with. I could choose not to introduce into the discussion this other world of philosophy that is alien to you, where logic, language, reality, objectivity and subjectivity mean something very different than what they mean to you

There is one good reason I can think of to venture beyond your familiar territory, but it depends on the purpose that your model serves for you. What would you say it is intended to clarify about the world?

i regard and treat metaphysics like science. ...in the spirit of science. ...as explanation for metaphysical and physical reality, and as a description of what metaphysicsally (describably and discussably) is.

However yes, I also feel that my metaphysics has implications on subjective matters, suggesting the meta-metaphysical impression about Good being the basis of what is. More about that tomorrow.

For instance. If your main interest is offering a new philosophical clarification on how today's physical science(physics, chemistry) is understood, then I don't think it would be particularly useful to you to insert Derrida or phenomenology into the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, your account is perfectly respectable for that purpose and I have nothing to critique in it.

But if you are trying to use your model to get a better understanding of ethics, aesthetics, affect and emotion,

The Hindus discuss those applications of philosophy, and I've found their writings helpful and worthwhile. More tomorrow.

I can elaborate further on this if you could say a few worlds about how your model deals with any of the areas I mentioned above.

Explanations interest me. I regard metaphysics in the spirit of science, with similar requirements, and even with applications and implications. ...just as physics has those.

Also, what motivated you in the first place to create your model? What specifically were you dissatisfied with in the way that other philosophies address the issues above?

Reading about Vedanta, reading that book that I mentioned, and the question about why there's something instead of nothing.

Materialism is to be rejected because of its big brute-fact.

I'll look up phenomenology and constructivism. I've read just a bit about phenomenology, and it had something to do with science of mind. I didn't disagree with its relevance as a topic. The dictionary confirms that it can be about science of mind.

My science-of-mind position is that we're animals, and animals are purposefully-responsive devices, in principle like a mousetrap. ...but more complex, and with a natural-selection origin. I don't subscribe to Mind or Consciousness separate from body, Animals are unitary.

My metaphysics is from the subjective point of view. That relates to the dictionary's other definition of phenomenology, relating to awareness and its objects.

I'd better get back to my cooking.

More tomorrow.

The characters in a novel stand apart from one another, so under your definition they exist. — Janus

It goes without saying that the events of Gone With the Wind really happened in that story, and that the characters really had certain experiences in that story.

But imagine that you're Rett Butler. Your experience would necessarily be much more detailed than his is related in the novel or the movie. So then it's obvious that neither the novel nor the movie is a complete possibility-world or experience-possibility-story.

So the novel and screenplay are just very incomplete and sketchy stories, nothing like a possibility-world or a life-experience possibility-story.

If they were incomparably more detailed, and self-consistent, (like some hypothetical computer-simulation of our universe) then they could only be said to be mimicing or duplicating a genuine possibility-world or life-experience possibility-story, but not "creating" it. But of course there's never been such a movie, nor could there be, without some very futuristic computers and programming (the kind hypothesized by the "simulated-univere hypothesis (...which I've debunked)) Of course even if there were such a "movie" or simulation, no one would have time to watch all of it..

(And of course there's no requirement for a novel or movie to be self-consistent. For example, consider the movie Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, a movie about a city's district called " 'Toon Town".)

...though there no doubt are many possibility-stories whose events and persons are very similar to those of a novel and screenplay such as Gone With the Wind. But that's irrelevant to the matter of the status of the novel and screenplay.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the difference between being metaphysically defined and just being defined? — Harry Hindu

"Real" and "Existent" have various different dictionary meanings, and they're widely used in non-metaphysical usages.

"Is that dollar-bill real?"

"My essay is only about existent authors, and not fictitious ones."

I see real, existent, and is, as synonyms. — Harry Hindu

I used to say that too.

Exist:

But now I agree with others who say that "exist" only applies to objects of metaphysics--discussable, describable things. In fact, it's been argued here that "existent" only refers to timebound things that come into and out of existence. ...maybe only physical things, in fact.

Real:

There seems to be some consensus that "Real" is much broader in applicability than "Existent". For example, abstract objects are often called "Real", but not "Existent".

I use the word "Reality" to mean "All" (as the all-inclusive noun). That's my only use of "Real" or "Reality"

(...with the exception noted below.)

Is:

I use "is" all-inclusively too. So, in my usage, "what is" means the same thing as "All".

...and "All that Is" is just a (maybe clearer) way of saying the same thing.

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I often use "is" as described above. That's what I mean when I use "is" at the end of a clause, without a predicate-nominative, speaking of one thing, rather than equating two things.

I avoid using "Real" or "Exist", "Exists" or "Existent".

I might sometimes speak of "physical reality" or "metaphysical reality" (uncapitalized) to refer to the set of things and relations described in those subjects.

But I avoid any debates about what's "real" or "existent" in metaphysics.

Nor do I debate (at least not anymore) the limits of discusability or describability.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, radical doubt will question the certainty with which you assert truths. Are you sure it's not a demon manipulating your mind? — TheMadFool

Then you believe in demons. I don't share that belief of yours.

Aside from that, are you referring to the doubt, or the asserted certainty?

Asserted certainty:

I do claim that there are uncontroversial metaphysical statements.

...but I don't make as many assertions as you might think, because I make no claim that the complex system of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, that i refer to, is "real" or "existent". (...whatever those words would mean.)

Doubt:

How sure are you that words can accurately and completely describe all of Reality?

If you can't say for sure that that's true, then any claim about all of Reality is questionable.

In any case, I'm not interested in debating or convincing anyone about the limits of discussion or description. I'd rather just discuss metaphysics, which is agreed, by most, to be discussable.

Michael Ossipoff