I'd not have any laws based on psychological effects period. — Terrapin Station

Again. You're not king remember? But how am I to understand this? You're OK with child abuse? Seriously?

But for the thousandth fucking time, who cares about GOP voters? — Maw

You should. They're your neighbours so you'd better work it out.

Let's start with psychological abuse. You can basically verbally abuse your kids because protected by free speech and child protection services can't intervene.

Edit: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/09/health/scream-at-your-own-risk-and-your-childrens.html

Some context.

OK. :brow: Do you have any sensible policy suggestions to deal with these problems given the nature of reality where you're not king? Or are you on the verge of realising the idea is as infantile as any argument starting with "if I were king"?

What about defamation?

What about spreading lies about a competitor causing him to lose money?

What about copyright infringement?

What about psychological abuse?

What about leaking military plans causing a lot of deaths?

What about leaking company secrets to competitors causing loss of income?

Because there will be a trial in the Senate, Maw. I know you've got your mind made up about his guilt regardless of what the Senate will conclude. That is most likely not true of everybody, especially Republican voters.

The only fly in the ointment is the doubt that he can force a no-deal Brexit through - seemingly against the law, as he insists but no-one outside the Cabinet believes. If he has to ask for an extention to article 50 he will presumably refuse. If he resigns, triggering an election, can he be prosecuted for disobeying the law? If I understand correctly, he can resign, but he is still PM and his govt are still in place until the election, so subject to the law. So we end up back in the Supreme Court?! — Tim3003

If the EU is done with it come end of October there will be a no-deal Brexit despite what the UK Parliament thinks of it.

I agree but Street is right about the underlying issue. There's something broken if a society is this polarized, the two parties are almost always at each other's throats instead of governing the country. It's precisely because the political elite is totally out of touch with real problems of people and not addressing them. They just line the pockets of special interests.

From a princeton study:

American Democracy?
Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion.

By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.

The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect.

Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for.

Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence.

Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.)

Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero.

What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.

A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorlyinformed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support.

But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good.

All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative.

Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies.

Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other noneconomic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues.

Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.

Sorry, but that doesn't make a lick of sense. A majority of voters favor impeachment, but when the GOP controlled Senate acquittes him, voters will be spurred to...vote for Trump? — Maw

It does to me. A lot people think it's a sort of legal proceeding and if he survives impeachment, they can play it as "not guilty" and that will be to his benefit because many will believe it. In other words, the outcome will affect whether voters will continue to think he should be impeached.

Remember "innocent until proven guilty" applies to Trump as much as it does to anyone else. — Janus

It's "presumed innocence". That's a big difference and it's a legal concept that requires the jury and judge to uphold the standard of there not being "reasonable doubt". The concept doesn't apply to moral judgments and strictly speaking not to impeachment procedures either.

Good question. There's new facts out compared to last time. I think the relevant House committee members must already know something we don't, because the information in the public domain is pretty much hearsay. So probably a couple of important facts have already been independently corroborated.

That said, if it doesn't stick I still think it will be of benefit to Trump during the elections. Plus, I find party loyalty quite extreme in the US, where not voting in a Democrat is more important than the character of a candidate and vice versa.

I always find it enlightening to read Breitbart comments to get a feeling of how others think as well. https://www.breitbart.com/news/rep-adam-schiff-trump-whistleblower-agrees-to-testify-before-congress/

So while a majority of voters probably want impeachment I doubt it matters for the impeachment outcome in a Senate controlled by the Republicans. And then come election time that will be played in favour of the Republicans.

Oh noes! :groan: "Let's throw about accusations to distract from the fact my statements are baseless and I don't have an argument."

If trying to tease out that you're lying about having read the report and the letter by demanding what factual discrepancies you have established, which everyone knows are there but I'm purposefully not offering up, if a loaded question then guilty as changed. You don't have an argument against the points I'm making. Which discrepancies do the letter and report have?

True, we’re the laughing stock of the world. — praxis

At least Europe.

As I’ve stated countless times now, I agree with Barr, but not only because he happens to be the top authority in the land, but because I agree with his arguments. I stated the argument I agree with, which you mysteriously leave out in every reply. — NOS4A2

I've dealt with your "corrupt intent" remark as inconsequential to impeachment at least 2 posts back and again in the last. You're mysteriously dense when arguments fail to agree with your unexamined conclusions.

You've stated the same thing often yes, like a record on repeat, but they are statements not arguments. Which discrepancies have you established between the letter and the report then?

If reasonable people tell me they disagree, then hopefully they have a reasonable reason as to why they do.

So tell me, why do accept Mueller’s judgement? Why do you discount and discredit Barr’s? I’ve told you why I agree with Barr’s assessment, so why don’t you tell me why don’t? — NOS4A2

I wasn't referring to our disagreement on the matter but the fact that Barr and Mueller disagree. You're appealing to authority and it makes me wonder why you think you're incapable of making up your own mind based on the facts as reported in the Mueller report.

As said, Mueller doesn't reach a judgment so it's not what I'm accepting as I already stated in my previous post. I actually read the report, and in the basis of what's relayed in it I disagree with Barr's representation of the "principal conclusions" of it. I don't think he could be considered objective on the matter considering the unsolicited memo taking issue with the entire investigation to begin with. But that's neither here nor there when we can compare the facts of the report with what Barr pretended it said; eg. the facts are there because it's written down.

So I've asked before: Are you aware of the material differences between his representation of the report in that letter and the facts described in the Mueller report? And you said yes, but accept Barr's conclusions while the falsity of them could be readily established.

We are now left with some possible conclusions, none of them very good:

1. You have not, in fact, read the report or the letter or both and lied about it;
2. You have a problem comprehending the English language and erroneously conclude the documents state materially the same thing;
3. You're simply biased and incapable of questioning your own assumptions (did I mention I'm Dutch so I don't have a horse in this race?); or,
4. (I'll help you out here and give it a positive) you think the only worthwhile conclusion was the absence of corrupt intent.

I suspect 1. But let's run with 4. Why did he lie about the principle conclusions of the report? What does it matter what Barr concludes if 1. sitting presidents can't be indicted and 2. corrupt intent is not a requirement for impeachment?

In other words, things don't add up and that's why besides his conclusion being irrelevant I also don't trust his judgment.

I’m not a lawyer, but Barr’s assessment makes sense: that little problem of proving corrupt intent, especially in an investigation with no underlying crime, is difficult if not impossible. With no evidence of corrupt intent, it doesn’t rise to the level of obstruction. Barr is the top legal advisor in the United States. Excuse me while I defer to his judgement.

So why do you (uncritically) accept Mueller’s judgement? Why do you discount and discredit Barr’s? — NOS4A2

Again, you didn't answer it and are just repeating yourself. What if reasonable people disagree? What then? How do you suggest to resolve this on the particular subject of corrupt intent? And while you're at it, what's the legal standard to impeach? Is corrupt intent required? In other words, is it even relevant?

As to Mueller's judgment; this is just a silly attempt to distract from your lack of arguments. What's Mueller's judgment on this matter again? Oh right, he doesn't have one...

You asked seven questions. I answered many of them. But I never answer questions? Your lies are annoying. — NOS4A2

You answered yes that you were aware of several documents and statements yet nothing in your answers reflect actually knowledge of them. That's why I followed up with a substantive question that you now say if because he's the expert on this matter. I already anticipated that with another question: what if reasonable people disagree? Well?

The Mueller report is a report for the DOJ, the Attorney General William Barr, who had to determine whether the conduct described in the report constitutes a crime because Mueller refused to. — NOS4A2

Again a mischaracterisation. Mueller didn't refuse, he believed he was bound by department policy that he wasn't allowed to and that indeed Barr's assessment contravenes this policy. In any case, you didn't answer the question about why you (uncritically) accept Barr's assessment. Why is that?

You do this all the time and it's annoying. You never answer questions.

But it’s thoroughly consistent with the Attorney general’s judgement on the matter, which I hope you’re aware of. — NOS4A2

I am aware that Barr, a Trump appointee, claimed no crime was committed. But then I'm not the one on record in this thread misrepresenting Mueller countless times which was what we were talking about. Can we now agree that it is incorrect to conclude that Mueller established no crime was committed?

Then we can move unto Barr. Before going into the details, maybe you can tell me what you know so far.

Are you aware of the content of the Barr memo? Are you aware of Barr's letter to Congress and what it said? Are you aware of the material differences between his representation of the report in that letter and the facts described in the Mueller report? Are you aware what Mueller himself said about Barr's characterisation?

Once you are capable of answering yes to all those questions what is then your reason for maintaining that we should accept Barr's assessment on face value? And assuming for the sake of argument there are good reasons to accept his assessment (I think his assessment is wrong), why is it not possible and reasonable that other people can come to another assessment? And if that is indeed possible how then would you suggest we move from there to get to some agreement in this thread? (I think there's a straightforward way to move from there but I don't want to lead what should be a dialog too much).

Mueller could have concluded Trump committed crimes — NOS4A2

This is contrary to what Mueller has repeatedly said. See my previous post on the matter directly quoting him. This is also in Volume 2 of the Mueller report, which you claim to have read.

So what reason do you have to assume other reasons than those given in the report and repeated by him multiple times?

Mueller was very clear as to why he did not comment on whether Trump should be "pursued" in his May 29 statement:

And as set forth in the report after that investigation, if we had had confidence that the President clearly did not commit a crime, we would have said so.

We did not, however, make a determination as to whether the president did commit a crime. The introduction to the volume two of our report explains that decision. It explains that under long-standing Department policy, a President cannot be charged with a federal crime while he is in office. That is unconstitutional. Even if the charge is kept under seal and hidden from public view, that too is prohibited. The special counsel’s office is part of the Department of Justice and by regulation it was bound by that Department policy. Charging the president with a crime was, therefore, not an option we could consider.

The Department’s written opinion explaining the policy makes several important points that further informed our handling of the obstruction investigation. Those points are summarized in our report, and I will describe two of them for you. First, the opinion explicitly permits the investigation of a sitting President because it is important to preserve evidence while memories are fresh and documents available. Among other things, that evidence could be used if there were co-conspirators who could be charged now. And second, the opinion says that the Constitution requires a process other than the criminal justice system to formally accuse a sitting President of wrong doing. And beyond Department policy we were guided by principles of fairness. It would be unfair to potentially — it would be unfair to potentially accuse somebody of a crime when there can be no court resolution of the actual charge.

So that was Justice Department policy. Those were the principles under which we operated and from them we concluded that we would not reach a determination, one way or the other, about whether the President committed a crime. That is the office’s — that is the office’s final position, and we will not comment on any other conclusions or hypotheticals about the President. — Mueller

In other words, no amount of evidence would have led Mueller to state Trump committed a crime and no amount of evidence would make it possible for prosecutors to indict Trump. But certainly a certain amount of evidence he did not commit a crime, would led him to have stated Trump was innocent unequivocally pursuant to the first paragraph I quoted.

It is then disingenuous to suggest Trump is innocent because Barr and Mueller claim it cannot be pursued. In fact, Mueller even explains the Consitution requires "a process other than the criminal justice sytem" to accuse Trump.

Because they haven't been litigated I say possible because I presume his innocence. But there's plenty in the report that gives me pause (as a lawyer) and believe there's a case - several of them - that can be pursued. Why isn't that your take away from the report?

A simple counterexample would suffice and I will admit my hasty generalization. — NOS4A2

Read the Mueller report. 10 possible instances of obstruction of justice.

Except he lied about more than just a confusion of dates:

1. He lied about when he was contacted, while it was clear he was contacted precisely because of his position as advisor to the Trump campaign. He got the dates wrong but pretty incredible;
2. He knew about the many connections of this professor with Russian government officials but said he was a nobody;
3. He said he had superficial contact with a female Russian before he became campaign advisor to Trump when in reality he tried to leverage that contact to get bring the campaign in contact with Russian officials.

See: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f0/Statement_of_the_offense.filed.pdf

So, do you think it's accurate then?

Why do you call it an intervention in politics? Why not say it is a decision based on constitutional principles?

Now you have to convince us that the president’s rebukes of the hoax was obstruction or the protestations of an innocent man. — NOS4A2

No I don't. You need to read the full report.

You're both more or less wrong. There's no such thing as criminal collusion. The hoax is that Trump introduced a term he could never be convicted of. Mueller concluded there was unlawful interference in the 2016 election by Russians and there was an incomplete picture "due to communications that were encrypted, deleted or unsaved, as well as testimony that was false, incomplete or declined." Nothing proved but definitely worrisome in and of itself even without the possible role of Trump in it.

The Mueller report also sets out 10 instances of possible obstruction of justice by Trump. In accordance with advice from the OLC the report doesn't conclude one way or the other but the facts are there for those who want to read it.

This is nonsense. The rules of the game affect how the game is played. The electorate does not have unlimited power or knowlegde, even if they could have it they don't have time. Most people are busy making a living. So we can certainly point out the many issues with various socio-economic systems.

You're frogleaping to a conclusion (or reading that in Tim3003's post) that because the US democratic system is broken (or any other) democratic systems must be bad or something must be wrong with democracy. I would expect that one of the measures of the system is whether it correctly reflects the democratic will of the people. But that shouldn't be, in my view, the only measure.

don't lie. You'd know more if you did.

Imagine that: the “ignorant Brexiteer masses” want what they voted for. That seems to me such a strange concept nowadays, especially given the refusal to deliver the results and the routine snobbery and fear mongering that justifies its disruption. — NOS4A2

Not again. Over half of Brexit voters don't want a no deal Brexit. So at most 25% of those who voted in the referendum for Brexit are in favour of no deal. The vote in the referendum was basically split so a vast majority of those who voted are against a no deal Brexit.

link please?

While I agree there are consequences to how the EU operates resulting from the way it is constituted I would resist the notion that flexibility is a goal in and of itself. I'm not a proponent of an EU à-la-carte, which would be optimal flexibility. In fact, I think it would be disastrous. That Cameron didn't get what he wanted was necessary to ensure no precedent was created.

In that respect I think your point that the EU appears blind to the consequences of expansion is far more accurate. It is a political vision to have the entirety of continental Europe included in the EU but it's a vision that's not shared by the EU27 electorate. Politicians and public servants are probably also moved by prestige; "I'm the one that got country X in the EU" so these things move forward inexorably - too far removed from common voters.

It wasn't an argument against the point you were making, merely that I think the "flexibility" qualification required more context. The basis not to agree to the UK's requests is quite sound; you don't want to continually revisit what has already been agreed. The EU member states expect EU regulations are implemented in the national legislation of other member states in the same way, so that there's integration and a level playing field. If we start granting exemptions on immigration for the UK then Italy will want them for budget rules. France will want leniency on environmental issues. etc. etc.

The only way forward on EU immigration issues would be a comprehensive review of the immigration rules for every member state, not bespoke exemptions.

Also, Turkey is "the next country" to join for 20 years now. It's not going to happen any time soon. It's not in Turkey's interest to do so and it's not politically viable for the EU either. It's raised as a spectre often enough

He pressed his case hard but the EU was unable to provide sufficient flexibility. — Punshhh

I think the issue here was that it wasn't an opt out, which you decide before signing up to an aspect of the EU legal regime but an attempt to renegotiate what was already agreed. This isn't too much of an issue where it concerns contributions to the EU, which is a continuous negotiation, but it's different when you want to change existing laws. If you allow renegotiating on a case-by-case basis you create a precedent that's not wanted for a political project that intends to integrate European countries.

It's not as if the Netherlands doesn't have people grumbling about foreigners (Polish or otherwise) but we don't blame this on the EU for the most part (only about 20% of voters does).

Also, thinking about it, it's also a sort of cognitive dissonance: EU please solve our problem by giving us special treatment but also stop butting in.

Why would this be a surprise? The EU was formed by national governments. It's wasn't formed by Napoleon (or Hitler), but with genuinely sovereign states coming together and through co-operation between them. Why then do you find this to be the problem? It's like some movie fans creating a fan club and then someone coming and objecting to the fact that the fan club is made of movie fans! — ssu

This analogy doesn't work. The EU passes laws which often have direct effect in the national legal order even if national legislators fail to implement it in time. Fan clubs don't affect those around them in a similar way.

Laws require legitimacy to be acceptable. Since the EU countries are all reportedly democracies that legitimacy is expected to be democratic. As pointed out above, the EU's legitimacy issue is finding the balance between the equality of nations and representative democracy of the electorate. It's not, and hasn't been since 1979, a club of only states and their national interests.

The EU has fraud issues both at the national level where EU subsidies are spent and within the EU organisation itself. At the same time, I don't think the EU apparatus itself is very expensive considering what it does when compared to, for instance, US institutions with similar functions. Except for the parliament and european council and council of ministers there might be misspending but the budgets are still relatively tight.

democratic legitimacy — Echarmion

And yet there are European countries part of the EU that are less democratic. The democratic deficit of the EU has been exaggerated for years now following a German constitutional court decision referring to a democratic deficit. But that turned on the matter that there's no real way to reconcile representation of the electorate (EU Parliament) with equal representation of states in international affairs (European Council and Council of Ministers). Both bodies need to approve laws even if the appointed Commission (by elected officials) is the body initiating bills.

Trump started the zero-tolerance policy. That means adults go to jail for breaking the laws of the country. The children were cared for by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in facilities built during the Obama administration, while their “parents” served their time and awaited processing. Children cannot be held in prison. If parents don’t want to be separated from their children they should not commit crimes. — NOS4A2

Expulsion from the USA could be perfectly done by Ice, as it had been doing, without separation. The court system was also overloaded because the change in policy was that stupid.

And if parents don't want to be separated from kids they indeed shouldn't commit crimes. Except when they get out of jail, they can be reunited without a problem with their kids. Where it concerns immigrants, apparently this will take up to 2 years to have everyone reunited. As I said, the crime was not having a process for that.

I wonder if you loved that he ended that loophole by executive order. Your hero indeed. — NOS4A2

There was no loophole. Children were separated from their guardians before the Trump administration when there was doubt about their familial relationship. It was a rare occurrence. Under Trump it became policy to criminally prosecute every illegal entry (instead of the administrative route with ICE). Detention was only possible for adults. So minors were separated in each and every case. The crime was, though, that no one in his administration had in place a process of reuniting minors with their parents after proceedings had ended.

Not only is Trump responsible for his administration's policies, such an extreme change must have been made at the highest level and will have included him. So his executive order didn't come until after the very public outcry of his botched policy that he initiated.

scorn, bullying and hatred — NOS4A2

The strangest choice of words considering who we're talking about. It's as if it's projection.

For the rest, your love note was tldr as I got nauseous.