The world of MAD actually looks quite civilised in retrospect, in that it seems to have kept everyone reasonably clear headed. — Brett

Yeah, but who wants to live in fear in perpetually?

The Cuban missile crisis being one example. How would such an event pan out today? — Brett

Actually, it was due to a sane and sober submarine officer that averted catastrophe. You don't hear about these stories because no nation wants to be portrayed as incompetent or irrational... https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov_(vice_admiral)

Did MAD actually work or have we just been lucky? — Brett

That's open for debate, but I think we've been pretty lucky thus far.

Yes, to every question...

Yeah, I can never overcome the pot-anxiety. It's like there, telling me that this isn't the best way to kill time.

Hmm, it seems to be that existential crises are not the same as contemplating or looking at the lure of suicide. At least, in severity I've never come across people suffering from existential bouts of anxiety or depression as enduring to the point of consideration of the escape from pain that suicide is.

How long have you had these thoughts for?

The issue kind of dissolves if you assume a pragmatic attitude. Doesn't get mentioned enough in regards to Witt...

One could go in that direction, but it would be more fruitful to consider the diagnosed schizophrenic as being in the ideal position to play language games with his listeners. After all, they don't have much else to do. — ernestm

One maintence shot of Abilify or Zyprexa, first I assume. Hehe.

Russell's criticism still applies. Just because he says his neighbor is a spy does not mean he actually believes his neighbor is a spy, even if he is schizophrenic. Ralph could be asserting that because he knows his listener thinks he is schizophrenic, so he states it to satisfy the audience. — ernestm

Yes; but, even given the opacity of determining intent, the conclusion still obtains.

Very interesting...

That is, while what he was stating about them was obviously delusional on the surface, it was derived from factual observation that one could interpret properly, given sufficient experience with his way of describing events. I dont know how that fits in with your 'de dicto' concerns. — ernestm

The point I'm trying to say is that the de re/de dicto distinction is epistemically in a loop. De dicto, Ralph is a paranoid schizophrenic. De re, Ralph continues to believe his neighbor is a spy as long as, de dicto, his schizophrenia isn't addressed.

That should be pretty straightforward.

Now, quantifying into a possible world where Ralph, still believes that his neighbor is a spy, then his de dicto "trait/qualities/property/attribute" of being schizophrenic (perhaps untreated) will dictate his de re beliefs about his neighbor being a spy. Hence, there is some element of rigidity for all possible worlds where Ralph professes these delusional beliefs, which in my mind boils down to essentialism. If you want to go a step further, then transworld identity is dictated by these very "trait/qualities/property/attribute" that Ralph has. Therefore, essentialism?

So, it seems that the issue here is not modalities of counterfactual beliefs; but, conditions that allow the de re subject to assert his or her epistemic belief dependent on de dicto facts about the individual, I think.

This might help:

I don't think "paranoid" is a designator at all, because it refers to a property rather than an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, hence essentialism? Think about it this way. If I stipulate a de re counterfactual, then I am bound to quantify wrt. to a subject de re. If this subject professes a de re belief that his or her neighbor is a spy, then isn't that bound to the abstract property of de dicto epistemic concerns about the subject?

The description of being paranoid wouldn't be a rigid designator then. — schopenhauer1

True, though it might be a vivid designator for any Ralph believing his neighbor is a spy?

But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is paranoid? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's kind of the point here. De dicto, the scope of the epistemic quantifier is non-bound by a singular individual's beliefs.

So, Ralph might be right that his neighbor is a spy in his own mind; but, de dicto that simply isn't the case, or might not be. Hence, de dicto we can conclude that Ralph is paranoid. De re, Ralph might still profess his paranoid belief irrespective of the fact that he may or may not be paranoid. Or, no. De re, Ralph will keep on professing his belief as long as he posses' the quality or trait of being paranoid.

What? — Banno

Never heard of the Barcan formula?

What about the possible worlds in which he is paranoid and thinks his neighbour is one of the alien lizards? — Banno

Well, there you have it. The counterfactual still obtains due to the attribute of Ralph being a paranoid guy? Call this a definite description or vivid designator for the (essential?) trait of Ralph being one of the paranoid types?

Now how do you make it into a counterfactual de re attitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, how do you make an abstract descriptor as "paranoia" into a, in a sense, a vivid designator for all Ralphs that posses the attribute of being "paranoid" manifest in his de re statement that his neighbor is a spy?

Further, in Kripke's account all proper names are rigid designators, while descriptions are non-rigid. — Banno

That's perhaps what I'm trying to address here as this was the most prominent feature of the N&N thread that stuck in my mind. Let me elaborate once more. In every possible world where Ralph is a paranoid guy, he will think that his neighbor works for the government and is a spy. Therefore, how does one call his paranoia as a form of rigidity? Does that make it at least a vivid designator in terms of de re statements?

As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude?

Logic doesn't work that way, it's backward. He must start with the designation, the neighbour is a spy, and proceed logically from there. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that would be a de dicto assertion, based on epistemic validity under my understanding of the issue. This is the difference between de dicto and de re, as much as I understand.

Perhaps, the term "vivid descriptor" is more apt here than "rigid designator", since we are talking about abstract "objects" such as Ralph having paranoid schizophrenia, which incorrectly leads him to believe that his neighbor is a spy.

It looks like you are trying to aim Quine at Kripke to see if you can score a hit. Is that right? — Banno

So, here's the question again:

Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals only obtains for rigid designators? — Wallows

And here is the reasoning:

If Ralphs believes his neighbor is a spy, then this can only obtain for stipulated worlds where Ralph is paranoid or has some essentialist feature of being a paranoid schizophrenic. Therefore, the rigid designator becomes the fact that Ralph will believe in any possible world where he is not treating his disorder (such as paranoid schizophrenia) and continues to believe in those worlds that the government is out to get him or his neighbor is a spy.

I don't think that this is an incredulous assumption and one that makes some sense in an essentialist manner?

Here is an appetizer of what I am getting at:



Available:
http://ge.tt/6y5U3Ow2

Yes, it's a desperate situation. Though, there is some hope.

This might help a little:

Not what you’re saying btw, just the whole necessity versus probability stuff. — I like sushi

See my latest response in regards to the Barcan formula. Actualism vs. possibilism.

The Barcan formula deserves a mention here due to the de re/de dicto difference meshing together without implying actualism:

What do you think, @Banno. Essentialism, or what?

Or to put this into a standard form:

De re (rigid counterfactual): Ralph believes someone is a spy. (True in possible worlds where Ralph is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.)

De dicto (non-rigid counterfactual): Nobody is out to get Ralph because he is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.

Could you rewrite the OP in plain English? I find modal logic incredibly obtuse. — I like sushi

OK, so let me elaborate at risk of spewing babble. De re counterfactuals seem to imply that quantification is limited to the scope of the singular individual expressing a "belief" such as:

Ralph believes that someone is a spy, instead of the de dicto assertion that,
Someone is such that Ralph believes s/he is a spy.

The limitation of the scope of quantification is the point here because, in a counterfactual world, it could be that case that de dicto there is no-one that is a spy or that nobody is out to get Ralph. De re, the assertion still obtains (perhaps because Raph is schizophrenic or is such that he is paranoid for some reason.), thus the rigidity of the de dicto assertion does not necessarily obtain because it encompasses the scope of the domain of individuals in the sum total of the "world", whereas the de re assertion is endowed with a sense of rigidity, due to the characteristics or quality of the person that is Ralph.

Now, this all seems to imply in my mind, that it boils down to essentialism, such that de re: "Because Ralph is a schizophrenic because he believes his neighbor is a spy." Whereas de dicto: "Nobody is a spy because Ralph falsely believes his neighbor is a spy due to his (essentialist?) quality of being a schizophrenic."

Hope that elucidates the difference I am trying to outline here.

Some more reading on the epistemic validity of de re/de dicto assertions:

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0002.019/--epistemic-modality-de-re?rgn=main;view=fulltext

But, out of curiosity, how does the Barcan formula ("If everything is necessarily F, then it is necessary that everything is F") lead us from pantheism to solipsism? — Pattern-chaser

So, it's my understanding that the Barcan formula imposes epistemic closure in a modally quasi-infinite universe. Meaning, that the domain of discourse cannot just keep on multiplying out infinitely so modally. Hence, certainty for the scope of quantifiers in a modal sense. Therefore, solipsism? Of course, this in some sense implies some form of essentialism, I think.

I'll try and provide you with everything that seems pertinent to the issue; but, am apprehensive of trying to rationalize this due to my own lack of knowledge on the issue:


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re#Context_of_modality

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vivid_designator

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operator_(linguistics)#Quantifier_raising

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html

Hope that provides some background context we can work on here.

Thanks.

Please talk about TRUST, and the importance of telling the truth, and how these things can be sustained in a merely human and imperfect world — unenlightened

Well, a heavyweight has entered the field. Google threw in 10 million to a team of fresh new blood into the field of LENR. Although they didn't validate 30 years worth of research due to practically starting from scratch it is a positive step forward according to many old timers involved in the field.

The real tragedy is that lies have become the new "bullshitting".

I don't want to resurrect the N&N thread again, and the following perhaps is better addressed in the logical progression stemming from N&N onto Reference and Existence; but, how does Kripke address the issue of an absolute modality that is "God"? I mean, this is perhaps the best example one can provide in addressing the issue of definite descriptions attaining the status of rigid designators in every possible world.

Thoughts?

It might be interesting to note, that meaning can only be appreciated after overcoming nihilistic tendencies. Nietzsche wrote about this, and logotherapy was born out of this predicament.

I'm here because I don't totally trust my own thinking and I want criticism, even insults. — yupamiralda

Don't be so self-abusive!

I think, that "meaning" is a psychological construct. So, perhaps you need to understand your own psychology to determine where are these questions arising from?

Also, if all this is correct, then being closer to God means being closer to solipsism. — Pussycat

Yes, solipsism is not an incoherent view in my opinion. The limits of my language are the limits of my world.

Well, at least the President isn't entirely exonerated and Mueller didn't really engage in doublespeak. Though, at least his public appearance is reassuring that Trump isn't entirely corrupt.

Phew!

Here it is again:

I'd be interested in anyone's take on the interpretation of God in the Tractatus?

We have encountered in this thread the notion of solipsism, and it being in agreement with pure realism. How do you understand this @Fooloso4 and @Pussycat?

Thanks.