and thus some sort of a metaphysical explanation — BlueBanana

How so?

An objective morality can't just "not exist". It must exist in some way independently of us, and then the description of that way of existing would be a metaphysical one.

For this to be done, the theory would have to claim objective morality, and thus some sort of a metaphysical explanation and reason for the morality. Most normative ethic theories don't go this far, however. — BlueBanana

I've been exploring the connection between objectivity and morality for some time. I recall a conversation on the old Forum from years ago, when I ventured that there is an 'objective moral order' and was told this was a ridiculous idea. I saw the point of the criticism, yet I persist in a realist view.

But it occured to me that the problem might be connected to the criterion of objectivity. After all what is 'objectively' the case is often very hard to ascertain, unless you're actually speaking in terms of the kinds of objects which are amenable to exact measurement. Hence, I think, the intuitive appeal of physics as being the paradigm for objectivity. This is why scientific materialists want to say that everything is ultimately grounded in the laws of physics. After all, in respect of the objects of physics, it is possible to arrive at an objective judgement with a high degree of mathematical precision; judgement concerning such objects is completely quantifiable in a way that judgements about many other kinds of issues could not be. The thought is, I think, that it is possible here to arrive at a truly objective judgement, and that therefore, that methodology might be generalised to arrive at similarly objective judgements in other matters as well.

But then, 'objectivity' might be spoken of as a criterion for judgement with respect to disciplines such as history, jurisprudence and so on. In such cases, one might criticize subjective bias if it appeared in a historical work or a legal judgement. And historians and judges are expected to avoid subjective judgements, and open to criticism if they don't. But perhaps in these cases, this is the idea of 'impartiality', which is not quite the same as 'objectivity'. I think the idea of 'impartiality' or 'detachment' has a somewhat broader scope than 'objectivity'. An impartial witness, or impartial judge, is thought to arrive at his or her opinion without self-interest; which is similar to objectivity but not quite the same.

I think the difficulty I have with 'objectivity' is that it embodies a kind of implicit normative epistemology. It presumes that the criterion of what is real, is that it can be assessed as an object. So implicitly it accepts that the judgement must be grounded in respect of some truly existing object, or a matter of fact which is amenable to precise quantitative analysis. I suppose it seems a rather positivist attitude, which nevertheless presents itself as impartial or disinterested.

I think the difficulty I have with 'objectivity' is that it embodies a kind of implicit normative epistemology. It presumes that the criterion of what is real, is that it can be assessed as an object. So implicitly it accepts that the judgement must be grounded in respect of some truly existing object, or a matter of fact which is amenable to precise quantitative analysis. I suppose it seems a rather positivist attitude, which nevertheless presents itself as impartial or disinterested. — Wayfarer

Good take on 'impartiality' (3rd paragraph of your post). As you pointed out, 'objective' in morality is not the same as 'impartial' in matters of decisions in human affairs. So, no problem there.
On to objective morality. Rightfully, the pain point of justifying objective morality is in the word objective. Here is a gift that keeps giving to its opponents.

Maybe this is a bit boring of a thought, but I find it interesting that there are no mentions of classifying these theories of normative ethics as descriptive ones (unless I just made an obvious and huge mistake somewhere there?). — BlueBanana

I've had exactly your thought a few times and I haven't seen it expressed anywhere else. Not that I read any philosophy these days.

Any moral theory that wishes to state what is a morally right thing to do should ground this claim on something. — BlueBanana

You are taking theory to mean more--or-less what it means in science, where theories are indeed descriptive and are (supposedly) grounded in publicly accessible, verifiable observations.

Just as a matter of language use, an ethical theory can be nothing more than a teaching - a cohesive system of beliefs that are accepted by way of persuasion or authority. In this case there is no requirement for the theory to be grounded in anything "objective," in the same sense in which objectivity is claimed for empirical theories.

More often in philosophy an advocate of an ethical theory will not ask you to accept it in toto on faith or authority, but will instead attempt to ground it in some truths and methods that are taken to be self-evident, and develop the theory from there. Which makes it basically no different from any other philosophical theory.

That said, I am also skeptical about normative - and even descriptive - ethical theories. I think they tend to unjustifiably simplify and "mathematize" a subject whose messy and complicated nature does not easily lend itself to such treatment.

I am not sure why anyone thinks morality must be grounded, as nothing else has ever been grounded. Mathematics relies on unfounded axioms, so math is not grounded. Science has the problem of induction, and remains ungrounded. Reason is ungrounded. So, why should there be this exception for morality?

Morality does not have to be based on any metaphysical absurdist claims. Morality is about getting along well together, and we know objectively that there are better and worse ways of doing that. We also know our morality started off from evolution, and to this day, about 50% of any person's political views, which are moral views, are based on evolutionary biology that gave rise to their political personality traits, which are approximately 50% heritable.

Any moral theory that wishes to state what is a morally right thing to do should ground this claim on something. For this to be done, the theory would have to claim objective morality, and thus some sort of a metaphysical explanation and reason for the morality. Most normative ethic theories don't go this far, however. — BlueBanana

I see you immediately falling down on the myth that a moral system can be objective. And reflect that you are also going to fall into Hume's is/ought problem.

which are approximately 50% heritable. — LD Saunders

99% of all stats are made up on the spot.

I see you immediately falling down on the myth that a moral system can be objective. — charleton

I don't say that is my belief, I merely recognize it as a theoretical possibility.

And reflect that you are also going to fall into Hume's is/ought problem. — charleton

How so?

Just as a matter of language use, an ethical theory can be nothing more than a teaching - a cohesive system of beliefs that are accepted by way of persuasion or authority. In this case there is no requirement for the theory to be grounded in anything "objective," in the same sense in which objectivity is claimed for empirical theories. — SophistiCat

But there exist theories as well that make the claim there is an objective universal morality. How are the theories that make a claim but then don't claim that claim to be objectively true different?

The reality could be different and things are matter of situation, therefore objective morality does not exist.

Funny how you say that morality does not have to be grounded (any more than anything else), then immediately go on to posit a ground for morality. It doesn't work, of course. You can join anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists in proposing an explantion for morality, but that does nothing to justify moral beliefs.

But there exist theories as well that make the claim there is an objective universal morality. How are the theories that make a claim but then don't claim that claim to be objectively true different? — BlueBanana

Depends on what "objective" morality means - as others have pointed out, that is a fraught term.

The value of x could be different and f(x) depends on x, therefore for any given f(x) there exists no objective value of x.

The issue is that the argument isn't that the f(x) is a constant, but that some objective f(x) exists, and thus for all x there exists an objective value of f(x).

I don't say that is my belief, I merely recognize it as a theoretical possibility.

And reflect that you are also going to fall into Hume's is/ought problem.
— charleton — BlueBanana

Just because killing is painful does not mean it ought to be considered immoral.

There are any number of moral leaders who have claimed the objectivity of their moral stance and all have without exception become out of date.

Just because killing is painful does not mean it ought to be considered immoral. — charleton

I didn't say that, or any else "is", would be where the "ought" would be gotten from.

Yes, f(x) could exist mentally. Like killing people are wrong. But you cannot deny that y(x) cannot exist. Therefore there is nothing objective as far as things depends on situation. Like killing people is right if their existence due to huge population causes catastrophe.

I didn't say that, or any else "is", would be where the "ought" would be gotten from. — BlueBanana

Personally I don't believe in absolute morals, so even though I have an opinion on normative ethics, I consider the thing to be that it's objectively true that I have a subjective opinion, and not that I subjectively believe something to be objectively true (this applies to most other fields of my philosophy as well). — BlueBanana

Oh?
I think you might not really be very clear on the meaning of the object/subject distinction.

Like killing people is right if their existence due to huge population causes catastrophe. — bahman

See, you're making an objective claim here. Things depend on situations, but there can still be an objective answer for any given situation.

The point is whether the act of killing is right or wrong objectively, mean absolutely. Everything is matter of situation. And yes, there can be an answer for any situation. That however doesn't impose anything objectively, the act is wrong always.

See, you're making an objective claim here. Things depend on situations, but there can still be an objective answer for any given situation. — BlueBanana

Like I said, you do not really appreciate what 'objective' means.

That however doesn't impose anything objectively, the act is wrong always. — bahman

No act is always wrong.

the act is wrong always. — bahman

Not according to relativism, for example.

Like I said, you do not really appreciate what 'objective' means. — charleton

How so? A couple of dictionary definitions:

• (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts
• not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased
• intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings, as a person or a book
• Wikipedia: "Generally, objectivity means the state or quality of being true even outside a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings."

I don't see my usage of the word contradicting these.

I don't see my usage of the word contradicting these. — BlueBanana

Well duh.