Sorry I just gasped at the comments about "Cantor's program". I meant Hilbert's program. Such a dumb and stupid mistake...

Sorry. A bit flustered today. Anywho, uhh, propose something to talk about and I'll meditate over it.

Thanks!

But I did. The picture theory is not relevant for 'lower' languages. So it's not relevant for 'higher' languages, either. — Banno

But, there seem to be facts that exist in a higher plane, that are pictures or synesthesia or some such?

And that's leaving aside the ambiguity of lower and higher. — Banno

If a higher power language can capture all the facts of the lower boundary, then logically there's nothing more that can be said from within the confines of a lower power language. That should clarify the ambiguity?

No. — Banno

Care to offer any proof to this assertion, kind Sir?

In a physical theory?

Math ≠≠ Physics. — fishfry

I don't know where the certainty in that negation is stemming from. Care to clarify?

That no formal axiomatic theory (that satisfies some key technical assumptions) can express all mathematical truth. Which is the answer to your original question. That's why we keep looking for mathematical truth. Because no formalism can capture it all. So we're never done just because we have a formalism. — fishfry

But, think of it this way. If there exists, a non-denumerably infinite alphabet, then we can enjoy everything there is to say about Cantor's work and program, ya?

Because first, Gödelian incompleteness does not apply to physical theories. — fishfry

You almost caught me off guard there. I think, there's more to it than meets the eye... Ehem, Platonism? And if not, then why not?

It applies (loosely speaking) to axiomatic systems of a particular logical structure, that support mathematical induction. — fishfry

Yeah, that follows.

No physical theory posits the existence of an infinite set of natural numbers. Incompleteness simply doesn't apply. — fishfry

Uhh, don't you mean non-denumerable? Cantor's program could have been completed, he just assumed that the program would account for everything, where Godel just kinda dashed those hopes. Just saying.

Secondly, incompleteness is not a statement about mathematical truth. It's a statement about axiomatic theories. — fishfry

Which is?

He was pointing out the limitations of axiomatic theories in discovering mathematical truth. — fishfry

Like I said, there's nothing wrong with axioms if they don't assume everything to be a certain case. I'm pretty rough with set theory; but, it just morphed into something else. Or is it really true that his Incompleteness Theorems only apply to set theory?

You seem to be looking for something that we can be certain of, perhaps as a way of founding an epistemology.

But that seems to me to show a misunderstanding about belief.

Certainty is a type of belief - a belief that is beyond doubt. But of course, one can believe anything one wants - even things that are not true. Hence, one can be certain about anything one wants, even stuff that is not true.

But one cannot know stuff that is not true.

Compare:
"He is certain there is a Santa, but of course that's not true"

with

"He knows there is a Santa, but of course that's not true".

All I am doing here is pointing to how the words are used; I'm not setting out which things are true, believed or known. — Banno

Nice. I wonder about your thoughts about the picture theory of meaning and this topic. Let's assume that a picture is worth a thousand words, bona fide (redundant but true), we entertain notions about what Van Gogh might have looked like based on some self-portrait. Escher was this dude that made cool paintings too. Etc.

Are there higher power languages that are devoid of the above? It seems like philosophers are fixated with looking down instead of up.

It seems to me that we have freedom to do whatever we want with Godels theorem. — Gregory

Ehh, like what? It seems to me that the vast majority of the world decided to ignore it despite it cropping up in Tarski's, Turing's, and other work (diagonal lemma).

What kind of cut can negative self reference do to a living consciousness? — Gregory

Meinong's jungle.

Plato's beard.

Leibniz said contingent proofs take an eternity to prove, but not all truths are this way. Maybe there are things math can't touch — Gregory

Ehh, that's an artifact of assuming that monads (logical atomism?) are logically the simplest possible things. But, that's off-topic, I think?

What more analysis do you need? — Banno

Well, I'm not writing elaborate papers or such. My point seems to be distilled into this sort of sophism:

I know.

How?

I don't know.

I've no idea of what to make of that post. — Banno

You thought the cow looked like a panther, so you knew it was a panther? Balls. — Banno

I thought I knew; but, was wrong? OK, then how does one begin to analyze that propositional statement?

Gratuitous? What do you mean by that? — unenlightened

not called for by the circumstances : not necessary, appropriate, or justified
a gratuitous insult
a gratuitous assumption
a movie criticized for gratuitous violence
2a: given unearned or without recompense — https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gratuitous

But, that just talks about definitions. The bigger issue is that the concept can be entertained at all, don't you think?

I don't see what Gettier has to do with the OP. — Banno

Well, it has to do with the nature of knowledge stored in everyday living. Things happen in a certain way, and the cow might look black, and from far away look like a large panther, or I could be on LSD. Who knows?

Why add "really"? — Banno

It seems to me that "really" presupposes the notion that knowledge can only be shared in a dialogue between participants, so, should we treat the proposition that I know, as already assuming and affirming the consequent?

But why? — Banno

Well, there are limitations to his proposal of treating everything as if in some manner already (false cause?) coherent and consistent with everything else. So, yes and no. I'm not a big fan of Gettier for the matter.

If the consequent Q is true, then so is the justification P > Q. If ravens are black, then grass is green justifies that ravens are black.

So that will not do. — Banno

Of course, we can pick out fun and silly examples, as the above; but, I don't see how Gettier accounts for coherence in terms of material implication.

Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.

But, they should be?

The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.

Yeah, and that's the issue. The material implication seems downright necessary here.

In my view, negative self reference shows what limitations subjectivity gives. — ssu

Please elaborate.

The normal response is quietism. I mean with the above logical preponderance, then what's the point of continuing research? Does it all boil down to psychologism?

You know, it's been a burning thought of mine as to why Wittgenstein called Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems as "logical tricks", and I believe the above is the answer why.

Supposedly, Gödel hated Wittgenstein when seeing him at the Vienna Circle.

'God' is a term I find necessary to philosophy, and unnecessary to life. — unenlightened

That's pretty deep. What does that say about philosophy, I wonder?

'minimising the pain' — unenlightened

So, you have gratuitous suffering and then the moral concept of pain or anxiety arising due to this. How does one minimize the anxiety of the notion that God exists?

But this is unnecessarily feeble. When God has lost patience with His creation, you will/will-not know about it in no uncertain terms. By definition. Imagine the world on fire. — unenlightened

As childish as this may seem or depressed, what's the point of showing and telling here?

As if a mathematical/logical theorem would doom science and scientific research. — ssu

It's not an "as if" here. One can always expand Gödel's alphabet to account for more than previously hoped for.

And this process, could, in theory, go on forever.

I heard He has anger issues.

@andrewk, care to take a look here, if I went wrong?

Yup, but you may not like what i have to say about it. Wallows. — creativesoul

Yeah, not a very happy thought. Although, who knows what the big entity, up above, thinks about it too.

So, it seems you don't understand Gödel either. That's alright.

No. — unenlightened

OK, let me connect the dots.

If none of us can speak for God, and S/He exists as an abstraction since S/He remains silent, then is there anything more we can do to make God correspond to our everyday pitiful human existence?

And, if the concept (God) is so easy to destroy, with the simple example of a burning fawn, and the very human concept of "gratuitous" suffering, then what's the point of entertaining these mentally ill and mental gymnastics?

I don't speak for God. — unenlightened

One doesn't need a concept. — unenlightened

See the issue here, already?

For instance, in favor of the theory, the truth of the claim, "god doesn't exist" fits quite well with the proposition, "there's too much evil in the world". — TheMadFool

I don't exactly know the why of bringing up Godel; but, suppose we have a theory that is such and such, it seems to me that as long as the theory is incomplete; whilst remaining coherent, then there's pragmatically no problem, is there?

No. I'm saying that to value something is to be vulnerable to suffering. — unenlightened

I don't know what this really means. If I have no conception of pain, then whoopitty-do, does that mean that my struggles are inferior to another being that experiences pain? Don't we all learn the same?

To value nothing is to be indifferent to suffering. — unenlightened

I never thought the thread would digress to some form of Stoical nihilism; but, I can see a happier world where there is no pain and suffering. If pain and suffering are so important, then does God experience it too?

But you see value in the faun. Do you think there can be a faun that does not grow old and die, or dies young? Is not the fragility of the faun, the vulnerability, that gives it value? An eternal indestructible mechanical non-suffering faun would not have the same value. No one would care about it. — unenlightened

So, you're basically saying that suffering and pain has its own value? Relative to what, and why should anyone care about the relativity here?

I get what you’re saying, but just because you don’t see value in pain and suffering, doesn’t mean there is no value in pain and suffering. There isn’t value from the fawn’s perspective. There isn’t from your perspective - indeed, from the perspective of much of humanity, there is no value in the pain and suffering of the fawn. I agree with you there. — Possibility

Hi! Quite a lengthy post. I'm not sure where to begin. I suppose my point is the simplicity used to deny any notions that suffering is justified in regard to the burning fawn.

I have tried to look at the notion of pain and suffering from a broader, universal perspective - and my philosophy tends towards a form of panpsychism, so the idea that all matter has some level of awareness (ie. relation to the world) is a key part of my thinking, as well as the notion that ‘God’ is the most objective relation to the universe and all existence that we can imagine. — Possibility

Yes, I like panpsychism quite a lot. I think, the issue is that at what point is suffering apparent to a living entity. Like, the hard question restated in regards to consciousness. Not sure if that's clear.

Pain is not necessarily ‘cruelty’. — Possibility

Well, I view a deity who instills the sense of cruelty towards his own creation, whilst devoid of experiencing it himself, as somewhat abnormal from a human perspective.

We judge that if someone has sufficient information and capacity to reduce the potential for pain or loss of life in a situation, they are morally obligated to act. — Possibility

Yes, so we are in agreement about the utility of pain from a moral perspective. Is there any to begin with? If it's promised that heaven is a place where nobody suffers, then why not just create a universe where everyone is guaranteed access to heaven regardless of their moral "worth"?

But to isolate a fawn in a forest fire is to ignore the rest of the information contributing to that situation - including decisions the fawn and its parents made prior to the incident, the events leading up to the fire, etc - most of which you may not be aware of. It’s also possible that the fawn’s mother had been recently hit by a car, or that the fire had been deliberately lit by an arsonist or a carelessly tossed cigarette. With this information, is God cruel or are we simply ignorant of our own capacity to minimise pain and suffering? — Possibility

These are all rationalizations, don't you think?

I must admit, that after those 4 minutes and 31 seconds, that I felt quite anxious.

You ask, anxious about what?

Well, the very fact that I need this; but, don't want to acknowledge it.

What do you all think constitutes "the good life?" — BitconnectCarlos

A good life seems to me to be one where a person:

1. Minimizes his or her own suffering or sadness, along with other people.
2. Maximizes the good and happy times.
3. Promotes what is good.
4. Desires what is good.

Oh, dear!

That touched me. But, the fawn still burned alive.

Why?

I understand.

With your belief system, you are in continuous agony and fear of suffering. Suffering owns you. You are not free. — Noah Te Stroete

What do you mean by that?

You’re almost being religious in your stubbornness. — Noah Te Stroete

Being stubborn is alright for the right matter. :halo:

Did you ever want to be persuaded, or are you trying to persuade others? — Noah Te Stroete

Not sure, I'm quite satisfied with just a discussion, not to get my hopes too high.

Sounds interesting. I do like the Hotel Manager Theodicy point. Care to elaborate on it?

But I think one answer is, it is an inevitable aspect of physical existence. — Wayfarer

Compared to the past, yes, we have come a long way. The sentiment seems to point towards a future, where suffering is completely eliminated. So, I think it's a good thing that we get rid of suffering, as nobody likes to suffer or the majority of humans don't like seeing other people suffer.

I think you could trace the lineage of that to having possessions and language which enables a sense of what is yours, and so what can be lost, and a way of conceiving of the meaning of loss and grief. In other words it is something which evolves with the human condition. — Wayfarer

Notice, the previous point. Suffering is something everyone hates. The anti-natalists, think the world is so full of suffering as to not procreate. I'll let that sink in.

In any case, the religions teach that to 'rise above' suffering is not simply to be anaesthetized to it, but to realise a higher identity. — Wayfarer

That's really interesting. But, there's nothing that will supplant the stark reality that suffering seems to be part of the human condition.

Suffering isn't factual. It's subjective. — Tzeentch

Arguably, it's a brute fact of life!