Coronavirus Benkei, you have some interesting ideas, but this is a semantic argument, not a deep philosophical one. One can just make the move in this tit-for-tat game to remake the terms and keep the same substance of the argument. The position is suffering is entailed in (most life that we've ever known).. That's good enough then if living doesn't entail suffering. But who knows, maybe living does entail suffering. That is an intriguing idea to pursue. Buddhists believe it to be some sort of necessity, for example. It may be considered an illusion ultimately in this conception, but it is part of the doctrine in a fundamental way. — schopenhauer1
No dude, this is most certainly not a semantic issue.
You underestimate the importance of delineation. If one thing is intrinsically part of something, that one thing is not caused by the something. Water does not, by its mere existence, cause itself to be wet. Does living cause breathing? Does living cause a heartbeat? If you want to make an argument, your use of language
must be sensible. So it's fundamental to decide whether living causes suffering (however remotely) or whether suffering is intrinsic to living. If the latter, then there is no argument to be had from an ethical point of view.
Also, Benatar isn't strictly a consequentialist. I actually see him more as a Kantian if we are to use the most widely used ethical categories. That is to say, he doesn't want to see people (the child) being used as a means to the someone else's (the parents') ends when it comes to generating the conditions for suffering for others (that is to say the necessary condition of life). — schopenhauer1
This makes no sense. I'm using non-existent people (which is in itself a contradiction in terms and therefore not intelligible)? Fine, that means I'm using nothing because non-existent (not that that can be a quality but whatever!). It's not Kantian, it's Konfused.
This to me is really what you are trying to argue. For all intents and purposes, living is the cause of that which is inevitable- suffering. We have to define suffering of course. Certainly a life that has experienced an ounce of disease has some suffering. It is another argument, for example, as to how much disease, and how painful for this to be considered truly "suffering". But your argument is strictly about whether living is necessary and sufficient. The facts are that suffering is almost impossible to avoid while alive. The proof is simply seeing the suffering in almost everyone's life. No utopia exists, no paradise exists, etc. If Buddhism/Schopenhauer does have some truth to it, then perhaps there is a metaphysical aspect of animal striving that indeed would relate suffering with living itself. None of this needs to be consequentialism, in other words. Even if it was, the balance sheet is not on your side of the argument, if we are to use Benatar's argument. That is to say, if in the procreational decision, no actual person loses out on experiencing the good life that is not bad (as there is no actual person). However, not experiencing the bad of life is always good, even if there is no actual person to enjoy this good (see Benatar's asymmetry and formal argument written elsewhere to get full picture of his argument before you go by my rough outline of the argument). — schopenhauer1
The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain. Living is simply not, and never will be, a sufficient condition for suffering. The disease causes suffering, being run over by a car causes suffering, a break up causes suffering etc. etc. Suffering is unique
and particular.
The whole anti-natalist approach also ignores the fact that suffering is subjective, that all the research on human well-being shows almost everyone across cultures is well above neutral on happiness. So Benatar (and you) are simply empirically wrong about the experience of suffering in the world. The argument "yeah, but you really suffer more and are just deluding yourself" does not resolve the issue because if it's true the delusion is the experience and it's
all about the experience.
And "not experiencing the bad of life" by not existing isn't "good" is the usual metaphysical mumbo-jumbo: We cannot ascribe ethical states to nothing.