Right, and that's exactly why the phrase is ambiguous. We don't know who weighed you, how they weighed you, when they weighed you, and so the phrase is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The phrase is not ambiguous. The phrase is crystal clear. "I weigh 196 pounds." You get to wonder to what degree of precision, if you want, or even if it's true. But as to its ambiguity, no. Unless you simply do not know what the word "ambiguity" means.

I would have deleted the OP if I'd seen it before it generated a discussion. It's so lacking in anything philosophical or interesting that it looks like just an attempt to get on the main page instead of the Lounge, where your threads usually end up. — jamalrob

Oh, well, to my defense, other people found it interesting?

Have you got anything to say about how it has been treated by philosophers? — jamalrob

Yeah, the Skeptics would have a lot to say about that.

In what way is its use vague, as you keep on saying it is, with no explanation? You have not described the problem with "I know" or how it is vague. It's your OP that is vague. There is no clear question, and what there is doesn't make much sense. — jamalrob

OK, then a thread devoted to vagueness in language use, cannot be vague itself, otherwise, there would be no need for it?

What is the philosophical issue? What does this have to do with formal languages, which is something you brought up? — jamalrob

To my knowledge, formal languages, don't have this sort of issue present in them. Why is that?

So you have no answer? No clarification of the OP? No attempt to tell us in what way you think "I know" is vague?

I'm not sure of your position here. Are you for or against the use of the phrase, "I know"., assuming it is vague at all?

I've been very clear. I've given you a chance to answer, to tell us all what the hell you have in mind, but you respond with evasiveness.

I've been very clear. I've given you a chance to answer, to tell us all what the hell you have in mind, but you respond with evasiveness. — jamalrob

Apologies, then.

My answer to my own question is that "I know" is vague because it seems to place the predicate on the individual speaker, when in fact, as others have noted, the truth of that statement can only be clarified or elucidated in a discussion.

Does that help?

I've walked passed and registered a tree, calling it X.

My friend and I discuss if there is any matter as to why we can breathe.

I stop, I say "Oh, I know" in reference to an off-hand theory I had about X.

What is vague about knowing?

I have a memory of X, it also is a pattern; when asked some questions I am a knowledge man, through the pattern of X, or X directly (if I was asked did I pass leafs on a trunk).

What's vague is my knowledge of X, not being 100%.

Can we spake a resolute "I know"? I'll let you decide.

As for the matter of this topic, I don't think 1 + 1 = 2 means "I know it = 2" is vague, I don't think X is vague. I think it's a whole different topic. We're discussing whether theories can ever be complete.

You can also say 'yes' if you know, you don't have to claim 'I know'.

We're discussing whether theories can ever be complete. — Qwex

What makes you say that? Quite interesting...

I've seen a similar topic, and I don't think I know is vague but knowledge is X probability.

Usually, when we want to do this, we look for less ambiguous phrases to get the point across. The ambiguous "I know", can get substituted with "to the best of my knowledge", which seems to encapsulate the phrase into something coherent or palpable. — Wallows

That's a long phrase to solve a problem I don't think I experience. In what contexts are you thinking we should substitute something like that? And if we really think we KNOW, that would not be conveying what we mean. I am not forced to take them at their word, but it does give me a clear message about they own assessment of their assertion. If someone I respect a lot says 'I know X to be the case' that is taken by me in one way, from a stranger another and so on. But it gives me a clear mess about that person's sense of what they are conveying. WE all know that people can think they know when in fact they don't have good ground for it. I don't feel compelled to accept what they say, but it does provide extra information. If someone goes out of their way to say 'to the best of my knowledge' I will think they are less certain or that's how they want to couch all their assertions. I won't know which until I get to know them. So, it's still not clear. And if it is someone I know, then I have a good sense of their thoroughness. I see no loss in the current common use of 'I know'. If I was naive and felt compelled or their were rules that I was compelled to accept any assertion starting that way, well, that would be a problem. But that's not the world I live in. If they say 'I think...' that conveys something else. And people can manage to convey their utter certainty and that one would be stupid to disagree with them when using 'to the best of my knowledge'. Just imagine that said in a condescending way. I don't think people should start using this long phrase that in itself might be incorrect. Perhaps they have actually seen counterexamples to what they are asserting so it isn't to the best of their knowledge, but they stubbornly believe. Any formulation is going to still be problematic if we conflate what the person means and the truth value of what they are saying.

In regards to OP. Let's see if "I know" what you meant by your questions.

Some people say "I know" in a vague way, especially when you already have not clarified what there is to be known. They say quite flippantly "I know", but later evidence shows that they did not know. In this case,fear of being judged as naive, or ignorant, urges the person to shutdown any further dialogue that might reveal what they fear. Though they cannot see it, they are keeping themselves in ignorance by ignoring what they don't know.

To decrease their vagueness about "I know" is to add a qualifier; as in, "I know that . . , or "I know if ...."
If the person cannot add a qualifier, then their "I know' is just a reaction from a fear of judgement.

The one explaining may know that the other does not know, and may actually say "Hear me out"...to create a pause in the listener.

Most people who say "I know" when they don't, are young people who still carry falsehoods such as shame (believing they are a mistake), usually introduced by their piers.

We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.

The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.

Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.

It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.

If you cannot provide a justification, that is, if you cannot provide other beliefs with which a given statement coheres, then you cannot be said to know it.

The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.

Yeah, and that's the issue. The material implication seems downright necessary here.

But of course, material implication can be used to justify anything.

Consider


If the consequent Q is true, then so is the justification P > Q. If ravens are black, then grass is green; hence, that grass is green justifies that ravens are black.

So that will not do.

If the consequent Q is true, then so is the justification P > Q. If ravens are black, then grass is green justifies that ravens are black.

So that will not do. — Banno

Of course, we can pick out fun and silly examples, as the above; but, I don't see how Gettier accounts for coherence in terms of material implication.

Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.

But, they should be?

But, they should be? — Wallows

But why?

Even Socrates rejected the JTB account immediately after he proposed it.

But why? — Banno

Well, there are limitations to his proposal of treating everything as if in some manner already (false cause?) coherent and consistent with everything else. So, yes and no. I'm not a big fan of Gettier for the matter.

I don't see what Gettier has to do with the OP.

When a person says, "I know", what do they really mean? — Wallows

Why add "really"?

I don't see what Gettier has to do with the OP. — Banno

Well, it has to do with the nature of knowledge stored in everyday living. Things happen in a certain way, and the cow might look black, and from far away look like a large panther, or I could be on LSD. Who knows?

Why add "really"? — Banno

It seems to me that "really" presupposes the notion that knowledge can only be shared in a dialogue between participants, so, should we treat the proposition that I know, as already assuming and affirming the consequent?

I've no idea of what to make of that post.

You thought the cow looked like a panther, so you knew it was a panther? Balls.

I've no idea of what to make of that post. — Banno

You thought the cow looked like a panther, so you knew it was a panther? Balls. — Banno

I thought I knew; but, was wrong? OK, then how does one begin to analyze that propositional statement?

Hu? What more analysis do you need?

Stop trying so hard.

What more analysis do you need? — Banno

Well, I'm not writing elaborate papers or such. My point seems to be distilled into this sort of sophism:

I know.

How?

I don't know.

You seem to be looking for something that we can be certain of, perhaps as a way of founding an epistemology.

But that seems to me to show a misunderstanding about belief.

Certainty is a type of belief - a belief that is beyond doubt. But of course, one can believe anything one wants - even things that are not true. Hence, one can be certain about anything one wants, even stuff that is not true.

But one cannot know stuff that is not true.

Compare:
"He is certain there is a Santa, but of course that's not true"

with

"He knows there is a Santa, but of course that's not true".

All I am doing here is pointing to how the words are used; I'm not setting out which things are true, believed or known.

You seem to be looking for something that we can be certain of, perhaps as a way of founding an epistemology.

But that seems to me to show a misunderstanding about belief.

Certainty is a type of belief - a belief that is beyond doubt. But of course, one can believe anything one wants - even things that are not true. Hence, one can be certain about anything one wants, even stuff that is not true.

But one cannot know stuff that is not true.

Compare:
"He is certain there is a Santa, but of course that's not true"

with

"He knows there is a Santa, but of course that's not true".

All I am doing here is pointing to how the words are used; I'm not setting out which things are true, believed or known. — Banno

Nice. I wonder about your thoughts about the picture theory of meaning and this topic. Let's assume that a picture is worth a thousand words, bona fide (redundant but true), we entertain notions about what Van Gogh might have looked like based on some self-portrait. Escher was this dude that made cool paintings too. Etc.

Are there higher power languages that are devoid of the above? It seems like philosophers are fixated with looking down instead of up.

Are there higher power languages that are devoid of the above? — Wallows

No.

And after Davidson, I'm not keen on the picture theory - at least if it is understood as some sort of model of the world.

Bu that's off-topic.

No. — Banno

Care to offer any proof to this assertion, kind Sir?

But I did. The picture theory is not relevant for 'lower' languages. So it's not relevant for 'higher' languages, either.

And that's leaving aside the ambiguity of lower and higher.

Too far off track.

But I did. The picture theory is not relevant for 'lower' languages. So it's not relevant for 'higher' languages, either. — Banno

But, there seem to be facts that exist in a higher plane, that are pictures or synesthesia or some such?

And that's leaving aside the ambiguity of lower and higher. — Banno

If a higher power language can capture all the facts of the lower boundary, then logically there's nothing more that can be said from within the confines of a lower power language. That should clarify the ambiguity?

Dude, i just denied the picture theory and you want to talk about junk?