Are we at a dip?

Usually, the logic is to sell when everyone else is buying and buy when everyone else is selling.

I also wanted to mention the similarity between religious leaders and philosophers. I often view clergy as one step ahead of the common philosopher in that they have abandoned doubt or skepticism. Many philosophers become more hardened in their view of life or society as they progress in their career. Obviously, not ALL philosophers do this, as it might just be the effect of age on one's view of things.

Regardless, if one looks at the history of having the clergy in power, the results are not very appealing. So, would philosophers follow a similar path? Debatable; but, worth considering.

From what I understand, philosophy does not have a direct impact or immediate impact on the workings of a nation or state. However, philosophers have shaped the construction of societies, nations, and individual minds to a large degree. Just think about Marx and the people affected by his works, or John Locke and the Bill of Rights or the Constitution of the United States.

Seneca doesn't get mentioned enough; but, he was a great statesman. Then there's the unfortunate perversion of Nietzsche and the Nazis.

Basically, thinking that philosophers ought not to rule a nation is just a prejudice. Sure, they might not be the best candidates for the position of power; but, then how does one determine or qualify those statements? Often positions of leadership require more than just intellect. So, maybe it's a categorical error to say that philosophers are best qualified to rule? I'm not sure.

I'm assuming that Trump is competent enough to realize that firing Mueller after Comey is suicide. But, the man is full of surprises. Let's see what happens.

You can see the notion being presented in this passage, or at least the sentiment to create institutions that are wholly owned or answerable to the people being governed by it.

In other words, public institutions, according to Hegel, are that objective attempt at viewing one's self or nations, and in the end, the very institutions (rightly so) should be directly answerable to the people who are governed by it, or rather the people govern it. We know how Marx thought about how this issue should be solved, in the form of communism...

But, this raises the issue Plato started in the Republic. How do you make sure you aren't governed by the less competent of a nation? Or what qualifications justify putting people (the same people who aren't infallible) in positions of power?

This creates a problem of demarcation between what is subjective (the mind or an individual) and having said individual in that objective form of governance in the form of public institutions. It would seem that only when philosophers become kings or kings philosophers.

No secondary sources apart from Max Blacks interpretation of the TLP. Send me a link to what you have in mind and I'll give it a good reading. Thanks.

If you could refer me to some other works, as the link seems more like handwaving than a serious philosophical critique of logical atomism.

Yeah, here's 2.0121:

2.0121 OGD [→GER | →P/M]
It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.
(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)
Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.
If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context. — Wittgestein, TLP, 2.0121

Same thing being said in the PI 48&49, no?

You can never get enough of Wittgenstein. Just reading passage 49, reeks of nominalism; but, then Wittgenstein says or tantamounts, 'So what?' Names only have to mean something in their use in any particular language game, so speaking of them in isolation is futile and pointless. Here's the passage:

49. But what does it mean to say that we cannot define (that is,
describe) these elements, but only name them? This might mean, for
instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one"'
square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.
Here we might say—though this easily leads to all kinds of philosophical
superstition—that a sign "R" or "B", etc. may be sometimes
a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it 'is a word or a
proposition' depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written.
For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B
and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word
is a description—a proposition. But if he is memoming the words
and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the
words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall
not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R",
for instance, is not a description; it names an element——but it would be
queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be
named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same
level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a
move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place
on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been
done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except
in the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said
that a word had meaning only as part of a sentence. — Wittgenstein, PI, 49.

I'd call it meaning as use, and agreement. If anything it smells of pragmatism, a lot!

It doesn't negate the notion of logical simples; but, attempts to show that they aren't necessary for agreement between individuals about the use of names for things. Yet, those things are important when talking about language at the risk of climbing that ladder and then throwing it away, not strictly referring to meaning as use or language in practice, as I understand it. See:

Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — Wittgenstein, PI, 48.

The picture grew to be a Lebenswelt. — Banno

Yeah, I guess you can call it that, or the logic of language in practice.

You know, when language goes astray, bewitchment happens. Or speaking about meaning without any context leads to throwing away the ladder.

And you think this is objects and things. Ah. — Banno

Things are logical simples, whatever that means if anything at all. Or 'things' manifest another way, is what Wittgenstein meant when asserting that 'logic takes care of itself'.

Do you agree that logical simples were rejected in PI? — Banno

I have yet to find a passage in the Investigations that even addresses logical simples. It's been a while since I've read it, or even from cover to cover without some external reference. If you happen to find a passage that addresses the logical simples professed in the TLP, I'd appreciate that piece of the puzzle I'm trying to find between Wittgenstein's evolution in thought between the two works.

I might be at the limits of my language and world, or any more and nonsense will manifest.

From my understanding of the TLP. The problem of Universal's is omitted by appealing to logical simples which can't be further reduced.

Objects have names, and relations between them give meaning. Things are none of those. According to Wittgenstein as I understand him.

Yes, this is nominalism being professed here.

Not really. Wittgenstein was aware of the limitations of logical atomism when he said that the limits of his or our language mean the limits of the intelligible world and that whereof one cannot speak (being at one's own limit) thereof one ought remain silent.

What I see the Investigations as, was an attempt to explain how one can learn new words to allow one to speak when confronted with said limits.

Obviously the picture theory of meaning existing in a two dimensional world in logical space is something clearly rejected in the Investigations.

Is the statement starting with, 'I know ... ' tantamount to stating a fact? It would seem that according to Wittgenstein in 'On Certainty', he says:

-For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew." — Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 12.

yes, so correspondence consists in acting within the world. — Banno

And here is the gem I was looking for. Regarding ethics and metaphysics, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one ought to remain silent, as Wittgenstein intended that statement to be understood within that context.

Back to quietism for me.

Using the word “correspondence” Only gives us a name for the posited relationship between word and thing. It does not explain anything. — Banno

Yes, but the world consists of objects, not things.

To move out? I can only move to my grandmother, and that's a big if. I don't have the luxury to move anywhere, and my mom tells me she needs me as support and to make sure my dad doesn't do anything against her.

I'm really stuck here between an anvil and a hammer. I wish things were otherwise, but it seems I have to bear this cross.

Why are fact's things that are valid only in view of the correspondence theory of truth?

Yeah, but facts do have ontological value, see;

3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.

Or more specifically, by rejecting the incredibly impoverished and anemic understanding of 'self-interest' that undergrids such horrible notions. — StreetlightX

Well, as long as such behavior counts as what is 'rational', according to economic theory and such, and produces the maximum amount of utility, then the whole issue is a non-starter.

Yeah, but that really doesn't answer the question as to whether in principle it is possible to model game theoretic situations to produce the optimal outcome for either all participants or a sole participant by a sufficiently complex calculus or even AI, in the future.

Regardless of that, it seems that the whole issue is marred by what counts as 'rational behavior' and if humans can ever be consistent in that behavior in a multitude of situations.

When you say 'is there a theorem for that' it has to be specific to a game or class of games. There's not 'theorem for that' for games which display most of the features of political/economic discourse or activity. There isn't even a guarantee for Nash equilibrium in this kind of context. — fdrake

I was under the impression that game theory is based on mathematics, so, eventually (given a sufficiently complex calculus) all games could be modeled to understand what actions would produce the maximum amount of utility to all participants. Since you seem to know more about this than I do, then I figure you must be right in highlighting the complexity of various games and imposed constraints on participants. But, again it seems that the underlying premise to render such a conclusion as sound would be that every participant is acting in their own or collective self-interest, no?

Trying to model 'the market' in terms of game theory is not usually done in a manner that represents the complexities of the market. If someone agrees that the Black-Scholes equation is useful - or more generally continuous time modelling of financial time series - this is no longer representable as a game with a finite number of actions without losing information. Fluctuations of the market in continuous time are generated per unit time through the activities of humans. — fdrake

Yes, I understand that modeling a situation often requires more than the 2D analysis we're talking about, or rather 3D analysis bounded by time; but, as I understand it, there are no hard limits imposed by any situation that wouldn't allow a sufficiently complex calculus to be devised to account for all externalities arising from interactions in the market.

In a tautologous sense, you can define self-interest as maximising your utility function. But to say that this necessarily contains all the features of 'rational self interest' in something close to the Randian or non-empirical economic models sense for all games just isn't true. — fdrake

What makes you say that? Again, is there a hard limit imposed by a theorem or such that would prohibit said modeling to occur?

I'm not sure what you mean with your question. Like, what exactly would need reconciling, and why? Could you elaborate? — StreetlightX

Well, the issues you present that are pertinent today with such cases as not accounting for the negative externalities of excessive carbon dioxide levels being raised by the working of the economy. It would seem that unrestrained economic growth has thus deleterious effects on the world. So, how do you address that issue manifest by the guiding principle of liberalism and neoliberalism that what is rational is to do what is best for one's self-interest?

I wonder how you can reconcile rational self-interest with the above.

In other words, how much is enough?

One thing that game theory does in an analysis is ascribe an abstract opponent. This can be 'nature' or another player. This can be generalised to cooperative games, where groups of players can form coalitions and solutions (strategies) of the game are ways of allocating resources (payoffs) or costs (losses) to groups. — fdrake

Yeah, but expected utility for an individual participant or a group of collectively cooperating participants is still defined as optimal if self-interest is maximized through decision making by anyone or group of individuals.

Further, the analysis can include leaving allied groups and making new allied groups. — fdrake

Game theory would postulate that common characteristics such as sympathy and such are irrational if participants stand to have a better payoff if the other group is more fit, and again fitness is defined as pursuing or maximizing utility by selfish behavior. But, fortunately, in reality, people aren't that rational.

The assumption that self interest generates optimal payoff in general really only applies to games of coalition of size 1; self interest becomes interest of one's coalition if they are pre-allocated — fdrake

If they are preallocated is a big 'if'. Rarely are things so clear or obvious in the real world, which you bring up later in your post. Which, leads me to believe that acting selfishly will almost always be what is best for the individual and group of individuals (Is there a theorem for that? I think the Nash Equilibrium only holds given that premise, otherwise the game falls apart, I think.). This isn't even starting to mention the asymmetric information problem. But, what I gathered from my short stint at one course of game theory at college, is that even when asymmetric information problems are avoided by having a game of guaranteed rewards or more formalized conditions (the market) is that utility is maximized even more by self-interested behavior. This is again because, at the very fundamental level, self-interested behavior is rational and ought to be done. So, the system is constantly self-reinforcing.

Although this still doesn't explain the difference between objects, like a red cup, and states-of-affairs, like a cup being red. Perhaps states-of-affairs are to objects as propositions are to sentences? I don't know. — Michael

In my view, the only difference between the two is one of incorporating intentionality into the sentence, thus making it more of a declarative sentence and not the typical descriptivist sentence, seen when trying to obtain a state of affairs.

So, something being red is qualitatively distinct from that something is red. In one case the subject is dissociated from the utterance and in the other, the subject is participating in the content or meaning of the utterance.

I don't know what you mean by this. It's a proposition if it's the meaning of a sentence. — Michael

Yes, but, the issue is with the truth or falsity of the proposition. If it obtains, then it's a fact. That a sentence or proposition is a fact doesn't change the content of the sentence.

Another way to talk about this issue is whether you believe in the correspondence theory of truth, where propositions are facts if they correspond with states of affairs in reality or if you subscribe to a different theory of truth that makes facts representative of an actual state of affairs. In fact, I don't believe there are other theories of truth that incorporate the importance of a proposition being true just based on whether it obtains with a certain state of affairs, thus making the sentence a fact or not.

No? — Michael

So, to what state of affairs do facts, or a fact, correspond to, in order for it to be a proposition?

EDIT: This is where,

3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.

, seems to be true in some observer independent or dependent sense.

Perhaps if we draw a distinction between sentences and propositions we can say that a fact is a true proposition. — Michael

Yes, but only if it obtains to a state of affairs in the world. Do you also see the fallacious circularity in stating that facts are true propositions?

I think that there are three types of things involved:

1. "the cup is on the table"
2. the cup on the table
3. the cup being on the table

The first is a sentence, the second is an object, and the third is... what? The state of affairs? I think the distinction between 2 and 3 is the most interesting area of discussion. — Michael

I'm not sure if this makes sense; but, 3 seems to prescribe a sense of intentionality (mistakenly?) when speaking about the object of interest, the cup, that is, being on the table.

To get straight to the point, what criteria warrants something becoming a fact?

Forgive my novice question; but, given that the Level III multiverse theory relies on the MWI, then how does one explain the fact that decoherence doesn't contradict the evolution of the wavefunction in every world? Meaning, how is causality preserved in each world and what concept of time is professed wrt. to each world in the Level III Multiverse? In other words, it seems like time is absolute and not relative with respect to each world in the Level III multiverse and decoherence being able to happen at all. Or am I understanding the wavefunction wrong here, as if it were multiple entities existing in each world and not one dictating the behavior of all worlds?

Not true. A claim that something is a fact is already assuming that the proposition is true, through verifying it via different means, depending on the context of the proposition.

See:
1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer

How is a fact a true truth-bearer? Through further examination/investigation of the utterance or verificationism.

I mean, the prominence of 'facts' started with the logical positivists after all. So, verificationism is somewhat a given.

But, what's most interesting is that the notion of the discovery of scientific truths is upheld through (in this case of facts and scientific facts) verificationism and not fallibilism.

Well, going back on my previous post, it can be asserted that the snow is white because we know that the snow is white due to it being an established fact through many observations. It just so happens that this is a trite fact that has no content. More like a tautology.

Going all Wittgenstein on this Sunday, there are other cases of using facts that do not have epistemological content, such as;

2+2=4 is a fact

Nothing has been said on face value, but, it could be understood that adding 'is a fact' denotes that the person understands the rules of the language game (in this case a formal language) and has verified the truth of 2+2=4 by understanding the rules of the formal language game. This is just another instance where verifying something lends it to being 'a fact', depending on one's level of knowledge about the world.

If you are using "fact" to mean the sentence "the cup is on the table", then, one is a state of affairs, the other a sentence.

If you are using "fact" to mean a state of affairs, then there is no difference between the cup being on the table and the state of affairs of the cup being on the table.

Confusion arrises when these two are mixed. — Banno

This doesn't seem to apply to some cases, especially when it comes down to epistemological degrees of knowledge. Take for example,

Sally loves Harry.
and,
That Sally loves Harry is a fact.

Again, different statements that hold different meanings. How? Well, one has the exclusivity of being verified to some degree of knowledge, up until the utterance can be said to be certain. Leaning on this one can say that some facts are indisputable because of their ability to verify and ascertain their true value.

So, the truth bearer of Sally loves Harry has been verified, by for example asking the question, how do you know? I know because they told me they're getting engaged, and is not something I have heard from Joe in the workplace. This is more apparent in cases of scientific facts, think water boiling at sea level at 212°F.

How do I know? I have verified it! Thus it is a fact.

No, I mean to use fact in all of the possible senses provided in the OP. There seems to be a fundamental difference in stating something as a fact in the specific senses provided instead of treating it as a speech act of some sort.

In other words what is the performative meaning of something being a fact under the above uses?

Then I again ask, what is the difference between the fact that the cup is on the table and the cup being on the table?