We should get
@Tobias in here as well.
:smile:
I'm not convinced I'm arguing for higher laws or principles and I'm not sure what I said that makes you interpret what I said this way.
Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and not a higher principle. I'll try to describe how I get to that rule by first discussing contracts and then apply that to treaties.
In my view, there are rules implied in performative acts. Let's imagine a society without any courts, means of enforcement or existing rules to regulate our behaviour. When we enter into a contract, doing so implies rules that arise from that act itself for that act to make sense. Let's say I'll wash your clothes in return for a meal.
You say "I promise if you wash my clothes I'll cook you a meal" and I say "If you are going to cook me a meal I'll wash your clothes". Implied here is that if I don't do anything, you'll never cook me a meal. We don't need enforcement or courts to "sanction" my non-performance.
Now, I do my part of the bargain but you don't. You broke your promise. But you promised this in the first place because you knew you would otherwise have to wash your own clothes. That is then the second implied rule, if one party performs their side of a bargain, the other party must do so too. Or to put it differently, I have a right to your performance. Why is this the case? Because otherwise you could've demanded or forced my performance and avoided making a promise but you had to give a promise because those options were not available to you for whatever reason. And not keeping your promise is sanctioned as well but less directly: I'll never enter into a bargain with you under these sort of circumstances again and if other people are aware, they will avoid bargaining with you as well, worried they'll be abused.
Now, of course, if you have a resource that everybody wants, you start to get a power imbalance. For instance, if you have all the food people will still need to bargain with you and accept the risk of abuse. That doesn't, however, negate the implicit rules established above with regard to promises. People will still expect you to keep the promise and this would become apparent when you would want to barter about other things than your monopolised resource. Chances are, in fact, that you'd get less favourable conditions as a result.*
The entering into a contract creates
expectations between us about the nature of promises and rights and it also creates
expectations in a wider community if they are aware of the promises we made. As a result, we've established rules intended to regulate behaviour through performative acts (two promises). It's these expectations and the underlying intent that is aimed at creating such expectations that, in my view, create law.
I don't think this is fundamentally different where it concerns treaty obligations. The system of national laws sets out that any treaty signed and ratified is accepted as binding and that national laws will be set aside in favour of the treaty rules. If this is not the case, then why bother including a supremacy clause and go through the public spectacle of voting on it (performative acts)? These are promises too and the direct sanction is that if you break treaties other signatories are not required to uphold their part of the bargain and the indirect sanction is waning of "soft power".
This is why I don't think enforcement is necessary for a rule to be law, because I think it's about intent and expectations; or, the meaning that arises from the promises made.
I hope that made sense and I wonder how much of this difference in views is the result of growing up in different legal traditions...
*This is precisely why I believe multilateralism is beneficial to everyone involved
in the long run. But different discussion.