What I'm talking about is gender.The World Health Organization defines gender as "refer[ring] to the socially constructed characteristics of women and men – such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It varies from society to society and can be changed. While most people are born either male or female, they are taught appropriate norms and behaviours – including how they should interact with others of the same or opposite sex within households, communities and work places. — Michael

Yeah and that's what I'm thinking might be incorrect. The human behaviours that are typical to specific gender but do not have a sociocultural but rather a biological basis should, in my opinion, be classified under gender, not sex. By that definition, animals other than humans do have a gender.

Does gender have to be an entirely social structure? I know people like to think the biological sex has nothing to do with personality and there's no psychological side to it, but if we choose the definitions to words by their usage, I think gender could be described as non-physical sex. As a dog owner I can confirm that male and female dogs have different personalities.

One can change their gender — Buxtebuddha

Person's gender can change but no one can change their gender out of their free will.

There is no real sex change — Purple Pond

The title says gender. Which one do you want to debate?

General relativity is isomorphic with the statement that Reality is a stationary block spacetime. — tom

It's five-dimensional, with the beings with free will being capable of controlling their movement in the fifth dimension.

Well, that's just an example of that theory being compatible with free will. I personally don't buy that because your space-time block doesn't explain causality.

Can you give a concrete example of merciful act? I cannot think of one where the morality is contrary to justice. — Samuel Lacrampe

Killing someone as a revenge might be just, but not moral.

I think you agree with me that killing everyone for no reason is unjust. And it is unjust precisely because there is an unequal treatment. In this case, because you treat the victims as what pleases you; not them. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how that is unequal just because there's someone deciding about the nature of that equal treatment.

Another example, what if you can choose to help one person or multiple people, but if you only help the one person, their gain from the help is greater than the combined gain of the multiple people?

(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's your opinion.

(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, that's just equality. Is killing everyone for no reason just? Justice is defined through morality, not the other way around.

(4) If the criteria to evaluate the moral value of an act is justice, and justice is objective, then morality is objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, if justice is objective.

Example: mercy isn't always just, but it could be argued to be morally right.

You’re saying that it is wrong to think of morality as objective. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

No he's not.

The problem though is only this part:

I lack belief in some things which are not gazoompas. — fdrake

(Should be "I lack the belief that there are things that are not gazoompas")

Going through my comments there's a load of mistakes so they were probably terrible to read through (sorry :p).

Ah, yes, my bad.

~B(Ex~P(x)) = not believing there is any x with the property P.

Yea, that looks correct to me, but the translation to English is wrong imo.

But shouldn't the first one be Ex~B(~P(x))?

~B(Ex~P(x)) — fdrake

Wouldn't that mean you lack the belief that there is some thing that is not a gazoompa? If you want to say you lack belief in some thing, shouldn't you put ∃ before the B?

¬B(p) ∧ ¬B(¬p) → ¬(¬B(p) ↔ B(¬p))

that would be translated to ~B(~p), not B(~p) — Mr Phil O'Sophy

You can just substitute ¬p=q.

Like I said, you do not really appreciate what 'objective' means. — charleton

How so? A couple of dictionary definitions:

• (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts
• not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased
• intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings, as a person or a book
• Wikipedia: "Generally, objectivity means the state or quality of being true even outside a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings."

I don't see my usage of the word contradicting these.

the act is wrong always. — bahman

Not according to relativism, for example.

Like killing people is right if their existence due to huge population causes catastrophe. — bahman

See, you're making an objective claim here. Things depend on situations, but there can still be an objective answer for any given situation.

Just because killing is painful does not mean it ought to be considered immoral. — charleton

I didn't say that, or any else "is", would be where the "ought" would be gotten from.

The value of x could be different and f(x) depends on x, therefore for any given f(x) there exists no objective value of x.

The issue is that the argument isn't that the f(x) is a constant, but that some objective f(x) exists, and thus for all x there exists an objective value of f(x).

Just as a matter of language use, an ethical theory can be nothing more than a teaching - a cohesive system of beliefs that are accepted by way of persuasion or authority. In this case there is no requirement for the theory to be grounded in anything "objective," in the same sense in which objectivity is claimed for empirical theories. — SophistiCat

But there exist theories as well that make the claim there is an objective universal morality. How are the theories that make a claim but then don't claim that claim to be objectively true different?

I see you immediately falling down on the myth that a moral system can be objective. — charleton

I don't say that is my belief, I merely recognize it as a theoretical possibility.

And reflect that you are also going to fall into Hume's is/ought problem. — charleton

How so?

An objective morality can't just "not exist". It must exist in some way independently of us, and then the description of that way of existing would be a metaphysical one.

If it's false, how could it possibly be knowledge? — LD Saunders

Because I define knowledge so that it can be false. It's the most correct definition because most things called knowledge aren't certain. Knowledge is a belief that one considers knowledge, or subjectively believes to be an objectively true fact - as opposed to beliefs that one objectively recognizes as subjective ones.

If the information about the truth value of a thing that was referred to as knowledge changes, whether it is knowledge in the colloquial sense cannot change because whether it was, at the time, justified to refer to it as knowledge defines whether the belief was knowledge. A word means what it refers to, and false information is quite often referred to as knowledge.

I mean it's still knowledge. There's correct knowledge and false knowledge, and the word knowledge refers to both, yet they're not "worth" the same.

The reason for this is that this definition actually describes the everyday usage of knowledge most correctly. We can never prove anything, except our own existence, and even that to ourselves, strictly speaking, so either nothing is knowledge, or there exists a theoretical possibility of that knowledge being false, while we can still refer to it as knowledge.

How not? False knowledge is worse than correct knowledge because it's false.

Once you claim that knowledge need not be true, aren't you then claiming that all claims are the equivalent of one another? — LD Saunders

The logical conclusion we can draw from that is that either all claims are equivalent, OR all knowledge is NOT equivalent. Since knowledge can be either true or false, I claim the latter. You can know 2+2=5, but you're wrong and it doesn't make the correct knowledge that 2+2=4 any less right.

He thinks you will agree with him that it would be odd to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. — PossibleAaran

And why is that usage odd? Because, (Gettier claims,) b is not knowledge.

Umm... I really don't understand what you mean, how is that an exception? — Abaoaqu

Gettier argues he doesn't know that.

"False knowledge" is a misuse of the word knowledge. That is what you call a false belief. — Abaoaqu

I consider that knowledge also requires the believer considers their beliefs knowledge, or at least objectively correct.

I disagree with the claim that JTB is not what we need for knowledge, because one can make a lucky guess and be right. — LD Saunders

I didn't say that the "justified" part was the problem though. I think both "true" and "belief" are bigger mistakes with the definition. First of all knowledge doesn't need to be true for multiple reasons, for example the existence of the words "false knowledge", and subjectivism redefining the term "truth". Belief, on the other hand, isn't enough to make something knowledge. One also needs to at least consider their beliefs to be objectively correct knowledge.

What you are claiming is that the "knowledge" of a lottery ticket winner in "knowing" he held the winning ticket I equivalent to the knowledge a physicist ha regarding why a bridge will stay in place. — LD Saunders

I'd actually say that other way around: I consider the knowledge of physicists to be equivalent to the knowledge about the lottery ticket in its lack of proper justification.

Smith believed that "Jones will get the job" which turned out to be false and not "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" which turned out to be true, so it doesn't debunk the JTB theory. — Abaoaqu

Except if we claim Gettier was incorrect and Smith does know that the person who gets the job has ten coins in their pocket.

knowledge is in itself a true belief — Abaoaqu

Yes, by JTB-definition. We can also take it as a premise that false knowledge exists.

how can we know that the belief is indeed true? We have to rely on some sort of proof, a justification — Abaoaqu

What is adequate justification?

Ie. any claim is an expression of an opinion (for example "God exists"="I believe God exists"), I believe in God, if God exists then God exists, God exists, therefore God exists. Therefore my belief in God is justified, so I know God exists.

I don't really know what you mean by it was interpreted in some other way. What other way is there to interpret the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford"? — Chany

If we consider the first case for example, the meaning of "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" changes if the person "the man who will get the job" refers to. This is what Lukasz Lozanski used in an article I found to solve the Gettier problem.

However, the entire point is to show that the definition leads us to accept conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, are false. — Chany

That should be done by coming to those conclusions from the definition alone. Taking one's own conclusion as a premise doesn't prove anything.

I think I can show why you could not accept b as knowledge under JTB. — Chany

I know all this to be true, but for either JTB-definition to be shown true or Gettier to be shown correct it should be proven that b is not knowledge, not only under JTB.

It also seems absurd to claim that one cannot be justified by false beliefs. If Smith fakes their vehicle registration for a Ford, pays people to vouch for him about owning a Ford, picks me up in a Ford that he does not own, and shows me pictures on social media of him driving around in said Ford, then I am, by any normal means of the word, justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. The claims are all false- Smith fabricated everything- but I am justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. From the proposition "Smith owns a Ford," I can derive the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford." The justification from the first transfers over to the other. — Chany

But where is the line drawn? Are logical fallacies enough justification? Is any amount of evidence enough or is proof required? This is all further evidence against JTB. How can knowledge be defined as a justified true belief when the word justified itself is so unclear?

By beliefs I only meant the final conclusions that turn out to be true. The premises for them are "Jones will get the job" and "Jones owns a Ford", which turn out to be false. If we look at the premises of those, we see that they are indeed true, but Smith jumps to invalid conclusions from them.

The US government deleted it.

It's in Wikipedia, for goodness sake. That reaches more people than the OED. — T Clark

And more things reach Wikipedia than OED reaches people. I wouldn't consider reaching Wikipedia to mean anything.

if the girl is younger than the age of consent, then she cannot give consent — tim wood

And cannabis is worse than alcohol and should be illegal because it's an illegal drug. Law is not moral, and the age of consent only matters to whether one can give a consent that matters legally speaking.

t=the sign is true.

t⟷((p→q)∧(¬p→(q∨¬q)))

(¬p→(q∨¬q))¬→t

What about the Flying Spaghetti Monster? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

There's a conspiracy theory about that?

You forgot the Crop Circles — Caldwell

Are there other theories about them than UFOs?