To those that believe the consciousness can survive the death: does the possibility exist of consciousness dying? How, when and why does this happen or not happen? Can consciousness change, and if so, why does it and how drastically and fast can that happen?

If something is (or even if it is not), we can make a word to refer to it.

Furthermore, if something is, it must have properties. Words can be made to refer to these properties.

Q.E.D.

We are social creatures and so the potential has to be socially constructed. It has to come from us collectively and pragmatically. — apokrisis

There's potential within both groups and individuals, although that's often potential to different things. I don't see how a culture can have potential for enlightenment in a way that individuals have; at most that'd be potential for the enlightenment of the individuals within the group. Similarly an individual doesn't have potential to form a culture to begin with.

Well, I did not make any statement about the causal relationship between the fact of inadequate pay and the fact of pay inequality. But, supposing that that causal relationship is as you describe, I use the word "secondary" in the sense of importance. — SynodOfDordt

It's not just a causal relationship: the problem at hand is a direct manifestation of the inequality.

In your example of the serial killer, it's relevant what's really causing the murders, what is the driving force within the murderer. If it's the murderousness of the murderer, I agree that the inequality and misogyny are secondary problems. If the cause of the murders is, however, the misogyny of the murderer, or even the unequal nature of the culture that created the person, the murders are a manifestation of the problem, not a separate problem. In that case, the misogyny is a bigger problem because it in a way contains the murders.

You are using potential here in a completely different way than what I am referring to in the OP (the secularized Medieval notion that we are manifesting some essence of what it is to be human by contributing to scientific/technological pursuits or having X experience). — schopenhauer1

If that essence is believed to exist by the people of some culture, then that essence exists as a mental construct within that culture.

So when I use the term "potential" here, I mean that we do not need to be born in the first place in order to have a particular X experience, or contribute to technological, or scientific accomplishment. — schopenhauer1

Are you saying we can do that without being born?

All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible. — javra

Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. I'd actually like to define this as knowledge so I'd go as far as to say that the person does have an infallible knowledge about the fact, but they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible.

As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. Objectively the answer would be no, thus "they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible", but as I also said, people are irrational.

This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). — javra

I don't think so because if the knowledge doesn't depend on the justification, only whether one believes the belief to be justified, it only matters what stance the person in the example takes.

All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning. — javra

Justification is evidence, not proof (although the evidence can be proof as well). Based on that, truth has some bearing on justification, but both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs are possibilities, so I don't exactly see what you mean by that "“justification” would be devoid of meaning". As you stated, there exist countless of definitions for it and opinions on what is justification, but the conclusion I draw is that whatever is that, it's not entirely dependent on truth.

So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. — javra

Knowledge clearly needs to be believed to be true, but I think that's a part of the definition, not a conclusion of it. Knowledge is a belief that is believed to be both true and justified, but a belief that is believed to be justified isn't necessarily believed to be true.

Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself? — javra

In theory, yes. In practice I don't think there's a limit to how irrational a person can be. I also think, however, that people can be objective and that doesn't necessarily contradict the irrationality, so there could very well exist a person that has an unjustified belief that they don't believe to be justified but still believe to be true.

then the fact of inequality is entirely a secondary issue, one that is resolved incidentally by tackling the more pressing problem of inadequate pay. — SynodOfDordt

I agree in principle but the choice of words seems perplexing. How can the cause of something be secondary to that something it causes?

Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true). — javra

I fully agree with your comment otherwise, but I think the distinction between these two should be made through the justification rather than the knowledge itself. One might, for example, have an infallible knowledge, which should have a certain justification, but if the person doesn't know of this justification, they can't have the knowledge and claim it to be true beyond doubt.

Let's say a person is asked what is the four-dimensional solid of revolution that forms when the graph f(x,y) rotates around x,y-plane in respect to the w,z-plane. This person doesn't know a thing about mathematics, but guesses the answer anyway.

The person had a belief that ended up being true. The belief was also justified as there exists a correct answer that could be calculated. However, even I wouldn't accept that guess as knowledge. I can see that someone might claim the belief wasn't justified to the person in the example, but we can also come up with examples of cases where the person, whether they are correct or not, believe to be justified. In that case I'd claim the person does have knowledge, so to those situations I have an alternate solution: knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not.

The leftist stance said in my previous comment stated, I also like Jordan Peterson's stance on the glass ceiling and why there are so much more men on the top of all the careers: getting to the top in anything takes an insane amount of work and dedication, and should generally not be done because that doesn't lead to happy and balanced life. It just happens to be (maybe because of evolution, maybe because of the sociocultural gender roles) that the people insane enough to do that, arguably a poor, choice are usually men. Although these kinds of people are often seen as successful, from normal people's point of view those people are the ones that have made the poor choices in their life, although the normal people don't realize that. So instead of complaining that all the politicians and CEOs are men, we should realize that no average person actually wants to be in that position.

I submit that the gender pay-gap, even if it exists, is either (a) not a problem in any sense, or (b) a problem in an incidental sense, that may be resolved by addressing a yet more pressing problem related to inadequate pay. Therefore, we should not consider the gender pay-gap as a problem to be solved in any sense. — SynodOfDordt

First of all the (b) is the case, which is a statistically verifiable fact. In that the women are on average paid less than men the problem is, of course, that the women are paid too little - something which you used quite a bit of text to state (which is not a problem as much as it is rather amusing). The problem is caused by inequality, which is a problem in itself, although not in this context, where it merely causes the problem.

But second, you've at least partly misunderstood the pay-gap. It's also, you see, a fact that pay-gap is almost non-existent when experience, career, profession, work-quality, etc. are considered. The issue is the culture and the gender roles defined by it that push men and women to different careers with different wages (maybe coincidentally, perhaps because the patriarchal society prefers the male-dominated careers). For example, teachers, most of whom are female, are underpaid considering the importance and influence of their jobs.

To answer this question, you simply need to compare the suicide rates and accidental drug overdoses of those in the musical/acting industry and those in the technical industry. This comparison shows that the artists seem to have a much harder time finding happiness. — Harry Hindu

That's quite a conclusion to jump into. Maybe artists just feel more overall.

A justified true belief is true knowledge. It seems logical that justified belief is then knowledge. Knowledge can be false. Therefore a justified belief can be false. If something can be some way, I don't see why one couldn't believe the thing to be so. So, a justified belief can be false, and therefore one can believe a justified belief to be false.

Seems far fetched but that might work :chin:

I wonder if I can tie this discussion back to the false knowledge, that was some interesting stuff back there.

So how could one believe the same belief to be both justified and false? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why not? For example, when a belief has sufficient evidence it's justified, but if two equally valid conclusions can be drawn from evidence, one could say that the other conclusion is valid and basing one's beliefs in it would be justified, while believing the other conclusion but recognizing the choice of conclusion as subjective.

And we're not discussing whether a false belief can be justified, we're discussing whether one can believe that a belief is both false and justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a belief is false, then one could believe that belief to be false. Yet, if the belief is justified, one can also believe it to be justified.

So you have contradictory justified beliefs then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, unless you mean belief as in believing it. Contradictory justified beliefs exist, but one can't have contradictory justified beliefs.

Actually, I'm taking that back: one can have contradictory beliefs, but one can't have beliefs they believe to be contradictory.

If you are considering both options, to believe in God, and to not believe in God, then you allow that one of these is false, but you are not believing that a particular one of them is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not considering them both, I accept both as justified beliefs.

You could say that it "was" a justified belief, but notice that (1) in the op requires that it "is" a justified belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does it matter what time we're talking about? Does it change with time whether a false belief can be justified? If we were having this discussion in the medieval times, it'd have clearly been possible to have a justified false belief.

But if you thought that it was just an opinion, and other people might have contrary opinions which were reasonable, you wouldn't designate the belief as false. A false belief is not a reasonable opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

An opinion can be reasonable but false, so I would designate the belief as false.

Example: both believing in God and not believing in God are reasonable and justified beliefs and there exist valid arguments for both. I still have an opinion on that that I believe to be objectively true, but still objectively recognize as a subjective opinion.

If you believe that X was a justified belief, but is no longer a justified belief, then it is still a lie if you state "X is a justified belief". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes but you could say it was a reasonable belief. It was justified to believe the Earth was justified in the medieval times.

Humans have no ideal potential state to live up to. — schopenhauer1

Maybe not ideal, but the potential is still there. And some potential states are ideal from subjective point of view.

I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said "... or a reason to believe in it or...". One can have an opinion but recognize it as a subjective opinion while accepting that other opinions are reasonable.

I've actually been using two different definitions in this thread. The first one is to consider justified to mean well and sufficiently justified, to the extent that the belief is certain. This is of course unpractical so I'm also using justified in a more colloquial sense, which I'd define so that a belief is justified if there's evidence for or a reason to believe in it or if it's a logical consequence of some reasonable thought process. The second definition does allow one to believe a justified belief is false.

I disagree with the demonstration because I disagree with you on the definition of justification, and thus on whether false beliefs (or knowledge) can be justified.

Are they not? Ok, how do you define sound, then?

Well, I'm arguing against it, but the conclusion in my last comment did have the assumption that you're arguing for it. If justified means just sound, correct guesses are knowledge by JTB.

So you're saying a sound guess can be knowledge? It would be sound that a die is thrown and the result is 6, but believing that prior to the throw wouldn't be knowledge.

How do you define justified?

So Smith used to know the event, but when it happens, he no longer knows that?

No, when the belief turns out to be false it's no longer justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

My question is whether it was justified, not whether it is anymore.

No of course not. The "net gain" criteria is closer to a last resort, not the first. Equality in treatment, or justice is the first. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? The only reason I can see for that is one's selfishness resulting in that they don't want to be the one in the worse situation.

For the sake of argument, let's assume that such an act is indeed unjust. It is also no doubt merciful. How do you now judge the merciful act to be morally good? — Samuel Lacrampe

Mercy is an expression of love towards another person, and love has an intrinsic value. Alternatively, moral intuition. Moral theories should be made to fit the applications, not another way around.

I admit I forget what the dispute was about on this one. — Samuel Lacrampe

It was about whether imposing everyone's will on everyone against their wills was unjust.

A house is on fire. You are a rescuer whose goal is to save the beings stuck inside. There is one human, one animal (say a dog) — Samuel Lacrampe

I've heard enough, dog it is.

No, what I am saying is that it is impossible to believe that X is false and also believe that X is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

What if a justified belief turns out to be false? Does that change whether the belief was justified?

No, I'm saying that you cannot honestly claim that you belief a specific belief to be both false and justified. If you belief that it is false, this denies the possibility of you believing that it is justified, because a false belief is known to be unsound and this contradicts "justified". — Metaphysician Undercover

Every fact has a possibility of being false, in which case they would be unjustified according to you. Whether the belief is justified or not cannot depend on whether the belief later turns out to be true or not.

An invalid attempt at justification is not justification. If it is not valid then is doesn't qualify as a justification. X is not justified if the claimed "justification" for X is not valid. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that only certain beliefs are justified? So the only justified belief is that I exist?

And as this "net gain" criteria is objective, it is compatible with an objective morality. — Samuel Lacrampe

Even if it's unjust?

But now, you say it is merciful to put him in jail; which to me is a form of punishment. — Samuel Lacrampe

I wouldn't call the minimal action done to only prevent further crimes a punishment, but if that is done, what about not killing Hitler, instead putting him in jail? That's merciful, but arguably unjust.

What about dragging the moral agents into all this? Is killing other animals for food immoral? (I think it is but as >90% of people are not vegetarians I think it's a safe bet to ask this rhetorical question.) What about non-conscious things? Do they deserve equal treatment?

It now sounds like we are arguing about the same position, namely, that the act of "imposing my desires on others (and no other reasons)" cannot pass the golden rule without contradictions. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I argued that treating others the way they want to be treated leads to contradictions. You can't take people's desires into account with golden rule in a way that doesn't lead to contradictions.

If you are going to use this absurd line of reasoning how can you claim that moral law is objective? When it is demonstrable that morals are different across time, culture, nation, and tribe, and between persons within those categories.
It is you that is acting stupidly, not me. — charleton

Don't drag me into that, that's not even my stance. If someone uses a bad or fallacious argument, I am going to point that out and argue against that argument, even if I agree with its conclusion. I don't agree with LaCrampe, but your claim that his opinion changed is false. From Wikipedia:

man (without an article) itself refers to the species, to humanity, or "mankind", as a whole.

It is simply an historical fact that women for centuries have not been considered as men's equals.
Such a position has been the moral standard until the 20thC. — charleton

Irrelevant. We're talking about an opinion of a person in 21st century.

Why are you trying to deny the basic facts of history? — charleton

Why are you acting dumb? I couldn't have denied them as I haven't made any claims about any historical facts.

Otherwise we could justify all sorts of irrational beliefs by asserting falsities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, we do. Those justifications are just not valid.

Is that an accurate description of communism? — Purple Pond

No, that is a description of what communist dictatorships have been in practice, and describes communism as an ideology about as accurately as the systematic killing of jews describes capitalism.

Oh except for this part:

The communist economy is --- inefficient. — Purple Pond

That part was about right.