but it's not necessarily intrinsic to Islamic culture — Wayfarer

nothing is intrinsic to Islamic culture, because there's no such thing as Islamic culture. That's my point.

Yeah, that Islam is a bad, bad person, who has some really violent beliefs.

What's that you say? Islam isn't actually a person at all, but a label applied to hundreds of millions of people who have an extraordinarily wide range of beliefs amongst them?

Stop over-complicating things! Obviously this Islam guy is just bad, right? ... and anybody who doesn't say they hate him needs to be thrown in jail or at the very least kept out of our country (which of course has no violence in it at all)..

The supposed difference in readability between analytic and pomo philosophy seems to me mistaken. There are hard-to-read analytics and hard-to-read pomos. At the mo', for example, I am stalled in the midst of 'Sameness and Substance' by David Wiggins, because it defies your ideas andrew and makes logic very hard work — mcdoodle

I agree with this mcdoodle.

Obscurity is by no means confined to pomo. I get far more irritated at obscure writing by analytics than I do by Continentals, because I feel that Continentals have an excuse (perhaps 'a justification' would be a better word there).

The part of Einstein's 1905 paper that derives his Special Theory of Relativity is only a few pages, as is John Bell's 1960s paper that changed the world of quantum mechanics. If something as complex and profound as those can be logically derived in a few pages I see no excuse for analytics to embed their arguments in wordy tracts that run for hundreds of pages.

I do love Hume though, even though he was lamentably verbose (500+ pages in The Treatise of Human Nature - what's that about then?). I have to remind myself that they didn't have word processors in those days so editing wasn't as easy as it is now. Perhaps those older analytic texts are more like running commentaries on their own process of exploration, with all the turns, dead ends and realisations that entails.

how does QM, GR, thermo, etc help you instrumentally? — darthbarracuda

GR helps me whenever I use GPS, which would be hopelessly inaccurate without it.
QM enables me to write these fascinating messages on this computer, and read the fascinating messages typed in by people on the other side of the world.
Thermo helps me whenever I travel by bus or use mains electricity, the majority of which is still produced by steam-driven turbines.

GR is probably the least useful of the three, if we treat it as just the incremental accuracy over Newton's theory, rather than as an entire theory of mechanics, which it really is. But even as only an incremental theory, it gave me the thrill of following the Apollo missions as a child, of which I still have fond memories and some much-loved scrapbooks.

Would you agree with the idea that "post-modern" philosophy, in particular, has a bit of a beef with science — darthbarracuda

Is the beef with science or with those - often not scientists - that make philosophical claims about science, such as that science reveals the Truth? The two are very different things.

I am passionate about science and devote time to improving my skills in QM and GR, as well as learning more about Thermodynamics. But I do not believe that it reveals 'Truth'. That is a philosophical claim, not a scientific one. My interest and participation in science is driven by considerations that are part instrumental and part aesthetic, neither of which relies on a belief that science delivers Truth.

Further society's interest in, and considerable investment in, science is principally driven by its instrumental value, not by any philosophical beliefs about Truth. We invest in science because it brings us useful things.

This is probably a really dumb question, but doesn't the claim that notions of truth are social constructs imply that the person making such a claim has somehow attained a perspective that lies outside of that — Erik

It's not at all dumb, because many people assume that. But I also think the implication fails. Someone who says truth is a social construct may also add - or leave implicit - 'including any assertions about truth that I may appear to be making now'.

Or, put more crudely, the person could just be saying 'trust nobody, including me'. There is nothing contradictory about such a statement. Nor is it only made by postmodernists. Krishnamurti, who was not at all postmodern, said things like that often.

7th Seal is the first one that popped to mind for me. — Moliere

Me too.

It's a tough one. But I wouldn't want to rule out the possibility that there may be some people in the world that may find his worldview spiritually fulfilling, in a way that they can achieve from no other philosophy or religion.

Are there strict rules in philosophy such as in mathematics, or can anyone create his own philosophy and worldview? — kris22

There are no rules. New worldviews are welcome, from any quarter!

Perhaps a better way to look at the 'appropriate' description of an emotion is to interpret it as meaning that an 'inappropriate' emotion is one that it is better not to have, and that it is worth working to eliminate.

Any emotion (perhaps with a very small number of exceptions) can be appropriate in the right context. This world contains far too much fear, greed and anger, most of which we would be better to work to eliminate, but there can be rare circumstances when those emotions are helpful.

So what society tells you about your emotions is irrelevant. In contrast, what a skilled counsellor tells you will usually be well worth paying attention to.

Take the example of the exam. A little bit of anxiety about an exam is helpful, as it motivates one to study and to make sure one gets to the exam on time and with the proper equipment. But a large amount of anxiety is harmful because it can prevent one from concentrating, maybe even make one ill.

With the exam results, a certain amount of disappointment from the student who gets a B despite expecting an A is appropriate, as it will motivate them to work out what they did wrong and strive to do better next time. But a large amount of disappointment is 'catastrophising' and will cause an unhelpfully bitter and gloomy approach to life - maybe even to giving up on the course altogether.

Even grief and rage can be helpful emotions in the right context. Grief is part of the necessarily painful process of transitioning to a new life without the one one has loved and lost.

The word 'appropriate' works for me, but I can see that it has the possibility of conveying the idea of being judged by others, which is absolutely not the point of CBT. If that baggage causes problems, you could try using the words 'helpful' and 'harmful' instead, to identify which emotions to accept and which ones to work to eliminate.

I don't know for sure but I think it will be either in the Ion or in the early parts of the Republic. That is where Plato sets out his hostility to Poetry. Its depiction of the gods as flawed is one of several reasons he gives for why poetry should be banned.

Yes, they're probably as "bad" as people say, if by that you mean to refer to the kind of graphic content which some people may find shocking, vulgar, obscene or objectionable in some way. — Sapientia

That's not what I mean by 'bad'. I mean if it encourages (eg by glamorising) harmful attitudes and actions (and looking back at my post, I believe that was perfectly clear). If it does then it's some of the people playing the game that are 'ruining it for the rest of us'. If it doesn't then I see no reason for anybody to object to people using them.

As I said, I have no knowledge of whether such things do encourage such attitudes and actions, as I have nothing to do with them.

as for the second point, if such portrayals are permitted in films and videogames, then porn should be no exception. — Sapientia

I agree. While I am generally very liberal, video games or other media items that encourage violence or socially harmful attitudes (eg to women or minorities), will be on my hit list if I ever attain any form of political influence.

However, having never played Grand Theft Auto or watched Game of Thrones, I have no idea whether they are really as bad as they sound.

While limiting one's concern to exploitation that is illegal is commonplace and understandable, it seems an unsatisfactory moral stance to me. It delegates the decision about what constitutes morally unacceptable exploitation to the relevant legal authorities, and law has only a loose correlation with ethics.

A parallel with the market for chocolate occurs to me. Until recently, most chocolate was produced from cocoa that was grown and harvested in poor countries under very exploitative conditions involving lots of child labour. That exploitation was mostly legal where it occurred.

In recent years there has been a strong global movement against this, the result of which is that an increasing amount of the chocolate produced is produced under much less exploitative conditions. There are certification schemes for Fair Trade chocolate that appear to be credible. At first, only niche suppliers produced Fair Trade chocolate but now the large players are seeing the need to start complying with these expectations. There is a long way to go but there has been real, tangible progress.

Maybe I'm easily amused but the idea of a Fair Trade Porn market, accompanied by a suitable certification scheme, appeals to me. The scheme could have dual criteria of (1) no significant exploitation of the people involved in production and (2) no portrayal of activity that encourages sexual violence or unfair use of power imbalance.

I wonder what the chances are of the US government sponsoring such a scheme.

In my experience, wise people rarely say that things are 'stupid'.

Yes that's what I meant.
Agnostic Uncommitted (AU) are people that that have no strong belief or disbelief in God, and who believe fairly strongly that it is impossible to know whether there is one or not. I would expect this to be a large group. Maybe a lot of non-philosophical, non-religious people are in this group.

Gnostic Uncommitted are people who have no strong belief or disbelief in God, but who believe it is possible for somebody (else) to know whether there is one. I sometimes think I might be in this group. I certainly think that, if there were a God, it would be possible for people to know of its existence, since such a powerful being could reveal itself to certain individuals, thereby removing any possibility of doubt from their minds. Of course, that knowledge would only pertain to people that received such revelations, (and gullible others that were told about it).

I don't think it works so well the other way though. I don't see how it could be possible to know with certainty that there is no God. But it depends on definitions. I think one can know with a great deal of confidence that there is no God of the type described in the Bible, because it is (IMHO) self-contradictory. But that is only one of a vast range of possible conceptions of God(s).

Which makes them theists, not agnostics. — darthbarracuda

You can choose to use the word agnostic that way if you wish. It would be consistent with how some people currently use it, but not consistent with the meaning it had when originally coined by Thomas Huxley. Nor is it consistent with Bertrand Russell's use. As one of history's most famous atheists, Russell described himself as an Agnostic Atheist.

A practical disadvantage of using agnostic that way is that one loses a simple way to refer to Christian agnostics, who have historically been very important. Aren't they often mystics, and weren't Kierkegaard and Simone Weil amongst their number?

Or, ..... there is no such thing as "the law". There is only individual laws, and you can judge each one as applicable, or grossly unjust with respect to your interests, without placing yourself as "higher than the law". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, of the two alternatives you describe, this one sounds closer to my position.

But how do we judge the authority of those authors?
..... Why, do you accept Singer's words as to when to disobey the laws? — Metaphysician Undercover

I place the authority of all authors at naught, and I would encourage others to do likewise.

I do not accept Singer's words, and I would encourage others to do likewise.

That may seem strange to you, since I agree with Singer on many things, including the circumstances in which it is reasonable to disobey the law.

But my principle is that I must decide for myself.

The reason I mentioned Singer is because he highlighted a number of considerations that I had not previously considered, and thereby enabled me to reason through to my own conclusion more clearly and with more confidence.

Singer is not your guru. I am not your guru. Nobody is your guru except you. You are your own guru. It is good to listen to what others have to say, as it helps one to think more widely and clearly. It exposes one to ideas, perspectives and channels of reasoning that one may not have previously experienced. But I believe that it is best for one to decide for oneself.

Since I am not your guru, you should not just accept that last sentence. If I were you I would think about it and decide for myself whether to accept it.

BTW your allusion to Thoreau's 'On the Duty of Civil Disobedience' is timely. I have been meaning to read it, and will bump it up my reading list as a consequence of this discussion. I suspect I will not agree with many of his conclusions as - based on Walden - his temperament seems to be much less communitarian than mine. But who knows? And in any case I expect it to be an enriching and entertaining read.

I have you to thank for the fact that I will probably now get around to reading it, whereas otherwise I would not have.

BTW BTW apropos of an earlier discussion: did you read 'The Death of Ivan Ilych'? I just finished it. It's a short and easy read. I'm still working out what to make of it. I'm glad I read it.

Here's an attempt from me:, using belief in god on the horizontal and belief in the possibility of knowledge of god on the vertical.

The area above the parabola is agnostic and below it gnostic. The six markers are:
GT = Gnostic Theist
AT = Agnostic Theist
GA = Gnostic Atheist
AA = Agnostic Atheist
GU = Gnostic Uncommitted
AU = Agnostic Uncommitted

This diagram captures the idea that it is not possible to believe with virtual certainty in god, or its nonexistence, while at the same time believing that knowledge about that is impossible. The more towards the middle one gets horizontally, the more viable it becomes to be either gnostic or agnostic.

The GUs are an interesting group. They have no strong belief or disbelief themselves but they are convinced that it is possible for others to know one way or the other.

If the definition of Atheism is merely lack of belief, both of these diagrams make no sense whatsoever. — WiseMoron

That may be overstating it a bit, but I think the diagram does have some problems.

I think that to be internally consistent, both dimensions need to be belief, with the scale indicating degree of confidence in the belief and the top/right being maximum confidence the belief is wrong and bottom/left being maximum confidence it is right.

Now comes the tricky bit:

While the horizontal scale represents belief in the existence of a certain sort of god, the vertical scale is belief that it is possible for anybody to know whether or not that certain sort of god exists.

In other words, the vertical scale is not knowledge but strength of belief in the possibility of knowledge.

Without that adjustment, I don't see how the vertical scale can be continuous. It seems to me it would have to be simply binary - Knows or does not Know.

That way you could pick and choose which laws to abide by, without worrying that this means you have disrespect for "the law" in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

'pick and choose' is a loaded term, implying a flippant attitude to the decision.

There was nothing the least bit flippant about Gandhi's decision to defy an unjust law. He expected to be beaten, vilified, imprisoned and fined.

Stripped of the loaded language, I can accept your formulation. That is, I believe that it is reasonable and consistent to choose, after serious ethical consideration, to disobey a law that one is convinced is unjust, while still believing that, in the absence of gross injustice, laws should be obeyed.

Peter Singer has written about this at length. He argues that one should obey the law except where there are gravely serious reasons not to do so. In a nutshell, his argument is that we all benefit when nearly everybody obeys the law. That benefit can only be outweighed by very strong considerations in the opposite direction, usually in relation to a grossly unjust or otherwise harmful law. Such exceptions occur only rarely, but they do occur.

Singer has lived out this philosophy by breaking laws to trespass to try to prevent environmental destruction, for which he was arrested in the 1980s. But in every other respect he has - to my knowledge - been a model law-abiding citizen and encourages others to do likewise.

If you want to call that 'disrespect for the law' then go ahead. But that looks to me a meaningless bunch of words, that is unable to account for why Singer scrupulously pays his taxes, does not litter, drives within the speed limit, etc.

If you'd like to dip into Singer's arguments why - other things being equal - it is ethically better to obey the law, they can be found in his book 'Practical Ethics' in chapter 11: 'Civil Disobedience, Violence and Terrorism'. I highly recommend it. It's a cracking read.

Referring to something higher than the laws, in order to determine that particular laws are inapplicable in particular situations, implies disrespect for "the laws in general". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm surprised that you have such a binary, black and white view of things. Do you not know of any people whom you mostly respect, but who have done one thing that you regard as stupid or mean? Are all your feelings about people either unconditional respect and obedience or complete dismissal?

Are you arguing that a person can have zero respect for the law, but at the same time, hold one's own system of judging good and bad, completely independent of the law? — Metaphysician Undercover

That goes too far for me. Look at my Gandhi example. Did he have no respect for the law? Of course not. He was a lawyer! He just had no respect for the race laws of South Africa.

The higher law that for Gandhi and others overrules the race law is his ethics. That does not require a belief in God. For some people such a belief is involved, while for others it is not. This is vanilla meta-ethics. I assume you are very familiar with all this and do not find it controversial.

It would be interesting to know how Gandhi pleaded in court when tried for burning his race card. I imagine he pleaded guilty, because he did not want to deny he did it - that would have undermined his campaign, shifting the discussion from whether a certain law is immoral to whether Gandhi did a certain act. But I do not have the details of the event. Perhaps one of the learned lawyers on here can help.

Another good example is people charged under the (US Federal) Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, for helping a slave evade recapture (penalty six months' jail and $1000). Again I imagine they would plead guilty if caught, in order to make a public stand against the law, but I don't know. Again, maybe one of our lawyers can help with that.

He pointed out that to understand an ostensive definition is already to understand the language game of Ostension; and rightly concluded that ostension cannot be the whole of language leaning. — Banno

Is there a step missing in that?

Certainly the first part seems sensible, but the second part doesn't follow from the first if human understanding of the Ostension Game is innate, rather than learned. Did Witt argue that it was not innate?

BTW, I agree that not all words refer. IMHO some do and some don't. I don't think either of the words in Charlie Brown's 'Good Grief' refers.

I didn't blame you, and I'm sorry that you thought I did. I can't see anything I wrote that implied that. Recognising the existence of a Verbal Dispute is a way of resolving an apparent disagreement, not a way of allocating blame. I find it very helpful, and usually both parties benefit.

By the way, I don't think my use is that unusual. I place very little credibility on dictionaries for philosophical discussions, but since you have referenced one it may help for you to consider the first definition under item 2 in this Oxford Dictionary definition: 'having done something illegal'. Or, if one prefers Cambridge, we have here: 'Responsible for breaking a law'. That law could be that one has to report any sightings of Jews to the Gestapo, and a saint could be guilty of breaking that law (and some were).

Indeed. I suspect that question is one of those that has no answer. Perhaps it is the 'wrong question'.

Goodness - I'd forgotten that Mary's Room is mostly about the Physicalism issue. It often sounds like it isn't because it often ends with a question about 'knowledge', but I think you're right - it was originally intended to put some sort of challenge to Physicalism.

Perhaps it can be recast to ask that. But I don't think it will help us to do so. Very few 'Why' questions have answers.

It occurs to me that another perspective on Mary's Room is that it highlights the limits of language. What Mary can learn while in the room is limited to what can be conveyed by language. It demonstrates rather neatly that one cannot convey the experience of colour by language alone. A critic might say that it can be highlighted more economically by simply observing that the experience of colour, or vision more generally, cannot be conveyed to somebody that was blind from birth.

Edit: I see the other Andrew also posted while I was writing this, and has also homed in on the limits of language issue.

Should harm be the deciding factor? What of moral intuition? — anonymous66

Doesn't it just come down to one's meta-ethical stance in the end? For a utilitarian, harm would be the sole factor. For a Divine Command Ethicist it would include what God decrees. For a deontologist, the issue you mention about means and ends would come into play.

I have decided that my meta-ethical stance (currently) is Love. That's agape love, not erotic so please don't make fun of me because of the context.

Love as a meta-ethical stance is closer to utilitarian than to most others, but it's more blurry around the edges and allows for decisions that may not necessarily be seen as utilitarian.

Being able to remember and recognize red sounds like knowledge. We do use "know" to mean experiential in addition to propositional knowledge. — Marchesk

Yes, it can work with that definition of knowledge, as well as with a more restrictive definition.

If we count ability to recognise and remember as knowledge, then Mary did not have complete knowledge of colour vision prior to leaving the room. So she acquires new knowledge when she sees the tomato.

If we do not count ability to recognise and remember as knowledge, then Mary did have complete knowledge of colour vision prior to leaving the room, and she does not acquire any new knowledge upon seeing the tomato, because the new thing is not knowledge.

Either way, Papineau's approach seems to resolve the dilemma.

I like the thought experiment because it makes us reflect harder on what we mean by 'knowledge' in a way that is different from the tired old debates about Justified True Belief.

Are you suggesting that "guilty" does not necessarily imply a judgement of wrongdoing? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. That is how I use the term. I understand that it is not how you use it. Are you familiar with David Chalmers' very useful notion of a Verbal Dispute? That is what this is.

FWIW, I too find Twin Earth devoid of interest or significance.

Other examples like Prof Nordby are human experts on bat echo-location or other animal senses that we either don't have or have in enormously lower amounts, like a shark sense of smell or its ability to detect electric currents.

But while Mary's Room is interesting to imagine, it doesn't actually signify anything because in the end it just comes down to discussing what certain words mean - in this case 'know'. David Papineau has a nice resolution of it. He says that when Mary sees the tomato she doesn't acquire knowledge of a new fact but rather she has learned new skills, which are to remember what it was like to see something red, and to recognise when something is red. I think it was in a Philosophy Bites podcast that he explained this resolution.

The person will necessarily feel bad about it, if only for the moment, because to make the judgement "I have done wrong" is itself a bad feeling. — Metaphysician Undercover

They won't necessarily feel bad about it. When I say they 'recall having committed the crime' I mean they recall having done the alleged act, not that they also judge the act to be bad. They may even, as in Ellsberg's case, judge the act to be good.

As I pointed out above, you and I are using the key words differently. Replace 'crime' by 'act' and 'guilty of' by 'actually did' and you will have an accurate translation of my statement from my personal language to yours.

Gandhi is another example that comes to mind. In my language he 'was guilty of the crime of burning a racial identity card' and I revere him for that and no doubt he felt good about having done it. In your language he 'performed the act of burning a racial identity card'.

There is no difference in meaning. Only in the words used to convey the meaning.

Yes I mentioned this possibility in my reply to Cicero, you can see it in the quote above. This would be what I called a subjective feeling of guilt. The person knows, deep inside, that what was done was wrong, and feels guilty. The problem which this leads to, as I mentioned, is that if the person doesn't know that what was done was something wrong, we still won't to be able to say that the person is "in fact" guilty, because the person will not believe that a crime was committed. Then we have no principle whereby we can say that the person is "in fact" guilty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This highlights again the lack of precision of natural language.

I was using 'guilty of the crime' with the meaning of 'had done the crime', whereas you were using it with the sense of 'felt bad about having done the crime'. Etymologically, yours may be more accurate, as I suppose that guilty derives from a root of 'feeling guilt', which is feeling bad about our actions.

I think my meaning may be closer to common use though. When we say that a convicted person is actually innocent, we mean that they did not do the alleged act, not that they don't feel bad about it. Consider somebody that is convicted of the crime of breaking an unjust law. They may be a moral hero in our eyes for standing up to injustice, and may be in their own too. I would not say that Daniel Ellsberg was 'not guilty of breaking official secrecy laws' but I would say that I greatly admire him for doing so.

Nobody deserves hate. Nobody deserves anything. But people need things. What that person needs is help. If for some reason help cannot be provided, and they do not desist, what the other people need is for that person to be restrained.

Since it appears like a judgement is necessary in order that the person is actually guilty, and the court has not judged the person as guilty, yet you state that most people would say that the person is "in fact" guilty, then don't you think that most people assume God makes this judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting points MU.

Certainly, to a theist that would be a sensible interpretation. To a non-theist, perhaps an alternative - and equally workable in my view - interpretation is that the accused themself makes this judgement. So a person is 'in fact guilty' if the person recalls having committed the crime.

I think both absolute-truthists and non-absolute-truthists could accept that meaning. Where they would part company is in the case of somebody with a false memory, or no memory, of the alleged crime.

I was recently, briefly discussing why nuclear weapons were created in the first place. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think there's much, if any, controversy about the US development of the A-bomb. It started early in WW2, when the Allies were aware that Germany was working on it too. If they got an A-bomb before the Allies, the consequences would be horrible. So they had to develop one.

The controversy is over whether, having developed one, it should have been used on the two Japanese cities. It's a very difficult and complex issue.My view on it has changed several times in my life, based on new historical information, and may do so again.

There's an excellent novel by CP Snow about the development of the A-bomb, seen from the British perspective. I can't remember the name. It may have been 'The New Men' or something like that. It was written in the fifties or sixties and gives a good sense of the feeling of urgency about the project. IIRC it also covers the devastation of some of the scientists when the weapon was used.

Well I would miss you. I would never have been introduced to Krishnamurti, for a start.

That's a very interesting example ernest. Did you come up with it?

I would agree with the conclusion that neither a metaphysical theory, nor theory of meaning, is necessary for communication to be successful. However, I don't think that makes Russell's position wrong. In my experience, people sometimes take a Russellian approach and sometimes a Wittian approach to conversations like that. In a Russellian discussion, an argument might ensue about whether it was raining 'You call that rain? That ain't rain. Go look it up in the dictionary!'

In fact, the discussion you describe reminds me of examples from books on relationship counselling and effective communication. It is the optimal way to communicate, in which we seek to understand what the other feels and wants, rather than literally insisting on the words they said. The reason so many self-help books get written about that is that most of us (very much including me) are not mature and insightful enough to listen and speak in that way. Instead we get into petty arguments about whether it really is raining and end up casting aspersions on each others' intelligence and education.

To be fair to Russell, there is a Russellian way to reach a similarly harmonious conclusion. The two would identify that they had different definitions of rain, agree on a different standard to use ('it's wet enough to get my pyjamas damp and uncomfortable') and then discuss the best way to deal with the groceries / meal situation.

By the way, why were there groceries out in the car if Bob was still in his PJs? Had Alice gone out shopping before breakfast? Or was it an evening shopping trip and Bob had already got ready for bed? I think that's the real mystery in this scenario.

No, if they're claiming the cures contradict science then they are making a claim about science. Can you not see that?

Far from being scientism, which is an attempt to colonise religion with science, what you are doing is the mirror image, trying to colonise science with religion - an activity which I hereby dub pietism.

I prescribe a dose of Stephen Jay Gould, specifically, reading about non-overlapping magisteria.

What could constitute 'evidence' of such a claim, if these cases don't constitute evidence? — Wayfarer

Peer review and acceptance by a panel of independent scientists, not chosen by the Vatican, conducting investigations under terms set by them, not by the Vatican.

If you believe the evidence for these miracles meets that standard, why do you think none of them have been published in scientific or medical journals? If the evidence is there, there's a Nobel prize awaiting the first person that transcribes the evidence and sends it to a medical journal.

By the way, in your latest post you have reverted to the weaker claim of 'can't be explained scientifically'. I pointed out earlier that there's nothing surprising about something not being explained by science, since most things aren't, and hence lack of explanation is no reason to assume a supernatural explanation. You then said 'there's more to this than [lack of an explanation]'. Have you retreated from that claim? If not, what 'more' is there?

I don't know why you've started talking about a case where the Vatican thought there was no miracle, as it has no relevance to the point in contention, which is the Vatican making claims that contradict science. In that case they made no claims that contradict science so I don't think anybody would be asking them for evidence.

The fact that the Vatican rejects some claims is no evidence at all that the accepted claims would meet scientific standards of proof. It's an easy way to build credibility to consider more cases than one intends to approve and reject some.

It's really very, very simple. If the Vatican wishes to make claims about purely spiritual things, they have no need to provide scientific evidence. If they make claims about scientific things, they need to meet scientific standards of proof. And they don't.